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Selected Bibliography for Lars Stole
Eli B. and Harriet B. Williams Professor of Economics



Accessing Articles

"Market Participation in Delegated and Intrinsic Common-Agency Games." David Martimort and Lars Stole; The RAND Journal of Economics, 2009, 40(1), pp. 78-102.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00056.x

"Selecting Equilibria in Common Agency Games." David Martimort and Lars Stole; Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144(2), pp. 604-34.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.010

"Chapter 34: Price Discrimination and Competition," Lars A. Stole, in M. Armstrong and R. Porter: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2007, pp. 2221-99

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S1573-448X(06)03034-2

"The Economics of Multidimensional Screening " Jean-Charles Rochet and Lars Stole, in M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen and S. J. Turnovsky: Advances in Economics and Econometrics : Theory and Applications : Eighth World Congress. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 150-98

">Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria." David Martimort and Lars Stole; Advances in Theoretical Economics, 2003, 3(1).

http://www.bepress.com/bejte/advances/vol3/iss1/art4

"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games." David Martimort and Lars Stole; Econometrica, 2002, 70(4), pp. 1659-73.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.t01-1-00345

"Nonlinear Pricing with Random Participation." Jean-Charles Rochet and Lars A. Stole; Review of Economic Studies, 2002, 69(1), pp. 277-311.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00206

Barter, Liquidity and Market Segmentation; Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; CESinfo working paper series ;; no. 586;; Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2001.

Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria; David Marimort and Lars Stole; CESinfo working paper series ;; no. 581;; Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2001.

Common Agency Equilibria with Discrete Mechanisms and Discrete Types; David Martimort and Lars Stole; CESinfo working paper series ;; no. 572;; Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2001.

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games; David Martimort and Lars Stole; CESinfo working paper series ;; no. 575;; Munich, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research, 2001.

"Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment," Tore Ellingsen and Lars A. Stole, in R. Mirus and B. Yeung: The Economics of Barter and Countertrade. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 2001, pp. 276-93

"The Non-Monetary Nature of Gifts." Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; European Economic Review, 2001, 45(10), pp. 1793-810.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00102-1

"Barter Relationships," Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole, in P. Seabright: The Vanishing Rouble: Barter Networks and Non-Monetary Transactions in Post-Soviet Societies. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 35-70

"Restricting the Means of Exchange within Organizations." Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; European Economic Review, 1999, 43(4-6), pp. 1007-19.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00110-X

Monetizing Social Change Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; IR/PS Research Report No. 98-05.; La Jolla, CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies; University of California San Diego, 1998

Non-Monetary Exchange within Firms and Industry; Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; NBER working paper series no. 5765.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

http://papers.nber.org/papers/5765

"Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment." Tore Ellingsen and Lars A. Stole; Journal of International Economics, 1996, 40(1-2), pp. 67-84.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(95)01401-2

"Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining." Lars A. Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel; American Economic Review, 1996, 86(1), pp. 195-222.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199603%2986%3A1%3C195%3AODATCU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

"Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts." Lars A. Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel; The Review of Economic Studies, 1996, 63(3), pp. 375-410.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199607%2963%3A3%3C375%3AIBUNC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

"Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning." Canice Prendergast and Lars Stole; Journal of Political Economy, 1996, 104(6), pp. 1105-34.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28199612%29104%3A6%3C1105%3AIYAJOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

"Nonlinear Pricing and Oligopoly." Lars A. Stole; Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995, 4(4), pp. 529-62.

Intrafirm Bargaining under Nonbinding Contracts Lars A. Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel; Research Paper,; No. 1324; Stanford: Graduate School of Business Stanford University, 1994

Organizational Design and Technology Choice under Intrafirm Bargaining; Lars A. Stole and Jeffrey Zweibel; Research paper,; no. 1325; Stanford: Graduate School of Business Stanford University, 1994.

"Information Expropriation and Moral Hazard in Optimal Second-Source Auctions." Lars A. Stole; Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 54(3), pp. 463-84.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(94)90046-9

Organizational Design and Technology Choice with Nonbinding Contracts; Lars A. Stole and Jeffrey Zwiebel; Research Paper no.1255; Stanford: Graduate School of Business Stanford University, 1993.

"Licensing and Technology Transfer," Lars A. Stole, in J. Leitzel and J. Tirole: Incentives in Procurement Contracting. Pew Studies in Economics and Security. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 121-31

"Do Short-Term Objectives Lead to under- or Overinvestment in Long-Term Projects?" Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Lars A. Stole; Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(2), pp. 719-29.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-1082%28199306%2948%3A2%3C719%3ADSOLTU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S

"The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information." Lars A. Stole; Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1992, 8(3), pp. 582-606.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=8756-6222%28199210%298%3A3%3C582%3ATEOLDC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23

Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to under- or over-Investment in Long-Term Projects?; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars A. Stole; Discussion paper,; no. 87; Cambridge, MA: Program in Law and Economics Harvard Law School, 1991.

Mechanism Design under Common Agency; Lars A. Stole; Discussion paper,; no. 100; Cambridge, MA: Program in Law and Economics Harvard Law School, 1991.

The Economics of Liquidated Damage Clauses in Contractual Environments with Private Information; Lars A. Stole; Discussion paper,; no. 99; Cambridge, MA: Program in Law and Economics Harvard Law School, 1991.

Do Short-Term Managerial Objectives Lead to under- or over-Investment in Long-Term Projects; Lucian A. Bebchuk and Lars Stole; NBER technical working paper series no. 98.; Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991.

http://papers.nber.org/papers/t0098

The Economic Effects of Liability Rules on Railroad Employee Accidents, 1890-1970; Lars A. Stole; Discussion paper,; no. 101; Cambridge, MA: Program in Law and Economics Harvard Law School, 1991.

Essays on the Economics of Contracts; Lars Stole; Ph.D. Dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991.

"Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games." Joel Sobel, Lars Stole and Inigo Zapater; Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, 52( 2), pp. 304.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90035-I

Fixed-Equilibrium Rationalizability in Signaling Games; Joel Sobel, Lars Stole and Inigo Zapater; Working Paper no. 90-13; La Jolla: University of California, San Diego Department of Economics, 1990.

Evaluating Employment Policy Alternatives; Lars Andreas Stole; B.A. Thesis, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985.

 

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