"Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger B. Myerson; Review of Economic Dynamics, 2007, 10(4), pp. 676-704.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.02.006

"Virtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136(1), pp. 260-85.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002

"Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication." Dino Gerardi and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60(1), pp. 104-34.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006

"A Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition. The Role of Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger Myerson; The Economics of Transition, 2007, 15(1), pp. 77-107.

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00280.x

"Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption." Roger B. Myerson; Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108(4), pp. 727-42.

http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x

"Population Uncertainty in Contests." Roger B. Myerson and Karl Wärneryd; Economic Theory, 2006, 27(2), pp. 469.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2

"Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in D. Glycopantis and N. C. Yannelis: Differential Information Economics. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2005, pp. 481-505

"Review of 'Economic Effects of Constitutions'." Roger B. Myerson; Economica, 2005, 72(3), pp. 555.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.430_5.x

Probability Models for Economic Decisions Roger B. Myerson; Belmont, CA: Thomson/Brooke/Cole, 2005

"Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster." Roger B Myerson; Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2004, 160(2), pp. 187.

"Comments On "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I-III"." Roger B Myerson; Management Science, 2004, 50(12 (Supplement)), pp. 1818-24.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0297

"Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Roger B. Myerson, in B. Dutta and M. O. Jackson: Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2003, pp. 17-22

"Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 103(1), pp. 219-51.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2830

"Review of 'Incentives and Political Economy'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, 39(4), pp. 1277.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28200112%2939%3A4%3C1277%3AIAPE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," R. Myerson, in Y. Varoufakis: Game Theory: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 159-66

"Economic Analysis of Constitutions." Roger B. Myerson; University of Chicago Law Review, 2000, 67( 3), pp. 925.

http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclr67&collection=journals&id=931

"Large Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 94(1), pp. 7-45.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2453

"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; European Economic Review, 1999, 43(4-6), pp. 671-97.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0

"Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, 37(3), pp. 1067-82.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28199909%2937%3A3%3C1067%3ANEATHO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

"Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures." Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1182-96.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199912%2989%3A5%3C1182%3ABAICFT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0

"Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27(Issue 3), pp. 375.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050079

"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25(1), pp. 111-31.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0610

"Working on Game Theory: A Personal Perspective," Roger B. Myerson, in M. Szenberg: Passion and Craft: Economists at Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 227-33

Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997

"Dual Reduction and Elementary Games." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 21(1-2), pp. 183-202.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0573

"Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons," Roger B. Myerson, in P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler and A. Vercelli: The Economics of Transnational Commons. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 17-34

"Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games," Roger B. Myerson, in W. Albers and et al.: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Edited with the help of Martin Strobel. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, pp. 111-21

"Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in D. M. Kreps and K. F. Wallis: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Seventh World Congress. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 46-65

"Analisis Economico de Las Instituciones Politicas: Una Introduccion (Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction with English Summary )." Roger B. Myerson; Cuadernos Economicos de I.C.E., 1996, (62), pp. 7-28.

"John Nash's Contribution to Economics." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14(2), pp. 287-95.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0053

"Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 9(1), pp. 35-65.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1004

"Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption." Roger B. Myerson; Social Choice and Welfare, 1995, 12(1), pp. 59-74.

http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=h24116h6x76372pv

"Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(1), pp. 77-89.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199524%299%3A1%3C77%3AAODISC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q

"Communication, Correlated Equilibria and Incentive Compatibility," Roger B. Myerson, in R. J. Aumann and S. Hart: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Amsterdam; London and New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1994, pp. 827-47

"Game-Theoretic Models of Politics." Jeffrey S. Banks and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 1-2.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1001

"An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories." Robert Forsythe, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert J. Weber; Social Choice and Welfare, 1993, 10(3), pp. 223-47.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182507

"Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(4), pp. 856-69.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199312%2987%3A4%3C856%3AITCFMU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C

"Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 118-32.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006

"A Theory of Voting Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(1), pp. 102-14.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199303%2987%3A1%3C102%3AATOVE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X

"Reviews of 'Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting' and 'Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1993, 31(1), pp. 237.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28199303%2931%3A1%3C237%3AAITSTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

"Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections," Roger B. Myerson, in W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich and N. J. Schofield: Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 107-33

"Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Roger B. Myerson, in P. B. Linhart, R. Radner and M. A. Satterthwaite: Bargaining with Incomplete Information. San Diego; London; Sydney and Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Academic Press, 1992, pp. 429-68

"Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory," Roger B. Myerson, in R. Selten: Rational Interaction : Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Berlin: Springer, 1992, pp. 13-33

"Viscous Population Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen M. Swinkels; Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, 3(1), pp. 101-09.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90007-2

"Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation," Roger B. Myerson, in P. H. Young: Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991, pp. 67-85

Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991

"Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48(1), pp. 264-303.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0

"Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value," Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. Roth: The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 175-91

"Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Roger B. Myerson, in W. P. Heller, R. M. Starr and D. A. Starrett: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 3-24

"An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria." Roy Radner, Roger B. Myerson and Eric Maskin; Review of Economic Studies, 1986, 53(1), pp. 59-69.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28198601%2953%3A1%3C59%3AAEOARP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

"Multistage Games with Communication." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986, 54(2), pp. 323-58.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198603%2954%3A2%3C323%3AMGWC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

"Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. Roth: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 115-47

"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in L. e. Hurwicz, D. e. Schmeidler and H. e. Sonnenschein: Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 229-59

"Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984, 52(2), pp. 461-88.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198403%2952%3A2%3C461%3ATBPWII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G

"A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983, 4(4), pp. 309-51.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(83)90013-6

"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading." Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite; Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29(2), pp. 265-81.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0

"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1767-98.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198311%2951%3A6%3C1767%3AMDBAIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F

"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information." Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1799-820.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198311%2951%3A6%3C1799%3AEADDRW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H

"Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10(1), pp. 67-81.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4

"Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs." David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982, 50(4), pp. 911-30.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198207%2950%3A4%3C911%3ARAMWUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y

"Optimal Auction Design." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6(1), pp. 58.

http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=9276184

"An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematical Programming, 1981, 21(1), pp. 182-89.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01584239

"Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981, 49(4), pp. 883-97.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198107%2949%3A4%3C883%3AUEATTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

"An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions." Roger B. Myerson; Theory and Decision, 1979, 11(4), pp. 339-52.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139446

"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979, 47(1), pp. 61-74.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197901%2947%3A1%3C61%3AICATBP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O

"Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197805%2968%3A2%3C231%3AD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

"Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1978, 3(4), pp. 265.

http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=9283137

"Discussion of 'Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors'." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197805%2968%3A2%3C231%3AD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A

"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977, 45(7), pp. 1631-37.

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197710%2945%3A7%3C1631%3ATBPACU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U

A Theory of Cooperative Games; Roger Bruce Myerson; Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.

Economic Analysis of Constitutions; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1291; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 2000.

Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1261; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.

Informational Orgins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1242; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.

Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1216; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.

Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1214; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.

Large Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1189; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1997.

Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1162; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1155; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

John Nash's Contribution to Economics; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1154; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro, 1996.

Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1134; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Dual Reduction and Elementary Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1133; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Extended Poisson Games and the Condercet Jury Theorem; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1103; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1102R; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.

Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1095; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Bargaining, Veto Power, and Legislative Committees; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1089; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1063; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1993.

Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters; Rebecca B. Morton and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1023; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.

Incentives to Cultivate Special Interest Groups under Alternative Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1000; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.

Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 956; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.

Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 928; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.

Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 907; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.

Viscous Population Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels; Discussion paper no. 906.; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.

Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions : An Application of the Shapley Value; Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Technical report no. 524; Stanford: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Stanford University, 1988.

Mechanism Design; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 796; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

A Theory of Voting Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; Discussion paper no. 782; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 767; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

Dynamic Matching Problems with Incentive Constraints; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 721; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1987.

Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans; Roger B. Myerson; Working Paper ;; no. 691; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986.

Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Working Paper ;; no.671; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986.

Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 658; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1985.

An Introduction to Game Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 623; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.

Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 591; Evanston: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.

Multistage Games with Communication; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 590; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1984.

Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 582; Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1983.

Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 548; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1983.

Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 528; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1982.

Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 527; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1982.

Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information; Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 495; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.

Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 481; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.

Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading; Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite; Discussion paper no. 469S; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1981.

A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 433; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.

Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 432; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.

Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 429; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1980.

Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs; David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 412; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1979.

An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 392R; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1979.

A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 381; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1979.

Optimal Auction Design; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 362; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.

Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 339; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.

An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 338; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.

Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 363; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1978.

Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 321; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1978.

Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 295; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.

Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 288; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.

Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 284; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.

Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics; Ehud Kalai and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 272; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1977.

Values of Games without Sidepayments; Ehud Kalai and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 267; Evanston, Ill: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1977.

Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 247; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.

Graphs and Cooperation in Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 246; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.

An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 245; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.

Value of Games in Partition Function Form; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 244; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1976.