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Published Works | Discussion Papers
"Decisiveness of Contributors' Perceptions in Elections." Rebecca Morton and Roger Myerson; Economic Theory, 2012, 49(3), pp. 571-90.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0605-y"Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." Roger Myerson; Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13(1-2), pp. 59-75.
"Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2009, 47(4), pp. 1109-25.
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=EP46814549
"A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, 53(3), pp. 470-82.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002709333356
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0071-6"Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 2008, 98(3), pp. 586-603. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.586
"The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State." Roger B. Myerson; American Political Science Review, 2008, 102(01), pp. 125-39.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080076"Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger B. Myerson; Review of Economic Dynamics, 2007, 10(4), pp. 676-704.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.02.006"Virtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136(1), pp. 260-85.
"Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication." Dino Gerardi and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60(1), pp. 104-34.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006
"A Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition. The Role of Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger Myerson; The Economics of Transition, 2007, 15(1), pp. 77-107.http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00280.x
"Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption." Roger B. Myerson; Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108(4), pp. 727-42.http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x
"Population Uncertainty in Contests." Roger B. Myerson and Karl Wärneryd; Economic Theory, 2006, 27(2), pp. 469.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2
"Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in D. Glycopantis and N. C. Yannelis: Differential Information Economics. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2005, pp. 481-505
"Review of 'Economic Effects of Constitutions'." Roger B. Myerson; Economica, 2005, 72(3), pp. 555.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.430_5.x
Probability Models for Economic Decisions Roger B. Myerson; Belmont, CA: Thomson/Brooke/Cole, 2005
"Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson; Chicago Journal of International Law, 2004, 5(1), pp. 91.
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/cjil5&id=99"Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster." Roger B Myerson; Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2004, 160(2), pp. 187.
"Comments On "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I-III"." Roger B Myerson; Management Science, 2004, 50(12 (Supplement)), pp. 1818-24.http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0297
"Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Roger B. Myerson, in B. Dutta and M. O. Jackson: Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2003, pp. 17-22
"Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 103(1), pp. 219-51.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2830
"Review of 'Incentives and Political Economy'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, 39(4), pp. 1277.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28200112%2939%3A4%3C1277%3AIAPE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8
"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," R. Myerson, in Y. Varoufakis: Game Theory: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 159-66
"Economic Analysis of Constitutions." Roger B. Myerson; University of Chicago Law Review, 2000, 67( 3), pp. 925.http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/uclr67&collection=journals&id=931
"Large Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 94(1), pp. 7-45.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2453
"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; European Economic Review, 1999, 43(4-6), pp. 671-97.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0
"Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, 37(3), pp. 1067-82.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28199909%2937%3A3%3C1067%3ANEATHO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
"Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures." Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1182-96.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199912%2989%3A5%3C1182%3ABAICFT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
"Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27(Issue 3), pp. 375.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050079
"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25(1), pp. 111-31.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0610
"Working on Game Theory: A Personal Perspective," Roger B. Myerson, in M. Szenberg: Passion and Craft: Economists at Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 227-33
Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997
"Dual Reduction and Elementary Games." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 21(1-2), pp. 183-202.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0573
"Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons," Roger B. Myerson, in P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler and A. Vercelli: The Economics of Transnational Commons. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 17-34
"Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games," Roger B. Myerson, in W. Albers and et al.: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Edited with the help of Martin Strobel. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, pp. 111-21
"Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in D. M. Kreps and K. F. Wallis: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Seventh World Congress. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 46-65
"Analisis Economico de Las Instituciones Politicas: Una Introduccion (Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction with English Summary )." Roger B. Myerson; Cuadernos Economicos de I.C.E., 1996, (62), pp. 7-28.
"John Nash's Contribution to Economics." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14(2), pp. 287-95.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0053
"Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 9(1), pp. 35-65.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1004
"Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption." Roger B. Myerson; Social Choice and Welfare, 1995, 12(1), pp. 59-74.http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=h24116h6x76372pv
"Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(1), pp. 77-89.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199524%299%3A1%3C77%3AAODISC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q
"Communication, Correlated Equilibria and Incentive Compatibility," Roger B. Myerson, in R. J. Aumann and S. Hart: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Amsterdam; London and New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1994, pp. 827-47
"Game-Theoretic Models of Politics." Jeffrey S. Banks and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 1-2.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1001
"An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories." Robert Forsythe, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert J. Weber; Social Choice and Welfare, 1993, 10(3), pp. 223-47.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182507
"Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(4), pp. 856-69.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199312%2987%3A4%3C856%3AITCFMU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
"Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 118-32.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006
"A Theory of Voting Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(1), pp. 102-14.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199303%2987%3A1%3C102%3AATOVE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
"Reviews of 'Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting' and 'Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1993, 31(1), pp. 237.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-0515%28199303%2931%3A1%3C237%3AAITSTO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
"Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections," Roger B. Myerson, in W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich and N. J. Schofield: Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 107-33
"Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Roger B. Myerson, in P. B. Linhart, R. Radner and M. A. Satterthwaite: Bargaining with Incomplete Information. San Diego; London; Sydney and Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Academic Press, 1992, pp. 429-68
"Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory," Roger B. Myerson, in R. Selten: Rational Interaction : Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Berlin: Springer, 1992, pp. 13-33
"Viscous Population Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen M. Swinkels; Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, 3(1), pp. 101-09.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90007-2
"Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation," Roger B. Myerson, in P. H. Young: Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991, pp. 67-85
Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991
"Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48(1), pp. 264-303.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0
"Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value," Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. Roth: The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 175-91
Reprinted in:
B. Dutta and M. O. Jackson; Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation. Heidelberg and New York; Springer, 2003, 207-20
R. J. Aumann; Collected Papers. Cambridge and London; MIT Press, 2000, 447-63"Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Roger B. Myerson, in W. P. Heller, R. M. Starr and D. A. Starrett: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 3-24
"An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria." Roy Radner, Roger B. Myerson and Eric Maskin; Review of Economic Studies, 1986, 53(1), pp. 59-69.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28198601%2953%3A1%3C59%3AAEOARP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
"Multistage Games with Communication." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986, 54(2), pp. 323-58.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198603%2954%3A2%3C323%3AMGWC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
"Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. Roth: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 115-47
"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in L. e. Hurwicz, D. e. Schmeidler and H. e. Sonnenschein: Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 229-59
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984, 52(2), pp. 461-88.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198403%2952%3A2%3C461%3ATBPWII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
"A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983, 4(4), pp. 309-51.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(83)90013-6
"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading." Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite; Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29(2), pp. 265-81.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Reprinted in:"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1767-98.
P. B. Linhart, R. Radner and M. A. Satterthwaite; Bargaining with Incomplete Information. San Diego; London; Sydney and Toronto; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Academic Press, 1992, 40-56
P. Klemperer; The Economic Theory of Auctions. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.; Elgar, 2000, 399-415http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198311%2951%3A6%3C1767%3AMDBAIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F
"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information." Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1799-820.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198311%2951%3A6%3C1799%3AEADDRW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H
"Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10(1), pp. 67-81.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4
"Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs." David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982, 50(4), pp. 911-30.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198207%2950%3A4%3C911%3ARAMWUC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
Reprinted in:"Optimal Auction Design." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6(1), pp. 58.
J.-J. Laffont; The Principal Agent Model: The Economic Theory of Incentives. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass. ; Elgar, 2003, 312-31
P. L. Joskow; Economic Regulation. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.; Elgar, 2000, 290-309
A. Sen; Industrial Organization. Delhi; Oxford and New York; Oxford University Press, 1996, 452-76http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=9276184
Reprinted in:"An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematical Programming, 1981, 21(1), pp. 182-89.
P. Klemperer; The Economic Theory of Auctions. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.; Elgar, 2000, 207-22
D. K. Levine and S. A. Lippman; The Economics of Information. Aldershot, U.K.; Elgar, 1995, 209-24
A. Rubinstein; Game Theory in Economics. Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.; Elgar, 1990, 492-507http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01584239
"Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981, 49(4), pp. 883-97.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198107%2949%3A4%3C883%3AUEATTE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
"An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions." Roger B. Myerson; Theory and Decision, 1979, 11(4), pp. 339-52.http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139446
"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979, 47(1), pp. 61-74.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197901%2947%3A1%3C61%3AICATBP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O
Reprinted in:"Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.
A. Rubinstein; Game Theory in Economics. Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.; Elgar, 1990, 526-38http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197805%2968%3A2%3C231%3AD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
"Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1978, 3(4), pp. 265.http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&an=9283137
"Discussion of 'Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors'." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28197805%2968%3A2%3C231%3AD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977, 45(7), pp. 1631-37.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197710%2945%3A7%3C1631%3ATBPACU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
A Theory of Cooperative Games; Roger Bruce Myerson; Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.
Many of these are available for download through Econpapers
Economic Analysis of Constitutions; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1291; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 2000.
Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1261; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.
Informational Orgins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1242; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.
Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1216; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.
Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1214; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.
Large Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1189; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1997.
Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1162; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1155; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
John Nash's Contribution to Economics; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1154; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.
Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro, 1996.
Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1134; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.
Dual Reduction and Elementary Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1133; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.
Extended Poisson Games and the Condercet Jury Theorem; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1103; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1102R; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.
Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1095; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
Bargaining, Veto Power, and Legislative Committees; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1089; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.
Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1063; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1993.
Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters; Rebecca B. Morton and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1023; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.
Incentives to Cultivate Special Interest Groups under Alternative Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1000; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.
Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 956; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.
Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 928; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.
Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 907; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.
Viscous Population Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels; Discussion paper no. 906.; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.
Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions : An Application of the Shapley Value; Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Technical report no. 524; Stanford: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Stanford University, 1988.
Mechanism Design; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 796; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.
A Theory of Voting Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; Discussion paper no. 782; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.
Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 767; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.
Dynamic Matching Problems with Incentive Constraints; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 721; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1987.
Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans; Roger B. Myerson; Working Paper ;; no. 691; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986.
Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory
