Accessing Articles

Published Works

"On the Existence of Monotone Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games." Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 2011, 79(2), pp. 499-553.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA8934

"Non-Cooperative Games (Equilibrium Existence)," Philip J. Reny, in S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230226203.1191

"The Role of Excess Capacity in Determining Market Power in Natural Gas Transportation Markets." R. Preston McAfee and Philip Reny; Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, 32(3), pp. 209-23.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-007-9037-9

"Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium." Philip J. Reny and Motty Perry; Econometrica, 2006, 74(5), pp. 1231-69.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x

"An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72(2), pp. 567.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.x

"Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views." Philip J Reny and Arthur J Robson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48(2), pp. 355.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009

"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions." Philip J Reny and Shmuel Zamir; Econometrica, 2004, 72(4), pp. 1105.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00527.x

"A Short Proof of Harsanyi's Purification Theorem." Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 45(2), pp. 369-74.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00149-0

"Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Public Randomization: A Short Proof." Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Economics Bulletin, 2002, 3(24), pp. 1-8.
http://www.economicsbulletin.uiuc.edu/2002/volume3/EB-02C70016A.pdf

"An Efficient Auction." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 2002, 70(3), pp. 1199-212.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00322

Advanced Microeconomic Theory; Geoffrey Alexander Jehle and Philip J. Reny; Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2001

"Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach." Philip J. Reny; Economics Letters, 2001, 70(1), pp. 99-105.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00332-3

"A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 26(2), pp. 279-85.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0655

"On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 1999, 67(4), pp. 895-900.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999461

"On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games." Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 1999, 67(5), pp. 1029-56.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2999512

Advanced Microeconomic Theory; Geoffrey Alexander Jehle and Philip J. Reny; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998

"An Extension of the KKMS Theorem." Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998, 29(2), pp. 125-34.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00004-9

"Two Lectures on Implementation under Complete Information: General Results and the Core," Philip J. Reny, in S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell: Cooperation : Game-Theoretic Approaches. Berlin, New York Springer, 1997.

"Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees." Elon Kohlberg and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 75(2), pp. 280-313.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2295

"Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths," Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders, in W. Albers, M. Strobel and R. Selten: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, pp. 305-12

"The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments." Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70(2), pp. 298-311.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0091

"Review of 'A Course in Game Theory'." Philip Reny; Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28(3), pp. 726.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/136062

"Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market." Utpal Bhattacharya, Philip J. Reny and Matthew Spiegel; Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 65(1), pp. 136-70.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1005

"Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games." Philip J. Reny; Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28(1), pp. 1-16.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/136020

"The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization." Christopher Harris, Philip Reny and Arthur Robson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1995, 63(3), pp. 507-44.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2171906

"On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games." Susan Elmes and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 62(1), pp. 1-23.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1001

"Erratum [A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers]." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 62(1), pp. 253.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1015

"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994, 62(4), pp. 795-817.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951733

"A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 59(1), pp. 50-77.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1004

"Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information." Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 59(2), pp. 257-74.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1017

"A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema." R. Preston McAfee and Philip J. Reny; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 1992, 114(1), pp. 61-67.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2159783

"Correlated Information and Mecanism Design." R. Preston McAfee and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992, 60(2), pp. 395-421.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951601

"Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria." Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992, 60(3), pp. 627-49.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951586

"Rationality in Extensive-Form Games." Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, 6(4), pp. 103-18.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138271

"Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: An Elementary Approach." Martin Hellwig, Wolfgang Leininger, Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, 52( 2), pp. 406.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-M

"Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction." R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1989, 57(6), pp. 1451-59.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913717

"Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Philip J. Reny, in A. Fine and J. Leplin: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1988, pp. 363-69
http://www.jstor.org/stable/192897

Two Papers on the Theory of Strategic Behavior; Philip Reny; Ph. D Dissertation, Princeton University, 1988.

"On Two Methods for Solving and Estimating Linear Simultaneous Equations under Rational Expectations." Gregory C. Chow and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1985, 9(1), pp. 63-75.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(85)90024-7

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