http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11149-007-9037-9
"Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium." Philip J. Reny and Motty Perry; Econometrica, 2006, 74(5), pp. 1231-69.http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00703.x
On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games; Philip J. Reny; UCLA Department of Economics, Levine's Bibliography, 2005.
"An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; The Review of Economic Studies, 2005, 72(2), pp. 567.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937X.2005.00343.x
"Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views." Philip J Reny and Arthur J Robson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 48(2), pp. 355.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.009
"On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions." Philip J Reny and Shmuel Zamir; Econometrica, 2004, 72(4), pp. 1105.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00527.x
"A Short Proof of Harsanyi's Purification Theorem." Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 45(2), pp. 369-74.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00149-0
"Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium with Public Randomization: A Short Proof." Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Economics Bulletin, 2002, 3(24), pp. 1-8.http://www.economicsbulletin.uiuc.edu/2002/volume3/EB-02C70016A.pdf
"An Efficient Auction." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 2002, 70(3), pp. 1199-212.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00322
Advanced Microeconomic Theory Geoffrey Alexander Jehle and Philip J. Reny; The Addison-Wesley Series in Economics;; Boston: Addison-Wesley, 2001
"Arrow's Theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem: A Unified Approach." Philip J. Reny; Economics Letters, 2001, 70(1), pp. 99-105.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00332-3
An Ex-Post Efficient Auction; Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Discussion paper #200; Jerusalem: Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1999.
"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core," Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny, in E. S. Maskin: Recent Developments in Game Theory. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar, 1999, pp. 464-86
"A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 26(2), pp. 279-85.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0655
"On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 1999, 67(4), pp. 895-900.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199907%2967%3A4%3C895%3AOTFOTL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
"On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games." Philip J. Reny; Econometrica, 1999, 67(5), pp. 1029-56.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199909%2967%3A5%3C1029%3AOTEOPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
Advanced Microeconomic Theory Geoffrey Alexander Jehle and Philip J. Reny; The Addison-Wesley Series in Economics;; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1998
"An Extension of the KKMS Theorem." Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1998, 29(2), pp. 125-34.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0304-4068(97)00004-9
"Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees." Elon Kohlberg and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 75(2), pp. 280-313.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2295
"Credible Threats of Secession, Partnership, and Commonwealths," Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders, in W. Albers, M. Strobel and R. Selten: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, pp. 305-12
Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees; Elon Kohlberg and Philip J. Reny; Working pape 96-072; Boston: Division of Research Harvard Business School, 1996.
An Ex-Post Envy-Free and Efficient Allocation Mechanism : Imperfect Information without Common Priors; Mischael Khanman, Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Discussion paper, no. 9624.; Tilburg, Netherlands: Center for Economic Research Tilburg University, 1996.
"The Partnered Core of a Game without Side Payments." Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70(2), pp. 298-311.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0091
"Review of 'A Course in Game Theory'." Philip Reny; The Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28(3), pp. 726.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199508%2928%3A3%3C726%3AACIGT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
Local Payoff Security and the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games; Philip J. Reny; Working paper no. 435.; Stockholm: Industriens Utredningsinstitut, 1995.
A General Solution to King Solomon's Dilemma; Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Discussion paper no. 9581.; Tilburg, Netherlands: Center for Economic Research Tilburg University, 1995.
"Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market." Utpal Bhattacharya, Philip J. Reny and Matthew Spiegel; Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 65(1), pp. 136-70.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1005
"Rational Behaviour in Extensive-Form Games." Philip J. Reny; Canadian Journal of Economics, 1995, 28(1), pp. 1-16.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0008-4085%28199502%2928%3A1%3C1%3ARBIEG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
"The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization." Christopher Harris, Philip Reny and Arthur Robson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1995, 63(3), pp. 507-44.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199505%2963%3A3%3C507%3ATEOSEI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K
The Partnered Core to a Game without Side Payments; Philip J. Reny and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Working paper no. 9404.; Toronto: Dept. of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis University of Toronto, 1994.
"On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games." Susan Elmes and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 62(1), pp. 1-23.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1001
"Erratum [A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers]." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1994, 62(1), pp. 253.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1994.1015
"A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1994, 62(4), pp. 795-817.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199407%2962%3A4%3C795%3AANVOCF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments; Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Research report,; 9317; London, Canada: Dept. of Economics University of Western Ontario, 1993.
Destructive Interference in an Imperfectly Competitive Multi-Security Market; Utpal Bhattacharya, Philip J. Reny and Matthew Ian Spiegel; Research report 9318.; London, Canada: Dept. of Economics University of Western Ontario, 1993.
The Partnered Core of a Game with Side Payments; Philip J. Reny, Eyal Winter and Myrna Holtz Wooders; Universitat Bonn Sonderforschungsbereich 303 - Discussion Paper no.B-258, 1993.
"A Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers." Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 59(1), pp. 50-77.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1004
"Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information." Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Theory, 1993, 59(2), pp. 257-74.http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1993.1017
"A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema." R. Preston McAfee and Philip J. Reny; Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society, 1992, 114(1), pp. 61-67.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9939%28199201%29114%3A1%3C61%3AASTWCU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
On the Rationale for Perfect Equilibrium; Elon Kohlberg and Philip J. Reny; Working paper 92-011; Boston, MA: Division of Research Graduate School of Business Administration Harvard University, 1992.
A Non-Cooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core; Motty Perry and Philip J. Reny; Research report, 9203.; London: Dept. of Economics University of Western Ontario, 1992.
"Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Philip J. Reny, in C. Bicchieri and M. L. Dalla Chiara: Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 345-53
"Correlated Information and Mecanism Design." R. Preston McAfee and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992, 60(2), pp. 395-421.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199203%2960%3A2%3C395%3ACIAMD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
"Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria." Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1992, 60(3), pp. 627-49.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199205%2960%3A3%3C627%3ABINFPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A
"Rationality in Extensive-Form Games." Philip J. Reny; The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1992, 6(4), pp. 103-18.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199223%296%3A4%3C103%3ARIEG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
"Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games of Perfect Information: An Elementary Approach." Martin Hellwig, Wolfgang Leininger, Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Journal of Economic Theory, 1990, 52( 2), pp. 406.http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90039-M
A Stone-Weierstrass Theorem without Closure under Suprema; R. Preston McAfee and Philip J. Reny; Caltech Social Science Working Paper no.727, 1990.
"Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction." R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan and Philip J. Reny; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1989, 57(6), pp. 1451-59.http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198911%2957%3A6%3C1451%3AETSITC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O
"Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Philip J. Reny, in A. Fine and J. Leplin: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association. East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1988, pp. 363-69
Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction; Preston McAfee, John McMillan and Philip J. Reny; Research report 88-04.; La Jolla, CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California San Diego, 1988.
Two Papers on the Theory of Strategic Behavior; Philip Reny; Ph.D Dissertation, Princeton University, 1988.
A Simple Proof of the Existence of Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinite-Action Games of Perfect Information; Philip J. Reny and Arthur J. Robson; Technical report,; no. 19; London: Centre for Decision Sciences and Econometrics University of Western Ontario, 1987.
"On Two Methods for Solving and Estimating Linear Simultaneous Equations under Rational Expectations." Gregory C. Chow and Philip J. Reny; Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1985, 9(1), pp. 63-75.