Text Search - Continuation

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and therefore paternal respects also; lastly, where there were no public judgments, and therefore no use of bearing witness, either true or false.

10. Seeing therefore our obligation to observe those laws is more ancient than the promulgation of the laws themselves, as being contained in the very constitution of the city; by the virtue of the natural law which forbids breach of covenant, the law of nature commands us to keep all the civil laws. For where we are tied to obedience before we know what will be commanded us, there we are universally tied to obey in all things. Whence it follows, that no civil law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Deity (in respect of whom cities themselves have no right of their own, and cannot be said to make laws), can possibly

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that it be once known. And if the subject afterward forget either the right he hath who made the law, or the law itself, that makes him no less tied to obey; since he might have remembered it, had he had a will to obey.

12. The knowledge of the legislator depends on the subject himself; for the right of making laws could not be conferred on any man without his own consent and covenant, either expressed or supposed; expressed, when from the beginning the citizens do themselves constitute a form of governing the city, or when by promise they submit themselves to the dominion of any one; or supposed at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the realm and laws for their protection and conservation against others. For to whose dominion we require our fellow subjects

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not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps not the laws; but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring against God. For whosoever are not subject either to some common lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.

20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience (such as is defined above, chap. 6. art. 13) to the city, that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who

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20. Seeing that from the virtue of the covenant, whereby each subject is tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience (such as is defined above, chap. 6. art. 13) to the city, that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which trespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin always, is worse than to sin once. And this is that sin which is called TREASON; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or

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tied to the other to perform absolute and universal obedience (such as is defined above, chap. 6. art. 13) to the city, that is to say, to the sovereign power, whether that be one man or council, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civil laws; so that that covenant contains in itself all the laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the general covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the laws. Which trespass is so much worse than any other one sin, by how much to sin always, is worse than to sin once. And this is that sin which is called TREASON; and it is a word or deed whereby the citizen or subject declares, that he will no longer obey that man or court to whom the supreme power of the city is entrusted.

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and sickly, although they cannot sin.

7. Now if God have the right of sovereignty from his power, it is manifest that the obligation of yielding him obedience lies on men by reason of their weakness.18 For that obligation which rises from contract, of which we have spoken in chap. 2. can have no place here, where the right of ruling (no covenant passing between) rises only from nature. But there are two species of natural obligation. One, when liberty is taken away by corporal impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all creatures, do obey the common laws of their creation. The other when it is taken away by hope or fear, according to which the weaker, despairing of his own power to resist, cannot

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give it to some other. But they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be said to be guilty of treason.

a count.

b contemplates.

c many.

d many.

e sense.

f to omitted in 1651.

g this.

h itself. CHAPTER XVI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.

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count.

b contemplates.

c many.

d many.

e sense.

f to omitted in 1651.

g this.

h itself. CHAPTER XVI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.

1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted the true religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors.
3. The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of nature, and the law of

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g this.

h itself. CHAPTER XVI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.

1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted the true religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors.
3. The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of nature, and the law of circumcision.
6. Abraham was the interpreter of the Word of God, and of all laws among those that belonged to him. 7.

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XVI. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD UNDER THE OLD COVENANT.

1. Superstition possessing foreign nations, God instituted the true religion by the means of Abraham. 2. By the covenant between God and Adam, all dispute is forbidden concerning the commands of superiors.
3. The manner of the covenant between God and Abraham. 4. In that covenant is contained an acknowledgment of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of nature, and the law of circumcision.
6. Abraham was the interpreter of the Word of God, and of all laws among those that belonged to him. 7. Abraham's subjects could not sin by obeying

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of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abraham. 5. The laws unto which Abraham was tied, were no other beside those of nature, and the law of circumcision.
6. Abraham was the interpreter of the Word of God, and of all laws among those that belonged to him. 7. Abraham's subjects could not sin by obeying him. 8. God's covenant with the Hebrews at Mount Sinai. 9. From thence God's government took the name of a kingdom. 10. What laws were by God given to the Jews. 11. What the Word of God is, and how to be known. 12. What was held the written Word of God among the Jews. 13. The power of interpreting the word of God, and the supreme civil power, were united in Moses

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and resemblances of finite things; and they worshipped spirits or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them devils. But it pleased the Divine Majesty (as we read it written in the sacred history) out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him; and to reveal himself supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous covenant with him and his seed, which is called the old covenant or testament. He therefore is the head of true religion; he was the first that after the deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creator of the universe. And from him the kingdom of God by way of covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. Antiq. Jews, lib. I. cap.
7.

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spirits or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them devils. But it pleased the Divine Majesty (as we read it written in the sacred history) out of all mankind to call forth Abraham, by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him; and to reveal himself supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous covenant with him and his seed, which is called the old covenant or testament. He therefore is the head of true religion; he was the first that after the deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creator of the universe. And from him the kingdom of God by way of covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. Antiq. Jews, lib. I. cap.
7.

2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not

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is the head of true religion; he was the first that after the deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creator of the universe. And from him the kingdom of God by way of covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. Antiq. Jews, lib. I. cap.
7.

2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not only naturally, but also by way of covenant, over Adam and Eve; so as it seems he would have no obedience yielded to him, beside that which natural reason should dictate, but by the way of covenant, that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the original of God's kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to

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way of covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. Antiq. Jews, lib. I. cap.
7.

2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not only naturally, but also by way of covenant, over Adam and Eve; so as it seems he would have no obedience yielded to him, beside that which natural reason should dictate, but by the way of covenant, that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the original of God's kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (whether the judicature of good

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2. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not only naturally, but also by way of covenant, over Adam and Eve; so as it seems he would have no obedience yielded to him, beside that which natural reason should dictate, but by the way of covenant, that is to say, by the consent of men themselves. Now because this covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renewed, the original of God's kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way; that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (whether the judicature of good and evil, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a

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or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbidden), God did require a most simple obedience to his commands, without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner (Gen. 17. 7, 8): I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an

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without dispute whether that were good or evil which was commanded. For the fruit of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner (Gen. 17. 7, 8): I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham

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of the tree, if the command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evil, that is to say, a sin.

3. Now the covenant between God and Abraham was made in this manner (Gen. 17. 7, 8): I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore circumcision was added to

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in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only (verse 20):a This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you. It is therefore covenanted, that

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be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only (verse 20):a This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you. It is therefore covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and

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thee and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession; and I will be their God. Now it was necessary to institute some sign, whereby Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only (verse 20):a This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you. It is therefore covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and the God of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit himself to

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Abraham and his seed should retain the memory of this covenant; wherefore circumcision was added to the covenant, but yet as a sign only (verse 20):a This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed after thee; every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin; and it shall be a token of the covenant between me and you. It is therefore covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and the God of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit himself to be governed by him; and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim; and that Abraham, for a memorial sign of this covenant, should

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of the covenant between me and you. It is therefore covenanted, that Abraham shall acknowledge God to be his God and the God of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit himself to be governed by him; and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim; and that Abraham, for a memorial sign of this covenant, should take care to see himself and his male seed circumcised.

4. But seeing that Abraham, even before the covenant, acknowledged God to be the Creator and King of the world (for he never doubted either of the being or the providence of God); how comes it not to be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price and

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is to say, that he shall submit himself to be governed by him; and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that land wherein he then dwelt but as a pilgrim; and that Abraham, for a memorial sign of this covenant, should take care to see himself and his male seed circumcised.

4. But seeing that Abraham, even before the covenant, acknowledged God to be the Creator and King of the world (for he never doubted either of the being or the providence of God); how comes it not to be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price and by contract an obedience which was due to him by nature; namely, by promising Abraham the land of Canaan, upon condition that he would receive

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himself with a price and by contract an obedience which was due to him by nature; namely, by promising Abraham the land of Canaan, upon condition that he would receive him for his God; when by the right of nature he was already so? By those words therefore, to be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee, we understand not that Abraham satisfied this covenant by a bare acknowledgment of the power and dominion which God had naturally over men, that is to say, by acknowledging God indefinitely, which belongs to natural reason; but he must definitely acknowledge him, who said unto him, (Gen. 12. 34):b Get thee out of thy country; &c. (Gen. 13. 14): Lift up thine eyes, &c: who appeared unto him

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in that notion, was not the worship of reason, but of religion and faith, and that which not reason, but God had supernaturally revealed.

5. But we read of no laws given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to his family, either then or after, secular or sacred; excepting the commandment of circumcision, which is contained in the covenant itself. Whence it is manifest, that there were no other laws or worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the laws of nature, rational worship, and circumcision.

6. Now Abraham was the interpreter of all laws, as well sacred as secular, among those that belonged to him; not merely naturally, as using the laws of nature only, but even by the

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Whence it is manifest, that there were no other laws or worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the laws of nature, rational worship, and circumcision.

6. Now Abraham was the interpreter of all laws, as well sacred as secular, among those that belonged to him; not merely naturally, as using the laws of nature only, but even by the form of the covenant itself, in which obedience is promised by Abraham, not for himself only, but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except his children had been tied to obey his commands. And how can that be understood, which God says (Gen. 18. 18, 19): (All the nations of the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and

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than was instituted by Abraham, to wit, in images made with hands,20 as other nations did; which for that reason were called idolaters. And hitherto, subjects might easily enough discern what was to be observed, what avoided in the commands of their princes.

8. To go on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture; the same covenant was renewed (Gen. 26. 3, 4) with Isaac; and (Gen. 28. 13, 14) with Jacob; where God styles himself not simply God, whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the God of Abraham and Isaac. Afterward being about to renew the same covenant by Moses with the whole people of Israel (Exod. 3. 6): I am,

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8. To go on now, following the guidance of the holy Scripture; the same covenant was renewed (Gen. 26. 3, 4) with Isaac; and (Gen. 28. 13, 14) with Jacob; where God styles himself not simply God, whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the God of Abraham and Isaac. Afterward being about to renew the same covenant by Moses with the whole people of Israel (Exod. 3. 6): I am, saith he, the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Afterward, when that people, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage, abode in the wilderness near mount

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whole people of Israel (Exod. 3. 6): I am, saith he, the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. Afterward, when that people, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage, abode in the wilderness near mount Sinai, that ancient covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. 19. 5):d Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob); then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests, and an

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of Jacob. Afterward, when that people, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage, abode in the wilderness near mount Sinai, that ancient covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. 19. 5):d Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob); then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered together, and said (verse 8), All that the Lord hath spoken, will we do.

9. In this covenant,

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when that people, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to human subjection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Egyptian bondage, abode in the wilderness near mount Sinai, that ancient covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner (Exod. 19. 5):d Therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob); then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered together, and said (verse 8), All that the Lord hath spoken, will we do.

9. In this covenant, among other things, we must

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my covenant (to wit, that covenant which was made with Abraham, Isaac and Jacob); then shall ye be a peculiar treasure unto me, above all people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered together, and said (verse 8), All that the Lord hath spoken, will we do.

9. In this covenant, among other things, we must consider well the appellation of kingdom, not used before. For although God, both by nature and by covenant made with Abraham, was their king, yet owed they him an obedience and worship only natural, as being his subjects; and religious, such as Abraham instituted, as being the subjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob,

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all people; for all the earth is mine, and ye shall be to me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. And all the people answered together, and said (verse 8), All that the Lord hath spoken, will we do.

9. In this covenant, among other things, we must consider well the appellation of kingdom, not used before. For although God, both by nature and by covenant made with Abraham, was their king, yet owed they him an obedience and worship only natural, as being his subjects; and religious, such as Abraham instituted, as being the subjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes. For they had received no word of God beside the natural word of right reason; neither had any covenant passed

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and by covenant made with Abraham, was their king, yet owed they him an obedience and worship only natural, as being his subjects; and religious, such as Abraham instituted, as being the subjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes. For they had received no word of God beside the natural word of right reason; neither had any covenant passed between God and them, otherwise than as their wills were included in the will of Abraham, as their prince. But now by the covenant made at Mount Sinai, the consent of each man being had, there becomes an institutive kingdom of God over them. That kingdom of God, so renowned in Scriptures and writings of divines, took its beginning from this

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such as Abraham instituted, as being the subjects of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, their natural princes. For they had received no word of God beside the natural word of right reason; neither had any covenant passed between God and them, otherwise than as their wills were included in the will of Abraham, as their prince. But now by the covenant made at Mount Sinai, the consent of each man being had, there becomes an institutive kingdom of God over them. That kingdom of God, so renowned in Scriptures and writings of divines, took its beginning from this time; and hither tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites asked a king (1 Sam. 8. 7): They have not rejected thee, but they have

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to Samuel, when the Israelites asked a king (1 Sam. 8. 7): They have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them; and that which Samuel told the Israelites (1 Sam. 12. 12): Ye said unto me, nay, but a king shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your king; and that which is said, Jer. 31. 31: I will make a new covenant, &c. although I was an husband unto them; and the doctrine also of Judas Galilaeus, where mention is made in Josephus'Antiq. of the Jews (Book 18. chap. 2), in these words: But Judas Galilaeus was the first author of this fourth way of those who followed the study of wisdom. These agree in all the rest with the Pharisees, excepting that they

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Pharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of liberty; believing God alone to be held for their Lord and prince; and will sooner endure even the most exquisite kinds of torments, together with their kinsfolks and dearest friends, than call any mortal man their Lord.

10. The right of the kingdom being thus constituted by way of covenant, let us see in the next place, what laws God propounded to them. Now those are known to all, to wit, the decalogue, and those other, as well judicial as ceremonial laws, which we find from the twentieth chapter of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy and the death of Moses. Now of those laws, delivered in general by the hand of

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from the twentieth chapter of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomy and the death of Moses. Now of those laws, delivered in general by the hand of Moses, some there are which oblige naturally, being made by God, as the God of nature, and had their force even before Abraham's time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the covenant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of Abraham, which had their force even before Moses's time, by reason of the former covenant. But there are others which oblige by virtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people themselves; being made by God, as being the peculiar king of the Israelites. Of

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some there are which oblige naturally, being made by God, as the God of nature, and had their force even before Abraham's time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the covenant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of Abraham, which had their force even before Moses's time, by reason of the former covenant. But there are others which oblige by virtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people themselves; being made by God, as being the peculiar king of the Israelites. Of the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue which pertain unto manners; such as, honour thy parents, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt

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as the God of nature, and had their force even before Abraham's time. Others there are which oblige by virtue of the covenant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of Abraham, which had their force even before Moses's time, by reason of the former covenant. But there are others which oblige by virtue of that covenant only, which was made last with the people themselves; being made by God, as being the peculiar king of the Israelites. Of the first sort are all the precepts of the decalogue which pertain unto manners; such as, honour thy parents, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness, thou shalt not covet;

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worship, as hath been declared in the foregoing chapter (art. 15). In like manner the second commandment, of not worshipping by way of any image made by themselves; for this also is a part of natural religion, as hath been showed in the same article. Of the second sort is the first commandment of the decalogue, of not having any other Gods; for in that consists the essence of the covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires nothing else, but that he should be his God, and the God of his seed. Also the precept of keeping holy the Sabbath; for the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memorial of the six days' creation, as appears out of these words (Exod. 31. 16-17): It is a perpetual covenant (meaning the Sabbath),

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that consists the essence of the covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires nothing else, but that he should be his God, and the God of his seed. Also the precept of keeping holy the Sabbath; for the sanctification of the seventh day is instituted in memorial of the six days' creation, as appears out of these words (Exod. 31. 16-17): It is a perpetual covenant (meaning the Sabbath), and a sign between me and the children of Israel for ever; for in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed. Of the third kind are the politic, judicial, and ceremonial laws; which only belonged to the Jews. The laws of the first and second sort written in tables of

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people of Israel for two things; his miracles and his faith. For how great and most evident miracles soever he had wrought, yet would they not have trusted him, at least he was not to have been trusted, if he had called them out of Egypt to any other worship than the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their fathers. For it had been contrary to the covenant made by themselves with God. In like manner two things there are; to wit, supernatural prediction of things to come, which is a mighty miracle; and faith in the God of Abraham, their deliverer out of Egypt; which God proposed to all the Jews to be kept for marks of a true prophet. He that wants either of these, is no prophet; nor is it to be received for God's

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with the event.

12. The Jews did hold the book of the whole law, which was called Deuteronomy, for the written word of God; and that only (forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history) until the captivity. For this book was delivered by Moses himself to the priests, to be kept and laid up in the side of the ark of the covenant, and to be copied out by the kings; and the same a long time after, by the authority of king Josiah (2 Kings 23. 2), acknowledged again for the word of God. But it is not manifest, when the rest of the books of the Old Testament were first received into canon. But what concerns the prophets, Isaiah and the rest, since they foretold no other things than what were

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were commanded not to account any man for a true prophet, but him whose prophecies were answered by the events. And hence peradventure it is, that the Jews esteemed the writings of those whom they slew when they prophesied, for prophetic afterward; that is to say, for the word of God.

13. It being known what laws there were under the old covenant, and that f Word of God received from the beginning; we must furthermore consider, with whom the authority of judging, whether the writings of the prophets arising afterward were to be received for the Word of God; that is to say, whether the events did answer their predictions or not; and with whom also the authority of interpreting the laws already received,

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were raised, not for the salvation of their souls, but by reason of their ambition and desire of dominion over the people.

14. In Joshua's time the interpretation of the laws, and of the Word of God, belonged to Eleazar the high priest; who was also, under God, their absolute king. Which is collected, first of all, out of the covenant itself; in which the commonwealth of Israel is called a priestly kingdom, or, as it is recited in 1 Peter 2. 9, a royal priesthood. Which could in no wise be said, unless by the institution and covenant of the people, the regal power were understood to belong to the high priest. Neither doth this repugn what hath been said before, where

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Word of God, belonged to Eleazar the high priest; who was also, under God, their absolute king. Which is collected, first of all, out of the covenant itself; in which the commonwealth of Israel is called a priestly kingdom, or, as it is recited in 1 Peter 2. 9, a royal priesthood. Which could in no wise be said, unless by the institution and covenant of the people, the regal power were understood to belong to the high priest. Neither doth this repugn what hath been said before, where Moses, and not Aaron, had the kingdom under God. Since it is necessary, that when one man institutes the form of a future commonwealth, that one should govern the kingdom which he institutes during his life (whether it be

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that even in Joshua's time the supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were both in one person.

15. After Joshua's death follow the times of the Judges until king Saul; in which it is manifest that the right of the kingdom instituted by God, remained with the high priest. For the kingdom was by covenant priestly, that is to say, God's government by priests. And such ought it to have been, until that form, with God's consent, were changed by the people themselves; which was not done before that requiring a king God consented unto them, and said unto Samuel (1 Sam. 8. 7): Hearken unto the voice of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected

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judged Israel; but their obedience was rightly due to the high priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom, after the death of Moses and Joshua, was without power; yet was it not without right. Now that the interpretation of God's word did belong to the same high-priest, is manifest by this; that God, after the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated, spake no more in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the propitiatory which was between the cherubims, whither it was not lawful for any to approach except the high-priest. If therefore regard be had to the right of the kingdom, the supreme civil power and the authority of interpreting God's word were joined in the high-priest. If

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priest. Although therefore the priestly kingdom, after the death of Moses and Joshua, was without power; yet was it not without right. Now that the interpretation of God's word did belong to the same high-priest, is manifest by this; that God, after the tabernacle and the ark of the covenant was consecrated, spake no more in Mount Sinai, but in the tabernacle of the covenant, from the propitiatory which was between the cherubims, whither it was not lawful for any to approach except the high-priest. If therefore regard be had to the right of the kingdom, the supreme civil power and the authority of interpreting God's word were joined in the high-priest. If we consider the fact, they were united in the prophets who judged

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of God, belonged to the king; and thus that book of the law was approved, and received again by the authority of King Josiah; as appears by the fourth l book of the Kings, chap. 22., 23.: where it is reported that he gathered together all the several degrees of his kingdom, the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all the words of the covenant; that is to say, he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaical covenant; that is to say, for the word of God; and to be again received and confirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the power of discerning God's word from the word m of men, and of interpreting God's word even in the days of the kings, was

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book of the law was approved, and received again by the authority of King Josiah; as appears by the fourth l book of the Kings, chap. 22., 23.: where it is reported that he gathered together all the several degrees of his kingdom, the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all the words of the covenant; that is to say, he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaical covenant; that is to say, for the word of God; and to be again received and confirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the power of discerning God's word from the word m of men, and of interpreting God's word even in the days of the kings, was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent

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the authority of King Josiah; as appears by the fourth l book of the Kings, chap. 22., 23.: where it is reported that he gathered together all the several degrees of his kingdom, the elders, priests, prophets, and all the people; and he read in their ears all the words of the covenant; that is to say, he caused that covenant to be acknowledged for the Mosaical covenant; that is to say, for the word of God; and to be again received and confirmed by the Israelites. The civil power therefore, and the power of discerning God's word from the word m of men, and of interpreting God's word even in the days of the kings, was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with authority, but in the form and by the

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have constituted others. Sacrifices indeed they have not offered; for that was hereditary to Aaron and his sons. But it is manifest, as in Moses' lifetime, so throughout all ages, from King Saul to the captivity of Babylon, that the priesthood was not a maistry, but a ministry.

17. After their return from Babylonian bondage, the covenant being renewed and signed, the priestly kingdom was restored to the same manner it was in from the death of Joshua to the beginning of the kings; excepting that it is not expressly set down, that the returned Jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras (by whose directions they ordered their state) or to any other beside God himself. That reformation

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Jews did give up the right of sovereignty either to Esdras (by whose directions they ordered their state) or to any other beside God himself. That reformation seems rather to be nothing else, than the bare promises and vows of every man, to observe those things which were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding (perhaps not by the people's intention), by virtue of the covenant which they then renewed (for the covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai), that same state was a priestly kingdom; that is to say, the supreme civil authority and the sacred were united in the priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the priesthood, and by the interposition of foreign princes, it was so troubled till our

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either to Esdras (by whose directions they ordered their state) or to any other beside God himself. That reformation seems rather to be nothing else, than the bare promises and vows of every man, to observe those things which were written in the book of the law. Notwithstanding (perhaps not by the people's intention), by virtue of the covenant which they then renewed (for the covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai), that same state was a priestly kingdom; that is to say, the supreme civil authority and the sacred were united in the priests. Now, howsoever through the ambition of those who strove for the priesthood, and by the interposition of foreign princes, it was so troubled till our Saviour Jesus Christ's time, that it

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this was to deny God to be a king by nature: next, idolatry, or the worship not of other (for there is but one God), but of strange Gods; that is to say, a worship though of one God, yet under other titles, attributes, and rites, than what were established by Abraham and Moses; for this was to deny the God of Abraham to be their king by covenant made with Abraham and themselves. In all other things they were to obey. And if a king or priest, having the sovereign authority, had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the laws, that had been his sin, and not his subject's; whose duty it is, not to dispute, but to obey the commands of his superiors.

a verse 10, 11.

b Gen. xii

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what.

g pit, &c. And.

h of prophets.

i The English 1651 reads: The priest could rightly do whatsoever every man could rightly do himself. The bracketed passage was translated from the Latin by Prof. Edwin Curley.

j laws.

k facts.

l second.

m words. CHAPTER XVII. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT.

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Latin by Prof. Edwin Curley.

j laws.

k facts.

l second.

m words. CHAPTER XVII. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT.

1. The prophecies concerning Christ's dignity. 2. The prophecies concerning his humility and passion. 3. That Jesus was THAT CHRIST. 4. That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God. 5. That the kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly, and shall begin from the day of judgment. 6. That the government of Christ in this world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by the way of doctrine and persuasion. 7. What the promises of the new covenant are, on both parts. 8. That no laws

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words. CHAPTER XVII. OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD BY THE NEW COVENANT.

1. The prophecies concerning Christ's dignity. 2. The prophecies concerning his humility and passion. 3. That Jesus was THAT CHRIST. 4. That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God. 5. That the kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly, and shall begin from the day of judgment. 6. That the government of Christ in this world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by the way of doctrine and persuasion. 7. What the promises of the new covenant are, on both parts. 8. That no laws are added by Christ, beside the institution of the sacraments. 9. Repent ye, be baptized, keep the

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4. That the kingdom of God by the new covenant, was not the kingdom of Christ, as Christ, but as God. 5. That the kingdom by the new covenant is heavenly, and shall begin from the day of judgment. 6. That the government of Christ in this world was not a sovereignty, but counsel, or a government by the way of doctrine and persuasion. 7. What the promises of the new covenant are, on both parts. 8. That no laws are added by Christ, beside the institution of the sacraments. 9. Repent ye, be baptized, keep the commandments, and the like forms of speech, are not laws. 10. It pertains to the civil authority, to define what the sin of injustice is. 11. It pertains to the civil authority, to define what conduces to the peace and defence of the city. 12. It

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cannot pass. 27. That the interpretation of Scripture depends on the authority of the city. 28. That a Christian city ought to interpret Scriptures by ecclesiastical pastors.

1. There are many clear prophecies extant in the Old Testament concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the Kingdom of God by a new covenant; partly foretelling his regal dignity, partly his humility and passion. Among others concerning his dignity, these. God, blessing Abraham, makes him a promise of his son Isaac; and adds (Gen. 17. 16): And kings of people shall be of him. Jacob blessing his son Judah (Gen. 49. 10): The sceptre (quoth he), shall not depart from

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the poor, &c.; And he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked. Furthermore in the same Isaiah (chapters 51. to 62.), there is almost nothing else contained but a description of the coming and the works of Christ. Jeremiah (Jerem. 31. 31): Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah. And Baruch (Bar. 3. 35, 37): This is our God, &c. Afterward did he show himself upon earth, and conversed with men. Ezekiel (Ezek. 24 vers. 2, 3, 25):b I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them; even my servant David. And I will make with them a covenant of peace, &c. Daniel

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Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah. And Baruch (Bar. 3. 35, 37): This is our God, &c. Afterward did he show himself upon earth, and conversed with men. Ezekiel (Ezek. 24 vers. 2, 3, 25):b I will set up one shepherd over them, and he shall feed them; even my servant David. And I will make with them a covenant of peace, &c. Daniel (Dan. 7. 13, 14): I saw in the night visions; and behold one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the ancient of days; and they brought him near before him; and there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, &c. Haggai

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and fulfilling all those things which the prophets had foretold of Christ to come. That this man, hated of the Pharisees, (whose false doctrine and hypocritical sanctity he had reproved) and by their means, of the people accused of unlawful seeking for the kingdom, and crucified; was the true CHRIST and king promised by God, and sent from his Father to renew the new covenant between them and God; both the evangelists do show, (describing his genealogy, nativity, life, doctrine, death, and resurrection) and by comparing the things which he did with those which were foretold of him, all Christians do consent to.

4. Now from this, that CHRIST was sent from God his Father to make a covenant between him and the people, it is manifest,

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God, and sent from his Father to renew the new covenant between them and God; both the evangelists do show, (describing his genealogy, nativity, life, doctrine, death, and resurrection) and by comparing the things which he did with those which were foretold of him, all Christians do consent to.

4. Now from this, that CHRIST was sent from God his Father to make a covenant between him and the people, it is manifest, that though Christ were equal to his Father according to his nature, yet was he inferior according to the right of the kingdom. For this office, to speak properly, was not that of a king, but of a viceroy; such as Moses' government was; for the kingdom was not his, but his Father's. Which CHRIST himself signified when he was

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thee before God, and the lord Jesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his kingdom, &c. (verse 18): And the Lord shall deliver me from every evil work, and will preserve me unto his heavenly kingdom. Nor is it to be marveled at, that the same kingdom is attributed to them both; since both the Father and the Son are the same God; and the new covenant concerning God's kingdom, is not propounded in the name of the FATHER; but in the name of the FATHER, of the SON, and of the HOLY GHOST, as of one God.

5. But the kingdom of God, for restitution whereof CHRIST was sent from God his Father, takes not its beginning before his second coming; to wit, from the day of judgment,

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If any man hear not my words, and keep them,f I judge him not; for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world: and, Man, who made me a judge or divider between you? and the very appellation of the kingdom of heaven testifies as much. The same thing is gathered out of the words of the prophet Jeremiah, speaking of the kingdom of God by the new covenant (Jer. 31. 34): They shall teach no more every man his neighbour; saying, Know the lord. For they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest of them, saith the Lord: which cannot be understood of a kingdom in this world. The kingdom of God therefore, for the restoring whereof CHRIST came into the world; of which the prophets did prophesy, and of which praying we

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second coming, or the day of judgment. But if the kingdom of God were now already restored, no reason could be rendered why CHRIST, having completed the work for which he was sent, should come again; or why we should pray, Thy kingdom come.

6. Now, although the kingdom of God by CHRIST to be established with a new covenant, were heavenly; we must not therefore think, that they, who believing in CHRIST would make that covenant, were not so to be governed here on the earth too, as that they should persevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant. For in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if we were not to have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are

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could be rendered why CHRIST, having completed the work for which he was sent, should come again; or why we should pray, Thy kingdom come.

6. Now, although the kingdom of God by CHRIST to be established with a new covenant, were heavenly; we must not therefore think, that they, who believing in CHRIST would make that covenant, were not so to be governed here on the earth too, as that they should persevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant. For in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if we were not to have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are directed in the way. Moses, when he had instituted the priestly kingdom, himself though he were no priest,

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kingdom come.

6. Now, although the kingdom of God by CHRIST to be established with a new covenant, were heavenly; we must not therefore think, that they, who believing in CHRIST would make that covenant, were not so to be governed here on the earth too, as that they should persevere in their faith and obedience promised by that covenant. For in vain had the kingdom of heaven been promised, if we were not to have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are directed in the way. Moses, when he had instituted the priestly kingdom, himself though he were no priest, yet ruled and conducted the people all the time of their peregrination, until their entrance into the promised land. In the same manner

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kingdom of heaven. That CHRIST had received no power from his Father to judge in questions of meum and tuum, that is to say, in all questions of right among those who believed not, those words above cited do sufficiently declare: Man, who made me a judge or divider between you? And it is confirmed by reason. For seeing CHRIST was sent to make a covenant between God and men; and no man is obliged to perform obedience before the contract be made; if he should have judged of questions of right, no man had been tied to obey his sentence. But that the discerning of right was not committed to CHRIST in this world, neither among the faithful nor among infidels, is apparent in this; that that right without all controversy belongs

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both may, and must be understood of the day of future judgment, it doth not at all repugn what hath been said before. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new laws, and that therefore by his office and mission he was no legislator properly so called, nor Moses neither, but a bringer and publisher of his Father's laws (for God only, and neither Moses nor CHRIST, was a king by covenant), is collected hence; that he said, I came not to destroy (to wit, the laws before given from God by Moses, which he presently interprets), but to fulfil; and, He that shall break one of the least of these commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven. CHRIST therefore had not a royal or sovereign power committed to him

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free, in which they were to be subject to no human power, on this condition; that they should serve the God of Abraham on that fashion which Moses should teach: lastly, both to them and to all nations, a heavenly and eternal kingdom, on condition that they should serve the God of Abraham on that manner which Christ should teach. For by the new, that is to say, the Christian covenant, it is covenanted on men's part, to serve the God of Abraham on that manner which Jesus should teach: on God's part, to pardon their sins, and bring them into his celestial kingdom. We have already spoken of the quality of the heavenly kingdom, above in art. 5; but it is usually called, sometimes the kingdom of heaven, sometimes the kingdom of glory,

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other's. Now in holy Scriptures, repentance is often put instead of obedience; because Christ teacheth every where, that with God the will is taken for the deed; but repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind. These things being understood, it will most evidently appear out of many places of sacred Scripture, that those are the conditions of the Christian covenant which we have named; to wit, giving remission of sins and eternal life on God's part; and repenting and believing in JESUS CHRIST, on men's part. First, the words (Mark 1. 15): The kingdom of God is at hand; Repent ye and believe the gospel, contain the whole covenant. In like manner those (Luke 24. 46, 47): Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and

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appear out of many places of sacred Scripture, that those are the conditions of the Christian covenant which we have named; to wit, giving remission of sins and eternal life on God's part; and repenting and believing in JESUS CHRIST, on men's part. First, the words (Mark 1. 15): The kingdom of God is at hand; Repent ye and believe the gospel, contain the whole covenant. In like manner those (Luke 24. 46, 47): Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem. And those (Acts 3. 19): Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out when the times of refreshing shall come,

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obedience, which when he answered that he had kept, he adjoins the other, saying (verse 22): Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that thou hast, and distribute to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me. This was matter of faith. He therefore not giving sufficient credit to CHRIST and his heavenly treasures, went away sorrowful. The same covenant is contained in these words (Mark 16. 16): He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; he j that believeth not, shall be damned: where faith is expressed, repentance is supposed in those that are baptized. And in these words (John 3. 5): Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven: where, to

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(John 3. 5): Except a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven: where, to be born of water, is the same with regeneration, that is to say, conversion to CHRIST. Now that baptism is required in the two places cited just before, and in divers others, we must understand, that what circumcision was to the old covenant, that baptism is to the new. Seeing therefore that was not of the essence, but served for a memorial of the old covenant, as a ceremony or sign (and was omitted in the wilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the essence, but in memory and for a sign of the new covenant which we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting,

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water, is the same with regeneration, that is to say, conversion to CHRIST. Now that baptism is required in the two places cited just before, and in divers others, we must understand, that what circumcision was to the old covenant, that baptism is to the new. Seeing therefore that was not of the essence, but served for a memorial of the old covenant, as a ceremony or sign (and was omitted in the wilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the essence, but in memory and for a sign of the new covenant which we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting, the act through necessity may be omitted; but repentance and faith, which are of the essence of the covenant, are always

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must understand, that what circumcision was to the old covenant, that baptism is to the new. Seeing therefore that was not of the essence, but served for a memorial of the old covenant, as a ceremony or sign (and was omitted in the wilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the essence, but in memory and for a sign of the new covenant which we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting, the act through necessity may be omitted; but repentance and faith, which are of the essence of the covenant, are always required.

8. In the kingdom of God after this life, there will be no laws; partly, because there is no room for laws, where there is none

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of the old covenant, as a ceremony or sign (and was omitted in the wilderness); in like manner this also is used, not as pertaining to the essence, but in memory and for a sign of the new covenant which we make with God. And provided the will be not wanting, the act through necessity may be omitted; but repentance and faith, which are of the essence of the covenant, are always required.

8. In the kingdom of God after this life, there will be no laws; partly, because there is no room for laws, where there is none for sins; partly, because laws were given us from God, not to direct us in heaven, but unto heaven. Let us now therefore inquire what laws CHRIST (established not himself;

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of these was given before by Moses in the same words (Deut. 6. 5); and the second even before Moses; for it is the natural law, having its beginning with rational nature itself: and both together is the sum of all laws. For all the laws of divine natural worship, are contained in these words, Thou shalt love God; and all the laws of divine worship due by the old covenant, in these words, Thou shalt love thy God, that is to say, God, as being the peculiar King of Abraham and his seed; and all the laws natural and civil, in these words, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. For he that loves God and his neighbour, hath a mind to obey all laws, both divine and human. But God requires no more than a mind to obey. We have

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20. Now a Church, which hath personal rights and proper actions attributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be understood, Tell it to the Church, and he that obeys not the Church, and all such like forms of speech, is to be defined so as by that word may be understood a multitude of men, who have made a new covenant with God in Christ, (that is to say) a multitude of them who have taken upon them the sacrament of baptism; which multitude may both lawfully be called together by some one into one place, and, he so calling them, are bound to be present either in person or by others. For a multitude of men, if they cannot meet in assembly when need requires, is not to be called a person. For a

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and he adds (verse 23):r Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained. But what binding and loosing, or remitting and retaining of sins, is, admits of some scruple. For first, to retain his sins, who being baptized into remission of sins, is truly penitent, seems to be against the very covenant itself of the New Testament; and therefore could not be done by Christ himself, much less by his pastors. And to remit the impenitent, seems to be against the will of God the Father, from whom Christ was sent to convert the world and to reduce men unto obedience. Furthermore, if each pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sins in this manner, all awe of

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and the like: the other, about questions of human science, whose truth is sought out by natural reason and syllogisms, drawn from the covenants of men, and definitions (that is to say, significations received by use and common consent of words) such as are all questions of right and philosophy; for example, when in matter of right it is questioned, whether there be a promise and covenant, or not, that is nothing else but to demand whether such words, spoken in such a manner, be by common use and consent of the subjects a promise or covenant; which if they be so called, then it is true that a contract is made; if not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men. In like manner, when it is demanded in philosophy, whether the

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(that is to say, significations received by use and common consent of words) such as are all questions of right and philosophy; for example, when in matter of right it is questioned, whether there be a promise and covenant, or not, that is nothing else but to demand whether such words, spoken in such a manner, be by common use and consent of the subjects a promise or covenant; which if they be so called, then it is true that a contract is made; if not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the compacts and consents of men. In like manner, when it is demanded in philosophy, whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once; the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men, about the

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ingratitude, contumely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby our neighbours are prejudiced; therefore also love, or charity, are g equivalent to obedience. Justice, also (which is a constant will of giving to every man his due) is equivalent with it. But that faith and repentance are sufficient for salvation, is manifest by the covenant itself of baptism. For they who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demanding him, what they should do? He answered (Acts 2. 38): Repent and be baptized over h one of you, in the name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins. There was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is to say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but to

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him, what they should do? He answered (Acts 2. 38): Repent and be baptized over h one of you, in the name of Jesus, for the remission of your sins. There was nothing therefore to be done for the obtaining of baptism, that is to say, for to enter into the kingdom of God, but to repent and believe in the name of JESUS; for the kingdom of heaven is promised by the covenant which is made in baptism. Furthermore, by the words of CHRIST, answering the lawyer who asked him what he should do to inherit eternal life (Luke 18. 20): Thou knowest the commandments: Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, &c.: which refer to obedience; and (Mark 10. 18):i Sell all that thou hast, and come and follow me: which relates to

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these, who believes not that God is, and that he governs the world; it is necessary, that the faith of God and of the Old Testament be contained in this faith of the New. Seeing therefore that atheism, and the denial of the Divine Providence, were the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the kingdom of God by nature; but idolatry also in the kingdom of God by the old covenant; now in this kingdom, wherein God rules by way of a new covenant, apostacy is also added, or the renunciation of this article once received, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Truly other doctrines, provided they have their determination from a lawful Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sin of disobedience. But it hath been fully declared before, that they are not needful to be

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the world; it is necessary, that the faith of God and of the Old Testament be contained in this faith of the New. Seeing therefore that atheism, and the denial of the Divine Providence, were the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the kingdom of God by nature; but idolatry also in the kingdom of God by the old covenant; now in this kingdom, wherein God rules by way of a new covenant, apostacy is also added, or the renunciation of this article once received, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Truly other doctrines, provided they have their determination from a lawful Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sin of disobedience. But it hath been fully declared before, that they are not needful to be believed with an inward faith.

12. Faith

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in matters spiritual, that is to say, those things which concern God's worship, some Christian Church is to be followed. For it is an hypothesis of the Christian faith, that God speaks not in things supernatural but by the way of Christian interpreters of holy Scriptures. But what? Must we resist princes, when we cannot obey them? Truly, no; for this is contrary to our civil covenant. What must we do then? Go to Christ by martyrdom; which if it seem to any man to be an z hard saying, most certain it is that he believes not with his whole heart, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST, the Son of the living God (for he would then desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ) but he would by a feigned Christian faith elude that obedience, which he hath contracted

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do worship in very deed: but they either stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawful sovereign. Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all times and everywhere, but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping God, beside the dictates of human reason; for then the will of the city stands for reason. But in the kingdom of God by way of covenant, whether old or new, where idolatry is expressly forbid, though the city commands us to worship thus, yet must we not do it. Which, if he shall consider, who conceived some repugnancy between this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so any longer.

20 In images made with hands.] In chap. 15. art. 14, there we have showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if

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this and art. 14, will surely cease to think so any longer.

20 In images made with hands.] In chap. 15. art. 14, there we have showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if it be done by the command of a city, to whom the written word of God is not known nor received, we have then showed this worship (in article 18) to be rational. But where God reigns by way of covenant, in which it is expressly warned not to worship thus, as in the covenant made with Abraham; there, whether it be with or without the command of the city, it is ill done.

21 I say, that to a Christian.] Although I conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it;

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In images made with hands.] In chap. 15. art. 14, there we have showed such a kind of worship to be irrational. But if it be done by the command of a city, to whom the written word of God is not known nor received, we have then showed this worship (in article 18) to be rational. But where God reigns by way of covenant, in which it is expressly warned not to worship thus, as in the covenant made with Abraham; there, whether it be with or without the command of the city, it is ill done.

21 I say, that to a Christian.] Although I conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my labour to make a more ample explication of it; because I perceive that being somewhat new, it may possibly be distasteful to

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Parliament, and did some of them more hurt to the King than if they had stayed where they were; for they had been so affrighted by such as you, with a panic fear of tyranny, that seeking to help him by way of composition and sharing, they abated the just and necessary indignation of his armies, by which only his right was to be recovered.

That very entering into the Covenant with the Scottish nation against the King, is by itself a very great crime, and you guilty of it. And so was the imposing of the Engagement, and you guilty of that also, as being done by the then Parliament, whose democratical principles you approved of.

You were also assisting to the Assembly of Divines that made the Directory, and which were afterwards put down by Oliver for

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zealous maintaining of controverted doctrines. And therefore I am verily persuaded, it was not his Divinity that displeased you or them, but somewhat else, which you are not willing to pretend. As for your party, that which angered you, I believe, was this passage of his Leviathan (vol. iii. p. 160); Whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, (this is it that angered you), even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act

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it was not his Divinity that displeased you or them, but somewhat else, which you are not willing to pretend. As for your party, that which angered you, I believe, was this passage of his Leviathan (vol. iii. p. 160); Whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, (this is it that angered you), even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.

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passage of his Leviathan (vol. iii. p. 160); Whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust. For there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, (this is it that angered you), even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile and unmanly disposition.

Besides, his making the King judge of doctrines to be preached or published, hath offended you both; so has also his attributing to the civil sovereign all power

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Thirdly, that it has power to correct all misdemeanours extrajudicial, tending to the breach of the peace, or oppression of the subjects, or raising of factions, controversies, debates, or any other manner of misgovernment. Fourthly, it may hold plea by writ out of the Chancery of all trespasses done vi et armis. Fifthly, it hath power to hold plea by bill for debt, detenue, covenant, promise, and all other personal actions. But of the jurisdiction of the King's Bench in actions real he says nothing; save, that if a writ in a real action be abated by judgment in the Court of Common Pleas, and that the judgment be by a writ of error reversed in the King's Bench, then the King's Bench may proceed upon the writ.

P. But how is the practice?

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at the names of things supernatural e. Chap. 12: How by deliberation from passions proceed men's actions f. Chap. 13: How by language men work upon each other's minds g. Of the condition of men in mere nature Chap. 14: Of the estate and right of nature Chap. 15: Of the divesting natural right by gift and covenant h. Of natural laws Chap. 16: Some of the laws of nature Chap. 17: Other laws of nature Chap. 18: A confirmation of the same out of the Word of God i. Chap. 19: Of the necessity and definition of a body politic Part II. 1. Concerning men as a body politic a. Of the generation and kinds of government

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all things, is one precept of nature. 3. What it is to relinquish and transfer one's right. 4. The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right.
5. Right not transferred by words de futuro only. 6. Words de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18.

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will to transfer, and the will to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right.
5. Right not transferred by words de futuro only. 6. Words de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.

1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon,

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both necessary to the passing away of right.
5. Right not transferred by words de futuro only. 6. Words de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.

1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon, by those that have hitherto written. For

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away of right.
5. Right not transferred by words de futuro only. 6. Words de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.

1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon, by those that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers

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futuro only. 6. Words de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.

1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon, by those that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the

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de futuro, together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7. Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust is of no validity in the estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.

1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon, by those that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of nature, do allege no

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as when one selleth upon trust; or else neither party performeth presently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should be any kind of contract besides these three. For either both the contractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other not.

9. In all contracts where there is trust, the promise of him that is trusted, is called a COVENANT. And this, though it be a promise, and of the time to come, yet doth it h transfer the right, when that time cometh, no less than an actual donation. For it is a manifest sign, that he which did perform, understood it was the will of him that was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon consideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants and signs of the will, or last act of

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such covenants be effectual; seeing he that performeth first shall have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the other, that may be compelled thereunto.

11. And forasmuch as in all covenants, and contracts, and donations, the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred, is necessary to the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence, are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures,

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all covenants, and contracts, and donations, the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred, is necessary to the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence, are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the

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to the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence, are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

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it is impossible to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence, are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

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of the same. First of all therefore it is impossible for any man to make a covenant with God Almighty, farther than it hath pleased him to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all

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and accept of the said covenant in his name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee

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Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a release of the covenant. And

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wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of common language.

12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all obligations are determinable at the

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either by the performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.

13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as are extorted from men by fear. As for example: whether, if a man for fear of death, have promised i to give a thief an

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But a covenant not to do, without time limited, which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And generally all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.

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is a release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.

13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as are extorted from men by fear. As for example: whether, if a man for fear of death, have promised i to give a thief an hundred pounds the next day, and not discover him, whether such covenant be obligatory or not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it is not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth no reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than that which we do for covetousness. For both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that proceedeth from fear of death, no

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reason, all obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.

13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as are extorted from men by fear. As for example: whether, if a man for fear of death, have promised i to give a thief an hundred pounds the next day, and not discover him, whether such covenant be obligatory or not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it is not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth no reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than that which we do for covetousness. For both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that proceedeth from fear of death, no conditions of peace between enemies, nor any laws could be of

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pounds the next day, and not discover him, whether such covenant be obligatory or not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it is not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth no reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than that which we do for covetousness. For both the one and the other maketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that proceedeth from fear of death, no conditions of peace between enemies, nor any laws could be of force; which are all consented to from that fear. For who would lose the liberty that nature hath given him, of governing himself by his own will and power, if they feared not death in the retaining of it? What prisoner in war might be trusted to seek his ransom, and ought

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nature hath given him, of governing himself by his own will and power, if they feared not death in the retaining of it? What prisoner in war might be trusted to seek his ransom, and ought not rather to be killed, if he were not tied by the grant of his life, to perform his promise? But after the introduction of policy and laws, the case may alter; for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden, then he that promiseth anything to a thief, not only may, but must refuse to perform it. But if the law forbid not the performance, but leave it to the will of the promiser, then is the performance still lawful: and the covenant of things lawful is obligatory, even towards a thief.

14. He that giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth to one, and after

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of his life, to perform his promise? But after the introduction of policy and laws, the case may alter; for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden, then he that promiseth anything to a thief, not only may, but must refuse to perform it. But if the law forbid not the performance, but leave it to the will of the promiser, then is the performance still lawful: and the covenant of things lawful is obligatory, even towards a thief.

14. He that giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth to one, and after giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth the same to another, maketh void the latter act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that right which he himself hath not; and that right he hath not, which he himself hath before transferred.

15.

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that putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature, that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him, in any other form or name, than what their own (which they think the true) religion teacheth them.

17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the covenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater danger, and of greater punishment.

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oath. For though all men may know by nature, that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that they swear by him, in any other form or name, than what their own (which they think the true) religion teacheth them.

17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the covenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater danger, and of greater punishment.

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carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater danger, and of greater punishment.

18.j Covenants and oaths are de voluntariis, that is, de possibilibus. Nor can the covenantee understand the covenanter to promise impossibles; for they fall not under deliberation: and consequently (by chap. 13, sect. 10, which maketh the covenantee interpreter), no covenant is understood to bind further, than to our best endeavour, either in performance of the thing promised, or in something equivalent.

a men are carried away.

b of passions.

c men having right.

d lands.

e lands.

f cause of transferring... is in the one.

g time

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also were not a law of the same Nature, That every man is obliged to stand to, and perform, those covenants which c he maketh. For what benefit is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the right of taking back what he hath given?

2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call INJURY, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore called UNJUST. For it is action or omission, without jus, or right; which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments

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is a great similitude between that we call injury, or injustice in the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not d to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant,

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and that which is called absurd in the arguments and disputations of the Schools. For as he, that is driven to contradict an assertion by him before maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not d to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an

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passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he promised not d to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For

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by covenant he promised not d to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice. And there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so called; for he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time to come; and he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master,

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he that doth any action, willeth it in that present, which is part of the future time, contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was

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contained in the covenant: and therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury: for injury consisteth in violation of covenant, by

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he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the not doing of the same thing, at the same time; which is a plain contradiction. And so injury is an absurdity of conversation, as absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.

3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury: for injury consisteth in violation of covenant, by the definition thereof.

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3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage) the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury: for injury consisteth in violation of covenant, by the definition thereof.

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the covenant was made. For example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and doth not; though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury: for injury consisteth in violation of covenant, by the definition thereof.

4. The names of just, unjust, justice, injustice, are equivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with no injury, and injury; and denominate the action just, or unjust, but not the man so; for they denominate him guilty, or not guilty. But when justice and

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side, neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for distributive justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits; seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure: it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be further extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

6. It happeneth many times that a man benefitteth i or contributeth to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less

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for distributive justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our own benefits; seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own, because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure: it can be no injury to any man, though our liberality be further extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

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injury to any man, though our liberality be further extended towards another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant: and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant, and not in the inequality of distribution.

6. It happeneth many times that a man benefitteth i or contributeth to the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby he may procure a greater, or no less benefit or assistance j to himself. For by necessity of nature every man doth in all his voluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is a law of nature, That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his charity, or good affection

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But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.

7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of this law of nature is not to be called injury; it hath another name (viz.) INGRATITUDE.

8. It is also a law of nature, That every man do help and endeavour to accommodate each other, as far as may be without danger of their persons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend themselves. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed from those

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in which are the numbers of men to whom they are made. And this is it men mean by distributive justice, and is properly termed EQUITY. The breach of this law is d that which the Greeks call {Pleonexia}, which is commonly rendered covetousness, but seemeth to be more precisely expressed by the word ENCROACHING.

3.e If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is, That such things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to the numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation when the quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the thing to be used in common not sufficient for them that are to use it without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the rest, that equality is

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same, or without limitation when the quantity thereof sufficeth. For first supposing the thing to be used in common not sufficient for them that are to use it without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the rest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws of nature, without any other covenant antecedent; for a man may have given away his right of common, and so the case be altered.

4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common, the rule of nature must needs be one of these: lot, or alternate use; for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be imagined. And for alternate use, he that beginneth hath the advantage; and

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to their former estate of hostility. For the taking away of which controversies, it is necessary that there be some common arbitrator and judge, to whose sentence both the parties to the controversy f ought to stand. And therefore it is a law of nature, That in every controversy, the parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence he shall give therein. For where every man is his own judge, there properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out his own right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at all; and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy, and therefore the right of hostility remaineth.

7. An ARBITRATOR therefore or

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7. An ARBITRATOR therefore or judge is he g that is trusted by the parties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth: first, that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in that case he is party,h and ought by the same reason to be judged by another; secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the

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the same by the declaration of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth: first, that the judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in that case he is party,h and ought by the same reason to be judged by another; secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other. Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just; for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature requireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if for favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than he thinketh

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and readiness to perform is taken for the performance.

11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not numbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many precedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a law of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so alter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by changing the circumstances, that that which was reason before, may afterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For though every man be bound to allow equality to another; yet if that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself inferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior, he

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one jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be fulfilled.

5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm 15, where the question being asked, verse 1, Lord who shall dwell in thy tabernacle, &c., it is answered, verse 4, He that sweareth to his own hindrance, and yet changeth not. And that men ought to be grateful,a where no covenant passeth, Deut. 25, 4: Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn, which St. Paul (1 Cor. 9, 9) interpreteth not of oxen, but of men.

6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the foundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table of the divine law, Matth. 22, 39, 40: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two laws depend the

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and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another, nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease; whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord, such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of covenant. And therefore no wonder if such irrational creatures, as govern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind, that do it by arbitrary institution.

6. It remaineth therefore still that consent (by which I understand the concurrence of many men's wills to one action) is not sufficient security for their common peace, without the erection of

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chapt. 12, sect. 8 to be the involving or including the wills of many in the will of one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of men, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of one COUNCIL; for a council is nothing else but an assembly of men deliberating concerning something common to them all.

7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do; and to do no action which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And farther: in case it be a council whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man

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making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do; and to do no action which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And farther: in case it be a council whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man,e being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the

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that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do; and to do no action which he or they shall forbid, or command them not to do. And farther: in case it be a council whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man,e being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself

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farther: in case it be a council whose commands they covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth. And though the will of man,e being not voluntary, but the beginning of voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey; and hereby, he that is to command may by the use of all their means and strength, be able by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and concord amongst themselves.

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city whereof they are members have allowed them.

10. In all cities or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man or one council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their SOVEREIGN, and his power the sovereign power; which consisteth in the power and the strength that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves, by covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood: that to transfer a man's power and strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called a SUBJECT (viz.), to the sovereign.

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subject hath right by his own judgment and discretion, to make use of his force; it is to be understood that every man hath the like, and consequently that there is no commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of a commonwealth, a man subjecteth i his will to the power of others, must appear from the end, namely security. For whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.

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whatsoever is necessary to be by covenant transferred for the attaining thereof, so much is transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure himself.

6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so covenant, nor are to be called laws; and leave men still in the estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion, there is no fear; the wills of most men will follow their passions of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them,

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8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by the means of this sword of justice that keeps them all in awe, are nevertheless in danger of enemies from without; if there be not some means found, to unite their strengths and natural forces in the resistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every member to contribute their several forces for the defence of the whole; whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible, for their defence. Now seeing that every man hath already transferred the use of his strength to him or them, that have the sword of justice; it followeth that the power of defence, that is to say the sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the

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and it must be so of necessity, because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons agreed upon; which agreement in a great multitude of men must consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a democracy.

2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant, between the sovereign and any subject. For while the democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then

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democracy is a making, there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any multitude (which supposeth union and sovereignty already made), it resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence, covenanteth to stand to and obey, whatsoever the major part of their whole number, or the major part of such a number of

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every man may come that will and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the people.

3. Out of this that hath been already b said, may readily be drawn: that whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject of the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury. For first, injury (by the definition, Part I. chap. 16, sect. 2) is breach of covenant; but covenants (as hath been said in the precedent section) there passed none from the people to any private man; and consequently it (viz. the people) can do him no injury. Secondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign demus shall do, is done by the will of every particular man subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore they style it injury,

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required to the making thereof but putting to the question one by one, the names of such men as it shall consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality of vote, to transfer that power which before the people had, to the number of men so named and chosen.

7. And from this manner of erecting an aristocracy it is manifest that the few or optimates, have entered into no covenant, with any of the particular members of the commonwealth whereof they are sovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man that can be called injury to him, howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before, section 3. Farther it is impossible that the people, as one body politic should covenant with the aristocracy or

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optimates, have entered into no covenant, with any of the particular members of the commonwealth whereof they are sovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man that can be called injury to him, howsoever their act be wicked before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before, section 3. Farther it is impossible that the people, as one body politic should covenant with the aristocracy or optimates, on whom they intend to transfer their sovereignty; for no sooner is the aristocracy erected, but the democracy is annihilated, and the covenants made unto them void.

8. In all aristocracies, the admission of such as are from time to time to have vote in the sovereign assembly, dependeth on the will and decree of the present optimates; for they being

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But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a right of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that purpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their conditional king to account, at their pleasure, and deprive him of his government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the condition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no covenant with a subject, be bound to continue him in the charge he undergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly for his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.

11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people, proceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath a double signification. In one sense it

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are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is.

g have declared.

h conditions.

i also deest.

j retaineth.

CHAPTER 3.

a 1, 2. Titles to dominion. Master and servant defined. 3. Chains and other material bonds a presumption of no bond by covenant. Slave defined.
4. Servants have no property against their lord, but may have one against another. 5. The master hath right to alienate his servant. 6. The servant of the servant is servant of the master. 7. How servitude is discharged. 8. The middle lord cannot discharge his servant of obedience to the supreme lord.
9. The title of man to his dominion over beasts.

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last chapters; for from thence cometh the right of sovereigns over their subjects in a commonwealth institutive. Concerning the second title (which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of death), thereby accrueth a right of dominion. For where every man (as it happeneth in this case) hath right to all things, there needs no more for the making of the said right effectual, but a covenant from him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus cometh the victor to have a b right of absolute dominion over the conquered. By which there is presently constituted a little body politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which is called the MASTER, or lord; the other subject, which is called the SERVANT. And when a man hath acquired right

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is called the SERVANT. And when a man hath acquired right over a number of servants so considerable, as they cannot by their neighbours be securely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.

3. And it is to be understood: that when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they show the servant is not trusted. But covenant (Part I. chapt. 15, sect. 9) supposeth trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever. This kind of servant is that which

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their neighbours be securely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.

3. And it is to be understood: that when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they show the servant is not trusted. But covenant (Part I. chapt. 15, sect. 9) supposeth trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without passion, is called a SLAVE. The Romans had no such distinct name, but comprehended all under the

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is a kingdom despotical.

3. And it is to be understood: that when a servant taken in the wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in prison; there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his master; for those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the verbal bonds of covenant; and they show the servant is not trusted. But covenant (Part I. chapt. 15, sect. 9) supposeth trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means soever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without passion, is called a SLAVE. The Romans had no such distinct name, but comprehended all under the name of servus; whereof such as they loved and

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whereof such as they loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at liberty, and admitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in their affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it was amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations; the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without covenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or other like forcible custody.

4. A master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over those, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he keepeth in bonds and imprisonment; and hath absolute dominion over both; and may

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admitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in their affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise restrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it was amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations; the former sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without covenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or other like forcible custody.

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what the captive transferreth to him) setteth again at liberty, by transferring back the same. And this kind of release is called MANUMISSION. Secondly, by exile; for that is no more but manumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but punishment. Thirdly, by new c captivity, where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience; for no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but

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back the same. And this kind of release is called MANUMISSION. Secondly, by exile; for that is no more but manumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but punishment. Thirdly, by new c captivity, where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience; for no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the obligation in

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Thirdly, by new c captivity, where the servant having done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life, entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience; for no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the obligation in foro interno, and therefore if he can get loose, may lawfully go his way.

8. But servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate lord, are not

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in them, having transferred his right before to another, namely to his own and supreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant, doth he thereby release the servants d of their obligation to him that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a release (which is the discharge of a covenant) the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made.

9. This right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another, so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures. For if a man in the state of nature, be in hostility with men, and thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill, according as his own conscience and discretion shall suggest unto him for his

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another, namely to his own and supreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate servant, doth he thereby release the servants d of their obligation to him that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth again the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a release (which is the discharge of a covenant) the right standeth as it did before the covenant was made.

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dominion over the child is originally the right of the mother. 2. Pre-eminence of sex giveth not the child to the father, rather than the mother. 3. The title of the father or mother to the person of the child, is not the generation but the preservation of it. 4. The child of a woman-servant is the dominion of her master. 5. The right to the child given from the mother sometimes by express covenant. 6. The child of the concubine not in the power of the father by that title. 7. The child of the husband and the wife in the power of the father. 8. The father, or he or she that bringeth up the child, have absolute power over him. 9. Freedom in subjects what it is. 10. A great family is a patrimonial kingdom. 11. Succession of the sovereign power, absolute disposable by will. 12. Though

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For else it would be wisdom in men, rather to let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in their danger or subjection, when they are grown.

4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the absolute subjection of the mother; another, by some particular covenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection. By absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her child, according to section 6, chapt. 3, whether he be the father thereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master in perpetuum.

5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and woman, there be some

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rather to let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in their danger or subjection, when they are grown.

4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child by the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the absolute subjection of the mother; another, by some particular covenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection. By absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her child, according to section 6, chapt. 3, whether he be the father thereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods of the master in perpetuum.

5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and woman, there be some which are made for a time and some for life;

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5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and woman, there be some which are made for a time and some for life; and where they are for a time,b they are covenants of cohabitation, or else of copulation only. And in this latter case, the children pass by covenants particular. And thus in the copulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by covenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the females.

6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or for society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the woman called a CONCUBINE. And here also the child shall be his or hers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant; for although for the most part a concubine is supposed to yield up the

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in the copulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by covenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the females.

6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or for society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the woman called a CONCUBINE. And here also the child shall be his or hers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant; for although for the most part a concubine is supposed to yield up the right of her children to the father, yet doth not concubinate enforce so much.

7. But if the covenants of cohabitation be for society of all things, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of all that is common to them both; without which (as hath been often said before) society cannot last. And

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and friends of the monarch, may with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or oppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but many have power of taking men out of the hands of justice; and no man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according to their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves without farther speaking, as a tacit covenant: Hodie mihi, cras tibi.

7. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws; concerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that the laws may be altered, according as men's manners change, or as the conjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth shall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it proceedeth from the

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himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as is required thereto. And the difficulty is this: we have amongst us the Word of God for the rule of our actions; now if we shall subject ourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as shall be by them commanded; when the commands of God and man shall differ, we are to obey God, rather than man: and consequently the covenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.

2. This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the world. There was no such dilemma amongst the Jews; for their civil law, and divine law, was one and the same law of Moses: the interpreters whereof were the priests, whose power was subordinate to the power of the king; as was the power of Aaron to the

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of his obedience thereby, or not, in matters of religion. In which case it seemeth reasonable to think, that since all covenants of obedience are entered into for the preservation of a man's life, if a man be content, without resistance to lay down his life, rather than to u obey the commands of an infidel; in so hard a case he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. For no covenant bindeth farther than to endeavour; and if a man cannot assure himself to perform a just duty, when thereby he is assured of present death, much less can it be expected that a man should perform that, for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned eternally. And thus much concerning the scruple of conscience that may arise concerning obedience to human laws, in them that interpret

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the laws civil; that it appointeth magistrates and public ministers, and that it implieth a universal impunity. How can b he or they be said to be subject to the laws which they may abrogate at their pleasure, or break without fear of punishment? And this error seemeth to proceed from this, that men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this word law, confounding law and covenant, as if they signified c the same thing. But law implieth a command; covenant is but a promise. And not every command is a law, but only (Part I., chap. 13, sect. 6) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action was commanded, not because it

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a universal impunity. How can b he or they be said to be subject to the laws which they may abrogate at their pleasure, or break without fear of punishment? And this error seemeth to proceed from this, that men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this word law, confounding law and covenant, as if they signified c the same thing. But law implieth a command; covenant is but a promise. And not every command is a law, but only (Part I., chap. 13, sect. 6) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action was commanded, not because it was hurtful of itself; and doing contrary to a command, were not at all hurtful, if

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in A; idemque legitur in B.

e their duties, which are the magistrates.

f besides these considerations.

g out of the.

h the opinions.

i yet deest.

CHAPTER 10.

a 1. All expressions of the mind concerning future actions, are either covenant, counsel, or command. 2. The difference between a law and a covenant. 3. The command of him whose command is law in one thing, is law in every thing. 4. The difference between law and counsel. 5. The difference between jus and lex. 6. The division of laws into divine, natural, and civil; written and unwritten; simple and penal. 7. That the divine moral law, and the law of

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are the magistrates.

f besides these considerations.

g out of the.

h the opinions.

i yet deest.

CHAPTER 10.

a 1. All expressions of the mind concerning future actions, are either covenant, counsel, or command. 2. The difference between a law and a covenant. 3. The command of him whose command is law in one thing, is law in every thing. 4. The difference between law and counsel. 5. The difference between jus and lex. 6. The division of laws into divine, natural, and civil; written and unwritten; simple and penal. 7. That the divine moral law, and the law of nature, is the same. 8. That the civil laws are the common measure of

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of the mind, concerning some action future to be done, or omitted. And all declarations and expressions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions, are either promissive, as I will do, or not do; or provisive, as for example, If this be done or not done, this will follow; or imperative, as Do this, or do it not. In the first sort of these expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second, consisteth counsel; in the third, command.

2. It is evident, when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit

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he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration b of a man's own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ; and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a

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and that there be no reason why the will or pleasure of another should be of any weight in his deliberation, that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration b of a man's own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ; and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is

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that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration b of a man's own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ; and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant

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whatsoever is a law to a man, respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a covenant is the declaration b of a man's own will. And therefore a law and a covenant differ; and though they be both obligatory, and a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a law, standeth thus: in simple covenants c the action to be done, or not done, is first

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a law obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a law, standeth thus: in simple covenants c the action to be done, or not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the promise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not to do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not done, followeth after.

3. And from this may be deduced,

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covenant made by him who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or omission, especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a law, standeth thus: in simple covenants c the action to be done, or not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the promise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not to do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not done, followeth after.

3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a paradox: that the

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As for the law of nations, it is the same with the law of nature. For that which is the law of nature between man and man, before the constitution of commonwealth, is the law of nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.

a Ch. 10. Argum. mutilatum ut supra.

b is a declaration.

c simple covenant.

d with them that they are counselled. C: and are angry with them that are Counsel; therefore in A intercal. Hobb. manu.

e when counsel should give... adviseth to, because the reason thereof itself is no more.

f but for things... can be said to be done.

g as for

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spiritual domination, hath there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place.j

From the propagation of religion, it is not hard to understand the causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an opinion of a deity, and powers invisible, and supernatural; that can never be so

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the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that hath the general command of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place.j

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the right; as in buying and selling with ready money; or exchange of goods, or lands: and it may be delivered some time after.

Again, one of the contractors, may deliver the thing contracted for on his part, and leave the other to perform his part at some determinate time after, and in the mean time be trusted; and then the contract on his part, is called PACT, or COVENANT: or both parts may contract now, to perform hereafter: in which cases, he that is to perform in time to come, being trusted, his performance is called keeping of promise, or faith; and the failing of performance (if it be voluntary) violation of faith.

When the transferring of right, is not mutual; but one of the parties transferreth, in hope to gain thereby friendship, or

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of right; and therefore he that promiseth only, because he hath already received the benefit for which he promiseth, is to be understood as if he intended the right should pass: for unless he had been content to have his words so understood, the other would not have performed his part first. And for that cause, in buying, and selling, and other acts of contract, a promise is equivalent to a covenant; and therefore obligatory.

He that performeth first in the case of a contract, is said to MERIT that which he is to receive by the performance of the other; and he hath it as due. Also when a prize is propounded to many, which is to be given to him only that winneth; or money is thrown amongst many, to be enjoyed by them that catch it; though this be a free

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I say, I think is the meaning of that distinction; but because disputers do not agree upon the signification of their own terms of art, longer than it serves their turn; I will not affirm any thing of their meaning: only this I say; when a gift is given indefinitely, as a prize to be contended for, he that winneth meriteth, and may claim the prize as due.

If a covenant be made, wherein neither of the parties perform presently, but trust one another; in the condition of mere nature, (which is a condition of war of every man against every man,) upon any reasonable suspicion, it is void: but if there be a common power set over them both, with right and force sufficient to compel performance, it is not void. For he that performeth first, has no assurance the

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be supposed. And therefore he which performeth first, does but betray himself to his enemy; contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that

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contrary to the right (he can never abandon) of defending his life, and means of living.

But in a civil estate, where there is a power set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that

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life, and means of living.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land, is understood to transfer the herbage, and

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set up to constrain those that would otherwise violate their faith, that fear is no more reasonable; and for that cause, he which by the covenant is to perform first, is obliged so to do.

The cause of fear, which maketh such a covenant invalid, must be always something arising after the covenant made; as some new fact, or other sign of the will not to perform: else it cannot make the covenant void. For that which could not hinder a man from promising, ought not to be admitted as a hindrance of performing.

He that transferreth any right, transferreth the means of enjoying it, as far as lieth in his power. As he that selleth land, is understood to transfer the herbage, and whatsoever grows upon it; nor can he that sells a mill turn away the stream that drives it. And they

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sovereignty, are understood to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.

To make covenants with brute beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of any translation of right; nor can translate any right to another: and without mutual acceptation, there is no covenant.

To make covenant with God, is impossible, but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural, or by his lieutenants that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it

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to give him the right of levying money to maintain soldiers; and of appointing magistrates for the administration of justice.

To make covenant with God, is impossible, but by mediation of such as God speaketh to, either by revelation supernatural, or by his lieutenants that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by

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that govern under him, and in his name: for otherwise we know not whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them.

The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; (for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove

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whether our covenants be accepted, or not. And therefore they that vow any thing contrary to any law of nature, vow in vain; as being a thing unjust to pay such vow. And if it be a thing commanded by the law of nature, it is not the vow, but the law that binds them.

The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; (for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid,

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The matter, or subject of a covenant, is always something that falleth under deliberation; (for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it self,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.

Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being forgiven. For

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(for to covenant, is an act of the will; that is to say an act, and the last act, of deliberation;) and is therefore always understood to be something to come; and which is judged possible for him that covenanteth, to perform.

And therefore, to promise that which is known to be impossible, is no covenant. But if that prove impossible afterwards, which before was thought possible, the covenant is valid, and bindeth, (though not to the thing it self,) yet to the value; or, if that also be impossible, to the unfeigned endeavour of performing as much as is possible: for to more no man can be obliged.

Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being forgiven. For performance, is the natural end of obligation; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as

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to more no man can be obliged.

Men are freed of their covenants two ways; by performing; or by being forgiven. For performance, is the natural end of obligation; and forgiveness, the restitution of liberty; as being a retransferring of that right, in which the obligation consisted.

Covenants entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other law (as in the condition, of mere nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are

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entered into by fear, in the condition of mere nature, are obligatory. For example, if I covenant to pay a ransom, or service for my life, to an enemy; I am bound by it. For it is a contract, wherein one receiveth the benefit of life; the other is to receive money, or service for it; and consequently, where no other law (as in the condition, of mere nature) forbiddeth the performance, the covenant is valid. Therefore prisoners of war, if trusted with the payment of their ransom, are obliged to pay it: and if a weaker prince, make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless (as hath been said before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by

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peace with a stronger, for fear; he is bound to keep it; unless (as hath been said before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today, hath it not to pass tomorrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have

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to keep it; unless (as hath been said before) there ariseth some new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down

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new, and just cause of fear, to renew the war. And even in commonwealths, if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money, I am bound to pay it, till the civil law discharge me. For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A former covenant, makes void a later. For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today, hath it not to pass tomorrow to another: and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.

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whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation, the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear: and what I lawfully covenant, I cannot lawfully break.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, (the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus,

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and therefore the later promise passeth no right, but is null.

A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, (the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is

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A covenant not to defend myself from force, by force, is always void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, (the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to

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void. For (as I have showed before) no man can transfer, or lay down his right to save himself from death, wounds, and imprisonment, (the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right, and therefore the promise of not resisting force, in no covenant transferreth any right; nor is obliging. For though a man may covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, kill me; he cannot covenant thus, unless I do so, or so, I will not resist you, when you come to kill me. For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such

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For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil, which is danger of death in resisting; rather than the greater, which is certain and present death in not resisting. And this is granted to be true by all men, in that they lead criminals to execution, and prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law, by which they are condemned.

A covenant to accuse one self, without assurance of pardon, is likewise invalid. For in the condition of nature, where every man is judge, there is no place for accusation: and in the civil state, the accusation is followed with punishment; which being force, a man is not obliged not to resist. The same is also true, of the accusation of those, by whose condemnation a man falls into misery; as of a

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man, his own religion: which hath place in the nature of man before civil society. The latter hath not so; at least not place enough, to keep men to their promises; because in the condition of mere nature, the inequality of power is not discerned, but by the event of battle. So that before the time of civil society, or in the interruption thereof by war, there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on, against the temptations of avarice, ambition, lust, or other strong desire, but the fear of that invisible power, which they every one worship as God; and fear as a revenger of their perfidy. All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power, is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth: which swearing, or OATH, is a form of

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yet they would have it thereby understood, they attributed to them divine honour. And that swearing unnecessarily by God, is but prophaning of his name: and swearing by other things, as men do in common discourse, is not swearing, but an impious custom, gotten by too much vehemence of talking.

It appears also, that the oath adds nothing to the obligation. For a covenant, if lawful, binds in the sight of God, without the oath, as much as with it: if unlawful, bindeth not at all; though it be confirmed with an oath.

CHAPTER 15. OF OTHER LAWS OF NATURE.

From that law of nature, by which we are obliged to transfer to another, such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men

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such rights, as being retained, hinder the peace of mankind, there followeth a third; which is this, that men perform their covenants made: without which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

But because covenants of mutual

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which, covenants are in vain, and but empty words; and the right of all men to all things remaining, we are still in the condition of war.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former chapter,) are invalid; though the original of justice be

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of war.

And in this law of nature, consisteth the fountain and original of JUSTICE. For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to every thing; and consequently, no action can be unjust. But when a covenant is made, then to break it is unjust: and the definition of INJUSTICE, is no other than the not performance of covenant. And whatsoever is not unjust, is just.

But because covenants of mutual trust, where there is a fear of not performance on either part, (as hath been said in the former chapter,) are invalid; though the original of justice be the making of covenants; yet injustice actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are

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actually there can be none, till the cause of such fear be taken away; which while men are in the natural condition of war, cannot be done. Therefore before the names of just, and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power, to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant; and to make good that propriety, which by mutual contract men acquire, in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a commonwealth. And this is also to be gathered out of the ordinary definition of justice in the Schools: for they say, that justice is the constant will of giving to every man his own. And therefore where there

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his own strength, or wit, to defend himself from destruction, without the help of confederates; where every one expects the same defence by the confederation, that any one else does: and therefore he which declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him, can in reason expect no other means of safety, than what can be had from his own single power. He therefore that breaketh his covenant, and consequently declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so, cannot be received into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by the error of them that receive him; nor when he is received, be retained in it, without seeing the danger of their error; which errors a man cannot reasonably reckon upon as the means of his security: and therefore if he be left, or

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and consequently against the reason of his preservation; and so, as all men that contribute not to his destruction, forbear him only out of ignorance of what is good for themselves.

As for the instance of gaining the secure and perpetual felicity of heaven, by any way; it is frivolous: there being but one way imaginable; and that is not breaking, but keeping of covenant.

And for the other instance of attaining sovereignty by rebellion; it is manifest, that though the event follow, yet because it cannot reasonably be expected, but rather the contrary; and because by gaining it so, others are taught to gain the same in like manner, the attempt thereof is against reason. Justice therefore, that is to say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason, by

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not breaking, but keeping of covenant.

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say, keeping of covenant, is a rule of reason, by which we are forbidden to do any thing destructive to our life; and consequently a law of nature.

There be some that proceed further; and will not have the law of nature, to be those rules which conduce to the preservation of man's life on earth; but to the attaining of an eternal felicity after death; to which they think the breach of covenant may conduce; and consequently be just and reasonable; (such are they that think it a work of merit to kill, or depose, or rebel against, the sovereign power constituted over them by their own consent.) But because there is no natural knowledge of man's estate after death; much less of the reward that is then to be given to breach of faith; but only a belief grounded upon other men's saying,

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men's saying, that they know it supernaturally, or that they know those, that knew them, that knew others, that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature.

Others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others: and this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it.

The names of just, and injust, when they are attributed to men, signify one thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, they signify

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that knew it supernaturally; breach of faith cannot be called a precept of reason, or nature.

Others, that allow for a law of nature, the keeping of faith, do nevertheless make exception of certain persons; as heretics, and such as use not to perform their covenant to others: and this also is against reason. For if any fault of a man, be sufficient to discharge our covenant made; the same ought in reason to have been sufficient to have hindered the making of it.

The names of just, and injust, when they are attributed to men, signify one thing; and when they are attributed to actions, another. When they are attributed to men, they signify conformity, or inconformity of manners, to reason. But when they are attributed to actions, they signify the

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of the same, (which is also called injury,) gives them but the name of guilty.

Again, the injustice of manners, is the disposition, or aptitude to do injury; and is injustice before it proceed to act; and without supposing any individual person injured. But the injustice of an action, (that is to say injury,) supposeth an individual person injured; namely him, to whom the covenant was made: and therefore many times the injury is received by one man, when the damage redoundeth to another. As when the master commandeth his servant to give money to a stranger; if it be not done, the injury is done to the master, whom he had before covenanted to obey; but the damage redoundeth to the stranger, to whom he had no obligation; and therefore could not injure him. And so also

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whereby they are endamaged; because the detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence, are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.

Justice of actions, is by writers divided into commutative, and distributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical; the latter in proportion

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the detaining of debt, is an injury to themselves; but robbery and violence, are injuries to the person of the commonwealth.

Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.

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Whatsoever is done to a man, conformable to his own will signified to the doer, is no injury to him. For if he that doeth it, hath not passed away his original right to do what he please, by some antecedent covenant, there is no breach of covenant; and therefore no injury done him. And if he have; then his will to have it done being signified, is a release of that covenant: and so again there is no injury done him.

Justice of actions, is by writers divided into commutative, and distributive: and the former they say consisteth in proportion arithmetical; the latter in proportion geometrical. Commutative therefore, they place in the equality of value of the things contracted for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men

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things contracted for; and distributive, in the distribution of equal benefit, to men of equal merit. As if it were injustice to sell dearer than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits. The value of all things contracted for, is measured by the appetite of the contractors: and therefore the just value, is that which they be contented to give. And merit, (besides that which is by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive,) is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the justice of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant,

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by covenant, where the performance on one part, meriteth the performance of the other part, and falls under justice commutative, not distributive,) is not due by justice; but is rewarded of grace only. And therefore this distinction, in the sense wherein it useth to be expounded, is not right. To speak properly, commutative justice, is the justice of a contractor; that is, a performance of covenant, in buying, and selling; hiring, and letting to hire; lending, and borrowing; exchanging, bartering, and other acts of contract.

And distributive justice, the justice of an arbitrator; that is to say, the act of defining what is just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him arbitrator,) if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own:

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the act of defining what is just. Wherein, (being trusted by them that make him arbitrator,) if he perform his trust, he is said to distribute to every man his own: and this is indeed just distribution, and may be called, (though improperly,) distributive justice; but more properly equity; which also is a law of nature, as shall be shown in due place.

As justice dependeth on antecedent covenant; so does GRATITUDE depend on antecedent grace; that is to say, antecedent free-gift: and is the fourth law of nature; which may be conceived in this form, that a man which receiveth benefit from another of mere grace, endeavour that he which giveth it, have no reasonable cause to repent him of his good will. For no man giveth, but with intention of good to himself; because gift is

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or trust; nor consequently of mutual help; nor of reconciliation of one man to another; and therefore they are to remain still in the condition of war; which is contrary to the first and fundamental law of nature, which commandeth men to seek peace. The breach of this law, is called ingratitude; and hath the same relation to grace, that injustice hath to obligation by covenant.

A fifth law of nature, is COMPLAISANCE; that is to say, that every man strive to accommodate himself to the rest. For the understanding whereof, we may consider, that there is in men's aptness to society, a diversity of nature, rising from their diversity of affections; not unlike to that we see in stones brought together for building of an edifice. For as that stone which by

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And because, though men be never so willing to observe these laws, there may nevertheless arise questions concerning a man's action; first, whether it were done, or not done; secondly, (if done,) whether against the law, or not against the law; the former whereof, is called a question of fact; the latter a question of right; therefore unless the parties to the question, covenant mutually to stand to the sentence of another, they are as far from peace as ever. This other, to whose sentence they submit, is called an ARBITRATOR. And therefore it is of the law of nature, that they that are at controversy, submit their right to the judgment of an arbitrator.

And seeing every man is presumed to do all things in order to his own benefit, no man is a fit

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in Greek {kyrios}; speaking of actions, is called author. And as the right of possession, is called dominion; so the right of doing any action, is called AUTHORITY. So that by authority, is always understood a right of doing any act: and done by authority, done by commission, or licence from him whose right it is.

From hence it followeth, that when the actor maketh a covenant by authority, he bindeth thereby the author, no less than if he had made it himself; and no less subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. 14) of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from

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the consequences of the same. And therefore all that hath been said formerly, (chap. 14) of the nature of covenants between man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.

When the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author

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man and man in their natural capacity, is true also when they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.

When the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature: for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do

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they are made by their actors, representers, or procurators, that have authority from them, so far forth as is in their commission, but no farther.

And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.

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And therefore he that maketh a covenant with the actor, or representer, not knowing the authority he hath, doth it at his own peril. For no man is obliged by a covenant, whereof he is not author; nor consequently by a covenant made against, or beside the authority he gave.

When the actor doth any thing against the law of nature by command of the author, if he be obliged by former covenant to obey him, not he, but the author breaketh the law of nature: for though the action be against the law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such

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against, or beside the authority he gave.

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gave.

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word; then is

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be against the law of nature; yet it is not his: but contrarily, to refuse to do it, is against the law of nature, that forbiddeth breach of covenant.

And he that maketh a covenant with the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned,

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the author, by mediation of the actor, not knowing what authority he hath, but only takes his word; in case such authority be not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself.

There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge,

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not made manifest unto him upon demand, is no longer obliged: for the covenant made with the author, is not valid, without his counter-assurance. But if he that so covenanteth, knew beforehand he was to expect no other assurance, than the actor's word; then is the covenant valid; because the actor in this case maketh himself the author. And therefore, as when the authority is evident, the covenant obligeth the author, not the actor; so when the authority is feigned, it obligeth the actor only; there being no author but himself.

There are few things, that are incapable of being represented by fiction. Inanimate things, as a church, an hospital, a bridge, may be personated by a rector, master, or overseer. But things inanimate, cannot be authors, nor therefore give authority to

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and interests of men, it becomes oftentimes, and in cases of the greatest consequence, a mute person, and unapt, as for many things else, so for the government of a multitude, especially in time of war.

Of authors there be two sorts. The first simply so called; which I have before defined to be him, that owneth the action of another simply. The second is he, that owneth an action, or covenant of another conditionally; that is to say, he undertaketh to do it, if the other doth it not, at, or before a certain time. And these authors conditional, are generally called SURETIES, in Latin fidejussores, and sponsores; and particularly for debt, praedes; and for appearance before a judge, or magistrate, vades.

PART 2. OF

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distinguish between injury, and damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one

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not offended with their fellows: whereas man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease: for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom, and control the actions of them that govern the commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is natural; that of men, is by covenant only, which is artificial: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (besides covenant) to make their agreement constant and lasting; which is a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit.

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth,

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one to own, and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person, shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all, in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COMMONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS. This is

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I shall speak of a commonwealth by institution.

a shown) in chapter 13, to.

b and endeavour.

c perform.

CHAPTER 18. OF THE RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS BY INSTITUTION.

A commonwealth is said to be instituted, when a multitude of men do agree, and covenant, every one, with every one, that to whatsoever man, or assembly of men, shall be given by the major part, the right to present the person of them all, (that is to say, to be their representative;) every one, as well he that voted for it, as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgments, of that man, or

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of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign a power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore,

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to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.

From this institution of a commonwealth are derived all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign a power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast

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all the rights, and faculties of him, or them, on whom the sovereign a power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another

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a power is conferred by the consent of the people assembled.

First, because they covenant, it is to be understood, they are not obliged by former covenant to any thing repugnant hereunto. And consequently they that have already instituted a commonwealth, being thereby bound by covenant, to own the actions, and judgments of one, cannot lawfully make a new covenant, amongst themselves, to be obedient to any other, in any thing whatsoever, without his permission. And therefore, they that are subjects to a monarch, cannot without his leave cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to

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cast off monarchy, and return to the confusion of a disunited multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man, or other assembly of men: for they are bound, every man to every man, to own, and be reputed author of all, that he that already is their sovereign, shall do, and judge fit to be done: so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their covenant made to that man, which is injustice: and they have also every man given the sovereignty to him that beareth their person; and therefore if they depose him, they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice. Besides, if he that attempteth to depose his sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the

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his sovereign, be killed, or punished by him for such attempt, he is author of his own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and

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own punishment, as being by the institution, author of all his sovereign shall do: and because it is injustice for a man to do any thing, for which he may be punished by his own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, because the right of

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own authority, he is also upon that title, unjust. And whereas some men have pretended for their disobedience to their sovereign, a new covenant, made, not with men, but with God; this also is unjust: for there is no covenant with God, but by mediation of somebody that representeth God's person; which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

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which none doth but God's lieutenant, who hath the sovereignty under God. But this pretence of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party

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of covenant with God, is so evident a lie, even in the pretenders'own consciences, that it is not only an act of an unjust, but also of a vile, and unmanly disposition.

Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one

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Secondly, because the right of bearing the person of them all, is given to him they make sovereign, by covenant only of one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because

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one to another, and not of him to any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because

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any of them; there can happen no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign; and consequently none of his subjects, by any pretence of forfeiture, can be freed from his subjection. That he which is made sovereign maketh no covenant with his subjects beforehand, is manifest; because either he must make it with the whole multitude, as one party to the covenant; or he must make a several covenant with every man. With the whole, as one party, it is impossible; because as yet they are not one person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right

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person: and if he make so many several covenants as there be men, those covenants after he hath the sovereignty are void, because what act soever can be pretended by any one of them for breach thereof, is the act both of himself, and of all the rest, because done in the person, and by the right of every one of them in particular. Besides, if any one, or more of them, pretend a breach of the covenant made by the sovereign at his institution; and others, or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to

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and others, or one other of his subjects, or himself alone, pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and

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pretend there was no such breach, there is in this case, no judge to decide the controversy; it returns therefore to the sword again; and every man recovereth the right of protecting himself by his own strength, contrary to the design they had in the institution. It is therefore in vain to grant sovereignty by way of precedent covenant. The opinion that any monarch receiveth his power by covenant, that is to say, on condition, proceedeth from want of understanding this easy truth, that covenants being but words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the

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words and breath, have no force to oblige, contain, constrain, or protect any man, but what it has from the public sword; that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are

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that is, from the untied hands of that man, or assembly of men that hath the sovereignty, and whose actions are avouched by them all, and performed by the strength of them all, in him united. But when an assembly of men is made sovereign; then no man imagineth any such covenant to have passed in the institution; for no man is so dull as to say, for example, the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans, to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions; which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to be alike in a monarchy, and in a popular government, proceedeth from the ambition of some, that are kinder to the government of an assembly, whereof they may hope to participate, than of monarchy, which they despair to

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the actions he shall do, or else justly be destroyed by the rest. For if he voluntarily entered into the congregation of them that were assembled, he sufficiently declared thereby his will, (and therefore tacitly covenanted) to stand to what the major part should ordain: and therefore if he refuse to stand thereto, or make protestation against any of their decrees, he does contrary to his covenant, and therefore unjustly. And whether he be of the congregation, or not; and whether his consent be asked, or not, he must either submit to their decrees, or be left in the condition of war he was in before; wherein he might without injustice be destroyed by any man whatsoever.

Fourthly, because every subject is by this institution author of all the actions, and

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that in a commonwealth once instituted, or acquired, promises proceeding from fear of death or violence, are no covenants, nor obliging, when the thing promised is contrary to the laws; but the reason is not, because it was made upon fear, but because he that promiseth, hath no right in the thing promised. Also, when he may lawfully perform, and doth not, it is not the invalidity of the covenant, that absolveth him, but the sentence of the sovereign. Otherwise, whensoever a man lawfully promiseth, he unlawfully breaketh: but when the sovereign, who is the actor, acquitteth him, then he is acquitted by him that extorted the promise, as by the author of such absolution.

But the rights, and consequences of sovereignty, are the same in both. His power cannot,

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and is the dominion of the master over his servant. And this dominion is then acquired to the victor, when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenanteth either in express words, or by other sufficient signs of the will, that so long as his life, and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof, at his pleasure. And after such covenant made, the vanquished is a SERVANT, and not before: for by the word servant, (whether it be derived from servire, to serve, or from servare, to save, which I leave to grammarians to dispute) is not meant a captive, which is kept in prison, or bonds, till the owner of him that took him, or bought him of one that did, shall consider what to do with him: (for such men,

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no obligation at all; but may break their bonds, or the prison; and kill, or carry away captive their master, justly:) but one, that being taken, hath corporal liberty allowed him; and upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him.

It is not therefore the victory, that giveth the right of dominion over the vanquished, but his own covenant. Nor is he obliged because he is conquered; that is to say, beaten, and taken, or put to flight; but because he cometh in, and submitteth to the victor; nor is the victor obliged by an enemy's rendering himself, (without promise of life,) to spare him for this his yielding to discretion; which obliges not the victor longer, than in his own discretion he shall think fit.

And that which

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For slaves that work in prisons, or fetters, do it not of duty, but to avoid the cruelty of their task-masters.

The master of the servant, is master also of all he hath; and may exact the use thereof; that is to say, of his goods, of his labour, of his servants, and of his children, as often as he shall think fit. For he holdeth his life of his master, by the covenant of obedience; that is, of owning, and authorizing whatsoever the master shall do. And in case the master, if he refuse, kill him, or cast him into bonds, or otherwise punish him for his disobedience, he is himself the author of the same; and cannot accuse him of injury.

In sum, the rights and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion, are the very same with

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to any thing but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion, is not subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said (for example) the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop. And when we say a gift is free, there is not meant any liberty of the gift, but of the giver, that was not bound by any law, or covenant to give it. So when we speak freely, it is not the liberty of voice, or pronunciation, but of the man, whom no law hath obliged to speak otherwise than he did. Lastly, from the use of the word free-will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in doing what he has the will,

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by the end for which he so submitteth;) the obligation, and liberty of the subject, is to be derived, either from those words, (or others equivalent;) or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty, namely, the peace of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by covenant of every one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest, that every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14th chapter, that covenants, not to defend a man's own body, are void. Therefore,

If the sovereign command a

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of the subjects within themselves, and their defence against a common enemy.

First therefore, seeing sovereignty by institution, is by covenant of every one to every one; and sovereignty by acquisition, by covenants of the vanquished to the victor, or child to the parent; it is manifest, that every subject has liberty in all those things, the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred. I have shewn before in the 14th chapter, that covenants, not to defend a man's own body, are void. Therefore,

If the sovereign command a man (though justly condemned,) to kill, wound, or maim himself; or not to resist those that assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty

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assault him; or to abstain from the use of food, air, medicine, or any other thing, without which he cannot live; yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.

If a man be interrogated by the sovereign, or his authority, concerning a crime done by himself, he is not bound (without assurance of pardon) to confess it; because no man (as I have shown in the same chapter) can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.

Again, the consent of a subject to sovereign power, is contained in these words, I authorize, or take upon me, all his actions; in which there is no restriction at all, of his own former natural liberty: for by allowing him to kill me, I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me. It is one thing to say, kill me, or my fellow, if you please;

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of judicature, of appointing officers, and councillors, of levying money, and the rest named in the 18th chapter.

The obligation of subjects to the sovereign, is understood to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can protect them, can by no covenant be relinquished. The sovereignty is the soul of the commonwealth; which once departed from the body, the members do no more receive their motion from it. The end of obedience is protection; which, wheresoever a man seeth it, either in his own, or in another's sword, nature applieth his obedience to it, and his endeavour to maintain it. And though sovereignty, in the intention of them that

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to be subject to the victor, he hath liberty to accept the condition; and having accepted it, is the subject of him that took him; because he had no other way to preserve himself. The case is the same, if he be detained on the same terms, in a foreign country. But if a man be held in prison, or bonds, or is not trusted with the liberty of his body; he cannot be understood to be bound by covenant to subjection; and therefore may, if he can, make his escape by any means whatsoever.

If a monarch shall relinquish the sovereignty, both for himself, and his heirs; his subjects return to the absolute liberty of nature; because, though nature may declare who are his sons, and who are the nearest of his kin; yet it dependeth on his own will, (as hath been said in

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The case is the same, if he die without known kindred, and without declaration of his heir. For then there can no heir be known, and consequently no subjection be due.

If the sovereign banish his subject; during the banishment, he is not subject. But he that is sent on a message, or hath leave to travel, is still subject; but it is, by contract between sovereigns, not by virtue of the covenant of subjection. For whosoever entereth into another's dominion, is subject to all the laws thereof; unless he have a privilege by the amity of the sovereigns, or by special licence.

If a monarch subdued by war, render himself subject to the victor; his subjects are delivered from their former obligation, and become obliged to the victor. But if he be held prisoner, or have not the

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counsel and command, one great difference is, that command is directed to a man's own benefit; and counsel to the benefit of another man. And from this ariseth another difference, that a man may be obliged to do what he is commanded; as when he hath covenanted to obey: but he cannot be obliged to do as he is counselled, because the hurt of not following it, is his own; or if he should covenant to follow it, then is the counsel turned into the nature of a command. A third difference between them is, that no man can pretend a right to be of another man's counsel; because he is not to pretend benefit by it to himself: but to demand right to counsel another, argues a will to know his designs, or to gain some other good to himself; which (as I said before) is of every man's will the

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to make them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power, and punishments to be ordained for such as shall break them; which ordinances are therefore part of the civil law. The law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the world. Reciprocally also, the civil law is a part of the dictates of nature. For justice, that is to say, performance of covenant, and giving to every man his own, is a dictate of the law of nature. But every subject in a commonwealth, hath covenanted to obey the civil law, (either one with another, as when they assemble to make a common representative, or with the representative it self one by one, when subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive life;) and therefore obedience to the civil law

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of him that commandeth, by voice, writing, or some other sufficient argument of the same, we may understand, that the command of the commonwealth is law only to those, that have means to take notice of it. Over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just, or unjust; because they had never power to make any covenant, or to understand the consequences thereof; and consequently never took upon them to authorize the actions of any sovereign, as they must do that make to themselves a commonwealth. And as those from whom nature, or accident hath taken away the notice of all laws in general; so also every man, from whom any accident, not proceeding from his own default, hath taken away the means to take

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before letters were in common use, the laws were many times put into verse; that the rude people taking pleasure in singing, or reciting them, might the more easily retain them in memory. And for the same reason Solomonb adviseth a man, to bind the ten commandments upon his ten fingers. And for the law which Moses gave to the people of Israel at the renewing of the covenant,c he biddeth them to teach it their children, by discoursing of it both at home, and upon the way; at going to bed, and at rising from bed; and to write it upon the posts, and doors of their houses; and (Deut.
31. 12) to assemble the people, man, woman, and child, to hear it read.

Nor is it enough the law be written, and published; but also that there be manifest

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law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same; and not a duty that we exhibit to God, but a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws; but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham (in a supernatural manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee. Abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law; which they could not be,

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a gift which God freely giveth to whom he pleaseth; as also unbelief is not a breach of any of his laws; but a rejection of them all, except the laws natural. But this that I say, will be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham (in a supernatural manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee. Abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law; which they could not be, but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who (if they be subject to no other earthly power,

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be made yet clearer, by the examples and testimonies concerning this point in holy Scripture. The covenant God made with Abraham (in a supernatural manner) was thus, (Gen. 17. 10) This is the covenant which thou shalt observe between me and thee and thy seed after thee. Abraham's seed had not this revelation, nor were yet in being; yet they are a party to the covenant, and bound to obey what Abraham should declare to them for God's law; which they could not be, but in virtue of the obedience they owed to their parents; who (if they be subject to no other earthly power, as here in the case of Abraham) have sovereign power over their children and servants. Again, where God saith to Abraham, In thee shall all nations of the earth be

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same authority to be a transgression of the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be disposed to obedience.

Before I infer any thing from this definition, there is a question to be answered, of much importance; which is, by what door the right, or authority of punishing in any case, came in. For by that which has been said before, no man is supposed bound by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not. But to covenant to

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by covenant, not to resist violence; and consequently it cannot be intended, that he gave any right to another to lay violent hands upon his person. In the making of a commonwealth, every man giveth away the right of defending another; but not of defending himself. Also he obligeth himself, to assist him that hath the sovereignty, in the punishing of another; but of himself not. But to covenant to assist the sovereign, in doing hurt to another, unless he that so covenanteth have a right to do it himself, is not to give him a right to punish. It is manifest therefore that the right which the commonwealth (that is, he, or they that represent it) hath to punish, is not grounded on any concession, or gift of the subjects. But I have also showed formerly, that before the institution of

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the punishment of the innocent, is a rendering of evil for good. And thirdly, of the law that commandeth equity; that is to say, an equal distribution of justice; which in punishing the innocent is not observed.

But the infliction of what evil soever, on an innocent man, that is not a subject, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth, and without violation of any former covenant, is no breach of the law of nature. For all men that are not subjects, are either enemies, or else they have ceased from being so by some precedent covenants. But against enemies, whom the commonwealth judgeth capable to do them hurt, it is lawful by the original right of nature to make war; wherein the sword judgeth not, nor doth the victor make distinction of nocent, and innocent, as to

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to make use of them, or be neglected by them, or not, concerneth my particular interest, at this day, very little. But supposing that these of mine are not such principles of reason; yet I am sure they are principles from authority of Scripture; as I shall make it appear, when I shall come to speak of the kingdom of God, (administered by Moses,) over the Jews, his peculiar people by covenant.

But they say again, that though the principles be right, yet common people are not of capacity enough to be made to understand them. I should be glad, that the rich, and potent subjects of a kingdom, or those that are accounted the most learned, were no less incapable than they. But all men know, that the obstructions to this kind of doctrine, proceed not so much

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should take a copy of from the priests and Levites; and which Moses commanded the priests and Levites to lay in the side of the ark, (Deut. 31. 26); and the same which having been lost, was long time after found again by Hilkiah, and sent to king Josias (2 Kings 22. 8) who causing it to be read to the people, (2 Kings 23. 1, 2, 3) renewed the covenant between God and them.

That the book of Joshua was also written long after the time of Joshua, may be gathered out of many places of the book itself. Joshua had set up twelve stones in the midst of Jordan, for a monument of their passage; of which the writer saith thus, They are there unto this day (Josh. 4. 9); for unto

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of the prophet Nathan, of the prophet Ahijah; to the Vision of Jehdo, to the books of the prophet Serveiah, and of the prophet Addo.

The books of Ezra and Nehemiah were written certainly after their return from captivity; because their return, the re-edification of the walls and houses of Jerusalem, the renovation of the covenant, and ordination of their policy are therein contained.

The history of Queen Esther is of the time of the captivity; and therefore the writer must have been of the same time, or after it.

The book of Job hath no mark in it of the time wherein it was written: and though it appear sufficiently (Ezekiel 14. 14, and James 5. 11) that he was no feigned person;

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be, by the understanding divided; that is to say, considered by parts; so as one part may be in one place, and the next part in the next place to it; and, in sum, which is not (taking body for that, which is some what or some where) corporeal; but in every place, the sense will bear the interpretation of angel, for messenger; as John Baptist is called an angel, and Christ the Angel of the Covenant; and as (according to the same analogy) the dove, and the fiery tongues, in that they were signs of God's special presence, might also be called angels. Though we find in Daniel two names of angels, Gabriel and Michael; yet it is clear out of the text itself, (Dan. 12. 1) that by Michael is meant Christ, not as an angel, but as a prince: and that

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for the monarchy, that is to say, the sovereign power of God over any subjects acquired by their own consent, which is the proper signification of kingdom.

To the contrary, I find the KINGDOM OF GOD, to signify in most places of Scripture, a kingdom properly so named, constituted by the votes of the people of Israel in peculiar manner; wherein they chose God for their king by covenant made with him, upon God's promising them the possession of the land of Canaan; and but seldom metaphorically; and then it is taken for dominion over sin; (and only in the New Testament;) because such a dominion as that, every subject shall have in the kingdom of God, and without prejudice to the sovereign.

From the very creation, God not only reigned over

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but by his own sense, his punishment was a privation of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17. 7, 8) to make a covenant with him in these words, I will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth

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of the estate of eternal life, wherein God had at first created him: and afterwards God punished his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17. 7, 8) to make a covenant with him in these words, I will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord

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his posterity, for their vices, all but eight persons, with an universal deluge; and in these eight did consist the then kingdom of God.

After this, it pleased God to speak to Abraham, and (Gen. 17. 7, 8) to make a covenant with him in these words, I will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting

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17. 7, 8) to make a covenant with him in these words, I will establish my covenant between me, and thee, and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God to thee, and to thy seed after thee; and I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a memorial, and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11)a the sacrament of circumcision. This is it which is called the old covenant, or testament; and

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I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a memorial, and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11)a the sacrament of circumcision. This is it which is called the old covenant, or testament; and containeth a contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though

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everlasting possession. In this covenant Abraham promiseth for himself and his posterity to obey as God, the Lord that spake to him: and God on his part promiseth to Abraham the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession. And for a memorial, and a token of this covenant, he ordaineth (verse 11)a the sacrament of circumcision. This is it which is called the old covenant, or testament; and containeth a contract between God and Abraham; by which Abraham obligeth himself, and his posterity, in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of kingdom to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the

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in a peculiar manner to be subject to God's positive law; for to the law moral he was obliged before, as by an oath of allegiance. And though the name of King be not yet given to God, nor of kingdom to Abraham and his seed; yet the thing is the same; namely, an institution by pact, of God's peculiar sovereignty over the seed of Abraham; which in the renewing of the same covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4. 11) that he is the father of the faithful; that is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptism.

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which in the renewing of the same covenant by Moses, at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4. 11) that he is the father of the faithful; that is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptism.

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at Mount Sinai, is expressly called a peculiar kingdom of God over the Jews: and it is of Abraham (not of Moses) St. Paul saith (Rom. 4. 11) that he is the father of the faithful; that is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptism.

This covenant, at the foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod. 19. 5) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation. For a peculiar people, the vulgar Latin hath,

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that is, of those that are loyal, and do not violate their allegiance sworn to God, then by circumcision, and afterwards in the new covenant by baptism.

This covenant, at the foot of Mount Sinai, was renewed by Moses (Exod. 19. 5) where the Lord commandeth Moses to speak to the people in this manner, If you will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar people to me, for all the earth is mine; and ye shall be unto me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation. For a peculiar people, the vulgar Latin hath, peculium de cunctis populis: the English translation made in the beginning of the reign of King James, hath a peculiar treasure unto me above all nations; and the Geneva French, the

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and this meaning of the place is confirmed by the reason God rendereth of it, which followeth immediately, in that he addeth, For all the earth is mine, as if he should say, All the nations of the world are mine; but it is not so that you are mine, but in a special manner: for they are all mine, by reason of my power; but you shall be mine, by your own consent, and covenant; which is an addition to his ordinary title, to all nations.

The same is again confirmed in express words in the same text, Ye shall be to me a sacerdotal kingdom, and an holy nation. The vulgar Latin hath it, regnum sacerdotale, to which agreeth the translation of that place (1 Pet. 2. 9) Sacerdotium regale, a regal priesthood; as also

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And (Micah 4. 7) And the Lord shall reign over them in Mount Zion: this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the earth. And (Ezek. 20. 33) As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you; and (verse 37) I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant; that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.

And in the New Testament, the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke 1. 32, 33) He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give

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this Mount Zion is in Jerusalem upon the earth. And (Ezek. 20. 33) As I live, saith the Lord God, surely with a mighty hand, and a stretched out arm, and with fury poured out, I will rule over you; and (verse 37) I will cause you to pass under the rod, and I will bring you into the bond of the covenant; that is, I will reign over you, and make you to stand to that covenant which you made with me by Moses, and brake in your rebellion against me in the days of Samuel, and in your election of another king.

And in the New Testament, the angel Gabriel saith of our Saviour (Luke 1. 32, 33) He shall be great, and be called the Son of the most High, and the Lord shall give himb the throne of his father David; and he shall reign over the

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(Acts 17. 7) That they did all of them contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying there was another king, one Jesus. The kingdom therefore of God, is a real, not a metaphorical kingdom; and so taken, not only in the Old Testament, but the c New; when we say, For thine is the kingdom, the power, and glory, it is to be understood of God's kingdom, by force of our covenant, not by the right of God's power; for such a kingdom God always hath; so that it were superfluous to say in our prayer, Thy kingdom come, unless it be meant of the restoration of that kingdom of God by Christ, which by revolt of the Israelites had been interrupted in the election of Saul. Nor had it been proper to say, The kingdom of heaven is at hand; or to pray, Thy

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and wheresoever the word Holy is taken properly, there is still something signified of propriety, gotten by consent. In saying, Hallowed be thy name, we do but pray to God for grace to keep the first commandment, of having no other Gods but him. Mankind is God's nation in propriety: but the Jews only were a holy nation. Why, but because they became his propriety by covenant?

And the word profane, is usually taken in the Scripture for the same with common; and consequently their contraries, holy, and proper, in the kingdom of God must be the same also. But figuratively, those men also are called holy, that led such godly lives, as if they had forsaken all worldly designs, and wholly devoted and given

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For St. Peter says not, We look for new heavens, and a new earth, (from nature,) but from promise.

Lastly, seeing it hath been already proved out of divers evident places of Scripture, in chap. 35. of this book, that the kingdom of God is a civil commonwealth, where God himself is sovereign, by virtue first of the old, and since of the new covenant, wherein he reigneth by his vicar, or lieutenant; the same places do therefore also prove, that after the coming again of our Saviour in his majesty, and glory, to reign actually, and eternally the kingdom of God is to be on earth. But because this doctrine (though proved out of places of Scripture not few, nor obscure) will appear to most men a novelty; I do but propound it; maintaining

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assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters following.

a assembled.

b commonwealth.

c be the head.

CHAPTER 40. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH.

The father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God; not only such, as he could take notice of, (as moral laws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as God should in special manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and needed

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following.

a assembled.

b commonwealth.

c be the head.

CHAPTER 40. OF THE RIGHTS OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD, IN ABRAHAM, MOSES, THE HIGH-PRIESTS, AND THE KINGS OF JUDAH.

The father of the faithful, and first in the kingdom of God by covenant, was Abraham. For with him was the covenant first made; wherein he obliged himself, and his seed after him, to acknowledge and obey the commands of God; not only such, as he could take notice of, (as moral laws,) by the light of nature; but also such, as God should in special manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal, by promise of the

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but also such, as God should in special manner deliver to him by dreams and visions. For as to the moral law, they were already obliged, and needed not have been contracted withal, by promise of the land of Canaan. Nor was there any contract, that could add to, or strengthen the obligation, by which both they, and all men else were bound naturally to obey God Almighty: and therefore the covenant which Abraham made with God, was to take for the commandment of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a dream, or vision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.

In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of important consequence in the government of God's people. First, that at the making of

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Abraham made with God, was to take for the commandment of God, that which in the name of God was commanded him, in a dream, or vision; and to deliver it to his family, and cause them to observe the same.

In this contract of God with Abraham, we may observe three points of important consequence in the government of God's people. First, that at the making of this covenant, God spake only to Abraham, and therefore contracted not with any of his family, or seed, otherwise than as their wills (which make the essence of all covenants) were before the contract involved in the will of Abraham; who was therefore supposed to have had a lawful power, to make them perform all that he covenanted for them. According whereunto (Gen. 18. 18, 19) God saith, All

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his family, so none but the sovereign in a Christian commonwealth, can take notice what is, or what is not the word of God. For God spake only to Abraham; and it was he only, that was able to know what God said, and to interpret the same to his family: and therefore also, they that have the place of Abraham in a commonwealth, are the only interpreters of what God hath spoken.

The same covenant was renewed with Isaac; and afterwards with Jacob; but afterwards no more, till the Israelites were freed from the Egyptians, and arrived at the foot of Mount Sinai: and then it was renewed by Moses (as I have said before, chap. 35.) in such manner, as they became from that time forward the peculiar kingdom of God; whose lieutenant was Moses, for his own time: and the succession to that

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By this constitution, a kingdom is acquired to God. But seeing Moses had no authority to govern the Israelites, as a successor to the right of Abraham, because he could not claim it by inheritance; it appeareth not as yet, that the people were obliged to take him for God's lieutenant, longer than they believed that God spake unto him. And therefore his authority (notwithstanding the covenant they made with God) depended yet merely upon the opinion they had of his sanctity, and of the reality of his conferences with God, and the verity of his miracles; which opinion coming to change, they were no more obliged to take any thing for the law of God, which he propounded to them in God's name. We are therefore to consider, what other ground there was, of their obligation to obey him.

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of the trumpets, and the mountain smoking, removed, and stood afar off. And they said unto Moses, speak thou with us, and we will hear, but let not God speak with us lest we die. Here was their promise of obedience; and by this it was they obliged themselves to obey whatsoever he should deliver unto them for the commandment of God.

And notwithstanding the covenant constituted a sacerdotal kingdom, that is to say, a kingdom hereditary to Aaron; yet that is to be understood of the succession after Moses should be dead. For whosoever ordereth and establisheth the policy, as first founder of a commonwealth (be it monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy) must needs have sovereign power over the people all the while he is doing of it. And that Moses had that

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as not knowing that it was by Moses his spirit that they prophecied. By which it is manifest, that no subject ought to pretend to prophecy, or to the spirit, in opposition to the doctrine established by him, whom God hath set in the place of Moses.

Aaron being dead, and after him also Moses, the kingdom, as being a sacerdotal kingdom, descended by virtue of the covenant, to Aaron's son, Eleazar the high priest: and God declared him (next under himself) for sovereign, at the same time that he appointed Joshua for the General of their army. For thus God saith expressly (Numb. 27. 21) concerning Joshua; He shall stand before Eleazar the priest, who shall ask counsel for him, before the Lord, at his word shall they go out, and at his word they shall

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the religion, to change the government, or revolt from their obedience at their pleasure: and from thence proceeded from time to time the civil troubles, divisions, and calamities of the nation. As for example, after the death of Eleazar and Joshua, the next generation which had not seen the wonders of God, but were left to their own weak reason, not knowing themselves obliged by the covenant of a sacerdotal kingdom, regarded no more the commandment of the priest, nor any law of Moses, but did every man that which was right in his own eyes; and obeyed in civil affairs, such men, as from time to time they thought able to deliver them from the neighbour nations that oppressed them; and consulted not with God (as they ought to do) but with such men, or women, as they guessed to be

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or because Josiah consulted Huldah the prophetess, concerning the Book of the Law, that therefore neither he, nor the high priest, but Huldah the prophetess had the supreme authority in matter of religion; which I think is not the opinion of any doctor.

During the captivity, the Jews had no commonwealth at all: and after their return, though they renewed their covenant with God, yet there was no promise made of obedience, neither to Esdras, nor to any other: and presently after they became subjects to the Greeks (from whose customs, and demonology, and from the doctrine of the Cabalists, their religion became much corrupted): in such sort as nothing can be gathered from their confusion, both in state and religion, concerning the supremacy in either. And

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coming of Christ, (Matt. 19. 28) Ye that have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

If then Christ whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new covenant, the kingdom, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to do, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should

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have followed me in the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye shall also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

If then Christ whilst he was on earth, had no kingdom in this world, to what end was his first coming? It was to restore unto God, by a new covenant, the kingdom, which being his by the old covenant, had been cut off by the rebellion of the Israelites in the election of Saul. Which to do, he was to preach unto them, that he was the Messiah, that is, the king promised to them by the prophets; and to offer himself in sacrifice for the sins of them that should by faith submit themselves thereto; and in case the nation generally should refuse him, to call to his obedience such as should

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and made canonical by Moses the civil sovereign.

After the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, Moses to the former laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy; that is, second laws. And are (as it is written, Deut. 29. 1) the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb. For having explained those former laws, in the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12th aa chapter, and continue to the end of the 26th of the same book. This law (Deut. 27. 1) they were commanded to write

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the Israelites were come into the plains of Moab over against Jericho, and ready to enter into the land of promise, Moses to the former laws added divers others; which therefore are called Deuteronomy; that is, second laws. And are (as it is written, Deut. 29. 1) the words of a covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel, besides the covenant which he made with them in Horeb. For having explained those former laws, in the beginning of the book of Deuteronomy, he addeth others, that begin at the 12th aa chapter, and continue to the end of the 26th of the same book. This law (Deut. 27. 1) they were commanded to write upon great stones plastered over, at their passing over Jordan: this law also was written

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temple,) and the time of Josiah, when it was found again, they had no written word of God, but ruled according to their own discretion, or by the direction of such, as each of them esteemed prophets.

From hence we may infer, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament, which we have at this day, were not canonical, nor a law unto the Jews, till the renovation of their covenant with God at their return from the captivity, and restoration of their commonwealth under Esdras. But from that time forward they were accounted the law of the Jews, and for such translated into Greek by seventy elders of Judea, and put into the library of Ptolemy at Alexandria, and approved for the word of God. Now seeing Esdras was the high priest, and the high priest was their

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in the imagination. Others are the names of the imaginations themselves; that is to say, of those ideas, or mental images we have of all things we see, or remember. And others again are names of names; or of different sorts of speech: as universal, plural, singular, are the names of names; and definition, affirmation, negation, true, false, syllogism, interrogation, promise, covenant, are the names of certain forms of speech. Others serve to show the consequence, or repugnance of one name to another; as when one saith, a man is a body, he intendeth that the name of body is necessarily consequent to the name of man; as being but several names of the same thing, man; which consequence is signified by coupling them together with the word

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that is, the thing which he should choose, it doth not follow, that he did not also give him the act of election. And for the other text, where it is said, that the price of the land was in Ananias's power, the word power signifieth no more than the word right, that is, the right to do with his own what he pleased, which is not a real and natural power, but a civil power made by covenant. And therefore the former answer is sufficient, that though such places are clear enough to prove election, they have no strength at all to take away necessity.

NO. X.

J. D. "Thirdly, if there be no true liberty, but all things come to pass by inevitable necessity, then what are all those interrogations, and objurgations, and reprehensions,

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Jews under the sword, and the Gentiles under the crown.

"Thirdly, though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God's justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God's will. God can do many things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a rule in

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though I confess that human pacts are not the measure of God's justice, but his justice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own, as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad; so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his creature. He made the covenant of works with mankind in Adam; and therefore he punisheth not man contrary to his own covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And divine justice is not measured by omnipotence or by irresistible power, but by God's will. God can do many things according to his absolute power, which he doth not. He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a rule in theology, that God cannot do anything which argues any wickedness or imperfection: as God cannot

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to be such as it is in the generation of a monster, the generation of a monster is necessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by an hypothetical necessity. (e) Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which he hath made with man, fac hoc et vives, do this and thou shalt live. Neither doth God punish any man contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself; but in me is thy help. He that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in this discourse the only

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are, that is, by an hypothetical necessity. (e) Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which he hath made with man, fac hoc et vives, do this and thou shalt live. Neither doth God punish any man contrary to this covenant (Hosea xiii. 9): O Israel, thy destruction is from thyself; but in me is thy help. He that wills not the death of a sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent creature. By death or destruction in this discourse the only separation of soul and body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as Lord of life and death, may justly do, and make it

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His doctrine that followeth concerning the generation of monsters, is not worth consideration; therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the reader.

(e) "Then he betakes himself to his old help, that God may punish by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not, now what God may do, but what God will do, according to that covenant which he hath made with man, Fac hoc et vives, do this and thou shalt live." It is plain (to let pass that he puts punishment where I put affliction, making a true sentence false) that if a man do this he shall live, and he may do this if he will. In this the Bishop and I disagree not. This therefore is not the question; but whether the will to do this, or not to do this, be in a

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tui.

"Thirdly, a resolved mind, which weighs all things judiciously and provides for all occurrences, is not so easily surprised with outward objects. Only Ulysses wept not at the meeting with his wife and son. I would beat thee, said the philosopher, but that I am angry. One spake lowest, when he was most moved. Another poured out the water, when he was thirsty. Another made a covenant with his eyes. Neither opportunity nor enticement could prevail with Joseph. Nor the music nor the fire, with the three children. It is not the strength of the wind, but the lightness of the chaff, which causeth it to be blown away. Outward objects do not impose a moral, much less a physical necessity; they may be dangerous, but cannot be destructive to true liberty."

T. H.

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cannot here be exactly fixed, more than in other moral subjects. To imagine, that the gratifying of any sense, or the indulging of any delicacy in meat, drink, or apparel, is of itself a vice, can never enter into a head, that is not disordered by the frenzies of enthusiasm. I have, indeed, heard of a monk abroad, who, because the windows of his cell opened upon a noble prospect, made a covenant with his eyes never to turn that way, or receive so sensual a gratification. And such is the crime of drinking CHAMPAGNE or BURGUNDY, preferably to small beer or porter. These indulgences are only vices, when they are pursued at the expence of some virtue, as liberality or charity; in like manner as they are follies, when for them a man ruins his fortune, and reduces himself to want and

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even to external Rights, since it tends to the universal Good to allow Force in pursuance of them.'

CIVIL Societys substitute Actions in Law, instead of the Force allow'd in the State of Nature.

Instances of external Rights are these; that of a wealthy Miser to recal his Loan from the most industrious poor Tradesman at any time; that of demanding the Performance of a Covenant too burdensom on one side; the Right of a wealthy Heir to refuse Payment of any Debts which were contracted by him under Age, without Fraud in the Lender; the Right of taking advantage of a positive Law, contrary to what was Equity antecedent to that Law; as when a register'd Deed takes place of one not register'd, altho prior to it, and known to be so before the second Contract.

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natural Justice obligeth to absolutely; therefore upon the Supposition that any one maketh a Promise, which is a voluntary Act of his own, to do something which he was not before Obliged to by natural Justice, upon the intervention of this voluntary Act of his own, that indifferent thing promised falling now under something absolutely Good, and becoming the Matter of Promise and Covenant, standeth for the present in a new Relation to the Rational Nature of the Promiser, and becometh for the time a thing which Ought to be done by him, or which he is obliged to do. Not as if the meer Will or Words and Breath of him that covenanteth had any power to change the Moral Natures of things, or any Ethical Vertue of Obliging; but because Natural Justice and Equity obligeth to

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Jews of the age immediately preceding Christianity, was conceived as knowledge of a divine code, emanating from an authority external to human reason, which latter had only the function of interpreting its rules and applying them to difficult cases. The normal motives to obey this law were trust in the promises and fear of the judgments of the Divine Lawgiver, who had made a special covenant to protect the Jewish people, on condition that they rendered Him due obedience; and the sources from which knowledge of the law was actually gained had the complexity often exhibited by the jurisprudence of an advanced community. The original nucleus of the code, it was believed, had been written and promulgated by Moses, other precepts had been revealed in the fervid utterances of the

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causing worse mischief than it prevents; while natural law, as we saw, is liable to be obscure and uncertain in its particular applications; and neither natural nor human law take into their view that supernatural happiness which is man's highest end. Hence they needed to be supplemented by a special revelation of divine law. This revelation, again, is distinguished into the law of the old covenant and the law of the Gospel; the latter of these is productive as well as imperative, since it carries with it the divine grace that makes its fulfilment possible. We have, however, to distinguish in the case of the Gospel between (1) absolute commands, and (2) counsels, which recommend, without positively ordering, the monastic life of poverty, celibacy, and obedience, as the best method of

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Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan, or, The Matter, Form, & Power of a Common-Wealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil (Intelex Electronic Edition, 1993.). [HobLevi]

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