TO: Chief of Division,
FROM: Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 8

PART I - GERMANY HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

AACHEN is a "ghost town", the easterly districts of the city still being part of the combat zone. Some 4,000 people remain in the center of this city which once had a population of 180,000. No shops are open, so that even the remaining inhabitants are rarely seen on the streets. From AACHEN comes an illustration of the difficulties which Allied forces will encounter as they penetrate deeper into the Reich. Since food is a major problem, the only food presently available coming from private stocks, military government began to recruit civilian labor from BRANDT camp to harvest the potato crop before it was spoiled by winter frost. At one farm, the farmer and his wife, with a young assistant, were blown up by a mine when they drove a cart across their field. American engineers who came to their rescue found 48 mines in one patch. This discouraged further volunteering. (It goes without saying that the Army authorities are cognizant of this problem but the higher priority of operational needs is apt to delay its elimination).

Although it is still out of the question to organize any enquiry thorough enough to give really reliable results, a number of individual interrogations of refugees has helped to make clear the attitudes of Aacheners towards particular questions of psychological warfare interest. It appears that the average citizen does not expect much from the future, and claims that he will be satisfied with work which provides for him the bare necessities of life. This is a part of his belief that the war is lost and of the absence of hope for post-war Germany in general, a condition which seldom evokes any suggestions as to how the future might be improved.

There are signs of the familiar accusations cropping up to the effect that the newly-appointed city officials include former collaborators; part of the explanation is probably to be found in personal jealousies, part in a difference of opinion as to what constitutes "collaboration". All the evidence seems to indicate, however, that the new Mayor, who is known as having been before 1933 a strong supporter of the Catholic Center party, is personally regarded with favor.

B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) Immediately in the path of the Allied advance

From COLOGNE have come further reports of friction between the population and the Nazis. More significant, however, is a P/8 report which suggests that in COLOGNE the party is preparing to play a role considerably different from that in AACHEN. It is said that only high Party officials have left the city. Lower orders of the hierarchy have remained to supervise the procurement and distribution of manpower for Schachtsäcke (workers on fortifications) and the Volkssturm. The present policy is to retain all males between 16 and 60 for these purposes and only to provide transport out of the city for women and children. If this report is accurate, COLOGNE may provide the first major showdown between the Party and the population. The following relevant data has been received in several reports on the city. Between 2,400,000 civilians, chiefly Italian, Russian, and French. Considerable anti-Nazi activity is centered in COLOGNE (e.g., it is claimed that 30 per cent of the workers...
children belong to opposition groups led by older people), and dissension within the V5 in COLOGNE has already been reported by PA/W. Increasing friction between old and young is predicted on the ground that young people, as a result of their Nazi education, no longer show the slightest trace of that respect toward age which older Germans look for. There have also been predictions that if armed and deployed in the woods, anti-Nazis would fire upon Nazis.

The RHINELAND is the center of numerus tales about "revolutionary" movements within Germany. Most frequently mentioned as centers of oppositional activity are COLOGNE, DUISBERG, ESSEN, and DUSELSDORF – cities which lie directly in the path of Allied troops. The evidence, as has been suggested before, is vague and contradictory, but the following facts seem to emerge. The organization most frequently mentioned by name is EDELWEISS-PIRATEN, who are known as Edelweiss or Garumbe in COLOGNE, and as Schlangebaende (snake-bands) in HANOVER. It is commonly referred to as a Catholic youth organization designed to combat the Hitlerjugend though in many cases growing up inside that body. There is very little indication of any positive ideological basis, and it is probable that the organization took its origin in little more than rivalry between youthful gangs based on purely personal motifs. According to the testimony of four members of the group from KOHLSCHEID, their activity seems to have been denoted largely to the creation (?) and rendition of their own songs, code names, and secret insignia. Occasionally they make sorties in search of individuals or small groups of HJ or SS members, whom they beat up. Claims have been made that the members are armed (in some cases only the leaders), but no hard evidence of this has yet been received. There is no trustworthy estimate of numbers involved, but the present membership seems to consist largely of youngsters under 15, of both sexes, for the older ones are now in the Army or the work battalions or the Heimstflak. The increasing number of Pf/N who claim knowledge of, or membership in, the Edelweiss indicate a source of potential strength which is of no practical use at the moment. The group is further hampered by the cellular form of organization it has been forced to adopt, the result of which is little or no communication between cells and a felt lack of leadership. While it must be borne in mind that more complete evidence might reveal greater strength, that so far available seems to justify the conclusion that the group will not be able to play a major role in assisting the advance of our troops into areas which are their strongholds. Until then, the most that can probably be expected of underground organizations is that their members should keep in touch with one another and out of the Gestapo’s clutches.

(ii) General

Hitler’s failure to make his proclamation in person is clear evidence of incapacity of some sort. On the other hand, the text was in places extremely characteristic of him, though elsewhere it seems possible to discern the hand of Himmler. On this basis the conclusion would be that the Fuhrer, though ill in some way, is still alive. (If he were really dead, the regime would hardly have been foolishly enough to go so far in suggesting the opposite). It is probable that his failure to appear on 9 November provoked considerable speculation in Germany, where rumors of his insanity, though not hitherto of his death, have been current for some time. If the decision to provide a celebration on 12 November was taken with a view to dispelling such stories, it is highly unlikely to have achieved its aim.

The general line of propaganda comment on the occasion suggests that the incapacity, whatever it may be, is expected to last some time. Himmler’s appearance on this occasion suggests that he has ousted Goering from the post of successor and serves to confirm stories about the latter’s eccentric conduct.

Fresh news about the Volksturm suggests that the Party leaders may be pursuing their familiar tactics of first persuading the other side (in this case the Reichshehr) to concede an inch and then proceeding to take an ell. Whereas first reports suggested that the numbers called up would be limited (even sometimes stressing the good physical material available) and that not more than one battalion would be formed in each district (i.e. about 900,000 men for the whole Reich) it has now been expressly stated that everybody will be enrolled, since even those who are semi-fit can serve as sentries. This
will give a total of over four millions. Battalions are being formed into regiments. Again, whereas previous decrees left it rather obscure at what stage (if any) the regular Army authorities would take over command of the VS, it now appears that in East Prussia, Party political leaders and state officials are being formed into special units, who will be able "to keep a firm grip on their areas up to the most advanced trenches. This makes it possible to dispense with the military administration which would otherwise have to be set up in regions near the front". The Party, in fact, seems to be having the best of both worlds. It has used a military pretext to increase considerably its control over the entire male population of Germany, but it has avoided giving any share of that control to the military commanders, presumably because it does not feel convinced of their readiness to use this instrument as a means of resisting up to the point of annihilation. By incorporating the whole nation into a body which will die rather than surrender, the leaders no doubt hope to make each German feel that he has lost all chance of escaping by his personal action from the doom which (according to the official propaganda) the Allies have in store.

Whereas about a year ago Nazi encouragement of the White Russian movement seemed to be at an end and its leader General VLASOV in disgrace, (allegedly because he refused to have anything to do with German projects to partition Russia) differences appear recently to have been patched up and Vlasov, his program unchanged, brought into the limelight. On 14 November his new "Committee of Liberation of the Peoples of Russia" held its foundation meeting in Prague. The objects of this move appear to be (a) to counter the German feeling of hopelessness at being faced by the overwhelming masses of the Soviet Union, which is to be achieved by showing that an important part of the Russian people is on the German side. (b) To support the Nazi argument that the struggle against Bolshevism is necessary and is recognized by an ever-increasing number of people. There may also be a desire to show the Germans they have a counterpart to the Free German Committee in Moscow. All these factors make the publicity given to Vlasov interesting for the light it throws on German public opinion. As to the suggestions that the White Russian forces are going to be used to keep order inside Germany and that Vlasov is being exploited for his nuisance value as a means of inducing the Soviet Union to open peace negotiations, the most that can be said is that the first is more credible than the second. Vlasov’s Prague manifesto contained objections, on "liberal" grounds, to the Bolshevist tyranny, but these were omitted from the reports given to the German home public.

Sterilization of the unfit has been abandoned. Some of the conditions which in 1939 justified sterilization are no longer allowed to justify exemption from military service.
PART II - BATTLE FRONT.

General Picture.

1. During the past week attention has been focussed on the west where the front of first one army and then another has flared into activity, until at the close of the week the whole line from NORDENHOLZ to the Swiss border is in movement with the Allies attacking in every sector.

2. Weather conditions are difficult, snow has fallen in many parts of the front and, the enemy having been able to prepare his positions, extensive minefields and wire are being met, especially in the sector north and south of AACHEN where resistance appears heaviest.

3. The numbers of PIs captured in the week's offensive are not yet to hand but during the week, November 6 to 13, the total figure for PIs since D day rose from 665,000 to 678,000, an increase of 13,000.

WESTERN FRONT.

4. (a) In the south, French troops attacking in the BEILFORT area have made advances both towards this city on which they are closing in, MONTBELIARD having been occupied, and further north to the south west of GRANDRUM.

(b) East of ERPIL and LUNEVILLE the line has been advanced substantially and our troops are at the approaches to ST. DIE, RION L'EST, PE and ELMONT.

(c) Further north the attack in the METZ region has met with considerable success and advances from both south east and north west have pushed forward so that the line now runs very roughly from a point 5 kilometres north east of DUNERZ to the south eastern suburbs of METZ, circles METZ on the west to a point on the north eastern outskirts of the city and then an arc almost parallel with the River MOSELLE to the German frontier about 15 kilometres east of PERL.

5. In the AACHEN area two attacks have been launched which have made progress in the face of heavy opposition. The first drive east of STOLBERG has made progress to the north and east and the second has thrust from the Dutch border towards JULICH.

6. On the Dutch front the Second British Army has attacked the army salient west of VENLO and reached the LEUSE at ROERMOND and the canals to the north and east. Patrols have crossed the LEUSE and troops are also across the canal south of MEUL, which was captured on Thursday.

EASTERN FRONT.

7. (a) No significant movement has taken place in EAST PRUSSIA or POLAND but in HUNGARY the Russians report further gains north of the River TISZA and have also extended their bridgehead across this river, occupying NEZKO KOSZOSO on the BUDAPEST-LINKSOLKOLZ railway. They now control 25 miles of this railroad north of SZOLNOK.

(b) South of BUDAPEST there are unconfirmed reports of a bridgehead having been established on the west bank of the River LEUSE south west of SUBOTICA. In the Central Carpathian region JOSZKAFATI has been occupied.

ITALY.

8. In the Adriatic sector, progress has been made north west of FORLI in the face of heavy opposition including tanks. The enemy appear to be standing behind the line, FIUME UNITY - RONCO - C. NALE NUOVO.
5.

9. (a) Although the German troops in Northern ALEPPO are separated from the main German-occupied areas by partisan-held districts, it is not considered that they will have any difficulty in forcing their passage through those zones. They have in fact captured FIGLIЯ in MONTE-NEGRO which seems to be an indication that they are trying to cut another withdrawal route to SERBIEVO. They have also driven a wedge into partisan-held territory west of KRAJEVO.

(b) An advance by BULGARIAN troops closer to SOKOLOVA is reported.

BURMA.

10. On the CHINJIAN front Allied troops have occupied MAHLIK unopposed and other Allied troops have made progress in the MYITKINA railroad corridor.

PHILIPPINES.

11. Our troops on LEYTE continue to meet determined resistance but slight advances have been made.
PART III

WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. RECENT PRISONERS:

Renewed activity on the First U.S. Army front during the last two weeks has resulted in the capture of Ps/W whose widespread defeatism and limited fighting qualities did not prevent them from offering firm resistance and maintaining good discipline. The Psychological Warfare Combat Team on this front reports that these Ps/W "clearly illustrate the efforts of the enemy to hold the line with makeshift units composed of workers and physically unfit veterans from other fronts in order to give the regular divisions time to reorganize somewhere in Germany".

Of a group of 35 Ps/W from the 275th Fusilier Bn. taken in this First Army drive, 15 different units were encountered. The fact that fighting units are scattered collections of men from various branches of service, with varying amounts of training and physical fitness, continues to have a depressing effect on the enemy's morale. These Ps/W cannot be considered representative of the more determined and better organized men who are certain to be encountered as the Allied drive progresses.

A Ps/W from a Volksgrenadier Division, captured on the 7th Army Front, has summarized the reactions of many other German soldiers who find themselves thrown into such fighting units.

"I have never seen such a jumble of men. Many come from the Navy and have had no Infantry training at all; others from the homeguard battalions who suddenly became good enough for combat duty. Most of them were old men from the last war, who already had had enough of it then, and they told us that the people's grenadiers were particularly good fighting units."

Some progress by the enemy in regrouping these field units is, however, indicated by a report from the Third US Army. Here personnel of units are described as being below pre D-day standards, but at least the troops now know the names of their Commanders and their regimental and divisional assignments.

Among those new Ps/W who still express confidence in ultimate victory, there are a certain number who in interrogation advance as the basis of their belief arguments more factual in character than the traditionally encountered reliance in secret weapons and the German character. They point out for example, that German supply lines are now much shorter. Or again, that, as Germans are defending their homeland, it is no longer necessary to set aside men for fighting terrorists. The existence of reserve divisions is now mentioned more often, as well as increased confidence about German fortifications. The Atlantic Wall may have been a failure, but German soldiers are now, or so it is argued, taking the task of digging it in more seriously. Moreover, the treacherous Generals who abandoned France have been eliminated.

These arguments almost always emerge in company with the theory that the Allies have been upset in their time schedule. The convinced Ps/W argues: "Two months ago, everybody believed that the Allies could simply walk through to Berlin. You have failed to do this. If you were actually so strong, and so so weak, then you would have made better progress. Now perhaps you cannot do it anymore."
The existence of such attitudes indicates a measure of success for Nazi propaganda, which even before D-day claimed that the Allies are pressuring for political reasons to win a quick victory, if they are not to lose the war. As a result, those soldiers who are completely loyal to the Führer have interpreted the comparative lull of the past two months as an indication that the Nazi claims were correct. It has often been pointed out that it is this minority of Nazified soldiers who in large measure maintain the fighting effectiveness of the Wehrmacht and keep the doubters in check. The strengthening of the determination of this "hard core" by such propaganda will have important effects in prolonging final resistance. (See below GERMAN COUNTER-PROPAGANDA).

II. LAST DITCH WARFARE:

The average German soldier, with the exception of the diehard Nazi, seems to view with disfavour the possibility of a scorched earth policy, and seldom considers himself as a potential recruit for a guerilla army. Nevertheless detailed interrogations indicate that the majority of Ps/W trust their leadership to the extent that they will at least attempt to carry out all orders for final resistance. Of 26 Ps/W questioned by F.WD-SHAEF, 12 stated that their leaders would not capitulate and that they as soldiers would obey all orders. Some of them cited faith in Hitler, or fear of Russia, as the basis for their willingness to carry out all orders. On the other hand 10 Ps/W stated that the "Führung" would attempt to fight to the end, but the Lander and the Civilians would not be so foolish as to participate and spill blood foolishly. Only two Ps/W mentioned the Rhine and Ruhr as the final limits of resistance.

The points of view at the opposite extreme, were presented by a 45-year-old desertor who declared that the German people would certainly never fight as partisans. If armed bands of Nazis took to the woods, anti-Nazis would fire on them and seek revenge for all they had suffered during the last 11 years.

Three Ps/W were doubtful as to whether final resistance should be carried out. Only the introduction of new weapons would in their view justify a last ditch stand. If they were not, even all the present fighting would have been the greatest swindle in the history of mankind. A SS man is reported to have deserted because he was told that he would have to fight as a partisan after organized resistance was over. Ps/W report, that the SS Officers (propaganda officers) have in some cases told their men that the families of deserters will suffer and that the names of every desertor is known since the American radio announces all their names. A considerable amount of evidence suggests that, at least as far as the intentions of the Party are concerned, the first of these threats is by no means empty.

III. DESERTIONS:

No evidence has been received that desertions are occurring in numbers of any consequence. Renewed drives usually result in the capture of many "token resistors," but the previously reported intensified program to prevent desertions seems to be effective. Strong ideological reasons, or else some personal peculiarity, are necessary before the Wehrmacht soldier is led to take the risks associated with deserting. A report from the 12 AG states that in all cases the actual conditions at the front, unfavourable as they were, contributed little, if at all, to the desertion of a small number of German soldiers, who were interrogated.
at the subject. Their aversion to the war dated further back and had a predominantly ideological basis. One, a graduate from an American school in Vienna, was a former student of philosophy and had a well developed opposition to the nihilistic attitude towards religion, the maniacal cruelty, injustice and lust for destruction," of the Nazis. Another deserter traced his opposition back to the period after the last war, when the Nazis were a "boisterous rabble" and he was still a "respectable citizen of the New German Republic." The third was a former member of the Communist Youth. Where ideological reasons are missing, the story of the deserter usually reveals a quarrel with a superior officer, the threat of punishment for a crime such as looting or theft or some other personal difficulty. Recently, there has been further cases of German soldiers donning civilian clothes and returning to their families who reside in areas occupied by the Allies. Such soldiers are motivated by strong desire to see their families at almost any price, or else simply feel that with the capture of their home town the war is over for them.

IV. GEWAN COUNTER PROPAGANDA:

In addition to repeating familiar lines, Nazi propaganda to the Wehrmacht appears to be making a special effort to counter Allied propaganda by "exposing" it. Soldiers are being told about the technique and tricks the Allies are employing in propaganda in order to achieve victory; the method has the advantage that direct refutation of Allied claims can largely be avoided. For example a leaflet entitled "The Secret Weapon of the Enemy Has Been Committed" explains the principles and dangers of foreign broadcasts in an educative, rather than a threatening fashion. They are:

a) The Allies announce things before they happen.
b) The enemy admits his own losses in an exaggerated way in order to obtain the reputation of veracity and to lie all the more at the opportune moment.
c) The enemy attempts to separate the leaders from the people. Just as the Kaiser was blamed in 1918, it now is Hitler who is supposed to be responsible.

Mitteilungen fuer die Truppe (October) also reviews the weapons employed in the "poison offensive". They include: Attacks against the Party and its predominant members ("this is not surprising as the enemy will, of course, attack those institutions which give us our greatest strength"); appeals to the Austrians to separate themselves from the Germans ("the time when we were split up in small states was the time of our greatest weakness"); sympathy with the poor German women who work in hellish factories ("the institution must be a good one, otherwise the enemy would not attack it"). The enemy tries to obtain the confidence of Germans by fast reporting of news in which truth and fiction are interwoven.

V. ALLIED LEAFLETS:

A summary of 315 Ps/WM captured on the First U.S. Army front and interrogated by G-2 reveals that 257 had seen Allied Leaflets. These Ps/WM were all from the 278 Infantry Division and were taken prisoner on a front of approximately 4 kilometers between FOTGEN and SCHMIDT. This percentage (over 80%) who saw leaflets is one of the highest ever encountered in a group survey, and probably represents the results of intensive distribution in this small sector, rather than a representative sample of the entire picture.
Of the 257 who saw the leaflets 185 professed credence without reservation; 32 gave credence to most of the points; 19 were somewhat doubtful; 31 completely disbelieved the contents. 17 of the Ps/W questioned claimed to have come over to our lines voluntarily; 9 of them professed that leaflets had some bearing on their decision to desert, especially the promise of good treatment. A broadcast which was released before the attack in which these Ps/W were taken was more or less ineffective. Only 31 of Ps/W questioned said they 'had heard the transmission' and of these, all but two men in advanced posts failed to understand the words.

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