SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division
INTELLIGENCE SECTION

I.S.280.

TO : Chief of Division.
FROM : Chief, Intelligence Section.

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 12

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

The sectors of Germany most recently occupied by Allied troops present a sad and suffering face. Destruction to towns and villages is now more severe than during the first stages of the battle on German soil - BEGBENDORF and STILBROD are estimated to be 90 per cent destroyed, for example, and G-5 reports destruction in BOVERICH and FLOREICH at 50 per cent. One important effect of this destruction, which is heaviest in the 9 U.S. Army area and seems largely due to ground action, has been to increase the tempo of evacuation, particularly in the smaller towns where bunkers and civilian shelters are inadequate or lacking. From this area, G-5 reports that the town of LINTERGELAR was "completely evacuated when occupied" and that "almost all the population had disappeared" from seven other towns (all very small towns, with the exception of GEILENKIRCHEN).

Although the hardships due to battle proximity were undoubtedly a factor encouraging people to evacuate in this area, it is quite clear that the Party brought pressure to bear at all points to make sure of clearing the area. An order issued by 31 Army Corps which has been directing the defense of this area, reveals both the opposition to evacuation among Landesers and the pressure exercised by the Party to bring the Wehrmacht into line. The blunt wording of this order, which was signed by KESCHLING and distributed to all subordinate formations, is noteworthy:

"The NSDAP, which is the organization entrusted with the evacuation of personnel, has repeatedly reported that individual soldiers are encouraging parts of the population who are unwilling to evacuate to remain in the neighborhood. In order to forestall this situation, evacuation is to begin in the town of Freiberg! Utterance of the Fuehrer! Acts of sabotage against the Fuehrer's measures, I refer once more to the orders issued by the Commander of the 7th Army and by me".

It is a moot point whether a town empty of Germans simplifies or complicates the life of a Town Mayor. But "complete" evacuation, on the basis of past experience, does not seem to last very long. Large cities, particularly, can hardly be completely evacuated (note that only one fair-sized town is included among the seven mentioned above). There are numerous examples to hand, particularly AACHEN, where what seemed a "ghost town" to the first occupying forces soon began to take on flesh and bones. It is now reported that AACHEN has reached the "saturation point" and that the influx of population has been halted temporarily by officials who do not know where to put them all. Even in smaller towns, many people escape evacuation orders by taking to the woods or to a nearby community where they have friends or relatives, and then hiding out until the storm has passed over, at which time they return to their homes. The devotion of these people to the "old familiar places", even when these have been recused nearly to rubble, has been noted by many interrogators. This sentiment has been of help for M.G. officials. It has kept many people from leaving, impelled others who had evacuated a considerable distance from home to return, and has motivated the vigorous "self-help" in reconstruction which is now evident in the towns under Military Government.

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The vigor with which the "self-help" program has recently gone forward is clear from the report of the Food Conference held at BRAND on the 29th of November. The Conference, which dealt with the food problems of the Landkreis AACHEN, was attended by the eight mayors of the area and their assistants.

The M.G. officer who opened the Conference informed all present that they could not expect any supplies of food from the U.S. Army. They could expect, however, support in the form of transportation and permits necessary for the distribution of food to the population. The Conference then set up a permanent Food Commission, with German officials, to supervise food distribution according to the basic policy of equal rations for all inhabitants of the Landkreis. In accordance with this policy, certain very specific commitments were made in the pooling and allocation of both labor and resources among the towns of the Landkreis. In AACHEN, a similar program seems to have been followed in the taking over of retail stores for community use as distribution centers. This was followed in Landkreis MENSCHAU by a conference called by the local M.G. officer to consider ways and means for improving control of the distribution of existing supplies of food, fuel and civilian clothing. The conference was attended by the Landrat of the Kreis, together with the acting Bürgermeisters of ZWEPFEL, ROTT and RECHTEN. The outcome of this meeting has not yet been reported, but it is clear that these conferences speak well for the settled condition of these towns and the start made toward efficient self-administration.

That all is not yet sweetness and light in the occupied areas is of course to be expected. Many violations of M.G. regulations are due to ignorance rather than intentional misconduct. The dissemination of information has been an extremely difficult problem, since the start of occupation, but a start toward its solution has been made by the use of local clergy, town criers, and publication of Die Neue Zeitung (now called Mitteilungen) - First Allied newspaper for Occupied Germany, published by F & F of 12 Army Group (initial issue was dated 27 November 1944). But a number of violations have indicated that part of the population, at least, does not look to the Allied forces as "liberators". In KORNELIENHOF, a woman who was convicted of destroying some Party records and trying to conceal others has been sentenced to six years' imprisonment. At EILENDORF Nazi Party members are required to report daily; it is still found necessary to remove certain German officials from their posts on grounds of security. The Acting Bürgermeister of HEND, for example, has recently been removed for this reason and is being held in a F/W cage. G-5 reports that M.G. officers are assisting in the security screening of the population of ESCHWEILER. Political screening has not yet revealed itself as a pressing problem, but interrogations make it quite clear that the estimates of Nazification made by Germans themselves are not necessarily reliable. The Bürgermeister of SCHERPENSEE, for example, is the only one instance, maintains that there were only about 50 Party members, prior to American occupation, out of a total population of 1,274. Any small town could be atypical, of course, but this estimate must be considered skeptical, for it is quite disproportionate to the ratio of Nazis for all Germany, which is roughly 1 Party Member : 3 Adult Males. On the same basis, the ratio for SCHERPENSEE would be roughly 1 Member : 3 Adult Males. To which unusual estimate, the Bürgermeister appends the observation that of the 50 Party members, only 20 were "real Nazis".

[This distinction between Party members and "real Nazis" is frequently heard in the Rhineland, and the usual explanation offered is that the population of this area is predominantly Catholic. A number of field interrogators have rejected the validity of this self-applied title to non-Nazi and even anti-Nazi views. While it is clear that in some places the Church has been lukewarm or even hostile toward the Party, in most cases this has not led to any concerted anti-Nazi opposition on the basis of Church support. In some cases, where Church property and officials were not disturbed by the Party, there appears to have been no friction at all. It is quite clear, at any rate, that individual Catholics, excepting those who were deeply imbued with basic theological and ethical concepts, had been little affected in their relation to the Party by their membership in the Church. Several Germans in the occupied area, usually vigorous anti-Nazis who are themselves Catholics, have protested any distinction between Catholic and Evangelical Churches, on the ground that political behavior in Nazi Germany has not been a function of religious affiliation.]

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B. ENEMY AREAS

(1) The German Combat Zone

In towns taken earlier by Allied forces the Nazis had relied largely on physical coercion to effect the evacuation of recalcitrant individuals. The success of this method was limited by the comparatively small number of trusty Nazi bodies available to move the comparatively large number of non-Nazi bodies who had no desire to move. Women kicked, screamed, and bit; men hid away. In some cases, local police were too soft to force their friends and neighbors to "get out of town"—they were replaced by police officials from other parts of Germany who had no such sentimental bonds. In other cases, Wehrmacht units were called in to support evacuation measures. The women told them to stop being idiots and hide with them instead of continuing an accursed war. Many soldiers did; others advised the women to stay (see Section A of this Summary). Where the soldiers followed orders, they got cursed as roundly as the SA, the police, and the "Goldsammeln" (Party officials) who tried to drive them out. The result had been an endless confusion, and considerable failure, of evacuation measures.

The Party, cognizant of the causes of failure, has recently started its evacuation drives earlier in cities not yet directly threatened by Allied advances. Compulsory evacuation of surplus population has been announced for cities as far behind the lines as ESSEN and GESSENKREICHEN, but coercive measures have not yet been taken. It is known that ESSEN police were used in the evacuation of AACHEN. It is likely that these officials are still being used in areas more immediately endangered and that few reserves are available from the already understaffed police forces of BERLIN and other large cities in the interior.

The Party seems, therefore, to be relying upon more subtle means of persuasion in these areas, at least for the present. One such means is withholding the special food ration cards of those whom it is desired to evacuate. In ESCHWILLER the original issue of special pink cards was cancelled by the subsequent issue of a much smaller number of green cards. Since holders of green cards only were permitted to draw official rations, all others had to choose among the alternatives of evacuating, starving or procuring an illegal food supply. This device has been used without great success in the past, because the time-lapse between specific orders for evacuation and the arrival of Allied troops was shorter. People who had decided to stay were able to accumulate sufficient secret stocks of food to carry them over until the Allied occupation, at which point their German ration cards were no longer necessary. When ration cards are withheld further back in the Combat Zone, and the prospects of early Allied occupation are doubtful, this may prove to be an extremely effective device for enforcing evacuation orders. The prospect of a long period without food coupons, plus a period of being pushed around by the various coercive agencies of evacuation, followed by a period of bitter combat all about one's home, may be sufficiently unattractive to persuade all but the most hardy to leave. The success of evacuation in this rear area would then therefore depend very largely upon the rate of the Allied advance, which thus far has been slow enough to give the Party a good head start.

The first impression that registered with a F/N passing through battered COLOGNE was: "Man ist erstaunt, wo die Leute alle Wohnen" (One wonders where all these people live). The answer seems to be that the majority live in bunkers. In addition to smaller bunkers scattered about the outskirts, there are three enormous bunkers in the heart of the city called "Donnbunker", "Hochhausbunker", and "Severinbunker" (the names indicate location). Each is estimated to have a capacity of 12,000-15,000 people, and all are said to be filled to capacity. This would give a population of about 40,000 for the bunkers alone. On the other hand another F/N, who was born and raised in COLOGNE, estimates destruction in the city at 75 per cent and population now remaining at 20,000 (of a normal population approaching 300,000). One cause of these extremely wide variations in estimating the population left in COLOGNE is the system of suburbs, for the suburban population was normally about three times as large as the "City" population. It is not clear which estimates, if any, take all or part of this population into account.
The most effective force for evacuation is said to have been the bombing of 30 October, prior to which some 250,000 people were reported still living in the city. The morning after this air raid, which destroyed the still habitable parts of the city and several shelters, the final exodus began. It lasted eight days, during which people are said to have gathered by thousands at the Rhine bridges and all available army vehicles loaded to capacity with refugees. The riots which were reported in the KREFELD section of the city throughout October were led, according to recent reports, by workers who resiled Party evacuation measures. The Wehrmacht was called upon to do the job, but is said to have refused. Finally, the SS was brought in to suppress the riots, and is reported to have done so with characteristic "efficiency". The fate of these instigators is not known. But there are several reports of the public hanging on 22 October of 16 men and 1 woman in the KREFELD section for the killing of four local Party officials. There are further reports that stragglers and deserters are hiding underground, and even that these men have established contact with foreign workers and operate small secret arsenals. The Gestapo occasionally catches some of these men and hangs them, whereupon the deserters, who are supposed to be fairly well organized, retaliate by killing Gestapo men. Although Fe/N bring these stories across to our lines fairly often, they must be treated with some skepticism.

The industrial installations of SAARBRÜCKEN and the main railroad line have been severely hit. To relieve the housing shortage caused by bombing, the government undertook to build "Notstandwohnungen" (emergency apartments), with the purpose of keeping its industrial workers content and on the job. Probably for the same reason, evacuation was not started in SAARBRÜCKEN until considerably later than in other cities of this area, and a strict system of control has kept prices low. Despite these measures, however, the government has been unable completely to prevent friction. Since the food rations are too small, many workers followed a system of bartering manufactured goods for farm produce. The Party tried hard to stamp this out, thereby causing considerable bitterness among the working classes - who seem everywhere to share the view that Parteibosse (Party Bosses) manage to eat very well, no matter how the workers may fare. Some light is thrown on the difficult manpower in SAARBRÜCKEN by a recently-retumed French worker, who reports that his factory there employed an unusually large number of 12-14 year old children.

Rites of information continue to come in from other parts of the Combat Zone. Gauleiter GROHE, whose death has been rumored since the newspapers announced the death of his brother two months ago, is now said to have moved his administration to GOESBERG, previously reported in this Summary as a favorite hideout for Party "big shots". SCHALLER, who has been designated by rumor as his successor, is now reported to be Assistant Gauleiter. In KOBLENZ the Volksturm has been organized into fighting units, issued rifles and ammunition (but no uniform), and assigned to guarding the bridges over the famous confluence of the Rhine and the Mosel. One report estimates that 2,800 people were killed in the 14 October raid on DUISBERG, and that curses are distributed equally upon the SA and the Allies. The police force of TRIER was sacrificed to the "needs" of the front, where the rather confused police bungled the bunker defenses and executed smart "disengaging movements" whenever Allied bullets came close. Exasperated Army authorities finally informed them that they would be more useful guarding rear areas and were not really needed at the front at all.

(2) The Interior

Some interesting data concerning the increased pressure upon industrial workers has come to light. Earlier Stakhanovite measures, together with indications of workers' protest against piecework pay rates, have been reported in this Summary. The order withdrawing extra food cards as punishment for "substandard" performance, has recently been supplemented by informal agreement upon 35 per cent of normal output as the minimal requirement for additional rations. No heavy or very heavy workers, whether German or foreign, who work less than the normal may be given additional ration cards. With
foreign workers the method is to grant additional food against control cards which are stamped only if performance is good. As punishment for absenteeism, additional ration cards may be withdrawn one week for each day of absence. Some success is reported for these measures, particularly the device used among eastern workers of transferring regular rations from those whose output is subnormal to those whose output is above normal. But food rationing is a very sore point among workers, as indicated in the discussion of SAARBRÜCKEN above, and discontent is sure to arise among hungry "substandard" workers.

The new role of foreign workers as diggers is a departure from the previously stated policy of the Reich. The SHAFF Economic Intsum of 13 December estimates that a total number of 1.7 to 1.8 million people are at present working on fortifications. Their rough breakdown by groups is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German adults</td>
<td>400,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAD &amp; OT members</td>
<td>125,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Youth</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Leaders&quot; (i.e. supervisors)</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,677,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With nearly two-thirds of Schanzarbeiten being done by foreigners, on this accounting, GOEBBELS must part company with his former line of reassurance to worried Germans – that foreign workers could not constitute a Trojan Horse because they were not used in positions of military importance. He cannot, after loudly boasting the value of digging, now claim that it has no military value.

Instead Dr GOEBBELS has recently taken up another favorite theme, disunity among the Allies as a supplement to German strength. For many weeks this old war-horse had been put under wraps and allowed to rest in the stable, while the GOEBBELS jockeys rode riot on every available incident as evidence that Churchill had agreed to the Bolshevization of Europe. The Western allies were charged with bending the knee to Stalin, with an undercurrent of resentment against this "treason" against another "Kulturvolk" under pressure of the Bolshevist hordes. Recent events, starting with the clause omitted at Dumbarton Oaks upon the request of the Soviets, have been slanted – the other way – as proof that a falling out among the Allies, "in the long run" at least, is inevitable. The divergence of British and American policy in relation to recent events in GREECE has provided Nazi propagandists with fresh material on this point. GOEBBELS, in his weekly Tas Reich article of 8 December, announced: "We could defeat every one of our enemies if we could face them singly ... but instead, we have to defend ourselves against a united mass coalition". Germany was entering the decisive phase of the war with her defenses strengthened and her war potential fully readied to meet all developments. The main German hope for victory is now a coveyage in the Allied camp, through which an alert German leadership will be able to strike with its mobilized might.

In the interim, while awaiting the Allied split, the German population is informed once again by the Reich Food Minister and Peasant Leader BÄCKE of the difficulties which are to be expected this winter. "Altogether", says a SHAFF economic summary, "the German farmer must have found this discourse not a little depressing". BÄCKE mentioned as outstanding hardships the cessation of imports of food and feeding stuffs, the serious lack of nitrogen fertilizers. Yet again, he emphasized the serious transportation situation, and noted as a key determinant of the farm program for this year the need to reduce the call on internal road, rail and water transport. The widespread dissatisfaction among rail workers which has been reported in several places during recent weeks apparently was seriously regarded by officialdom. A Day of German Railwaymen was instituted, and on the first celebration of this festive occasion Dr GOEBBELS, according to DNB (7 December), "made the historic statement that to be a railwayman today means more than just to ply any sort of trade". With many references to "the railway front" and "the battle of
transport", GOEBBELS informed the assembled workers that they were being "honored with the highest orders in the name of the Fuehrer". It is not clear whether the men were impressed.

A somewhat more substantial sop was thrown to the populace of BERLIN last week, but in this case it seems clear that these highly-favored were not impressed. A Swedish correspondent's comment ought to be noted:
"The extra food rations are hardly likely to create a festive atmosphere. The longed-for and expected coffee is conspicuous by its absence. The bottle of wine and half a bottle of spirits are only an unconfirmed rumor as yet. The toys made by the HJ are not particularly good nor are there enough of them. Otherwise only the remains of formerly less desirable picture books are obtainable and some games which are either too difficult or too dull for children. In order to console people some special clothing coupons will be valid. Women will be able to buy one pair of stockings or one brassiere, one scarf or three handkerchiefs and men three handkerchiefs or one pair of braces, one pair of socks or one pair of sock suspenders".
Part II: WEHRMACHT MORALE


The fact that the combat efficiency of German troops still remains high can be attributed in part to the skill with which the German High Command is executing its defensive strategy, and committing its reserves. On the U.S. Ninth Army Front, according to the Ph Combat Team in that sector, the average morale of the Lendier is being strengthened, as new units are constantly being committed. On this front, for example, the 20 SS Panzer Division, composed of many Waffen SS volunteers, who upon interrogation still fanatically believe in final German victory, fights with great determination. A report from 3-2, First U.S. Army, states that morale among Pa/V formed and captured has recently achieved a "new high". This has been expressed by attempts to escape and an avowed eagerness of prisoners to return and rejoin the battle for Germany. The G-2 report cites, in this respect, the skill with which von Rundstedt has defended and husbanded his forces.

Similar stiffening of morale on the First French Army Sector is reported as a recognized fact. "In order to bolster up the morale of the troops, the OKW has filled gaps and replaced lost equipment with a great deal of cleverness. Whenever the French hesitated to attack on one point, the enemy put the delay to good use. Weapons, such as the Panzerfaust (bazooka) are effective and they seem to be supplied to the troops in great quantities."

2. Junior Officer Morale.

It is obvious, from the stiff resistance being put up by the Wehrmacht, that its officers are performing their task bravely and well. Despite this fact, however, recently there have been more expressions of dissatisfaction with the conduct of junior officers by prisoners of war. It is undoubtedly true that in some isolated instances officers have behaved badly. Whether this is due to lack of adequate training or not is difficult to determine.

These stories of prisoners of war with respect to the cowardly conduct of officers must be taken with several grains of salt. The stories, widespread though they are, deal with isolated instances insufficient in number to mark a serious breakdown of morale among junior officers, nor even a feeling of general dissatisfaction with their conduct on the part of the Lendier.

From one sector of the front there has come a partial explanation of why some of the prisoners of war stories are exaggerated. First French Army has reported that "the majority of Pa/V complain that their officers have deserted them." It points out that "it is worth noting that they are mistaken. The truth of the matter is that the proportion of officers to non-coms and men in German units encountered on this front is extremely small, so small that, when they are in the lines, the men seldom see their unit commander who has his CP at least 500 yards in the rear. In reality, the men do not see their officers after capture. Officers are killed or captured some time later. Desertion or withdrawal by unit commanders is the exception. Then interrogated, officers say that it would be impossible for them to go back without their unit - it would mean immediate court-martial. They prefer to be captured."

Reports of shortages of officers, which can be expected in an army that has suffered as heavy casualties as the German army has, should be noted with the reservation that in the German army senior NCOs frequently assume command positions which, in the British and American armies, would be held by junior officers. The morale of these NCOs, as previously reported, is extremely high.

Among many junior officer Pa/V, an almost amazing confidence in orders, based on what appears to them as sound military judgment, is encountered. For example, Lt. De captured north of Mulhausen after he and his officer comrades had fought a delaying action, gave a clear idea of the meaning of his mission in Alsace. All German troops fighting there were ordered to make it possible for the Wehrmacht to evacuate heavy equipment across the Rhine and to man Westwall fortifications along the Rhine between Mainz and Karlsruhe. He felt that
his sacrifices had been worthwhile. Now, he believes the fortifications are sufficiently well defended to make it impossible for the Allies to attempt a crossing of the Rhine in this sector. When asked whether he really believed in the existence of the necessary reserve troops, he answered that he had discussed the matter with well-informed staff officers who told him that the Wehrmacht was training new shock troops, young fanatics who were ready to give their all for the cause. These men would not be brought into the lines before spring when they would be supported by countless new weapons, not secret ones, but perfected ones. The strength of his morale position was finally defended by his conviction that, "Of course, I am not so foolish as to pretend that Germany will win the war. But a total Allied victory, such as you expect it, is impossible."

Another consideration to be kept in mind is that many a career officer professes openly that he will keep on fighting until ordered to stop, regardless of the chances of victory and regardless of political considerations. They indicate that as career soldiers they are afraid that once the war is over there will be no place for them and that they feel themselves incapable of resuming a civilian position.


Most German officers admit having read some of our leaflets. It is known, for example, from enlisted P/7s, that officers who gave orders to destroy all leaflets, read them themselves. However, either because of security consciousness or soldierly pride, they deny that their men were influenced by our propaganda. They claim, in addition, that they and their comrades officers had shown very little interest in the contents of Allied leaflets.

Although these "high morale" junior officers may genuinely believe that our leaflets have little influence on German troops (captured documents indicate that higher commands think otherwise) further interrogation usually reveals that their off-hand statements about their own personal lack of concern about our leaflets are largely unreliable.

They are amasingly well informed about our main appeals and frequently offer elaborate counter-arguments to interrogators. They comment that the unreasonable claims in our leaflets about German losses and prisoners captured clearly show their propaganda nature. They try to relate our propaganda to their military intentions. One P/7, for example, stated that a leaflet, allegedly pointing out that the war will end before winter, was discussed among his battalion staff officers and was interpreted by the commanding officer as meaning that the Americans were afraid of the winter. Therefore, if the German army could hold out through the winter, Germany would be able to drive the Allies out.

4. Officer Training.

The relatively intact position of the officer corps is seen in a study by the Second British Army, based on P/7 information which concludes that during recent months the German army has not felt it necessary to introduce an emergency procedure for building up officer strength rapidly. Company commanders continue to recommend promising candidates and occasional appeals for volunteers have been issued.

P/7 opinion was unanimous that influence of any sort, whether through high-placed friends or through the Party, has no effect on a candidate's chances of selection if he does not possess the necessary qualifications. (From captured documents it is known that pressure has been exerted to get all former Hitler Youth Leaders to become officers.) A clean combat sheet is essential and an unblemished civilian record. Every candidate must have served infantry and basic training and a minimum of two months front line experience. University training seems to make a man almost automatically a prospective candidate, provided that his military record is satisfactory. Ian have, however, been selected with an elementary school education.

The officer candidate usually goes to a NCO course in their own arm for a period of three to six months. Then normally returns to regimental duty and after
serving as a Faschirich (officer candidate, junior grade), and later Oberfahnrich (officer candidate, senior grade) receives his commission. In special cases the procedure is shortened.

It appears that the majority of new officers come from the lower ranks. Senior NCOs are not generally anxious, although ambition and the desire for prestige does motivate some. They do not desire to exchange their Kingdoms for a lieutenancy. In the light of the foregoing it seems reasonable to assume that in the near future the morale and training of German junior officers will remain more than adequate. Even without drawing heavily from the ranks of the trained senior NCOs, this will probably be the case.

5. German Counter-Propaganda.

More and more Fo/M report having had to listen to the speeches by NPSO officers. One of the main subjects seems to be German weapons; attempts are made to explain the absence of the Panzerkreuzer while the arrival in the near future of new and better weapons is guaranteed in outright fashion. Fo/M profess, although it is probably not entirely correct, that they usually sleep through these sessions, or at least pay little attention, until the closing SIG HEIL is sounded.

New German leaflets include a reprint of our red Passatreschein which carries the following message in both German and English above General Eisenhower's signature:

"The German soldier who carries this safe conduct passage is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to go into captivity for the next ten years, to betray his fatherland, to return home a broken old man and very probably never to see his parents, wife and children again."

Guidance for political discussion, as revealed by a captured divisional order, indicates that the Nazi Party, as early as the first part of October, took special steps to counter anxiety among German troops about the fate of their relatives in the districts west of the Rhine. The order points out that "the Führer has specifically desired that no German shall be left in the hands of the enemy. The responsibility for this lies with the Party leadership. They have gained sufficient experience and deserve full confidence. The Party's role in bringing about the successful defense of the Ostfront line is cited as evidence. Therefore, the troops are to be taught that it is their duty to urge relatives to comply with the arrangements and the directions given at Party centers.

The difficulties encountered in obtaining suitable material to implement directives pointing out the terror conditions in German areas occupied by the Allies can be seen in the relative absence of this theme in broadly disseminated items. However, for propaganda lectures within the Wehrmacht more of such material seems to be forthcoming. A Fo report while attending a military course, that they were told in occupied Germany civilians are not permitted to leave their houses. A young girl once stopped into her garden to get some potatoes for dinner. German soldiers beat her mercilessly until she staggered back into the house and fell bleeding to the floor.


First mission assigned to Volksstumunits in the SaarLautern-Vervig area was to round up the cattle in the combat zone. The units in this area were called up on 8 November and completed their training within one week. There was even no time for political indoctrination and they were not informed as to their military status. They were equipped with antiquated weapons. Nevertheless, these recruits supplied considerable resistance in house-to-house fighting in SaarLautern, according to G-4 sources. They were under the general command of the local divisional commander, but still were fighting as units with their own officers.
The results of Schanzarbeiten (trench digging) by the very young and the old civilians have not caused satisfaction among Fs/N. They claim, according to a report from one sector only, that these entrenchments are not wide and deep enough. Also, these prepared trenches are reported to having proved unsuited for the tactical situation when the attack came from the side and thus enabled the Americans to put enfilading fire on Fs/N platoon.

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Mr. Jackson
Mr. Crossman
Lt. Col. Gurfein
Major Linsky
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Plans & Directives (2)
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Lt. Magary
Radio

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Political Advisers, SHAEF (2)
Political Officers, SHAEF (2)
SHAEF (Main) 3-2
" " 6-2, C.I., Civil Security Section
" " 6-3
" " 6-4
" " 6-5 (8)
P&W, 6 A.G. (6)
P&W, 12 A.G. (3)
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