The great question mark in regard to Germany and the Germans this week is the outcome of the present Russian drive in the East. Reports from Germany of the past few days have a tentative air about them, as though all measures are makeshift until it is clear whether, and if, the Red Army is going to stop. It is clear that the speed of the Russian advance has caught the home front psychologically unprepared. Whether the critical transport situation in the East can be solved, whether the Volksturm can be organized in time, whether sufficient equipment can be brought up, whether the people can be evacuated — all these and similar questions admit of no solution until an affirmative answer is given to the question "Have the Russians been stopped yet?" For the predominant feeling that seems to emerge is that so long as one says "No" to this question the answers to the other questions can hardly matter. It is within the context of this big question mark that one must read the news of the week from Germany, for any report written before the last 3 days must otherwise seem stale and a little irrelevant.

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Soldier and Civilian

The Russian advance raises sharply again the question which was posed earlier by the allied entry on to German soil in the West: what effect does the returning soldier have upon the morale of his civilian compatriot, and how does contact with civilians affect the soldier? The question is extremely complicated but several factors have become clear during the course of occupation in the West. Certain frictions between soldier and civilian were inevitable, particularly during the great Wehrmacht confusion in the early weeks of September — a period to which the German press attached the label "Flight of Stappenschweine". Lost soldiers, remains of units, groups of deserters, took over the small towns of Western Germany — and their heavy drinking, noisiness and vandalism caused considerable irritation to the civilians. Even as the Wehrmacht recovered its poise, the natural tendency of soldiers in uniform to push civilians around remained a source of friction. Although many individual soldiers assisted civilians to evade evacuation, the official authority of the Wehrmacht was on several occasions used to enforce it. And this formal participation of the army in measures ordered by the Party was perhaps the sharpest focus of dissension. Despite all this, it was clear that civilians did not entirely blame their soldiers, and that the average German's continental affection toward the Lander remained approximately the same as the American's toward the G.I. or the Briton's toward the Tommy. Cases of irritation toward individual soldiers or small groups were frequently evident but censure was attached mainly to the officialdom of the Wehrmacht.

This feeling of community frequently led the civilians to urge the soldiers to stop resisting. It is difficult to say what extent civilian encouragement led to actual desertion, but a good many deserters to this day continue to be found in civilian homes within the occupied Rhineland, and many prisoners have referred to the fact that they were encouraged by civilians to quit.

In the East, the situation differs from that which obtained in the West. The speed of the Russian advance eliminates, at the moment, the possibility of prolonged civilian influence upon soldiers. But even if the

* See WD Weekly Intelligence Summary # 6
Red Army slows down and regular contact between soldier and civilian becomes possible, the Silesians are not likely to react as did the Rhinelanders. For the former were facing the hated Russians and dreaded Poles. Their fears of the occupying forces and their own guilt fears, for Nazis was strong in Silesia, will make them think twice before giving up or urging the soldiers to surrender. But even if the Silesians were inclined to urge soldiers to quit, they will probably not have the opportunity. Whereas party attempts to control relations between soldiers and civilians in the past were largely a matter of "frühzeitige" orders which could not be enforced, in the East the Party now has at its disposal the Volkssturm, which is an excellent device for bringing civilians under the control of a few selected hard-core NSDAP's. And the indications this week are that the Party means to make full use of this device in Silesia. (See Part B of this Summary).

The Political Question

Any attempt to estimate political sentiment in occupied Germany must take careful account of the facts: that those who remained behind are the Rhineland non-Nazi and that the questions are being asked by men in Allied uniforms. Some weighting in the appreciation of bare statistical results must derive from our knowledge of what the Germans think the allies want to hear and, in no case, can the results be applied to Germany as a whole. With these cautions, and in view of the trend in individual interrogations, it can be said that the majority of Germans now living under Allied rule are "Left-of-Center" in their political sentiments. Three surveys, conducted at intervals of approximately one month, reveal this trend of political desires among the Germans in occupied areas. The surveys were not based on stratified sampling, but were purely random and hence make no pretense to be adequate samplings of the community as a whole.

The First survey, conducted on 28 November among 66 people in the town of STEINBERG, showed a slight majority in favor of democratic government along the lines of the "Weimar Republic." Most of the others favored some sort of democracy but not the symbol "Weimar." (Only 2 of the 66 interrogees mentioned any alternative - i.e., constitutional monarchy.) Along the same lines, a large majority were in favor of a Rhineland independent of Prussia, the implication of "Prussia" being clearly militarism and autocracy. About half of this predominantly Catholic population expressed the desire that the Church remain completely apart from politics and that the Catholic Zentrum Party play a smaller role than it has so far under occupational authority.

A second survey, conducted among 43 German civilians in the VUGHT Internment Camp on 25 December, revealed a similar tendency. The line of questioning was here less sharply defined and for this reason it is perhaps more significant that slightly more than half of those questioned spoke clearly for a democratic type of post-war government. It is noteworthy that one-fourth, instead of speaking directly for a democratic German government insisted on the primary need for a strict post-war military government by the allies. Resistance on the allies has most frequently been linked with fear that democratic tendencies within Germany may not of themselves be strong enough to support a spontaneous native democracy. (In this survey, too, a moderate monarchist made his inevitable appearance, this one even specifying Prince Louis Ferdinand as the monarch he desired).

The third, and most satisfactory survey, was conducted among 136 people in AACHEN on 15 January. Those surveyed were asked only one question and that very specific: how they would vote if there were elections with the same contending parties as before 1933. The replies were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrists</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkspartei</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The prevailing attitude is clearly to the Left, in the sense that 101 of the total votes went to the two Marxist parties. A breakdown by sexes reveals an interesting ratio among those voting for the Marxist parties: 83% women, 70% men. (Women, in the past, have been considered stronger Nazis than the men). This one is considerably firmer than the two earlier surveys, because the number of people included is much larger, and because conditions in Aachen have become fairly settled during three months of efficient administration. AACHEN, being "big city" folk, would normally be expected to be more articulate on political questions than a random sample in STOLBERG, or the rather dazed inhabitants of an internment camp.

Even putting the results of all three surveys together, however, one is able to draw only two general conclusions:

(1) That German propaganda has not succeeded in identifying Marxist with the Devil's code in the average German mind. Germans have always known thoroughly respectable Social Democrats and even Communists in their home towns and the stigma of "Satanz" is therefore likely to seem a little silly when applied to the man next door. (In regard to Russia, the attempt has been far more successful, but it is interesting to note in this connection that among prisoners and civilians who have been in Russia during the war GÖEBBELS' program of identifying STALIN with Satan and Russia with Purgatory has largely broken down).

(2) That the majority of people now in the occupied areas would, in an election conducted under Allied authority, probably vote for the Left parties.

These conclusions cannot be extended beyond the occupied areas, however, because of the special conditions discussed in the first paragraph which attach to any survey made under present conditions. That interrogation of former Nazis and pro-Nazis and sympathetic non-Nazis within the interior of Germany is likely to reveal cannot be predicted from the present samples.

It is curious to note Herr GÖEBBELS' version of the results of the STOLBERG survey which appeared in his Kiez nach article of 12 January. Instead of a team of American sergeants and 66 people whom they met at random in the town, the affair became "a public opinion survey conducted by the American Gallup Institute to determine what the feeling was for a reintroduction of the Weimer Republic". "Das ergab", said Dr. GÖEBBELS, "was für die Feindsse weitgehend niederschmettern" (The results were really disastrous for the enemy). Despite the fact that "the allies left no stone unturned to convince interrogates of the wonders of democracy, not even 5% favored such a course for Germany". The facts, as noted above, are that well over 50% actually expressed preference for a democratic form of government, and interrogators made no attempt to win converts to democracy, either of the Weimer or American pattern.

Nachrichten (The Aachen News)

The German counteroffensive in the ARDENNES revealed, among other things, the need for a regular Allied channel of information to the population under our authority. With the lack of electric current in many towns throughout the occupied area the people depend more heavily than elsewhere upon newspaper information. The Mitteilungen of F & F, 12 A.G. did a gallant job of distribution during the counteroffensive and played a considerable role in forestalling the circulation of wild rumors concerning the success of German operations. Unfortunately, the attack was first announced on 16 December, the day Mitteilungen appeared, and since the
paper is a weekly it was not until 25 December that the first issue containing authoritative news reached the nervous and unhappy Germans. The Anchen Nachrichten is the first German-managed, Allied-controlled newspaper in the occupied areas. A press control team has completed procurement and requisitioning activities, has secured the German personnel necessary to make a start in publishing the paper, and put its first issue on the street on 24 January.

Conceived as a weekly and priced at 20 pfennig, the paper will be welcome to the news-hungry German population. Some indication of the popularity of German-language news is indicated by the small "black market" which a group of enterprising lads have set up in AACHEN with Die Mittellungen. On 16 January these lads got hold of some 50 copies of the paper, which is distributed gratis by 12 A.G., and quickly peddled them off at 50 pfennigs a copy among the civilians who were happy to pay for the quicker service. It is likely that the Anchen Nachrichten will be issued as a bi-weekly as soon as printing facilities and personnel permit, and perhaps eventually as a daily.

The front page gives authoritative news of both European fronts and briefer accounts of the action at HANNOVER and the Allied bombing of DUISBURG. A boxed announcement informs the population that the curfew hour has been advanced from 1730 to 1800 hours. And the "Feature" article of the page deals with the sentence of an umbrella-manufacturer and his wife to 9 months' imprisonment for hoarding food and concealing this from the American authorities. Articles of this letter type are particularly welcome to A.G. officers, who have been faced with the difficult problem of disseminating information and are convinced that many violations of minor A.G. ordinances are due simply to ignorance on the part of the population. A letter from Major JONES, A.G. Commandant at AACHEN, is printed in the first issue and expresses a warm welcome to Anchen Nachrichten on behalf of the Military Government.

B. EMILY AREAS

The Red Army's Advance

With the Russians occupying most of East Prussia, which has been cut off from the rest of the Reich, and the main industrial areas of Silesia, it is illuminating to note the commentaries of the leaders of German opinion. German propaganda has centered mainly upon the primary necessity of preventing panic. The authority of Clausewitz is called upon to assure the public that no battle is lost before it is finally ended. This line, negative as it is, is the dominating tone of the week's propaganda output. It is clearly admitted that a great emergency is at hand, even indicated that things are likely to be worse, and no attempt is made to minimize the potential threat. Reassurance mainly takes the form of trying to ally fears that the High Command has lost control, or that large-scale countermeasures have already been tried and have failed. DITTMAR on 23 January admitted that things in the East hang in the balance but specifically denied that countermeasures on a final scale had yet been undertaken. He prepared the public for the loss of East Prussia and Upper Silesia by showing that these losses would take place before the planned German countermeasures could begin to be effective. East Prussia he referred to as a temporary bastion, but he made no mention of either new reserves or entrenchments upon which a major defensive operation would have to rely. The most striking thing in his address was its vagueness and the weakness of his assurances. The following day von BERCK, speaking for HIMMLER, admitted less openly that DITTMAR the unrecorded gravity of the situation, but his assurances were even weaker. He devoted considerable attention to the theme of "You'll be sorry" - maintaining that the Red Army's threat brought home finally to all other leaders what the German leaders had long known: that should the Reich's structure crumble its ruin would spread far over the earth.

SECRET
"We always know the deadly seriousness of this war. Now at last may the whole of mankind become aware of its deadly seriousness, and may those who have even a slight sense of responsibility ask themselves how much more the bread of peace must be soaked in blood before it may be eaten, for they must see and know that we Germans will never give up our freedom, our soil and our way of life".

The Russian advance affected even former German claims of the "strategic success" of the ARDENNES offensive. The line by last week had given up all attempts to claim von RUNDSTEDT's counter-offensive as a genuine victory in any measure, contenting itself with assurances that it had been necessary to "disarrange" the Western Front before the Russians launched their "expected" drive in the East. In this, the German radio was saying last week, they had succeeded and were now in a position to turn their attention to "disarranging" the Red Army's front. By this time the line would look a little ridiculous and it has been dropped altogether. Only BAVIEN, among the top commentators, dealt with the ARDENNES offensive at all, and he was both brief and unenthusiastic. This went even further, intimating that a new large-scale Allied attack in the West was in prospect. Listening to the radio this week could hardly have been a good way for a German to lift his morale.

The Transport Crisis and Evacuation

The Red Army's offensive aggravates still further the already critical position of German transport, particularly in the East. The dislocation of large sections of the Reich transport system, and the increased demands upon the remaining facilities, both rail and road, has already made itself felt in the daily life of many Germans. The system of inter-regional food distribution which ensured each part of the Reich's planned food supply through the exchange of surpluses for shortages has already, according to recent announcements of BACKE, discussed in this Summary, partially broken down. Another result, probably felt by Germans even more deeply than the lack of a balanced diet, has been the breakdown of the postal system. Comparatively few families have been left completely untouched by the enormous displacement of persons within present-day Germany. Families have depended very largely upon letters to maintain contact with one another. Now comes a "total ban" on private letters and parcels, announced on 22 January. The ban is not, in fact, total, for field post and foreign letters are not affected by the ruling. And to soften the blow for purely civilian correspondence, post-cards and even letters are permitted to circulate between two towns with favorable transport conditions.

The first sentence of the announcement states the reason frankly:

"The whole machinery of the German Reichsbahn is needed to strengthen the German front in the East".

It is in the East, of course, that the lack of adequate transport facilities has now become literally a matter of life or death.

It is reported that NAUKWEL of the Propaganda Ministry, in a speech at POSEN, informed unhappy citizens of that town that they must "fall at their post". The local newspaper, according to a Swedish report, announced that only invalids, children under 12 and oldsters over 60, and these unfit to fight, have "the right to leave" the town. All previous official evacuation orders have recently assumed that all males of Volkssturm age (16-60) must stay behind. But this announcement makes two startling exceptions:

(1) the age limit of children forced to remain is revised downward from 16 to 12,
(2) females are included on the same basis as males.
This measure is very likely the result of the practical impossibility of organizing a full-scale evacuation, due equally to the shortage of transport and the rapidity of the Russian advance. It is unlikely that the order to remain will deter those who are able to escape from the town by private means. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung of 22 January said that great numbers of refugees have, in fact, already left East Prussia and Silesia, and this is confirmed by a Moscow report of 24 January which says that Russian aircraft have observed streams of refugees jamming the roads leading westward. Even the German Home Service has been broadcasting accounts of the hasty evacuation in bitter cold. A typical broadcast, on 25 January, reported that in the preceding days some 300,000 people had left BRESLAU. The fortunate ones rode in open carts and lorries; but wherever transport was not sufficient women and children marched in columns to safety, thankful that the icy winds had abated somewhat. The best Front und Heimat could offer worried soldiers from the East in the way of reassurance was that "this German evacuation bears no resemblance to the French refugee flood of 1940". One estimate from London has calculated that the number of refugees on the move probably considerably exceeds 3 million.

The Volkssturm is Suppressed

The lot of those Germans on the road or already evacuated to strange places is hard enough, but the greatest hardship, and the most significant test of the fighting morale of the German people, is that imposed upon the civilians mobilized into the Volkssturm battalions of Eastern Germany. It has become clear during the past two months that the Volkssturm has gone considerably beyond the comic opera level which characterized many aspects of its initial efforts. The series of orders issued by Martin BORMANN alone is some evidence of the Party’s intention to employ the Volkssturm as a military formation wherever possible. BORMANN made it clear, three months ago, that the Volkssturm was not to be regarded as just another Nazi Verein. To requests from the leaders of various organizations that they be permitted to form their own Volkssturm units he replied: "A baker’s Volkssturm is nonsense, a contradiction in terms... The Volkssturm is the most profound articulation and underlining of German unity. The Volkssturm is a welding into one". On a less elevated but more practical level of personnel policy BORMANN has directed his Gauleiters that all retired Generals and other officers are to be used in the Volkssturm according to their training and capacity, and that he personally is to be informed in each case whom an officer of this type is assigned a position of command. On another occasion he ordered that, due to the shortage of priests at home, the induction of priests either into the Wehrmacht or the Volkssturm was prohibited. An especially "considerate" order by BORMANN, issued in agreement with "K.F.S.O. HJ.LOC." instructed all Volkssturm commanders how to handle former criminal elements within their command. The main thing was that criminals were to be given a fair chance and be treated like any other Volkssturm soldier until they gave grounds for other treatment. The same order, even more significantly, dealt with the specific question of political "criminals" who were not to be treated with suspicion "simply because of previous convictions or their bad reputation".

Further evidence that the Volkssturm has, in fact, been called up extensively in the eastern parts of Germany is contained in the German newspapers which daily announce the call-up of new units from one town or another. Whereas in the West no Volkssturm unit larger than a battalion has yet been encountered, in East Prussia organization of the Volkssturm on a regimental basis has been frequently reported, and it seems likely that the Volkssturm has actually performed better on the Eastern front than it has done in the West. Although accounts of Volkssturm heroism in the East are probably exaggerated, the special conditions which harden the morale of people in that area are indicated in these sentences from a speech by a
Volkssturma Company Commander to units being sworn in before a crowd of "nearly 100,000":

"There is no need to tell Upper Silesians what the words 'To preserve the Fatherland' mean. Those who live close to the frontier know their meaning. I need merely remind you of the year prior to the liberation of the homeland. Then our enemies derisively called us 'Hitler's soldiers'. We shall show them what stuff 'Hitler's soldiers' are made of."
I GENERAL

The effects of the Russian drive on the morale of German troops fighting in the West has not yet been reported. Interrogations of Pa/W taken on the first and Third Army fronts during the first days of the Russian offensive show the German soldiers to have been until that date wholly ignorant of the extent and strategical implications of the drive. The few isolated reports of Pa/W who knew about the offensive before they were captured provide no basis for generalisation, but indicate some lines of reaction. Some of these Pa/W admitted that the end was only a matter of weeks. It was "obvious" to one 30 year old professional NCO, that Germany can now no longer hold off the Russians. "If the High Command pull back divisions from the Western front the Americans will break through". A few "extremely pro-Nazi" soldiers however minimised the drive and believed that the Russian front would be stabilised. Pa/W already in an Allied enclosure who were informed of the Russian drive refused in the main to believe the facts of the Russian successes as told to them by interrogators. Those who gave the news credence forcibly admitted how desperate the situation was and were deeply concerned about the fate of the German civilians in the threatened areas. Many a Nazi still spoke valiantly and dogmatically of the necessity for continuing the fight to the very end.

In the meantime, the Germans continue their systematic withdrawal in the Ardennes sector. The IV Combat Team operating on this front reports on the confusion caused in the enemy's lines due to the steady retreat and the unceasing pressure of artillery barrages. Experienced officers and NCO's complain after capture of the lack of information about the tactical battle situation. Some incidents of companies being lost because higher headquarters left them without orders are being encountered. Losses continue to be high, and many of the counter-thrusts which have been ordered have resulted in the destruction of entire units. Moreover, replacements arriving at this front are mainly air force or infantry units containing a high percentage of Volksgrenadiere who are insufficiently trained.

Despite these difficulties, morale and discipline of the troops in the line remains firm enough to make possible effective withdrawals. The feeling of confusion which some NCOs and officers report reflects in large measure only the immediate situation in which they find themselves. But such confusion is hardly typical for the German High Command has again displayed its ability to retreat with success.

In the absence of a general order to surrender, which seems most unlikely, the signs of final collapse, aside from physical destruction, are likely to be found in an increase in the number of token resisters and deserters, the surrender of small groups under the authority of an NCO, and a marked tendency just to return home under the assumption that the war will be over any day. During the period of the German retreat across France a d of the push into the Arden sector this latter practice appeared to have developed to some extent, especially among soldiers whose homes were overrun or directly threatened by the Allied advance. This pattern is likely to repeat itself to an even greater extent. But judging by what happened after the break-through in Normandy, German soldiers will not give up the fight with any real rapidity, until a deep Allied penetration has been made into their lines and encirclement is actual or threatened.

On the Ninth U.S. Army front, the lack of any widespread military activity has left morale relatively unchanged. Reports speak of some attempts to exploit the news of the Saar offensive to counteract the effects of the lack of a decisive break-through in the Ardennes. No current reports have been received on Pa/W taken on the Alsation front.
II OFFICER MORALE

For the first time since the beginning of the Bundesstaat offensive, reports of bad leadership, in the form of inexperienced officers, and even cases of cowardice are being encountered with some frequency. The typical story is that of officers who, while exhorting their men to fight to the last bullet, removed themselves to rear at the first opportunity. It still appears nevertheless that these stories of cowardly behavior of officers deal with isolated cases, insufficient to indicate any serious misconduct by junior officers or even general dissatisfaction with their conduct on the part of the Landsie.

Interrogators of many junior officers captured recently in the Ardennes, indicate that among them the feeling that time is on the side of Germany, is still strong and elaborately articulated. The Bundesstaat offensive is viewed in that light. One captain, a regular Army officer of Prussian family, summarized his position in a fashion typical of many other junior officers. For him the offensive was a complete success. Time works in favor of Germany and he is convinced that if only the Allies do not finish off Germany too quickly, the Germans will mass forces for bigger and more powerful counter-attacks. The present German government will fight it out to the bitter and regardless of the consequences. He criticized our all too obvious tactics, and was surprised that we are not exploiting the present situation in the Ardennes to greater advantage. The Germans have wide experience of retreats and defensive warfare and therefore they can always recuperate in a short time unless one keeps stepping on their heels constantly. When told of the present Russian offensive, he conceded that it might change the situation. But he still claimed that the High Command hopes to reach a stalemate in the West. Their basic idea is that the American soldier is tired of war, that he does not know what he is fighting for, and that when public opinion in the USA discovers that the war in Europe is costly in lives, it will demand peace. Although many other junior officers may not have formulated so clearly reasons for continued resistance, it is obvious that for the majority of them there still seems to be a real purpose in fighting one. This, plus their soldierly training and honor renders them determined opponents.

III CONTACT WITH GERMAN CIVILIANS

German civilians who lived in the areas occupied by the Allies had opportunities to speak to German soldiers during the early days of the Ardennes counter-offensive as the troops pushed through. The effects of these conversations seem hardly to have strengthened Nazi propaganda claims to German troops that life under Allied occupation would be unbearable. These civilians, according to German soldiers who later became Pz/1, spoke of the fair treatment they had received at the hands of Allied military government. In fact some Pz/1 spoke of actual outspoken resentment towards the German troops. “Barun sind Ma zuulokgokaren?” (Why have you returned?) Hugh was made of the fact that American troops were not billeted in private homes while the returning German soldiers took this practice for granted.

It is reasonable that the hostility of the civilians was in part generated simply by the fact that they were once more in the battle zone and that they again faced the threat of evacuation. But for the German soldier it was concrete evidence of fair treatment of civilians by the Anglo-Americans. The influence of this sort of propaganda was of course limited by the fact that only a very small number of troops had the opportunity to come into contact directly with German civilians in those areas, but there is reason to believe that stories of these conversations were circulated in the ranks of the Wehrmacht.

IV ROLE OF VOLKDEUTSCH

It has been clearly shown that ever since Normandy Volksdeutsche with few real German ties are most likely to be token resisters or even deserters. Most of them (lists III and IV) were
never received into the Wehrmacht with any degree of equality and for them the prospect of a German victory does not seem indispensable to their own personal existence. However, it would be wrong to assume that all Volksdeutsch soldiers are of this state of mind. Many of them have a strong German heritage and have through five years of war become quite thoroughly assimilated into the Wehrmacht. They have become completely professional soldiers. For some of them a German victory is an important goal. In the event of a German defeat, they can never return to Russia, the Baltic states, Poland or whatever country they came from. During the days of Nazi conquest they or their families frequently shared in the spoils of aggression, and in order for them to retain these or even to be assured of any economic security, a German victory is essential.

Others of these Germans have become extremely apathetic and fatalistic. They have come to believe that nothing they do can affect their own personal future. Uprooting from their homes and coercion into service, has destroyed any sense of initiative. As a result they fight on with simple mechanical motivation, and without any clear-cut reasons for doing otherwise. Nevertheless, the Volksdeutsche in the Wehrmacht, as a class, continue to constitute an excellent propaganda target.

V PROPAGANDA TO THE SOLDIER

Efforts to probe the state of mind of the German soldier while actually in the fighting line predominantly indicate that concern with personal safety and personal comforts overshadow all other considerations. As a result, the claims of propaganda and counter-propaganda about problems which he cannot immediately visualise, receive little attention.

One forward observer states the case in extreme fashion when he declares that as far as the average Landsknecht is concerned:

"I noticed that the front-line soldier doesn't give a damn if his Führer Hitler speaks for six months or not or if strong men Himmler or somebody else is arming the whip over him. He doesn't care if Ravenswa has fallen or not, and he cares less about the destruction of Germany's oil production since he doesn't see the connection between this fact and his lack of food... Of course he curses the German artillery for falling short and for not firing as many rounds as was, but has no idea about the cause. He misses the Luftwaffe, makes jokes about Göring, but he is happy again if he sees two German planes in the sky, although he has no idea about the overall picture and cares even less. If he thinks the war is lost, he doesn't stop to worry while he is in his foxhole about what is going to happen to Germany, or who is going to be his boss as long as the war is over for him and he can work again."

On the other hand, there is reason to believe that when the soldier is in reserve, away from the immediate danger of the battle, in possession of time for relaxation and consequently, for thinking, he becomes more susceptible to propaganda. There is time to reconsider the experiences of the battle and even to speculate on the ultimate outcome of the war; likewise there is time to hear once again, the basic arguments of Nazi propaganda.

Nazi policy in their propaganda to German troops continues to avoid an answer to Allied factual statements of the failure of the counter-offensive in the West. Instead, new leaflets to the Wehrmacht stress the (alleged) contrast between the American soldier who is a mercenary and the German soldier who fights for existence. They are designed to counter-set feelings that the American soldier is a fair soldier; instead he is portrayed as indiscriminate murderer who uses air power to kill mothers, wives and children. Another concern of Nazi propaganda is an explanation of the need for a "Peoples' Sacrifice" in the collection of old
Clothes. Soldiers are urged to write home and have party uniforms, dancing frocks, hunting jackets, mountaineering jackets and the like turned in. A Front Line Press release takes the opportunity to explain that the clothes situation in the Reich is satisfactory and on the whole the same is true for the civilian population. But the influx of foreign workers in recent years, all the need good work clothes, and the recruitment of women for factories caused the difficulty. Air raids also affected stocks. No doubt special appeals to the soldiers in this campaign were designed to help in making the drive a success. But the removal of the remaining stocks of civilian clothes may be incidentally a security measure to prevent would-be deserters from obtaining civilian clothes. Needless to say, the Nazis have not given this as a reason.

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