WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE # 20

PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS : The Trend of German Attitudes

The Germans Come to Life

Five months ago, as the Allies first moved on to German soil, the dominant scene was ruin and devastation, and the chief impression derived from observation and conversation with Germans was of an overwhelming apathy. People were too worn by five years of war, heightened latterly by the crescendo of mass bombings, and capped by several weeks of destructive artillery and ground action, to care about anything but the physical needs of day to day living. Each town was in some degree a ghost town; the cellar was the normal residence; and people ate what they had been able to hide away before the Wehrmacht departed. While the primitive problems of survival and animal comfort absorbed their attention, people had but little time and care for the more complex problems of men. They merely looked on, leaving all questions for their new rulers to decide.

A report on civilian morale on 1 October wrote: "They are quiet, obedient ... care only for peace ... are anxious to please and to do as they are told". A report of mid-October added: "They are following orders almost too perfectly ... The people expect that the Americans will look after everything and that they are almost relieved of responsibility for their own lives". Early in November a morale study of 100 civilians in BRAND and ROETGEN characterized them as "beaten and spineless people with no strength left to govern themselves". At the end of November, a similar study of 200 civilians in AACHEN concluded: "Complete mental lassitude is perhaps the key reaction..., it is said by most that any government is welcome (To which some add, 'if they don't bother me with politics')".

As the first weeks of occupation passed, however, the towns under Allied rule recovered the semblance of normal conditions under the aegis of Military Government. The system of food distribution was improved; homes were repaired from local materials and made liveable again; miners and mechanics and clerks were put to work; families, separated during the critical weeks of the Wehrmacht's retreat, were re-united. With the restoration of town life, the problems of community leadership that faced any normal community began to emerge. That active instrument, the human mind, began to function again, and wherever there is thinking there is sure to be criticism. The picture changed from apathy and automatic obedience to considerable interest and questioning.

It is an ironical commentary on the shortness of human memory that in towns like STOLBERG and AACHEN an articulate number of people now concern themselves with such complex notions as representative democracy and the techniques of military justice, where four brief months ago they seemed to have little interest in anything but the mechanisms of maintaining life.
The Germans Start to Grumble

Right at the start the Germans were too bewildered and confused to notice much of what was happening all about them, even if they cared. When the atmosphere cleared a bit, however, normal curiosity about what the Anglo-Americans were like asserted itself. Germans began to think over what they had seen or heard and to form opinions, to discuss these among themselves and, finally, to express their views to representatives of the occupying authority. It was quite clear that the Germans were "not afraid" of the Americans. For GOEBBELS' propaganda concerning the "nation of gangsters" was more than offset by memories in the Rhineland of the last occupation, by the large number of Germans who had settled in America, by the common feeling that the Americans were basically - like the British and the Germans themselves - a "Kulturvolk". As it turned out, this view led to the first disappointments: many Germans had expected to be fed by the Allied armies, to find Allied soldiers friendly and easy-going, to receive special consideration because they had resisted Nazi evacuation measures. Instead, they were told that the Allies would do no more than help them feed themselves, that Allied soldiers had no relations with them at all, that Allied policy was primarily directed to getting on with the war.

Interrogators began to hear grumbling in various towns. Many Germans claimed to be "bewildered" by non-fraternization, and the "anti-Nazis" particularly were offended, for the measure seemed to put them in the same category with those Germans whom they had "opposed". Others were annoyed by looting, several making a distinction between the combat troops and the service echelons which followed them. The former were said to be "very decent", whereas later arrivals "had too much time on their hands". Objections were directed mainly against what they considered "senseless destruction". In some towns the community was particularly agitated by the manner in which tactical commanders enforced billeting measures, complaining that frequently they were compelled to leave their homes on short notice, often with no effort to appreciate Allied military necessity. In STORUPEN, particularly, several self-professed anti-Nazis complained that they were forced to move, while the Nazis were permitted to remain in their own homes. What might at worst have been a pure accident of choice which benefited some "Nazis" (although there is no proof of this) became a rumor against U.S. military authorities.

The Germans make Demands

As the weeks under occupation turned to months, the tenor of grumbling remained the same but the volume increased considerably. Soon grumbling was formalized into requests for the correction of ills. Usually this was a matter of the man who considered himself aggrieved paying a visit to the Town Mayor's office. Occasionally a single individual made application for redress in writing, but the use of the petition for the redress of public grievance came to the fore in connection with the requisitioning of radios and bicycles in several towns**. A communist miner, who had been extremely helpful to the authorities, wrote a petition asking that there be no confiscation or

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* The Germans make no clear distinction between "dislike of" the Nazis and "opposition to" them, perhaps because such a distinction would be too embarrassing for most of them.

**See FBI Weekly Intelligence Summary # 19, p.1.
requisitioning of these items in his own town of ALSDORF. There are
two remarkable things connected with this petition, both clearly the
work of a man trained in political maneuver. First, the petitioner
introduced in evidence an "English leaflet" dropped several days
before the Americans entered ALSDORF, which contains the following
phrase:

"3. The Allied troops have instructions to respect the
lives and private property of the German population."

Armed with this statement, he covered himself further (against a possible
charge of violating the order which forbids public meetings) by passing
the petition around among individual workers with instructions that
each one who agreed was to sign it by himself in the washroom.

This is a far cry indeed from the attitude which prevailed four
months ago, when Germans wished to be "relieved of responsibility for
their own lives". It indicates both a certain new-found initiative,
and a confidence in the fair-mindedness of the American administration.
To some at least of the signers it must have been a heavy feeling to
sign such a petition to the occupying power, in view of the fact that
most of them would never have dared such a thing under the Nazis. When
questioned about the origin of his petition, the writer simply said it
had occurred to him that Americans would be more impressed with many
signatures than with a statement from him alone, adding "I have confidence
in the democratic system."

Although ostensibly concerned with the subject matter of
requisitioning, the more genuine significance of the petition is as a
political act, for it indicates one problem which will be posed by the
German population to the occupying authorities. Indeed, since the
original petition from the ALSDORF miner a series of written petitions
have been received in towns where requisitioning of bed sheets had been
carried out for reasons of urgent military necessity. These petitioners
claim that it had been expected by many that the sheets would eventually
be returned, although no such promise had been made and recall of the
sheets would have been practically impossible in view of the wide
distribution.

In HERZOGEMRATH two significant letters were received, one signed
by two doctors, the other by two priests and a nun. In KOHLSCHEID
letters were received from 5 priests and from the representatives of the
miners. A 12 A.O. study of these letters reports that they present a
"uniformity of argument", differing only in emphasis and tone. The
medical petition stressed that contagious diseases can only be treated
under hygienic conditions and that the conditions of poverty under which
most of the people live require, for sanitary as well as humanitarian
reasons, at least one clean sheet weekly. The other letters argue mainly
the anti-Nazi character of the people affected, and particularly their
faith in the Allied proclamation which announced that private property
would not be touched.

The letters contained not only reproach but also a note of
warning. Most strongly worded was the petition from the 5 priests at
KOHLSCHEID:

"... If you take the sheets away from the people you will
create bitterness in the hearts of the people which could
hardly be remedied... and the bitterness will create hate
and hate creates violence. If you take away from them now
the few things they need so desperately to live... passive
resistance will spread more and more."
This type of threat of "passive resistance" is to be expected at some time during any military occupation, but the above seems the first instance where any German in the occupied zone has had the temerity to raise it in writing.

**VOX POPULI and Pressure Groups**

Several aspects of these petitions should be taken into account by psychological warfare. First, the miners' petition is the first strong indication that Germans in occupied areas regard the Allied military administration as fair-minded and disposed to give consideration to expressions of popular sentiment. (The author was sanguine that his petition would reach General EISENHOWER, although it might take a little time). Second, on issues important to them, the Germans will subscribe to collective expressions which the Allied authorities might regard unfavorably, if some leader among them takes the initiative. In the ALSBACH petition, the communist miner clearly led the articulation of a sentiment which undoubtedly existed among the miners concerning the possible loss of their bicycles.

The position is less clear concerning the KOHLSCHEID and HERZOGENRATH petitions for the return of bed sheets. While there is no substantive evidence that these petitions are the result of collusion among a small pressure group, circumstances encourage doubt about their authenticity as expressions of the popular will. To begin with, public response to the original collection of bed sheets had been very cooperative. People understood that the sheets were to be distributed among combat troops for use as snow camouflage, and it is improbable that many could reasonably have expected their return. Despite this, several hundred people are reported to have come on foot to the M.G. office on the day set for collection with their sheets draped over their arms. It is difficult to accept without question that such a demonstration of community cooperation one week would be followed by an outburst of public indignation the next week.

Remarkable, too, is the "uniformity of opinion" of these documents and their appearance in different towns exclusively under the signature of a few doctors and clergymen. It should be remembered that these individuals are less hampered by circulation restrictions than the rest of the community and that it is possible for them to meet for informal discussion without arousing undue suspicion. While it is by no means certain that this particular case was the result of collusion, the possibility of pre-arrangement indicates that in evaluating public attitudes it will be necessary to distinguish carefully between the efforts of pressure groups and genuine expressions of popular sentiment.

**The "Political Problem"**

The political field is, of course, the happy hunting-ground of pressure groups. And the presence of such groups in occupied Germany has already been detected. As far back as mid-November, the SHAFF 0-5 Summary # 23 wrote:

"In the city of STOELEBERG, certain very leftist elements attempted to play American Army politics by manipulating C.I.C. against H.G."

As normal life returns to larger areas of Germany, the normal pull-and-tug of politics is sure to make itself felt within communities and eventually in representations to the occupying authority. In political matters it is that section of the population which is nominally the Left, albeit a dehydrated Left, which is likely to be most active.
It is notable that thus far complaints, particularly when they are accompanied by suggestions for corrective measures, usually have come from those who consider themselves special friends of the Allies. This has been particularly true in regard to the problem of who is going to speak to the Allies for the population, and who is to interpret the will of the Allies to the population. The political anti-Nazi (those who "did not like" the Nazis), which is largely identical with the Left, consider they have prior right. For it considers itself the strongest ally within Germany of the Anglo-Americans, claiming that it subscribes to democracy as against Nazi ideals and that it has "kept the faith" throughout the decade of Nazi rule.

For these reasons it is from the Left that we may expect concerted pressure for the privileged position of intermediary between the military Government and the population. Expressions of dissatisfaction with those who presently fill this office have been heard in various towns. Sometimes the argument is purely ad hominem, as in STOLBERG, where the personality of the Burgermeister has been much discussed. On other occasions, criticism has been the grumbling of individual malcontents who express their opinion in such terms as "Politik wird immer Politik bleiben" (Politics will always be politics). The only sustained line of dispute has been that between the Left (Social Democrats and Communists) and the Center (Catholic Centre). The Leftists charge that Centrists occupy a position of power far out of proportion to the number of people they represent and that frequently former Nazi supporters take cover within the Center Party. This dispute is likely to continue throughout the occupation of Germany.

B. Enemy Areas

"We will all hang together"

A major effort of the Party has been directed in the past to convincing the German people that the Allies intend to "destroy" Germany and "enslave" the Germans. Among fairly large sections of the population, it would seem, this campaign has fallen flat. Evidence from the areas already occupied shows that many Germans, including even some who have been members of the Nazi Party, do not consider themselves guilty of any crime and have, by some device of psychological evasion, convinced themselves that they bear no part of the blame for acts committed by their government during the past decade.

It is against this feeling, which may be assumed to be fairly widespread, that Das Schwarze Korps, official organ of HITLER's SS, directs an article entitled "Innocent Lambs" which makes the following points:

"In the first place, their hopes are false, because General Bradley has stated that he is not just warring against Hitler and the Regime, because all Germans have contributed to the war. Bradley is right, because though the 'innocent lambs' may not have declared war on anybody, or thrown a hand grenade, they did not refuse any of the gains that were to be had. We have not yet met anybody who for political reasons refused marriage subsidies." That many Germans will claim grace, and actually consider that they are exempt from Nazi sins because they threw no hand grenades, is already quite clear. It is equally clear that few, if any, will consider themselves guilty because they did not refuse marriage subsidies. The "guilt complex" of Germans, mentioned so frequently both by foreign workers and by the Germans in the occupied zone, has been limited thus far mainly to a few super-ideological Social Democrats many of whom, indeed, while asserting the guilt of the German nation tend to absolve themselves.

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Conditions in BERLIN

There is no "hard" intelligence on conditions in BERLIN this week. The only available "evidence" comes from neutral correspondents or from official German news agencies. The material deals with: (1) the number of refugees in the city; (2) the state of order and (3) the attitudes and expectations of the population.

As to the first point, a neutral correspondent of a Swedish paper reports a sharp increase in the number of refugees streaming into BERLIN. While his figures (he estimates that there are now about 3 million German refugees in BERLIN) seem exaggerated in view of the September 1944 official census figure placing the population at 2,800,000, the report may be taken as evidence that the stream of refugees continues in large proportions.

As to the second point, there were earlier reports of confusion in the capital as the Red Army approached the ODER. It now appears that there has been no major flight from the city, even after the recent Allied bombing, and while some dislocation in DNB and other transmissions was noted people seem to be able to carry on without radio services. Radio propaganda, as instanced by Trans-Oceanic on 3 February, gives the impression of order prevailing in its statement that "hundreds of thousands of men from 15 to 60 are employed by the Party in digging trenches and preparing strong points". While there is no reason to doubt that fortification digging is going on, there is no evidence from any Allied source as to whether it is orderly and efficient.

As to the third point, the dilemma that faced the Berliners upon the early news of the Russian advance was, as one correspondent put it, "whether to stay and endure possible siege or expose oneself to all the strains of flight without knowing where flight will end". Recent dispatches indicate that this dilemma no longer seems urgent as even some of the "nervous people" have resolved it either by definitely staying or by leaving. The effect of Party control in creating the impression of discipline in the population is mentioned by one neutral correspondent, who hastened to add however that "when it is said that the Berliner shows no nervousness this is mainly true of the German workers ... who await the arrival of the Russians calmly".

The Food Situation

Announcements in the German press are sufficiently reliable evidence of the accrued difficulties of day-to-day living, although there is no evidence of starvation. On 3 February DNB announced the loss of a week's rations. "Everybody must manage to live for 9 weeks on the cards for the 8 weeks of what were to be the next 2 rationing periods", said the announcement, adding "the sugar ration must be made to last for 3 periods and the potato of 3 kilograms per head per week will not be maintained at that level". It is not likely that the population took very kindly to DNB's reassurance that people who have lost their homes in the East "have suffered the worst fate of all", or that they expressed enthusiastic agreement with the sentiment "it is our obvious duty to help them".

The reduction of the potato ration, foreshadowed on 3 February, was announced the following day by DNB: "from the beginning of the 72nd rationing period (i.e. 5 February) the weekly ration of eating potatoes ... will be reduced by 0.5 kilograms ... People entitled to supply who have stored 150 kg. are obliged to return 25 kg. from their storerooms. No more eating potatoes must be stored". Strangely enough, in view of the Party's anxiety about conflicts among refugees and their "hosts", here again difficulties of food supply were attributed to the needs of refugees from the East (and of course to the loss of the rich agricultural lands there).
Refugees are not being pampered, however, it is clear from an announcement that upon arrival in Berlin they must get their papers stamped by the Police before they will be issued new ration cards. Difficulties do not end with the procurement of a card, for even the small authorized rations are frequently not available, and it may be expected that both the potato and flour ration will have to be cut still further as the available supply grows shorter. Other new restrictions include the elimination of coffee substitutes which had previously been allowed in Schleswig-Holstein to inhabitants of areas with bad drinking water. Some tea substitutes will be issued in place of the coffee substitutes. In Westphalia it is announced that women under 25 or over 55 will receive tobacco cards only if they can produce a field post number of recent date. The only encouraging note is that "vagons containing stored red and white cabbage are being despatched every day, mostly to Southern Germany".

The Transport Position

A recent report from Switzerland gave the following comparative tables on the percentage of rail traffic absorbed by the major sections of the German people:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wehrmacht</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armaments Plants</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Related Industries</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Products</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travellers</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Traffic</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures cannot be taken as exact but they agree with the general trend of Reichsbahn traffic as reported from other sources. Wehrmacht requirements, according to this chart, doubled during the period 1939-44, whereas "Related Industries" was halved and "Miscellaneous Traffic" was reduced to 0% (this is officially true, of course, but unlikely in practice).

From the point of view of effect upon the daily life of the average German, however, a more significant item is the reduction of "Farm products" from 15% to 2%. For this drastic decrease tells the story of the extreme dislocation, within the Reich agricultural economy, of the system of inter-regional exchange of surpluses for shortages. This dislocation was announced several times during 1944 by B.C.E., and its effects have already been noted in this Summary*.

Important, too, in daily life is the cut among "Travellers" from 17% to 8%. Recent regulations restrict personal travel even further, and if one is fortunate enough to get an official order which permits him to travel, his difficulties have only begun. A Luxembourg who many times during the past 4 years travelled by rail between Vienna and Luxembourg, reports the following comparative time schedules: in January 1944 he made it in 26 hours, with an unforeseen delay of 8 hours in Metz. In May 1944 the trip required two and a half days. Today, according to the same informant, it takes 5 to 6 days to come from Vienna only as far as Cologne, a trip which he himself made during the last days of 1944. His account of the journey confirms previous reports of the terrific destruction to large sections of the German railroad system. According to the Luxembourgian, trains were so packed, it was possible to get in only through the window. Naturally, he considered this irritating, but in his judgment the terrific restrictions on travel had not given rise to any special bitterness or retributions. In fact, he said, people were apt to treat the train situation as a joke.

* See P.D Weekly Summary # 12.
Evasion of the Volkssturm

It is reported that HIMMLER's order for the first call-up of the Volkssturm called upon each Gau to produce 2 regiments "fit for combat duty" by the end of 1944. By "fit for duty" he seems to have meant that these regiments should be ready to be entrained and used in combat upon 24 hours notice.

It is now estimated that some 50 regiments have been organised in conformity with this order, which would involve approximately 140,000 men. This estimate, if reliable, would account for barely 15% of the men considered fit for service. Partly this would seem to be due to a shortage of arms and equipment for further levies. The "People's Taskforce", which was designed largely to raise equipment for new Volkssturm units, was clearly a failure in its initial stages and had to be extended for two weeks. It is now claimed that the collections have had a great success, and although this is no doubt largely intended as a booster to morale, it is probably true that sufficient equipment for several new regiments has been received.

There has been some resistance, or at least evasion, of call-up in various areas. On at least two occasions German newspapers have announced that Volkssturm men and the first and second levies "are present sitting in rearward areas must immediately report to their units". It is reasonable to suppose that some of those called up would have evaded the order to stay behind when their women and children were evacuated. They are apparently still refusing to report.

Others have reported to the Volkssturm when called up but have managed to get out again, possibly by acquiring dubious medical certificates of ill-health (there have been a number of complaints about such medical reports). A report issued by the SD Auszubehör (Field Office) on the formation of the Volkssturm in Constance said:

"There was considerable bitterness in the north-western Gegend, especially over the fact that out of 136 men who appeared, only 110 remained. Forces amounted to only 50-70% of the estimated strength."

It is not known just how widespread evasion of the call-up is, but it is unlikely in the immediately threatened areas, where the Wehrmacht and SS and already formed Volkssturm units are available to act as controls, that resistance to the call-up has gone very far.

Partizanism in Adversity

There have been a large number of fairly vague reports concerning the failure of nerves among local party functionaries in the Eastern front. That there is some truth to these reports is attested by the weak treatment of the point by Himmler who asserts:

"It may well have happened that here and there one who should have been the last to leave was the first to look for safety and that another one who was supposed to help was only thinking of himself."

A few such cases have been announced over the German radio. Perhaps the most striking is the announcement that HIMMLER had several high SS officials in BRONBERG on trial before a court-martial. SS Standartenfuehrer von SALLISCH, President of Polizei, was stripped of his rank and sentenced to death after conviction of the charges of cowardice and neglect of duty. The sentence was carried out immediately. Burgermeister Ernst, Regierungspräsident KÜHN and Ortsgruppenleiter RHEIT were convicted, apparently on the same charges. These three were expelled from the Party, stripped of their rank and placed in a penal battalion where they will be used for extremely difficult and hazardous tasks. No explanation is given of the difference in severity between the two sentences. It is perhaps taken for granted that an SS
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Standartenführer would suffer more heavily for such an infringement of military law and discipline than civilians, even though these might be high Party officials.

These cases, announced shortly after the report that the Assistant Burgemeister of ENSIEN, Dr. SPEHL, had been shot for cowardice, indicate that the "iron determination" of the Party is less strong among some of its representatives than a desire to run away. In SPEHL's case, the extent of the crime seems to have been that he, probably recognizing the hopelessness of the situation in ENSIEN, wanted to surrender the city to the Russians. It is quite clear in the other cases, however, that the Party bosses were mainly concerned with saving their own skins rather than defending "the sacred soil of the fatherland to the last drop of blood".

One reason for the severe crackdown on Party Officials is suggested by a recent report that HESSLÄR has issued a Führerbefehl in the East. This would indicate that HESSLÄR has, for practical purposes, replaced HITLER as the supreme civilian authority in the East. It is said that he has "planted" several commissioners at different points throughout the threatened Eastern areas with the purpose of showing local Party leaders that the rule of terror is directed against them no less than other elements of the population.

General DITTMAR's Speech

It's Gen. DITTMAR, who has always been the most realistic of German commentators, gave one of his most sober speeches last Tuesday. Never before has one of his broadcasts been so utterly devoid of military discussion. The speech concerned itself mainly with the unspeakability of unconditional surrender.

"The demand for unconditional surrender can only be taken as an authorization which our people are asked to give those who want to extinguish its life!"

DITTMAR's terms of reference, however, must have left many listeners with the distinct impression that any hint of terms other than unconditional surrender would be welcome, indeed. On the military situation DITTMAR compared Germany's present position with that of a tightrope walker who cannot afford to make one false step lest he fall into the abyss. DITTMAR follows the analogy still further: the Wehrmacht can still hit the enemy with the balancing pole of the tightrope walker, but he is careful to point out that such blows may smart and sting but cannot destroy. This is his clearest admission that Germany cannot possibly hope to win the war militarily, cannot indeed hope to do more than impose temporary delays and set-backs to the enemy. He turns, therefore, to an attack upon "unconditional surrender".

In conclusion DITTMAR considers the complexities which beset an army fighting rearwards on its own soil and shows particular concern over the recent misbehaviour of high local party and government officials (discussed above). He says:

"Let us not forget that the fighting on native soil can give strong impulses but that it can also create deadly negative impressions. Each real or imaginary stoppage or failure in the structure of government leaves its mark on the Army."

Thus, the conception that every German will prove a hero on his own soil is coming to be openly doubted by high Nazi officials. The urban the Nazi mood of importing defeat and a growing resentment against the Nazi toughness which refuses to admit that the war is hopelessly lost in the face of clear evidence to the contrary.
PART II — WEHRMACHT MORALE

1. BATTLE BEHAVIOUR IN THE WEST

Growing awareness of the scale of the Russian offensive coupled with utter battle exhaustion, is definitely affecting battle behaviour as Allied pressure develops in the West. Much of the fighting in the West is currently taking place in sectors of the Siegfried Line, where the protection offered by prepared positions and fortifications is an important stimulus to continued resistance. But already field reports tell of isolated group surrenders, increased token resistance, and active desertion—signs of collapse which are certain to increase as soon as the battle breaks out into the plain behind the Siegfried Line.

(a) Group Surrender

Reports of group surrender, thus far, are only isolated in occurrence, and usually involve only small numbers of men such as a squad or a platoon, or even a depleted company. A few cases of even larger groups have been reported. In most instances, the decision was taken by a non-commissioned officer or a commissioned officer, who felt that the war was lost and that further resistance was futile. For example, one 2/7 reports that he and 30 other men, together with their CO, were in the Company CP, when American troops began to break into a nearby village. Communications with adjoining CPs were broken. The men were then ordered to the CO said to his men, "Es hat kein Zweck zu schiessen, das waren nur unnötiges Blutvergießen!" (There is no sense to shoot; that would only be useless bloodshed). Thereupon the entire group gave themselves up to the first US soldier who arrived.

Some of the surrenders occurred when troops cut off in a bunker failed to resist to the end because their feelings of despair of victory led them to place personal survival above a last ditch stand. In other cases of group surrender, it has been reported that soldiers have even opposed orders for continued resistance. For example, an unteroffizier reports that he was in a group of men under the command of a platoon leader who were sent to defend a pill-box. At the approach of American armoured units, the platoon leader yelled: "Los Koch! Schiessen!" (Let's go! Shoot!). The men did not even bother to aim their weapons; their morale could not have been lower. The unteroffizier claims that as he realised that the situation was hopeless, he got furious at this suicide order and disobeyed it. Whereupon, he was threatened with a courts-martial by the platoon leader, but that had little effect on him or the others in the pill-box. They all just simply refused to shoot and waited for capture.

Comments on group surrender were offered by a Captain, who surrendered his battalion staff without opposition. He believes that large group surrenders are very likely to occur in the future if we make a strong attack. He claims that only time and the course of events can assist this process of surrender. "Men in my position can speed up the end only by staying in the CP and letting ourselves be captured." High German officers should not be approached by the Allies, since the German soldiers will not permit them to act openly now. Moreover, most divisional commanders and higher-ups are still frightened of the power of the Nazi Party and are entrenched in the Nazi security system.

A technique for stimulating group surrender, aside from the standard procedure of leaflets, radio and loudspeaker appeals, is reported by an US Inf. Battalion. The procedure is as follows: From a group of newly captured Pz/W, two are selected to be used as convicts. WOs of German nationality are preferred. They are kept for 24 hours, treated well and impressed with the feeling that they are fortunate to be out of the war. The enemy position is attacked heavily up until the point of final assault. Firing cases and the convicts are sent out under a white flag to convince the enemy of the futility of their resisting. US soldiers are never sent along. The scheme worked 9 times out of 10, and even the tenth time the enemy surrendered in the end. It is said to have saved many casualties, and that
no converts have ever been lost on such a mission. It is claimed that 500 Pz/IV were captured in this fashion.

(b) Token resistance

The favourite technique of those soldiers who want to remove themselves from the battle is still to allow themselves to be overrun by the advancing forces without offering resistance. It is of course difficult to determine accurately whether token resisters have actually increased since the details of the Russian offensive have become known to troops fighting in the West. Claims of token resistance seem to be put forward by very many recently captured Pz/IV. The interrogation record of one division reveals the extent to which Pz/IV claim that they were only partial resisters. Of 63 Pz/IV from the 246 VG Div., it is reported that only 3 had deserted outright, while 41 stated that they had waited to be captured despite the fact that escape routes had existed. The rest admitted that they had to submit to capture or be killed. Although some Pz/IV may have exaggerated their lack of resistance, the general impression seems to be that the number of Pz/IV who did not fight until overthrown is the highest actually encountered, except perhaps for the period of withdrawal across France in August and September. Token resistance has been reported as being carried out by firing last rounds of ammunition into the air in order to absolve twisted consciences from orders for total resistance. Among some Pz/IV from areas in Eastern Germany, it seems that the occupation of their home community by the Russians has meant for them, personally, the end of the war. As a result they profess to have seized the first opportunity to surrender. The words of one Pz/IV typified this attitude: Jetzt habe ich nichts mehr, wohin ich komme, will meine Harnis besiegelt ist. (Now I have nothing left to fight for because my own home has been occupied). This feeling of utter despair instead of determination to fight to the end, on the part of non-political German soldiers whose homes have been occupied, was noted previously in the MANCH area. Here many soldiers whose homes were occupied or even threatened with occupation reacted in such personal terms that they believed that the war was over and therefore they went home. Often they even donned civilian clothes in order to start their civilian existence over again. In the case of the Russian offensive, obvious geographical separation and different attitudes towards the Russians alter reaction, but the same tendency to consider the war lost with the occupation of one's own hometown can be noted.

(c) Desertion

Steady withdrawal on many sectors have offered excellent opportunities to many would-be deserters. Field reports indicate that some increase in the number of desertions has been noted, but lack of comparative statistics makes a precise evaluation impossible. A few deserters articulate reasons connected with the Russian offensive. For example, a statement in this respect was: "Ich war schon lange die absicht hatte webrallaufen, haben die Deutschen gesagt, mir den Otfertum mir den Entschluss lochristor gumaht. (Even though I had long ago planned to desert - the final decision was made easier for me through the happenings on the Eastern front). Other deserters stress the unbearable conditions of front line as the final cause for desertion. Typical was a rear echelon soldier who was transferred to a rifle company and committed into a defensive position. He complained that for ten days the men in his unit suffered terrible hardships. Everybody had dysentery, many had frozen feet and trenchfoot. Food when it arrived was sold, there was no water and no cigarettes. Finally he and three other men discussed the possibility of desertion; they volunteered for a patrol at the first opportunity and crossed over to our lines carrying passcards. Interrogations reveal discussions among very small groups before capture as to the advisability of desertion and even the formation of groups of three or four men for the purpose of deserting. One source states desertion in groups of three or four is preferred to single actions since detection is less likely and the fiction of capture more plausible.

The strongest deterrent against desertion continues to be fear of retaliation against one's family. It is important to note that some deserters have stated that they no longer felt constrained in this respect since their homes were in occupied Eastern provinces and the Nazis could no longer carry out their threats. In this connection it should be noted that an SS Colonel,
commanding officer of the Goetz von Berlichingen Division, during interrogation held the opinion that holding the family responsible in cases of desertion was more a threat than a fact. Family punishment was almost impossible to carry out in the case of Volksdeutsche, in any case, because of the frequent moves such families had made in the last few months.

There is some evidence that the feeling that the war is soon to be over is developing into a deterrent to active desertion. It seems that some would be deserters who are convinced that the war is lost and collapse near at hand, are becoming hesitant to desert; for them there seems little point in becoming a POW in the last minutes of the war. The main problem is to stay alive, engage in as little fire as necessary, and only if necessary allow oneself to be overrun. It is impossible to state the extent to which such an attitude has developed, and to what extent it is affecting the non-deserters. For such soldiers, it might appear that the shortest route home was not through an Anglo-American POW camp, but rather by simply going home when Anglo-American troops arrived at their hometowns or when an Armistice would be declared.

The assumption on the part of some soldiers that the Wehrmacht will be disbanded after defeat may help to strengthen this tendency. For example, among a group of about 20 POWs, 15 had not given the matter any thought before they were asked about it. Of the remaining fifteen, five thought that the Wehrmacht would be taken prisoners on V-day, while ten thought that the remaining Wehrmacht would simply be sent home.

II. NEW ATTITUDES AMONG POW

Aside from the effects on battle behaviour noted above, examination of current POW interrogations reveals the extent to which news of the Russian offensive has produced a state of almost complete despair on the part of the German Landsers. It seems clear that officers are deliberately attempting to withhold news from their men and where admissions are made they are invariably evasive. Nevertheless the news of the offensive continues to reach the furthest outposts. Among one group of 20 POWs only 8 were still uninformed, the remainder, although many days behind the news, possessed varying amounts of knowledge about the Russian drive.

(a) Outcome of the Russian Drive

Of the group of 100 POWs captured mainly during the last days of January, only an isolated few (5%) still believed that the Russian drive would be halted. They offered secret weapons, faith in German character and the Luftwaffe in reserve as the basis for their belief. Another 5% (die-hard Nazis) simply stated the fight must be continued regardless of the state of the battle. The dominant attitude (held by 65%) was that the war was lost and it was only a matter of a few more weeks. Some of these POWs in a vague fashion, believed that continued resistance in the West was futile, but they seemed to be the type who were forced to fight on because of automatic obedience. Others displayed such apathy that it was almost impossible to discern whether they had any definite attitude on the Russian offensive, except that they felt that the end was near. It appeared that the Russian offensive directly affected 15% of the entire group. Either they outrightly claimed that the Russian drive was the reason for their desertion, or they were POWs whose homes were in Russian captured territory and as a result expressed the sentiment that for them the entrance of Russian troops into their homeland meant the end of the war.

Among the remaining 10%, fear of Russia is so pronounced that they offered no opinions as to what the ultimate result of the Russian offensive would be. They could not conceive of Russian occupation. They predicted or expressed hope that the Anglo-American forces would soon be fighting the Russians.

(b) No Desire to Fight on the Eastern Front

The threat to the Reich by the Russian drive has failed to produce among Germans fighting in the West a great desire to be transferred to that battle front. In fact, motivated by strong impulses for self-preservation
the German Fœ/N display quite contradictory attitudes on this subject. As one report stated it: On the one hand they realise that from their point of view prolonged resistance on the West front is against their conception of the best interests of GERHÄN since they prefer an Anglo-American occupation to a Russian one. On the other hand, they are glad that a Western front exists as it saves them as individuals from service on the Eastern front. There is, indeed, some evidence that the lack of desire to fight on the Russian front is so strong that rumour of impending transfer of a unit to the East has caused would-be deserters finally to risk the hazards involved in crossing over the lines.

In this connection it can be noted that the Fuehrerbefehl permitting men from territories threatened by the Russians to transfer for service on the Eastern front is relatively unknown among German Fœ/N. It appears that this order first appeared to East PRUSSIA but was later extended to include most of Eastern GERMANY. Among recently interrogated Fœ/N, none had any knowledge of men who actually volunteered; one Fœ/N, however, reported that in August, when the order was read to his company, several men were selected as "volunteers".

(c) Prolongation of War to Save the Nazis

Until the failure of the ARDENNES offensive the feeling that the Nazis were continuing the war to protect their own lives was held by only the convinced anti-Nazi minority. Nationalistic sentiments, complete lack of any sense of war guilt, and a belief that victory was necessary if the German individual was to have any real economic or political security, prevented the growth of any ideological split between the Nazi leadership and the mass of the Wehrmacht. Hostility towards the Party was directed largely to the lower ranks of functionaries who were in the main accused of corruption and inefficiency. During the last month, the attitude that the Nazis are merely fighting in order to preserve their own lives seems to be increasing.

Evidence is supplied by a write-in poll of 325 Fœ/N captured during the month of January which revealed that about two-thirds answered "Yes" to the question whether they believed that the Nazi Party continues the war to save its own skin. Confirmation of this figure is supplied by the interrogations of 30 Fœ/N of whom it was found that 21 believed that the main motive behind the continued resistance of the German leaders is to prolong their own lives as long as possible. These figures are based on the statements of German soldiers after capture and the element of disillusionment as a result of capture is certain to have affected their answers. Nevertheless the results are impressive in indicating the growth of a deepening cleavage between the Followers and the Leaders. This growing feeling that the war is being continued against hopeless odds, not for the benefit of GERMANY, but to save the Nazis is certain to make itself felt when opportunity for surrender arises.

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