A. OCCUPIED AREAS

"The Pleasures of Publishing"

Some foretaste of the problems which are likely to be encountered in the control of German Information Services is given by the rich daily reports from members of the first P.I.B. Press Control Team now operating in AACHEN. The Achtener Nachrichten, the first newspaper produced in Germany by Germans working under Allied policy control, was born three weeks ago and has appeared each week since then. Experience during the past two weeks indicates, as had been expected, that the labor pains which preceded delivery were scarcely more complicated than the painful problems of young parenthood.

In AACHEN the initial problem of physical plant and materials was solved comparatively easily because the building of the Politische Tageblatt was found fairly intact, its presses ready to function and a good supply of newsprint and paper on hand. These were requisitioned. Rather more complicated was the problem of finding suitable German personnel, a task which is particularly difficult in view of the fact that most people connected with publishing or other "cultural" activities are members of the Nazi Party either by compulsion or by accident. It devolves upon Press Control officers, in consultation with C.I.C. and G-5 officers, to distinguish the sheep from the goats and then to find capable newspaper men among those who are politically acceptable. Communications is a burning problem for a newspaper like the Nachrichten, which depends upon a news file from rear areas in order to get adequate coverage of world events. These problems, with the inevitable daily crises that make a newspaperman's life pleasurable, had been fairly well planned for in advance.

Other difficulties arose out of the local situation. To cite but one illustration: the post-master of AACHEN seems to be a man who keeps his eye on the main chance. He calculated that the Nachrichten, at 20 pfennigs, with a circulation of some 21,000 already in prospect, could be a very good thing. He therefore requested that he be allowed to take over distribution of the paper for the whole AACHEN area, including outlying towns. The manager of the paper, harassed with important editorial and production problems, was glad to be rid of this worry over circulation, for it is necessary to secure circulation permits, local distributing agents, and equitable arrangements for distribution in the poorer communities. Before he agreed, however, he consulted with the Press Control officer who, more sensitive to the implications of things, immediately pointed out that post-masters in the smaller communities around AACHEN were likely to take a poor view of the monopoly set up in connection with the first German newspaper. The manager of Nachrichten was, therefore, still worrying about how to get his paper distributed - at least in the outlying communities.

Many other practical difficulties beset the staff. Electric power goes off and on, and with each disappearance of the current the metal cools off and there is a tedious delay in the typo-setting process. The feeding and bringing to work of the local employees also presents difficulties, since, according to local curfew regulations, German civilians are allowed on the streets only between 0700 and 0800 and 1700 and 1800 hours, even when provided with special passes as "essential workers".
Even the postmaster, who is taking charge of the sales in the city of AACHEN and has already set up a kiosk opposite the M.G. administration building from which he calls out at opportune moments "Kauft die Aachener Nachrichten!" is himself unable to circulate through the town except at the stated times. Often the only solution for distribution is the hectic use of the office jeep whenever it happens to be available. News-gathering is also a head-ache, if German reporters are used, since in many areas they cannot move about except when escorted by M.P.s.

But all these difficulties were almost forgotten when the first issue was welcomed enthusiastically by the population. The population of the AACHEN area was happy to have a German-language newspaper which brings not only war news but also local news and M.G. announcements. The matter of dissemination of M.G. proclamations through this channel has been welcomed by M.G. officials, who see in the paper a solution to their dissemination difficulties aggravated by lack of current for radio reception. People who were questioned systematically about their reactions to the paper were all favorable to the format, which follows the American style of make-up and headlines. Many said they missed the daily German communiqué, which had appeared in the Mitteilungen, and which they had become used to reading, as one of them put it "as something like a comic strip". Frequently the comment was heard that this was the first paper in years which they could really trust and that, for the first time, they were actually reading every article.

From a detailed report of the reaction of the population of nearby STOLBERG to the publication of the Aachener Nachrichten, it is apparent that the paper was a complete success. All 3,500 for STOLBERG were sold out soon and the general impression was that more could have been sold had they been available. (A SHELF directive limits distribution to one paper for every five inhabitants, which is the prevailing quota for liberated territories.) The fact that this paper, in contrast to the Allied paper Mitteilungen, was published by Germans, though under Allied control, did not seem to impress this news-starved community very much. The main complaint of the local citizens was that the first issue did not carry any story about STOLBERG, the biggest town next to AACHEN. Several suggestions were made in regard to editorials and short fiction stories. People were very much interested in the exchange of ideas with neighboring towns about reconstruction, since the circulation restrictions hamper their movement.

The mayor took particular notice of two stories from AACHEN. One mentioned the curfew in AACHEN which is at 9:00. In STOLBERG it is still at 7:00. The mayor brought this story to the attention of the IGO with the intention of inducing him to make the same change in STOLBERG. Other people just built their hopes for the future on this story. The other news item to which a similar reaction was observed was a forecast of the distribution of cornflakes, marmalade, starch and sugar in AACHEN. The food situation in STOLBERG is quite a sore point since the town is an industrial town which used to receive its food supply from the neighboring regions. The war and circulation restrictions have curtailed the food supply considerably. Therefore the news of such "delicacies" being distributed in AACHEN were noted by the population with interest. The mayor again used the story as a lever to get more freedom of movement, and also admitted that the story gave him more hope for the future. Even though the people seem not to consider the Aachener Nachrichten as an entirely German paper, yet it is probable that this attitude will change as soon as stories sent in by them begin to appear in the paper. The mayor has already sent some stories to the editor.

To supplement the fledgling newspaper the staff put out a single sheet wall newspaper which they posted in the windows of the plant.
along with current news photos. As this display attracted considerable attention 100 copies were printed, 15 of which were turned over to M.G. for their own use, the rest distributed throughout the town. An unforeseen difficulty developed even in this activity, however, when M.G. pointed out that wall newspapers encouraged crowds to develop and that it was not desirable to have people loitering on the streets during their brief non-curfew periods.

An interesting question of policy came up with respect to the publishing of dismissals of Nazis from offices at the behest of the Allied authorities. At first M.G. tended to think publication of such items would "call their hand" and make subsequent dismissals more difficult to execute, but later reversed their opinion since it became obvious that news of dismissals spread rapidly through all official circles anyway and that non-official circles — in other words, the public — were very much impressed by news of this sort, which increased their confidence in the paper.

Hitler's Children

With no schools, no organized youth activities and almost perpetual curfew, children in occupied Germany today lead a dull but expectant life. In some communities the Church has organized daily classes, under nun or the priest himself. For 14-year-olds there are community work projects, but the younger children are left largely to themselves, without any guidance but what their parents or their religious instructors may happen to give them.

For the moment they are glad to be free from the burden of HJ-Dienst with its many petty annoyances, its perpetual boredom, rant on Weltanschauung, the threatening ways of its petty tyrants, its interference with good instruction at school, with Church attendance, and with just plain fun. One little girl told of her 14-year-old brother who had spent 2 weeks in jail on bread and water for disobeying his Hitler Youth Leader: "... and was he skinny when he came out!" Another boy of 14 kept trying to meet up with G.I's so he could learn more English.

Thus for children do not constitute a "problem" in the M.G. sense. They keep out of the way and seem only too eager to be friendly. They are obviously full of "great expectations". They want more freedom, more fun, more chance to learn, and better and more things to eat. They want leaders and teachers they can trust and respect. They probably have a lot of disappointments ahead, but if reasonable guidance and adequate outlets for their interests and energies are not provided they will probably generate plenty of "problems" for M.G. and everyone else concerned.

What To Do with German Youth?

Suggestions for de-Nazifying German Youth have been received from an unusual source — a fanatical 13-year-old HJ leader convicted of espionage by an Allied Military Court, and sentenced to death (later commuted to life imprisonment). A graduate of the stream-lined HJ Leadership School (akademie fuer Jugendfuhrung) at KRAUSEN, he has nevertheless put forth the following suggestions for (a) controlling German youth during the combat period and (b) reorienting them toward the democratic new world in the long period thereafter.

(a) Combat Period: He feels that the best way to avoid trouble is some system whereby all the youths of an area are placed into a unit or camp where their activities can be closely supervised. The boys assembled in such a camp
could be used efficiently to perform labor necessary for the welfare of their respective communities. A certain part of the time should be devoted to re-education, a study of history as it really was, and something to counteract the lies in Nazi propaganda. He does not believe that there would be any resentment on the part of parents or youths, if these camps were run in a manner not indicating them as penal institutions. Here, too, leadership of high caliber would be most important, as without efficiency and competent leadership, the confidence and cooperation of the German youth cannot be won. One point about this type of camp is that they should be in the general vicinity of the youth’s homes, wherever possible, and also that they should not be continued any longer than is absolutely necessary. He feels that offenders against any of our regulations should be interned for the duration, but that in the case of these youths, some program of re-education should be carried on during this internment period.

Reconstruction Period: Subject believes that the problem of German youth under Allied occupation will be very acute. Their existence under a constant stream of orders, rules and regulations has caused them to lose the ability for independent thought and action. The sudden relaxation of a very strict discipline and the total lack of leadership that follows the dissolving of the HM is bound to upset most youths and cause a major problem. Over a period of years they have been scientifically alienated from the influences of Church and Home, and this gap cannot be breached overnight. The German youth will be looking for leadership and guidance, and it is most vital that they come under the right influences. Their old indoctrinated HM leaders are the best trained leaders available, and therefore it is very likely that they will once more follow them. This tendency back to Nazism must be prevented, either by eliminating these former leaders, or by re-educating them, so that they may exert their powers of leadership to further our democratic aims. A strong effort should be made to once more return the youth to the spheres of Home and Church.

Just where the sponsorship and the administration for these schemes is to come from are problems our life-timer does not discuss. After all they are more our problems than his.

Limited "Scorched Earth" Policy

The Nazi policy in regard to "scorched earth" measures (ARL Massachus.) has been treated already in a previous Summary. A partial illustration of the workings of this policy is given now in a report about coal mines in the UERNIEN-ALENBERG area. Since it will appear from this report that the amount of destruction was not very great, it might be well to point out that the mines in question were captured quite early by the Allied armies and it is possible that no set policy has been adopted by the Nazi government at that time. No conclusion should be drawn from this about the amount of possible destruction we may yet encounter in newly occupied territory.

The absence of the three highest officials of the mine makes it unlikely that all the facts about what happened at the Carolus Magnus

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* See F/D Weekly Intelligence Summary # 17.
**From PW, Ninth US Army.
mine (the biggest mine in this area) are brought out in this report. Most of the information comes from Above-Ground Manager SCHMIDT. He is not believed to have told the whole truth. When questioned by CIK he persistently refused to admit membership in the Nazi Party, even though he was positively identified as a member by many informants.

What Happened at the Carolus Magnus Mine: Six weeks before the Americans occupied the area the mine directors of the Almser area met in conference. They agreed among themselves that the mines should be maintained under all circumstances, that sabotage would permanently ruin their enterprises, and that they themselves should stay on the job. At first the official policy agreed to this.

With the help of the government a certain number of employees were obligated to remain under all circumstances. These men were put on emergency service duty (Notdienstverpflichtung). This group numbered at first 300, but was later cut down to 50 because of damage caused to the mine through American bombing. It might be well to note here that all foreign workers had been evacuated earlier as a security measure. The Landrat (Kreis police authority) issued orders to this emergency maintenance crew to remain at their place of work under all circumstances, and also makes it quite clear that the workers are under martial law. It is doubtful that the Landrat himself could authorize such a policy, and the names of higher authorities have been mentioned in this connection. It has not been possible to ascertain this higher authority but it seems probable that it was the Reichs Defence Commissioner (Reichsverteidigungskommissar) of the district who was designated as the central authority for ARZ measures in regard to civilian interests. These orders also seemed to conflict with orders received by the Party leaders who were supposed to evacuate everybody. The Party seems to have been given a list of those men on emergency service, but, nevertheless, tried to evacuate some of them at the very last moment. The highest official of the mine, Bergrat SCHERER, removed some of his own property, also important records, around the middle of September. He returned, but left again a week before the Americans came. It is believed that he went to CECOS to talk with the Gauleiter Economic Counsellor. He returned with instructions to act as special commissioner for the mines in the area and see to their continued maintenance. He also brought back orders for the high officials to leave. Nevertheless, the officials of all mines except the Carolus Magnus mine, remained. The day before the American occupation, SCHERER came to the Carolus Magnus mine and left with the biggest part of the treasury.

The Party made several attempts at sabotaging the mine, but all were more or less unsuccessful. Dynamite was placed in the mine but the wires were soon cut by employees. Another time Party men came and demanded the keys to the store-room from SCHMIDT. He surrendered them "at the point of a gun" according to his own statement. The Party men took away stocks of food, textiles, clothes, shoes, and oil. The dump trucks were pushed down into the mine shaft by an SS man, but this did not result in much damage. Early in September an order came that all vital parts were to be shipped to ESSEN. Thereupon, the mine officials, under the leadership of SCHERER, removed some bearings, conveyor-belts and air compressors from some machines but left them in others. On orders from SCHERER, the parts were hidden in a well shaft on the mine property. The next day a Party delegation came to inspect the work and left satisfied. It is clear that this disobedience to Party orders on the part of the mine officials did not stem from anti-Nazi feelings but purely from economic self-interest. Officials at the other mines seemed to have been left behind with instructions to maintain the mine but not to produce coal for the Americans. It is probable that no such policy existed at the time of the occupation of the Carolus Magnus mine, which was occupied from two to four weeks earlier than the other mines in the region.
As was pointed out in the beginning, this incident should not be considered typical of what we can expect in the future. Indeed, some reports already show a greater amount of destruction. For instance, in COGAR, the Nazis blew up a paper factory before they left. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the greatest resistance to K/LZ measures will come from the industrialists themselves who place their economic self-interest before unquestioning allegiance to the Third Reich — or, indeed, to anyone else.

B. ENEMY AREAS

"Das linke Rheinufer wird nicht mehr versorgt, die geben uns wahrscheinlich schon verloren" (Nobody cares about the left bank of the Rhine anymore; they seem to be giving us up for lost already). Such was the complaint, perhaps a little hysterical, of a woman writing from the MAINZ neighborhood last October, and the subsequent months can only have served to make conditions more difficult in the area which First and Third Army troops are now entering. Until recently it probably had a larger population than in peacetime, for none of the towns in it are large and it had served as a reception area for evacuees from COLOGNE and other cities. Moreover, all the usual reasons against evacuation have been reported as operating, including the catastrophic transport situation which necessitated a ban on the removal of furniture and in one case resulted in cattle, collected together for transfer further inland, being left stranded at the local railway station for a week. Evacuation has not yet become compulsory everywhere, though the recent capture of policemen with strong Nazi sympathies who reported their mission as being to keep a "Red Zone" 15 km. behind the battle-line clear of civilians suggests that the official intention may be to apply coercion as the fighting approaches. Where compulsion has already been reported, there appears to have been the usual resistance.

In any event, it is unlikely that many civilians will be found in the area, unless our advance is rapid. For one thing, entrance into it, at any rate in the north, has been controlled, as has use of the Rhine bridges, although reports of evacuees drifting back as soon as they found that their homes were not immediately threatened, suggest that the control was imperfect. But living conditions will have been most uncomfortable. Railways have been out of operation for civilians — and latterly for military — purposes while for road transport civilians will have had to depend on such lifts as they could pick up from the Army. Partly in consequence, the rationing system seems to have got into difficulties while in some towns women and children have only been fed by emergency kitchens set up in the streets. Elsewhere (e.g. at SCHLEIDEN and ZUELFICH) destruction by shelling and bombing has been such as to drive away almost all the inhabitants, so that P/F.'s estimate that in the area between SCHLEIDEN and EINN only 5 to 20% of the population (about 900,000 in 1939) remained is probably only a slight underestimate. Most of those remaining will be found in detached farm-houses where control is more difficult, food conditions easier and danger from enemy action less.

The cattle have in some cases been taken away, in others slaughtered and in others again successfully kept behind. One report states that in the COGAR area Land-polizei have been brought in to prevent pillaging by retreating troops; the danger is known to be a real one and fear of it a strong deterrent to evacuation so that it will be interesting to discover whether the innovation has any success.

According to official policy, the evacuees should not have included men between 65 and 10, since these should have remained to provide the local Volkssturm. But a number of official remonstrances and a report of a Volkssturm training camp at BAD Godesberg for all eligible persons arriving in the area from further west suggest that a number of those concerned got away before they could be caught and have
had to be rounded up afterwards. Other reports say that, thanks to shortage of fuel and raw materials, not to mention Allied attacks, work is rapidly falling off in factories round DÜREN and COLOGNE and that the workers thus left unemployed are being taken into the Volksarmee instead.

The population of COLOGNE remains a matter of guesswork but a figure of between one and two hundred thousand seems reasonable. (Most P./W. estimates are lower but experience shows that P./W. always tend to underestimate in such cases). Reports of friction in the city between civilians and Party members continue. DÜREN, which had hitherto been a reception area, has emptied even more rapidly than COLOGNE and it is likely that here also all persons not actively engaged in war work have been forced to evacuate by the threat to withhold their ration cards; the population is probably somewhere around 50,000 as against 100,000 last September. The town contains a number of foreign workers whom it is hard, according to a P./W., to distinguish from the rest of the population. A number of reports have dilated on the destruction at COBLENZ, the most picturesque of which described how "a tin saucepan was more valuable than Rosenthal china and a cheap pocket knife than a valuable bronze ornament". Most of the population (92,000 in 1942) have left, while a good proportion of the remainder spend their nights outside the town. TÄGER is described as empty of everyone except those on essential jobs, though on the other hand several hundred women are said to have demonstrated against the war early in December and have been broken up by the S.S. The town is under constant shell-fire, while the doubtful distinction has been claimed for the railway station of being the worst scene of destruction in Western Germany. All these places are without water, gas or electricity and transport conditions make it highly unlikely that there is such coal anywhere in the area except in the immediate neighborhood of pits.

There is a striking absence of information about KEPPEL and MÜNCHEN-GLADBACH except for a P./W. story of riots in the latter town after the air raid of December 20, leading to widespread arrests. The story adds that "Allied leaflets spread in large numbers among the population had a substantial influence in this connection".

Clothing

The "Peoples' Sacrifice" collection of clothing, which has already been extended once, will now be continued till the end of the month. A home service broadcast on the subject admitted that "we have received much but not such overwhelming sacrifices as might be expected". It further explained that the most noticeable gap was in old textiles and rags; "a surprisingly great quantity of old clothing, shoes, boots, weapons and other equipment has been collected". This is in keeping with previous announcements which evoked the surprise that a number of people had taken the opportunity to get rid of their Party accoutrements; another (private) report alleges that numbers of S.S. and S.A. uniforms loaded with stones have recently been washed against the Rhine weir at MANNHEIM. The official explanation of the lack of rags is that people thought they only need give things involving a real sacrifice; a possible alternative is, however, that in Germany today even rags are being pressed into everyday service.

Foreign Workers and Public Safety

On January 28, the National Zeitung of ESSENG announced that a few days earlier the Deputy Ortsgruppenleiter of ALTEN ESSENG had been killed by foreign burglars whom he and two other Party members found robbing food stores. The paper went on to prophesy that "thefts and burglaries by foreign workers and escaped prisoners would increase and might become a grave threat to security and supply unless "all forces were concentrated to eliminate this trouble radically". Besides
suggesting a nightly patrol service, it urged that leaders of workers camps must be made to keep a proper check on the movements of inmates and maintain liaison with employers so as to prevent loitering between camp and factory. The incident bears out previous evidence as to the tendency of foreign workers to grow bolder and as to the alarm felt by the German people at the danger this presented. Two other sentences for burglary after air raids have been announced this week, the first of 2 men at DORTMUND, the other of a 26-year-old German girl at MUNICH.

To some extent the publicity given to these sentences may be intended as a preventive, but equally there is unmistakable evidence that disobedience of this type is on the increase, and that the authorities are acutely nervous in view of the strain on their scarce resources.

Dr Ley's Paper Closes Down

The newspaper DER ANGRiff ("Attack") has ceased publication. Until 1933 the mouthpiece of GEBHARDT, this paper has latterly been the organ of the belligerent and voluble Dr LEY, head of the Labor Front. It was LEY who after July 20 led the movement to foment blame on the upper classes, and who, with a characteristic excess of zeal, more recently announced the Party's intention to hold BERLIN to the last. The action is explained as an economy measure and may well be so, but it is interesting that LEY's paper should be the one chosen for sacrifice.

Government Evacuation

Reports of the evacuation of Government officials and archives from BERLIN are legion; DRESDEN, LEIPZIG, HAMBURG and MUNICH have all been named as destinations, and none is improbable, though any ministries which have gone to the first must now be feeling, much as did the French officials who reached TOURA in June 1940. It would be highly surprising if evacuation had not been carried out, particularly in view of a secret order recently captured which emphasizes the responsibility of local officials in territory about to be occupied for seeing that all archives, and particularly personality files, are removed to a place of safety. (N.B. Nothing is said about destroying them). But it is likely that any move now made will be right to the south, close to the area in the Bavarian and Tyrolean mountains reportedly marked out as the last stronghold of National Socialism. (In this context, however, there is interest in a press report that strong Volkssturm reinforcements have been sent to the Baltic island of DORNÖHLA, testing-ground of the flying-bomb and another possible ultimate refuge).

Morale in BERLIN

In what would appear to be an unusually objective despatch, the correspondent of the Swiss paper DER PUND wrote from BERLIN on February 14:

"People do not weep like hysterics nor curse like the very excited. They carry on with their work; in almost silent calm they wait for hours for their trains, without making any noise, without any abuse. As members of the Volkssturm they work after business hours on the many large fortifications, hardly saying a word. At home, too, they only talk very little about the things which move and excite them. But in their eyes you can read all the anxiety, all the questions and their fear of what may happen if ill fate so decrees, and often also the tired, doubting feeling as to what is left to promise a way out ... Today the Germans know how critical the position is and that it may become yet worse. They would like to get some good news for a change, not to make them shout with delight and to think that their trials are past, but just to get a breather. It wears you down if you have to take it day in, day out."
"All this makes propaganda awkward, and makes it difficult
and often impossible to hold out hope of better days to come.
Recently the BBC said that home propaganda had failed
completely in the face of the overwhelming force of events.
GOEBBELS had lost the confidence of the broad masses. In
my view, that opinion does not hit on the essential point.
Certainly, the general mood — I have just described it myself —
is as gray as the days of this winter with so little sun,
and there is no longer any real confidence, exuding strength,
in further developments. But that is a very natural consequence
of years of suffering. Who would expect a people which has
passed through such severe tribulations and which is facing
new sufferings of war and grave personal blows, to be anything
but very grave? Propaganda would be ill-advised not to admit,
for its part, the full extent of the present great trial.
Propaganda can after all not prevent the sufferings and misery
of the millions of refugees and evacuees from being evident.
It cannot prevent the many restrictions, personal, occupational,
and material, from having their effect on people's minds and
bodies. But it is propaganda's task to maintain the morale
which is needed to hold out and further to prevent a moral
collapse and a psychological catastrophe altogether, or at
least as long as possible. People who have spent the past few
months with their onslaught of national trials in Germany do
not speak of a failure of propaganda but rather of success.
For the fact that the Russian breakthrough, together with the
terrible blow of the air war and the millions of refugees
from the East on their trek of misery have not simply thrown
the people off their psychological balance is something like
a phenomenon."

**German Propaganda Methods**

A certain resemblance can be discerned between German strategy in
the propaganda and in the military field, for both have sought to yield at
first to the attack in the hope of meeting it when it has begun to spend
its force. As a HAMBURG paper stated on February 8:

"The East Army leadership wanted at all costs to avoid repeating
the French leadership's mistake in 1940 when the plan of new
resistance on the Aisne was smashed by the German breakthrough.
The German leadership wanted to avoid having newly-arrived
reserves overrun by the enemy's Lupus. The consequences
of abandoning ground which was certainly not decided on
voluntarily were certainly great."

Neither the courage nor the resources of the enemy are underestimated nor
is the gravity of the position disregarded. DITTLER on February 13 praised
Soviet strategic skill and fighting qualities. "It is true", said the
Political Review on February 12 "that we have no OKALS to retire to". But
these admissions are only made in order to obtain a hearing for
reassurances and appeals. The article already quoted ended by claiming that
the fruits of the strategy were already becoming visible, while DITTLER
said that:

"The superiority of the German soldier is manifest wherever
difference in the weight of material is not too gross ... an
army which after a strategic set-back on the scale of the
Vistula bend marshals the strength to resist for weeks has not
reached the end of its morale."

Military reporting has been deliberately deceptive — for example an article
in the Vossischer Beobachter on February 14 which described the Russian
situation as "unfavorable" because of their "threatened" flank and the two
"bastions" in their rear provided by the German armies in Hungary and
Kurland. On February 12 Dr. GOEBBELS is said to have spoken to the
people of BERLIN over the Drahtfunk (a form of wired communication which
seems to be increasingly used) and declared that the city was being
prepared for defence and would be defended. (Reports from neutral
correspondents suggest that the chief difficulty is likely to be food,
since supplies on hand are unlikely to last for more than about 3 weeks).

Those who show impatience with the High Command for failure to stage the
promised counter-blow (which HITLER notably played down) are told that
"The Fuhrer himself is working out plans". But these reassurances again are used as text to sermons on the virtues of calm.

"Even the most brilliant plan would not avail the Fuhrer
without a nation behind him to carry it through resolutely ...
Only he who 'gives himself up as lost is lost.'" (DNB Feb. 12).

"When one believes everything is lost one must look at the
example of the enemy, as the English in 1940 and the Russians
in 1941 who show what iron will and political passion can

"The type of man who is excited, nervous, rumor-spreading and
frightened is just what the enemy wants at present."
(Voelkischer Beobachter, Feb. 7).

It is, however, interesting that the Propaganda Ministry finds it possible
to mix such appeals for calm (which must in part reflect lack of calm
among the public) with warnings of the awful consequences of defeat.
Whereas at the beginning of the Russian offensive, the theme of Bolshevist
atrocities was noticeably absent, it has now reappeared in strength, the
previous silence being excused on the ground that hitherto there had been
some refugees who had not yet succeeded in escaping from the Russians.
One article denounced explicitly those Germans who do not accept the
assertion that "the Soviets are not human beings", thus suggesting a
possible reason for the change of policy.

GOEBBELS' Das Reich article last week, entitled "A People on the
Defensive" once again represented Germany as standing alone for the
interests of Europe against an onslaught from the East aimed at the whole
continent.

"The disaster which would happen to Europe if the German nation
fell a prey to Bolshevism as weakly and spinelessly as, let
us say, the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the Finns, is hard
to imagine ... (Germany) is Europe's salvation today and
will be its pride tomorrow."

In this context a propaganda barrage has been released against the YALTA
communique, described by Schwarz van Berk as "a milestone from
STALIN's quarry". It was apparently thought too risky to allow the German
people to read the actual text, and a highly distorted picture was
substituted to the effect that Germany was to be split up into separate
republics, German industry was to be completely eradicated, the German
population was to be reduced by 40 to 50 million and courts were to be set
up for the "mass-execution" of German men and women. The fear of the
Propaganda Ministry that the Conference might produce an appeal to the
German people - an appeal which great pains had been taken to discount in
advance - and it has been suggested that the only reason for its non-
appearance has been the need for further discussions before the three
statesmen could agree on a common text.
Abroad, German covert propaganda has suddenly made a much stronger attempt to sow inter-Allied discord, including a bogus BBC transmission to Russian troops, reports of an agreement between RIBBENTROP and the Western Powers and stories of US front-line propaganda exhorting German soldiers to fight in the East rather than the West.

The Shape of Lies to Come

The immediate purpose of exploiting the Bolshevik bogey theme, both in stiffening resistance at home and weakening British and American determination, is obvious. But the policy also has a longer-term interest in that it is clearly building up a world picture suited to act as the foundation for that justification of Nazi policy which will form the propaganda part of clandestine resistance after occupation. All the ills from which Germany -- and indeed Europe -- then suffers will be attributed to Allied blindness in refusing to make peace before the Russians had reached the center of Europe. "The bourgeois world", said Dr GEBEELS last week, "simply will not see reason". The war will be pictured as the result, not of Nazi aggression, but of foreign envy at German social achievement.

"Already at the outbreak of war it became clear that the rise in our social consciousness was one of the causes of hatred against our people. The Crimean communiqué shows that we shall be compelled to revoke all the laws and decrees passed since 1933 and to liquidate all organizations set up since that date ... All our achievements in the field of social policy since 1933 are to disappear. The foundations of our social charter and the German Labor Law are to disappear ... Social reforms such as the National Socialist pension scheme for the aged are to be dropped ... "Mother and Child" and other social organizations are to be disbanded." (DNB Home Service, Feb. 15).

If, as is not improbable, the war is followed in Europe by temporary economic dislocation, the claim will no doubt be made by the German underground that such dislocation can only be avoided if there is a single strong coordinating power such as was provided in the German "New Order". Thus the Allies will be accused not only of wrecking, in their jealousy, German internal social prosperity, but also of frustrating the German mission to assure civilization and prosperity to the rest of the Continent. Events will thus continue to be twisted so as to suggest that Germany lost the war, not because she was in the wrong, but because other nations were short-sighted.
I. Officer Morale.

Specific material on officer morale is not received regularly in sufficient volume to warrant reporting. The following is a summary of the interrogations of 80 officers of company grade captured during the last five weeks.

a) Battle Behaviour

Despite growing doubts as to the strategical advantage of continued resistance, the overwhelming majority of German junior officers carry out their orders for defensive fighting with professional skill and aggressiveness. Hopeless tactical situation, however, often result in orders to surrender rather than in a last ditch suicide stand. In this respect the fear of responsibility for having caused useless bloodshed at this stage in the war appears to weigh heavily; for others the desire of self-preservation is evident. Isolated incidents of officers allowing themselves to be captured when escape was still possible are reported. Even borderline cases of officer desertion have been recently encountered.

A detailed examination of the battle record and motivation to surrender of 30 officer Ps/W captured in January yielded the following conclusions:

17 of the officers seem to have attempted determined resistance and surrendered only when cut off or actually overwhelmed.

3 professed to have given up the fight in order to save wounded soldiers or because they felt that they could not take the responsibility for further fighting in the unfavourable tactical situation.

4 claimed that the local military situation had become so confused that they felt that further resistance had no point and saving ones life was justified.

2 were potential deserters because of ideological reasons.

4 others did not reveal accurately enough their story of capture so as to indicate the manner in which they resisted.

In viewing these findings it should be remembered that any sample of officer Ps/W will not include adequate representation of those fanatical resisters, most of whom are killed rather than captured.

b) Outcome of the war.

Faith in ultimate victory among officer Ps/W is currently at the lowest point yet encountered. Among one group of 43 officer Ps/W, 15 thought defeat was certain while another 10 were doubtful; 18 felt that victory was still possible or that further resistance would result in a stalemate favorable to Germany. A consolidated report of another 30 officers captured between 30 January and 4 February prepared by P.W. SHAFF inter-
rogators yields similar findings. The defeatism is even deeper for many of those who believe in victory that represents a wish rather than a prophecy, because the loss of the war would be too difficult to bear. The belief in a compromise peace seems to draw its strength partly from the belief in an inevitable clash between Russian and the Anglo-American forces and partly because (in the case of belief in victory) some faint hope must somehow be maintained to give a semblance of meaning to their personal existence. As in the case of enlisted men professed belief in some measure of victory is closely related to devotion towards or at least general approval of Hitler. Those who believe in victory or a stalemate favourable to Germany invariably also display acceptance of Hitler as a leader.

c) Reaction to the Russian Offensive

The FAB SHAEB consolidated report of 50 officer Ps/W mentioned above found that all the officers were fully informed of the progress of the Russian offensive up to a day or two prior to their capture, largely through information obtained from Wehrmachtberichte. Yet knowledge of the Russian offensive seems to have produced no startling effect on immediate battle behaviour. "They are shocked and those from the East are particularly depressed, but on the whole the attitude prevailing is Befehl ist Befehl, (an order is an order)." The already existing apathy is such that nothing concerns them except the immediate military situation in which they find themselves. The disregard of these officers for geographical considerations is seen by the fact that they attach no importance to the imminent fall of either BRESLAU or KOENIGSBERG. All the officers agree that the fall of BERLIN will not mean the end of the war, though most admit that it would have repercussions all over the Reich. But some were quick to point out that the air war had reduced the importance of BERLIN. (Berlin is only a rubble heap /Trümmerhaufen/; it is the German capital only on paper.) Fanatical believers in victory, even minimize the fall of Berlin by declaring that in modern war, cities no longer play a role.

II. Pattern of Resistance.

a) Group Surrender

The occurrence of small group surrenders noted last week continues to be reported. A report of the F/ Combat Team operating with the 9th Army, dated 6 February, offers the following explanation for group surrenders occurring on this sector. "The tactical situation - surprise attack against a line of pill boxes - accounts for the phenomenon. However, troop morale is an extremely important factor."

Although Ps/W statements are notably unreliable on the subject of how they were captured an attempt has been made to classify 150 stories of capture in terms of the amount of resistance the Ps/W profess to have offered. These Ps/W were captured on the 1st, 3rd and 9th Army fronts during the period 1/7 February. The percentages listed below should probably be corrected somewhat, since some Ps/W obviously hide the fact that they resisted to the last.
Active Dutchers 22%

Members of a Group Surrendered (at least 5 soldiers) 6% (a small number of these were active resisters)

Token Resisters 20%

Active Resisters 31%

Wounded, surrendered, on-extendant and so forth 9%

No data 10%

Even more newt that battle behaviour is indicated by a report from the 7th Army. Among a group of 44 P's/7, 13 were classified as deserters, 30 as belonging to smaller or larger groups "who did not offer any particular resistance to their capture", 2 were captured inside American lines during patrols, while 4 declared that they were ready to return to their positions and continue to fight if given an opportunity. The pattern of the whole group, of course, cannot be adequately measured since among killed, wounded and non Prisoner of War survivors, the majority are likely to have been active resisters.

b) Group discussion.

With an apparent increase in group surrenders there has also been an increase in the reporting of discussions on the subject. For example, a 35-year-old radio worker P/W from Berlin describes this process: "During one night in a bunker without light and without much to do the men often discussed capture; conversation usually started about families, who was married, and what was to become of their families. The subject became more acute as the Americans approached. They all agreed that it was senseless to defend the bunker and that they could be better off in captivity since the war was lost anyhow. Retreat was possible but when they heard from a passing Infantry soldier that an adjoining bunker had fallen to the Americans they walked over with a piece of white cloth and shouted, "Ich surrenne." Other P/W report that the receipt of news about the Russian front often caused group discussion and out-spoken consideration of the desirability of further resistance. Isolated reports point to the conclusion that on occasion dogmatic orders for final resistance will bring about open discussion as to how far continued resistance is advisable. The great preventive of free discussion is still the isolated "hard-core" Nazi sitting in the group. One P/W aged 45 describes the group surrender of seven men defending a bunker. Motivation to surrender grew out of the orders to defend the bunker to the very end, which were given by the Lt. in Command, who immediately took off. Mutual trust was established as the men talked about their hopeless situation, and the position in which their 60 had left them. Nobody in particular led the discussion but not one man disagreed. As a result, a white flag was prepared and the group waited to surrender. The opportunity presented itself when one of the men cut looking for water discovered an American patrol which led to the bunker.
III. Exposure to Allied Propaganda

The extent of cumulative exposure to Allied leaflets is reported by field interrogations of prisoners captured during the period 15 December - 7 February. During this period, among samples of Pz/W captured by 1st, 3rd and 9th Armies, the number of Pz/W who saw Allied leaflets has increased steadily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Saw Leaflets</th>
<th>Did not see Leaflets</th>
<th>Number of Pz/W interrogate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-31 Dec. 1944</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-15 Jan. 1945</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-31 Jan. 1945</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7 Feb. 1945</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>102</td>
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The figure of 85% coverage reported for the first part of February equals the period of most successful leaflet operations during the Normandy campaign (July 1944). However, it must be added that this percentage does not represent current operations, but rather cumulative exposure since many Pz/W make reference to leaflets soon as far back as September/October.

The extent of current operations on the 7th Army Front is seen by a report covering 41 Pz/W captured between 25 January and 1 February. 5 Pz/W of this group saw our leaflets during the month of January. On the other hand, about 75% of the group have found our 'Safe Conduct' passes or received them from fellow soldiers. Several Pz/W stated that at the present time about every second or third soldier carried one of our 'Safe Conduct' passes on his person "just in case".

IV. German Counter-Propaganda

One of the main efforts of Nazi propaganda to the WEHRMACHT has now become the counter-acting of the growing apathy and practical acceptance of an Anglo-American occupation. From captured documents and Pz/W statements it is clear that aside from its military implications the Massstadt counter-attack offered an excellent opportunity to the German soldier to view at first hand "the correct behavior" of the Americans in German occupied territory. Not only was an impression made on the soldier who re-entered territory occupied by the Allies, but it is clear that these soldiers soon spread their findings to many other quarters of the Wehrmacht. A revealing NSFK directive of the 6 SS Pz Army, summarizes the impression which German civilians who lived under Allied military government made on German soldiers; counter-propaganda lines to be employed are set forth. The document points out that German soldiers through conversations with German civilians learnt that Americans had been quartered in the woods and had for the most part left the civilians alone; moreover the food supply was good. In answer, the directive points out the "proven Nennersdorf atrocities" can be cited. The reason for the isolation of the troops from the civilians, the directive claims is merely to prevent "infection of the American troops with National Socialism". Another reason is that the Eupen-Malmedy region is a mixed border area belonging to Belgium since 1919 and the Americans conducted themselves better here than in other areas.
for propaganda purposes. But with the rise of death and hunger, the Americans will be less controllable.

Another directive for unit leaders which appeared in Der Politische Soldat (The Political Soldier), for the month of January, is concerned with the phrase "the Americans are human beings," This phrase which is admitted to be currently circulating among Germans is labelled as an invention of "American agitation itself." The suggested line of refutation is based on the allegation that the goal of America in the war is merely the gaining of Europe as a market. The question is asked: "Do the Americans intend to liberate the Germans from their socialized order and independence?" The lack of social welfare in America is cited in answer.

Many other current leaflets to the Wehrmacht show sensitivity on this point and attempt to issue denials based on the device of linking the future role of the Anglo-American occupation forces with those of the more feared Russian threat. The central argument in this connection is that the Anglo-Americans have conceded 10,000,000 German workers to Stalin. Those Germans who think there is no difference between the occupation of 1918 and the one now threatened are foolish; the German hating Jews are now behind the Americans and a conquered Germany will be turned into a Communist State. The shades of the Versailles Treaty are called forth and the term "Wilsonian fraud" has been recently employed in propaganda released to the troops.

For the Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,

V.W. ROGGE, Col. G.S.
Executive Officer.

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