PART I - GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Opinions in a Newly-Occupied Town

In the northerly area occupied by 21 Army Group, 146 German civilians were interrogated in the town of BEDBURG. This group cannot be considered as a fair sample of Germans in the Rhineland, or even of BEDBURG, for little is known of its composition, except that many are evasives and that the preponderance of men over women among those interrogated is not characteristic of the community as a whole. For the lack of actual polling by stratified or by true random sampling in these interrogations, no quantitative result on German attitudes is offered as a true measure for BEDBURG as a whole. Nevertheless, the results of these interrogations throw interesting light upon the present frame of mind of some Germans living under Allied rule.

For example, the interrogees unanimously expressed the opinion that the war will end with an Allied victory, as against a German victory or a stalemate. And a clear majority asserted that prolongation of the war serves the interests of the Nazi Party, not the interests of Germany.

On the question of war guilt, the greatest number answered that the Nazi Party was responsible for the war. Very few placed the blame upon the German High Command, and only one each felt that the German people as a whole, or the Allies, had caused the war. It may be noted that among PaIs many more are prone to blame war guilt, at least in part, on the Allies.

Questions on German atrocities produced an interesting series of replies. When asked directly: "Do you believe that Germans (immaterial whether SS, Gestapo or Wehrmacht) committed atrocities during the war in other European countries?" about half said "Yes" and a small minority said "No". As always in response to such a question, a fairly large number made no reply and these, to judge from the record of past interrogations, have at least a strong suspicion that such atrocities were committed. In any case, the proportion who openly admit knowledge of atrocities is considerably higher here than was shown in earlier interrogations, and tends to confirm the suspicion that professed ignorance of atrocities is, in many cases, not real ignorance but an attempt to escape association with such atrocities.

On the question of responsibility for atrocities, there were fewer abstentions and a clearly marked desire to "pass the buck" to the Party, probably on the assumption that it will be indicted anyway. If guilt can be fixed on the Party leaders, punishment will be localised and affect comparatively few men. This may explain why a majority of the interrogees placed the guilt upon the Party and its agencies, while only a small proportion felt that the individuals who committed atrocities were really responsible for them.

Somewhat surprising is the fact that very few Germans consider the High Command responsible, an attitude which seems related to the widespread feeling that the Generals are, after all, only "Fuchleute" (specialists), and that dirty work is forced upon them by superior political orders of the Party.

On the interesting question of who should pass judgment and punish those guilty of atrocities, only one German openly favored a completely German court. The largest single number favored an international court with Germany represented. However, the majority of those interrogated approved, in principle, of no representation at all for Germans - these divided equally in favor of an international court without Germany, or of punishment for atrocities in the country where they were committed. That half of those who
answered approved of no representation for Germany on these courts may reflect their belief that this is the method most likely to be used by the Allies; and therefore, that this will be the most acceptable answer on their part. To some extent, however, it is another illustration of how the guilt complex reveals itself indirectly (i.e. Germans are "not worthy" to participate in such courts).

Perhaps the most depressing, although expected, replies were produced in answer to a question: "Are there any anti-Nazi organizations in your home town?"). There were almost no abstentions on this question - the great majority answered a flat "No". Even among this group, professedly and admittedly less nazified than many other Germans, people seem to be quite positive that no underground or overt anti-Nazi movement exists. Of the few who answered affirmatively two people named "the Catholic clergy" generally, and two named the "Christian Union" - replies which show that they misunderstood either the interrogator's question or what constitutes an anti-Nazi organization.

On the question of listening to Allied broadcasts, 100 Germans said they listened to London and 57 to Radio Luxembourg (the high figure here is due to overlapping; several of the individuals claim to have listened to both stations). The large majority of the population in this area who claim to have listened to broadcasts also credit them with a high degree of verity (65 said they believed Allied broadcasts completely; 18 said "Yes with reservations"; only 1 said "No"). These answers are not entirely reliable in the absence of detailed questioning as to wave-length, hours of listening, names of programs and personalities; for radio listening is regarded as a question to which an affirmative answer is necessary in order to please the interrogator. Experience in the past has shown, however, that many who say they listened regularly may, in fact, have listened once or twice, or not at all. However, although the evidence is not yet sufficiently clear or detailed, that now available indicates that Allied radio was well received in this area.

Anti-Nazis in the Rhineland

Any discussion of the strength and potential role of anti-Nazis in Germany must proceed on the basis of two clearly established facts: that there has as yet been no sign of a well-organized, centrally-directed and highly-efficient anti-Nazi organization within the Reich; that there are in Germany today genuine anti-Nazi individuals, some of whom have managed to keep in touch with each other. Investigations in the newly-won areas west of the Rhine have brought to light two excellent illustrations of the sort of the anti-Nazis are, and of how they work.

KREFFEL: Here interrogators found one of the few, by profession important leaders of a Catholic anti-Nazi opposition yet encountered in the occupied territory. In his late fifties, the man has been a prominent Catholic leftist leader for over 20 years. He was a member of the executive committee of the Center Party (speaking for the left wing of that Party), a member of the Prussian list, and of the local city council. For 15 years he was the editor of an influential Rhineland newspaper. Soon after the last war he became the Polizeipräsident of KREFFEL, from which position he was promptly ousted when the Nazis came to power. To support himself he opened a cigar store whose customers, he claims, included bishops and leading clergymen.

Using this as a base of operations, and his position as representative of a Catholic welfare organization as cover, he started as early as 1938 to make plans for the day when the Nazis would be removed. (The significant fact that his plans did not include active participation in the removal should be noted as characteristic of even the genuine anti-Nazis we have found). In 1938 he composed a new prayer, pleading
for "the recognition of the human being in all his dignity, regardless of race, color or creed", which apparently became widely known in Rheinish Church circles.

This anti-Nazi has few illusions about the strength of anti-Nazism in the Reich today. His travels through the big Rhineland cities - DORTMUND, DÜSSELDORF, ESSEN, HAMBURG, HAMBURG - during which he held secret meetings with groups ranging in number from 10 to 100, have demonstrated convincingly that no great surge of anti-Nazi feeling, expressed in overt action by Germans, can be expected before the destruction of the regime by the force of Allied arms. On the other hand, he asserts confidently, the same meetings and conferences showed that the nucleus of a genuine anti-Nazi leadership exists among former leftists in the Rhineland.

Many of these former leaders are now in concentration camp - those whom he identified as certain prisoners are JOST, KARFAUS, LUELLER, HEGGE and ADEMAUER. But those who remained in the various Rhineland cities still managed to keep in touch and, despite their former differences of Party affiliation, their present views have a certain consistency. As illustration of this he cites the "GOEBBELS incident". A representative of the GOEBBELS conspirators is said to have approached the Rhineland group on 30 December 1942 and sought to enlist their aid in the planned assassination of HITLER. According to their own account, the Rhinelanders were quite prepared to see HITLER assassinated, but apparently were not prepared to commit themselves to a post-HITLER regime dominated by the military. After discussion, their joint opinion was summed up by the following remarks addressed to GOEBBEL'S representative:

"If you, Herr Mueller, succeeded in killing Hitler, I would jump up and cry 'Hoch Mueller!', and immediately after that 'Down with Mueller'. I would appreciate your deed as a tremendous service to Germany but I would deplore your taking over power in the name of the Generals. I would go up and down Germany, urging that the people put up monuments in your honor, but that they keep power out of your hands."

The informant assured interrogators that his group is not unique; that its program is, in fact, past the planning stage and has been accepted by a number of influential leaders, mainly from the former Centrist Party. The program is based, organizationally, on one Labor Party composed of all "Scharfenhoe Haendel" (producing workers) in Germany and subsuming the three parties which formerly represented them (Centrists, Social Democrats and Communists). Their platform includes the following points:

1. Immediate peace; 2. establishment of the basic freedoms, of speech, assembly, publication; 3. free trade unions; 4. cooperatives; 5. socialization of heavy industry; 6. socialization of banks and insurance companies; 7. partition of the big estates; 8. large-scale public works; 9. the liquidation of the Nazi criminals. On the latter point, the informant is sorry that the Allies, and not the Germans, will do the job. He feels that the Germans should do the housecleaning themselves.

Trier: Illustration of a less high-powered and nebulous group of anti-Nazis comes from a report on the activities of former Communists in Trier. In many essential points the story here is the same - difficulty of maintaining contacts, the increasing small number of leaders who are able to stay out of jail, the tentative feeling about plans based exclusively on the post-Nazi period (without including participation in hastening the arrival of that period). In this case, however, the story centers about an incident which is both limited and local, and therefore perhaps more easily credible.
Before 1933 the Communists in TRIER numbered 5,000 of a total population of 90,000. As HITLER rose, the Communists went underground, but continued some activity until 1936 – generally limited to occasional leaflets and pamphlets, and some small acts of sabotage. After 1936 many of the leaders were arrested and sent to SINGSBURG, a penitentiary for political prisoners in COLOGNE. Early in their imprisonment, strict supervision by SA and SS men made communication with the outside extremely difficult. As the manpower shortage in Germany became more severe, however, older and fewer men were used as guards and discipline relaxed. The prisoners were allowed to have visitors, who brought with them news of the outside world. Further, a Dutch Communist, charged with repairing the radio of camp officials, managed to steal enough parts to construct a small set of his own. He listened to BBC and Radio Moscow and distributed the news through the orderlies and sympathetic guards. News from "the outside world" was eagerly sought among these highly political prisoners and spread by word-of-mouth from one to the other.

During the long years of internment, plans for a prison break had been conceived and perfected. When the Americans approached COLOGNE they were finally realized. Although full details are not yet available, a 12 Army Group report states that various sources have confirmed the actual occurrence of the break.

In TRIER the Communist leaders, including those who had escaped from SINGSBURG and those who had been released in 1941, resumed their underground activities. In small cells of 4 to 5 men, which worked independently and with only one "contact" man for each cell, they managed to keep in touch with each other and with Communists from other countries. This was usually done by towns: e.g. TRIER kept in touch with Luxembourg, COLOGNE kept in touch with the cities of Holland.

Their activities were largely confined to preaching defeatism and spreading rumors among the population. In the factories, and later in digging fortifications, they attempted to slow down production. The great German retreat, starting with the collapse of the RUNDSTEDT offensive, made their position easier. In the ZETTLEHOFER ammunition factory, for example, the new year brought a great change of tone. The boss and his directors no longer cared about their production record, and the chief of personnel never bothered to report a lex worker or minor saboteur to the Gestapo. Even the SA guards "did not seem to care".

The last act of the Communists in TRIER before American occupation is said to be a rumor campaign, started by them, which broke the back of the Volksstuma morale. The rumor, which soon acquired a semi-official flavor, stated that the Americans were going to drop weapons and officers to lead the foreign workers in the city against the Germans who were outnumbered by three to one. German workers were given sticks and whips to beat off the coming attack. Naturally they became nervous and frightened, "Are we supposed to fight machine-guns and pistols with sticks and whips?" they asked. Although no paratroops ever descended on TRIER, it is estimated that this rumor particularly helped to weaken resistance to the American entry into the city.

The Hangings in COLOGNE

Information recently received from COLOGNE helps to clarify the stories concerning mass hangings from there which have been rumored and repeated since last October. According to the most reliable accounts now available, field interrogators report that there were two separate hangings, held two weeks apart at the same place – the little square in front of No. 3 Schoenstattistrasse. Although they involved groups of an entirely distinct character, the hangings were apparently based on similar charges in both cases.
The first execution, on 26 October, took the lives of 11 Russians and Poles (the presence of a single Frenchman in the group has been mentioned, though not confirmed). When the gallows were set up, on 25 October, the news spread through the town and the following day several hundred spectators appeared. The condemned were led to the platform, the nooses placed around their necks, and four Nazi dignitaries held forth on their crimes and the particulars of the sentence. During the recital an air raid alarm was sounded. Without finishing, the officials took off for the nearest shelter while the guard lowered the platform and left the bodies dangling. The corpses remained on public display for several days.

The second hanging took place on 10 November. This time 13 men, all Germans, were to be executed. Since 4 of the condemned were 17 or younger, and the youngest still dressed in knee breeches, the authorities were apprehensive lest a popular demonstration, and perhaps armed intervention by the victims' friends, disturb the proceedings. Consequently, the gallows were set up only a few hours before the time of execution and the hangings carried out speedily. This time there was no crowd and no air raid, but again the corpses were left to public view for a few days.

The reason for these executions is not entirely clear. One version states that the charges centered mainly about looting and desertion. Some natives of COLOGNE estimate that the number of deserters in the city at that time was nearly 50,000, and that armed bands of deserters wandered about together with foreign workers securing food supplies or the ration points with which to buy them. These activities frequently led to open conflicts with the police, when they were caught in the act and decided to shoot it out. In one case a group of men are reported to have stored a cache of arms in a cellar on the Schoenhaustrasse and to have barricaded themselves there when the police tried to arrest them. It is difficult to estimate the accuracy of the numerous tales of large bands roaming the streets and creating active outbreaks, but there were undoubtedly a considerable number of such bands. It is said that the two hangings described above were designed to serve as a public warning.

Another version, offered mainly by the Left-wingers in COLOGNE, maintained that the executions were "political" acts of reprisal for the killing of several Party officials. The first victim was SOENTGEN, the Ortsgruppenleiter of FRIENFELD. According to the victim's sister and to several Edelweiss Piraten, SOENTGEN was killed at 10 p.m. on 23 September while returning home on his bicycle. The Edelweiss boys say that the killer, a 17-year-old boy named BALZEN who belonged to their gang, was shot dead the same night by the Gestapo, and that his family was deported and has not been heard of since then. Two other Ortsgruppenleiter, ORTMANN and HOOVER, are said to have been killed in October 1944, again by members of the Edelweiss Piraten. These two men were reported to be ruthless in forcing people to comply with the evacuation orders prevailing in COLOGNE during that month. One interrogator has talked with the Edelweisser, a 15-year-old boy, who claims to have committed these two murders. Several informants speak in lurid terms of numerous attempts all through the autumn of 1944 upon the lives of Party functionaries. The adherents of the "political" line of reasoning maintain that the discovery of hidden supplies of arms decided the authorities to take drastic steps to frighten the opposition elements.

Although looting is clearly a more widespread activity than political opposition among Germans today, there is some evidence that political motives may have played a part in the COLOGNE "incidents". Further, gang lawlessness, expressed in such acts as looting, is in itself regarded as a form of political action by the Nazis. For this reason, and apparently because the Party leaders feared such "incidents" might multiply beyond control, the extremely severe measures described above were taken.
Public reaction to the hangings divides fairly clearly according to the explanation of those who accept it. Wealthy and middle-class Germans, who generally accept the version that the victims were convicted of looting, tend on the whole to be fairly complacent about their execution. A characteristic remark by one member of this group was: "What else could they expect? Criminals and deserters". Some sympathy is shown among this group for the very young victims, those who were in their teens at the time they lost their lives. However, the dominant feeling among left-wing circles in Cologne, who believe the executions were a reprisal for political activity, condemns these hangings as a moral outrage and as the inevitable administrative method of Nazism.

Tears of the Crocodile

Claiming that the Anglo-American "intention of slowly and painfully starving Germans in occupied areas" is no more "humane" than the Bolshevik method of "a shot in the neck", German radio on March 19 denounced the rationing situation in Cologne. German civilians "receive rations too small to live on", the broadcast alleged, adding that the rations in Cologne were only a fraction of the allocations made in Germany, and quoted an alleged Reuter's admission that they were "starvation" rations. This broadcast, which is illustrative of dozens made during recent months, is part of a systematic campaign to persuade Germans that the Western Allies are "no better" than the Russians.

E. ENEMY AREAS

The Strain on Nazi Control

Two tendencies have become increasingly clear during recent months: the absorption of lesser police officials into more immediate military tasks has weakened the system of Party controls, particularly at the local levels; the increasing dislocation arising from the fighting on German soil, large-scale destruction by Allied bombings, and mass evacuations, has led to a parallel increase in crime. This has been particularly marked among foreigners within the Reich, for whom weakened controls have been equivalent to greater freedom of circulation within the German community.

The trend has been established over a long period. A report by the main office of the SD states that the incidence of crime among foreign workers during the first quarter of 1944 was more than double as compared with the same period of 1943, (from 4,031 to 9,399 cases). "Nearly one-third of the murders and robberies with violence in the Reichgebiet were committed by foreigners" summarizes this report. When read in conjunction with ROMANN's earlier report concerning the sharp rise of juvenile crime (see F.D Weekly Intelligence Summary # 24, page 7), it is clear that crime in several places has gone considerably beyond the control of local authorities.

A significant development in more recent months has been the increase of crimes committed jointly by foreign workers and Germans, including particularly deserters from the Wehrmacht. There is as yet no measure of the extent to which this has gone throughout the Reich, but its occasionally serious nature is clear from reports both by foreign workers and by Ps/I. (see Part II of this report). The recent "incidents" in Cologne, discussed above, which led to the hanging of some 24 foreign workers and German civilians are a case in point. There is some evidence that similar conditions exist in those areas of the Reich not yet occupied.

A striking example of the extension of Nazi controls attempting to deal with this condition, is the order for "security raids" issued on 21 February by the Police Chief of the Ruhr town of RECKLINGHAUSEN. The order, which incidentally depicts the German countryside as a haven for
escaped foreigners, convicts, A.D.L. and deserters, indicates the weakness of the present policing situation in that area. One of the protective measures, for example, calls for greater supervision of foreigners by employers - i.e., "foreign workers on farms who work on Sundays and holidays". Another of the measures seems designed to reduce the threat of foreign workers by decreasing their numbers - i.e., air raid shelter is to be denied to all foreigners until "the last German racial comrade has found shelter therein". The measure provides also for a "dog net" in which the Gestapo, Kripo, Wehrmacht and US are to operate for the apprehension of all suspicious foreigners or Germans. An announcement on 1 March by a newspaper in Hanover draws attention, on behalf of the Police-president, that it is prohibited for Germans to give away food supplies or food coupons to foreigners. Reports of joint looting or black market dealings in food by foreigners and Germans have been heard from various places. This announcement explains that the abuse is "increasingly noticeable" and that foreigners who beg are to be disregarded because "they are sufficiently well fed in their camps". It adds as a warning that any dealings by Germans along these lines "will be considered as illegal intercourse with foreigners".

**Conditions in Berlin**

According to numerous P/A reports, BERLIN itself illustrates quite sharply the weakening of controls. One P/A who was in BERLIN on 28 February says that the whole of Wehrkreis III is under military law. All trains are checked by MPs and no soldier may enter the city without a special pass, stamped and countersigned by the G.R.I. According to the same source this is intended to check the influx of deserters who, under cover of the prevailing disorder, find hiding-places in the capital. Another P/A, who served on a GERMEN execution-squad until 2 March, asserts that during each of his 15 days service, between 10 and 30 GERMEN officers and soldiers were shot each morning, mainly for desertion and sodomy. Where there is no clear evidence of desertion soldiers picked up under such circumstances are immediately sent to the Eastern front. However, says the P/A, the walls are plastered with notices of recent executions for desertion, while other P/A's have testified to the breakdown of control measures in Germany generally owing to the chaos of the transport system. A BERLIN paper on 19 March announced a reward of RM 5,000 for anyone helping the Criminal Police to find the murderers of a member of the security police who was killed by a bullet at 23.00 on 13 March in BERLIN West.

Disorder in the city is a combination of various factors. Allied bombing has left a considerable portion of the city in ruins and seems particularly to have disrupted all surface transportation. As of 9 February, the Viennese Bahnhof is said to have been completely destroyed and the only transport which runs with any regularity in BERLIN is the subway. Since the MINISTER decree which required all men and women of the capital to work on the city's defenses during their leisure time, the bomb-ed-out streets have been full of people preparing barricades in all sections of the city.

War reporter, AKUTZ, writing in Das Echo on the plans of defense, says enthusiastically that these fortifications are being built under experienced engineering officers, and that the overall plan is to divide BERLIN and its wider approaches fan-like into defense sectors. The sector is planned on natural obstacles such as the defense position, craters and ditches, covering firing positions and observation posts. From the approaches to the built-up area of the city the defense network is woven closer, and the scheme is to canalize the attacking armor into pre-arranged tank destruction lanes. Apparently an extensive system of mines is being planted, and civilians working with these instruments are being exhorted by the inspirational phrase "Sappers sweat saving lives". It is unlikely
that so much tactical information would be presented to the Allies unless there was some ulterior motive, such as the desire to calm the population, to spur them on to greater enthusiasm or to mislead us as to the progress actually achieved. The propaganda emphasis has amounted to a large-scale campaign. A recent Transocean item, for example, describes how several hundred men and women of a BERLIN suburb built their own air raid shelters, using as material the rubble of bombed houses. They began the work in April and used some 58,000 hours of their spare time to complete the shelters.

Exact and detailed information about the food position in BERLIN is not available. Nor, where available, can it be considered particularly reliable. One report dated early in February gives the following black market prices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td>5 RM each</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>12 RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabbits</td>
<td>250 RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>400 RM per kilo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>250 RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour</td>
<td>145 RM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol</td>
<td>75 RM per liter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These seem unusually high, even considering that black market operations probably reached a peak following the Russian break-through in the East during this period. In any case it should not be assumed that such prices had been normal for the city.

Somewhat less precise, but probably more reliable information comes from a Swedish correspondent that "well-to-do Berliners have hoarded colossal stocks of food in time and still have large stocks left". Apparently the food position in the countryside surrounding the capital is adequate to keep the city fed; the same correspondent reports that "in certain outer BERLIN districts" supplies are still large, and adds that "hundreds of thousands of Berliners travel daily to the countryside to barter clothes, china, etc. against food". This practice has probably lessened since the "total mobilization" of civilians for digging and the large-scale destruction of surface transport. But there seems as yet no concrete reason to believe the assertion of "as neutral for many years resident in Germany" that "BERLIN cannot withstand the long siege because the population would simply starve". Germans have been "food-shortage-conscious" ever since the last war, and popular belief probably tends to exaggerate the facts of the case.

Morale in BERLIN is clearly a function of the behavior of its women; a DNB broadcast of 17 March says:

"The picture of the Reich capital is determined by the BERLIN women ... they no longer wear hats and veils; the elegance of the city has given way to the practical demands of the changed everyday life ... The BERLIN housewife has no easier life than her sister in a job. Electricity cuts, and the coal shortage have made her life even more difficult. Her day is an incessant race against time, daylight and the alert".

Sandwiched in between these frequent attempts to "glorify" the women of BERLIN, caught under "terror bombing" and between two advancing armies, are occasional items of more practical importance. The Reich Ministry of Finance, for example, has decreed that maternity benefits which employers paid to pregnant women in addition to their weekly wages, are now free of income tax. The one point on which women receive no mercy is rumor-mongering. BERLIN radio has shown great concern over rumor-mongering in Hausfrau circles, pointing out over and over that they are irresponsible and fraught with a malicious effect.
Hints for propagandists are given by a Transocean broadcast to Europe on 19 March on the subject: "What interests the Germans most in their papers, which have become so thin?" Of constant interest clearly are their everyday worries which vary from month to month, and advice on how to improvise substitutes to replace shortages is eagerly sought. Transocean claims, however, that the one item which is read before all others is "most certainly the O.K.L. communiqué. The place names given in it are for, them the most important source of news unvarnished by propaganda."

Party Plans for Sabotage

For some time, there has been a considerable question mark as to whether the Party intended, in particular cases, to evacuate skilled workers and to carry out a program of sabotage. Some additional evidence that the Party does not intend to sabotage mines is shown by a letter of 4 February from the Reich Mining Bureau to mine directors. The letter, which urges mine directors "to bear in mind that the Reich needs every able-bodied man" when submitting names for exemption, at the same time reminds them that the Reichsmacht classifies miners "doppels UK". It emphasizes also that men classified "doppels UK" must not be touched by other authorities "such as Kreis or Gau agencies on man-hunts".

Operation of the mines, it is made clear, is not to cease completely even "if upon the approach of the enemy, an evacuation of the population and men fit for military duty is approved". To assure "emergency maintenance" and "prevent collapse and flooding" in the mines, "it may become necessary to retain men fit for military duty". This is a fairly clear mandate to keep the mines operating, as a priority even higher than Reichsmacht service. To prevent abuses, the letter concludes with a request for a description of contemplated emergency measures and the names of men selected for emergency service.

Books and Books

Under the title "Ausgetriebene Bücher" (Bombed-out Books), DBB on 19 March announced that Allied bombings have caused a serious revision of the German system of lending libraries, which "has improved further the arrangements for providing people with the relaxation of good reading". The new system was established by a directive issued by the President of the Reich Book Bureau, to the effect that all bombed-out lending libraries which are no longer operating as such must "sell or lease, or otherwise make available" their present stocks of books to a central lending agency under the control of the Reich government.

Under the new system deposits should normally be realistic but dealers may demand (in the interests of maximum security) a deposit equal to five times the original retail price of the book. With a characteristic flourish, the order announces that there will be "an exact control over the number of days any given book is held by a reader". Those who had not been paying deposits, and particularly "old customers who have been dealing with lending-libraries for many years", are asked not to consider a sudden request for additional deposits unfair.

These steps have become necessary because many readers who have been bombed out, have frequently ("not from principle but from necessity") forgotten to return the books. To prevent this "more and more book-sellers have lately been demanding deposits from their readers". The consequence of deposit barriers created by book-sellers, and book shortages created by forgetful readers, was in many cases to deprive the general public of books. The introduction of a universal deposit system, with a strict check upon return of books and the accumulation of book stocks now unused, will help make books available to all who desire them.

SECRET
Books lost through "enemy action" will not be the responsibility of the reader who, when he no longer wishes to remain a customer, can request the return of his full deposit. The losses of book-sellers will be borne as "war-damage" by this new central agency.

A local item which is sure to alter the reading habits of some Germans, announces that three H.DEN newspapers (Abbott, Oberbadisches Volksblatt, Markransteler Teublatt), in view of increasing press restrictions which have become necessary, have decided henceforth to amalgamate and issue a common newspaper. The restrictions referred to may be the new requirements of smaller format which have been announced in various parts of the Reich. The new paper, which was scheduled to make its appearance on 19 March, will be called the Oberbadische Gemeinschaftszeitung, and will be printed in Waldshut.
PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. General

The inability of the German armies to defend the Eastern bank of the Rhine is now certain to cause the utter defeatism within its ranks to manifest itself in increased mass surrender and nominal resistance. With the exception of some German para units, only moderate opposition was encountered initially in the new Rhine crossings of the Second British, Ninth and Third US Armies. On the Ninth US Army bridgehead over 2,000 Fs/w were taken during the first day alone. Although detailed morale interrogations have not yet been received from these new sectors, it is clear that the signs of crumbling resistance encountered on the Western bank of the Rhine are certain to be duplicated and increased after the main centers of opposition are bypassed or destroyed.

For the ordinary German soldier the crossing of the Rhine, the most important natural barrier to the heart of Germany, will mean that the war is hopelessly lost. (A sample of 366 Fs/w captured early in March showed that only about 1% still professed belief in victory; among more recent groups, captured on the Western bank of the Rhine, this belief was almost wholly absent. Considerations of personal survival, which were noted as increasing during the last weeks, will become paramount. The Nazi leaders and their hard core of fanatics, whom they have compromised will try to prevent capitulation or outright collapse, but they will not be able to slow the ever speeding disintegration.

Fw Combat Team with the First US Army reports that on the Remagen bridgehead, despite extremely advantageous terrain for defense and even relatively good troops, the pattern of flitting resistance can already be seen in the German failure to contain our thrusts. Here after engaging a collection of low grade troops and assorted Ad units rather well equipped, well supplied panzer formations were encountered. Fire from artillery and self propelled units constituted the main resistance to our attacks. Although these Germans were not waiting to surrender they hardly displayed any determined will to resist. Once in an unfavorable situation they readily surrendered. Frequently fearful of our artillery and mortar barrages, as was the case on the West bank of the Rhine, they hid in cellars and dugouts and surrendered to the first American troops without opposition.

Towards the end of the period, German replacements of very low quality were encountered in the Remagen sector. Stragglers, elements of battered units who retreated across the Rhine, new recruits, youngsters and very old men were thrown into Hrash Battalions and were hastily committed. Among the replacements are still some young Nazis, imbued with fighting spirit and ignorant of the general state of the battle. Soon after their initial commitment, the confusion and desperation existing in their lines shakes them and they become poorer soldiers than the depressed veterans, who are accustomed to battle.

The desire to survive personally, and the feeling that the Nazis are merely prolonging the war to save their own skins has increased desertions only slightly. Even before the assault across the Rhine desertion by Germans re-crossing the Rhine to surrender were reported. But active desertion remains, and will continue to remain, relatively unimportant in the collapse, partly because of fear of the physical difficulties involved and of reprimal. All sources agree that the growing realization that the war is soon to be over is developing into a barrier to desertion and surrender. The feeling is more definitely encountered that entering into an Allied P/w camp in the closing minutes of the war is certain to result in years of separation from one's family. While this is a deterrent, it is not, of course, a complete deterrent.

II. Defeatism among Senior Officers

That the war is lost is obvious to almost all recently captured regular senior officers, who, despite security, admit it readily. Majors and Colonels are still found whose position in the Army was closely related to the success of the Nazi Party and who still, because of fanaticism, express the belief that GERMANY will win the war. Senior officers generally, however,
execute higher orders, although individual cases have been reported where they employed stand fast orders in order to permit honourable surrender. An occasional senior officer will tell of his attempt to resist with his staff when personally threatened, but usually this last brave show was devoid of fanaticism. In most cases these officers seem to have been captured simply as a result of being overrun by the speed of our attack.

The extent to which a professional soldier is willing to offer criticism of the Nazis may be seen in the remarks of recently captured General SCHIEFF. The General declared his opposition to the association of the VOLKSTUM with the Party. He ridiculed the military role of the Gauleiters and believed that most of them are cowards. While talking about the Wehrmacht, he insisted that one should differentiate between the old school and new school. He was perfectly aware of the shortcomings of the new leadership, but he was ashamed to talk about this with the enemy. At the end of the interrogation he could not refrain from making a few derogatory remarks about MOLDER.

**Nezi Control**

Perhaps more important than any sense of professional militarism in explaining their continued resistance - for a professional knows when to employ surrender - is the degree to which many of them feel that they have become enmeshed by the Nazis. Their pride in having been soldiers before the Nazis came to power, and in many cases of having participated in the 100,000 man Army, is shown in their criticism of Nazi military strategy, Nezi war aims and the Nezi leaders themselves. Generalmajor Heilmann, Commanding General of the 7th Panzer Div. told an interrogator that the Wehrmacht is still fighting to keep the Party bosses in power. His disapproval of his superiors was based on his contempt for the failure of the Nazis, as well as any hatred he had towards them.

The utter subjugation of senior officers is most clearly seen in their attitude towards NS Indecision officers. They candidly reveal that these Nezi officers maintain an independent reporting system on German officers and "you're done if he gives bad account of you."

Strong sympathies with the 20 July plot is implied by the statements of some; the main element of criticism often being that it was poorly organized and that it failed. It is impossible with the evidence at hand to state precisely how many were involved directly or even how widespread tacit support of the plot would have been. But it is now clear that the failure of the attempt in 20 July has left the impression on these captured senior officers that any attempt to eliminate the Nazis or negotiate with the Allies, except in a purely tactical situation, is impossible.

In general, professional senior officers are apprehensive about their personal post-war future, although they are reluctant to discuss this problem. Since their only profession was soldiering, they realize that their present well-being and prestige depended on a Nazi victory. However, there is strong evidence to believe that many were beginning to realize that a victory with the Nazis still in power, might well have been intolerable for them personally. As a result, some of them seem to be under the illusion that military success, and therefore for them personal success, will ultimately be achieved in some sort of long term realignment between GERMANY and the Anglo-American powers on one side and RUSSIA on the other side.

**Deterioration of Behavior**

Despite the successful isolation of the senior officer corps from the possibility of any organized defeatist action, the Nazis are finding themselves more and more unable to check deterioration of individual behaviour. The wide range of activity of German officers which the Nazis are having increasing difficulty to control is reflected in a secret order of the High Command of Army Group B, dated 21 January, which states that Himmler has drawn up exact instructions concerning officer offenses which were to be reviewed at least once a month. Political divergence will be harshly dealt with regardless of previous military or political service. Officers who
abandon their men in times of danger are subject to the death penalty. They should not defend another accused officer out of a false sense of comradeship. Officers are warned against misappropriation of hospital goods, holding back favourites in replacement units and many other forms of corruption. Officers should be solicitous of German women and if they abuse their position to molest female auxiliaries, they will lose the right to wear the uniform of an officer. Drunkenness in public will lead to deprivation of rank. Any soldier should denounce the misdeeds of an officer even if that officer is not personally affected by them. If the officer is acquitted of the charge, the soldier is not to be punished, if the accusation was made in good faith.

Another Himmler order, dated 11 Feb 1944, addressed to the officers of Army Group Weichsel and distributed through SS channels, continues the threat against falttering officers. After stating that an SS Standarten Fuehrer and a Colonel had been recently shot for cowardice, he issued a traditional appeal for bravery among officers. He declared that he expected that court martial would be conducted with the severity which has always been customary in the "Prussian" German Army. Despite Party encroachment on all forms of Army administration, Himmler apparently still feels obliged to honor, in his appeals at least, the traditional court martial procedure.

III. Political Indifference

Enough time has elapsed since the declaration of the Yalta Conference to indicate that the ordinary German soldier has not been stirred out of his overwhelming political apathy by this declaration of Allied intentions for post-war GERMANY. Probably the most important reaction to the Yalta Conference is a negative one. German Pa/W's are not now convinced to any greater degree that Great Britain and the United States on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand, have evolved a program of political cooperation in EUROPE, which will persist for years to come, in the event of German defeat. Therefore, many German soldiers who hope for some ultimate amelioration of GERMANY's post-war position as a result of rivalry between the Allies continue to do so. It should, however, be noted that with the ever-growing deterioration of GERMANY's economic situation this hope of friction among the Allies supplier less and loss of a positive incentive to further immediate resistance. (A March sample of 386 Pa/W's reveals that less than 10 percent believed that GERMANY, by prolonging the war, would obtain better terms from the Russians and the Anglo-Americans.)

The die-hard Nazi minority is usually quick to claim that the Yalta Conference merely represents the final expression of the Allies' intentions to destroy GERMANY completely; on the other hand, some Nazis characterize the declaration as just "Vichy's treason." In the statements of "informers" Nazis, the Yalta Conference was alleged to have been a victory for Stalin and thereby proves again the role of National Socialism in opposing the threat of Bolshevism.

Anti-Nazi Opinion

Only among a very small minority of long-standing Anti-Nazi's was any real expression of approval found. The most important element of the Declaration for them was the Allied expression of a determination to exterminate militarism in GERMANY. Many of them seized upon it as a possible indication of modification of the Allied unconditional surrender program. For example, one P/U declared that we should make more propaganda about what had been decided at Yalta as "there still exists a strong fear among the Leaders that a defect might mean the extermination of the German people."

More typical among the views of those who did not openly oppose the intentions of the Yalta Conference was the expression of a general feeling of acceptance. Typical was a 32 year old Unteroffizier, formerly a skilled labourer, who reported that all he knew was that the big three had gotten together and he considered it was matter of course that they decided to eradicate National Socialism and militarism. He could not figure out exactly what the future of GERMANY would be but felt that it would be an easy problem once all the Nazis were eliminated.
As yet no evidence of illegally organized anti-Nazi activity of any note in the ranks of the Wehrmacht has been encountered. Nazi controls, as well as the general disorganization of five years of war, tend to make organized contact within the Wehrmacht impossible. In one case the First French Army reports that several Pawi captured west of the Rhine who belonged to a Volksgrenadier Division declared that there existed in their Regiment a Council of Troops (Soldatenrat) very much resembling the same type of organisation which came to life at the end of the last war. They claimed that soldiers from RHENELAND districts played an open role in this group, whose principal purpose was to liquidate the SS or officers who tried to oppose capitulation of entire units. In COLOGNE, Pawi professed that German deserters participated in a Widerstandsbewegung (Resistance Movement) composed of civilians and foreign workers. At the moment the full extent of such claims has not been ascertained, but it seems that such activity was without any real immediate political consequence. In the absence of an opportunity to desert or surrender, extreme desertion is more likely to lead those who break with Wehrmacht discipline to attempt self survival rather than engage in organized political opposition. The favorite technique is to try to return home where, through the assistance of family and relatives, a soldier can hide until the arrival of the American troops. Where that is impossible, such German soldiers tend to gravitate to large cities. In ESSEN, for example, Pawi report that many deserters are living in the cellars of bombed out houses with families, girl friends and prostitutes. Widespread looting, in conjunction with civilians, has been reported under such circumstances. (See Part I.) Reports of outbursts of violence between such deserters and military police, attempting to round them up have been reported, but as far as can be ascertained, this resistance is isolated and sporadic.