A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Attitudes in a Rhineland City

In the area won by the 21 Army Group, in the industrial city of HUECHEN-GLADBACH, 166 German civilians were interrogated in the H.C. civilian registration office. Individuals were selected at random in an attempt to obtain an approximate cross-section of the population. However, a tendency was found on the part of the women to be dishonest and suspicious, so that the final sample contains about twice as many men as women, in spite of the preponderance of women in the population.

With respect to exposure to Allied radio broadcasting, the picture is rather bright. When electric current was available, there was apparently much listening. London was listened to by 103 of the group of 166, and Luxembourg by 98, with some of each group listening to both. Luxembourg was better received than London on the "Volkspfandner" (Peoples' Receiver). 136 report that they believed the Allied news, but this figure is probably inflated by the fact that the question was put by conquerors.

Attention is invited, in connection with this group of interrogations to those obtained at EDEBURG and reported in the previous number of this Summary (26 of 26 March 1945). Although the questions used were largely similar, the results of the two series of interrogations are not really comparable in view of the fact that neither sample is a truly random one.

In general, the results are similar to and tend to confirm those obtained at EDEBURG. About half the group stated that they believed the prolongation of the war serves the interests of the Nazi Party and that the outbreak of the war was its responsibility. A similar proportion believed Germany had the same right to expect physical and material relief from the Allies as France, Poland and Norway had admitted to the belief that the Germans had committed atrocities in foreign countries.

Few people profess any knowledge of anti-Nazi organizations in HUECHEN-GLADBACH, but the very high proportion of failures to answer this question indicates that there may be undisclosed suspicions. Two persons claimed actually to have been members of the Edelweiss Pirates, and a workers' organization alleged to be functioning in some of the factories, the Kampfgruppe Gegen den Faschismus, was also mentioned. There is still no evidence of a strong underground.

It would seem that when people think there is any chance of the Allies taking them to task for their replies, the effect is to increase the degree of anti-Nazi expression. It seems clear from this and previous material that most Germans are well aware that the "correct" reply, i.e. the one they believe to desire, is to blame the Nazis. Such a reply, moreover, supplies precisely the kind of scapegoat necessary for self-protection. The impinging of these factors upon interrogations, as well as upon the reports of German officials appointed, will render difficult the separation of genuine anti-Nazi from opportunists.
COLOGNE

Enemy propaganda has been painting a colorful picture of the "fat smooth Jew Max Minden" whom, according to Dr. OBERBACH, had been appointed by the Allies as Police President of COLOGNE and provided with a gorgeous uniform in which to strut around. In fact, up to 22 March, no suitable person had been found to fill this post, nor has a head of the provisional City Administration yet been appointed. Generally, the lack of competent administrators who are not also compromised by association with the regime is proving a considerable problem. Only two of the twelve departments in the administration have yet been provided with heads, though two more assignments are almost definite. All civil servants in the previous administration who were Party members have been dismissed, without a pension. This indication that the Allies are in earnest over their intention to root out Nazism is reported to be considered in certain German quarters as "harsh," the usual excuse being offered that the individuals concerned were "forced to become Party members." Other elements of the population are, of course, quite pleased.

Whereas hitherto COLOGNE has contained not only its own administration but also that for the Regierungsbereich, it is planned that, for the present, the city will govern itself independently and there will be no wider authority. The Party headquarters have been badly damaged but are usable. They contain a library and also some records which have been placed under guard. All police records, however, are thought to have been evacuated or destroyed, and all senior police officials have disappeared. A public health report on 24 March disclosed 70 to 100 cases of typhus, and the disease has caused a number of deaths, but N. O. authorities are rapidly getting the situation under control. The treasures of the cathedral have been reported as being intact at BRENZSTEIN.

"The Avengers of German Honor"

Descriptions of the assassination of Dr. OPFENHOFF, the Mayor of ACHEN, have already been published in the press and no further particulars are known. German propaganda has attributed the deed to "German freedom fighters" and stated that "the National Court for the Preservation of German Honor sentenced the faithless traitor to death immediately he took up his office." Nothing is said to suggest that the murder was committed by persons specially sent across the line for the purpose; instead it is represented, no doubt in the hope of giving the home public an object lesson, as the inevitable reaction of a population determined never to submit. According to Transocean (the German news agency for overseas) "the teacher Velten who accepted the office of Mayor of NERZENICH near KENSCHAU, with all his family, was killed in the night by an explosion caused by unknown perpetrators." No confirmation of this story is forthcoming from Allied sources.

"The Avengers of German Honor" have also been at work distributing leaflets in COLOGNE. These are hand-made productions, crudely printed which promise vengeance to all who collaborate with the conquerors. One leaflet promised a return of the Germans by May 1. Generally they are left on the doorsteps of potential victims. So far only one German, a member of the civil auxiliary police, has been murdered in the city, and there is no link with the "Avengers" could be established. It is thought that a few Hitler Jugend fanatics are probably responsible, but the leaflets are reported to have "disturbed" the population and to be capable of continuing to do so to the detriment of Allied activities. In addition, an American infantry division has claimed that some of its men have been wounded in the city, without fatal results, by knife attacks at night.

It remains to be seen whether the new organization of Werewolves will do any better.
German Information Media

A Big-Time Newspaper: The plant of the Kölnische Zeitung, once famous and powerful newspaper organ of the Rhine Land industrialists, has fallen into our hands virtually intact. On 3 March 1945, secret orders were received by the publisher to "demolish" the equipment, i.e. remove key portions of the machinery, to the other side of the Rhine. Instead the parts were hidden in the cellar.

A degree of passive resistance seems to have been maintained by this paper to Nazi pressure. The paper was never enthusiastically Nazi, and printed Nazi material mainly when it had to. Local news remained relatively untainted, but other news was fed to it through Nazi channels.

The Stadtbote, a non-political newspaper was also published in Cologne by the same publisher, WAGNER-SCHULTZ, who was one of the few remaining publishers whose papers were not pooled with other newspapers by the Nazis.

At present the plant is reported in fairly good shape. It possesses its own Diesel generator, which requires only Diesel oil for operation. The last air raid destroyed the power-transformers which transform the city's alternating current to direct current used by the two main presses, and destroyed the newspaper's motor park.

Previous to our occupation, the paper had been a four-page issue, which the presses could turn out at 30,000 per hour.

KOBLENZ

A P & F radio report from here dated 21 March stated that the central part of Koblenz, with the exception of the Rhein Platz along the Rhine, is completely destroyed. Walls are still standing, roofs are largely gone and rubble fills many of the side streets, though the Germans have swept the main thoroughfares. The population numbers 2,000-3,000 civilians; large groups are still in hiding and there are many foreign workers who are well disposed toward "good Germans" who helped them escape evacuation measures. The river port is undamaged; there is no electric power yet. Evacuation measures in Koblenz were carried out intermittently but strictly. People were driven to bunkers by false air raid alarms and then shoved into waiting automobiles by the SS. Most of them were sent to Thuringia. On 9 February an attempt was made to evacuate railroad workers, some of whom left "for fear of Americans and revengeful foreign workers".

According to this report " Koblenz may well mark a turning point" in relationships between American troops and civilians. The population indicates that it considers the Americans as "liberators" and addresses them as "Kamerads". This attitude is best summarized by the statement of a grocer who rushed toward some Americans with outstretched hand: "We wanted to wait for the Americans. They will treat us well. I know this from the last occupation".

FRANKFURT

The FRANKFURT radio transmitter is reported to have been completely destroyed by demolition.

LÜBBERICH-GLADBACH

Occupied since 9 March, this town of approximately 65,000 is returning to normal. People are generally content with N.O. regulations, although rationing has been reduced 50% to conserve stocks. The water-works are intact because the Volkssturm squad threatened to execute three engineers who were ordered to destroy them. Occupation, too, sits lightly
on the minds of the population as indicated by the interrogations of
90 persons of both sexes between the ages of 15 and 72. Pleasant surprise
with the conduct of our occupation appeared general. "We have convinced
ourselves that American soldiers are mere boys", although women complained
about evictions from their homes and food shortages. These complaints were
rooted in philosophic resignation, however, as war-imposed regulations are
much preferable to bombings. A manager of a textile factory declared he
remained "because I feel more at home with Anglo-Saxons", and a boy of 15
was glad "to play soccer now instead of going to HJ meetings".

Many carry slips signed by foreign workers certifying to decent
treatment. Denunciations are common; one girl's story led to the arrest
of the last military commander of the town hiding in civilian clothes.

BONN

Teaching in the University of BONN is reported to have ceased
at the end of the Spring Term 1944, though a few students managed to
continue after that date, and the Medical School functioned without
interruption as a military training institution, with eight to nine hundred
uniformed students at the time of American occupation. On 13 October the
main University building was virtually destroyed by high explosive and
incendiary bombs. The University of GOTTINGEN agreed to accept BONN's
books and records, but only the Physics department took advantage of the
offer and the 400 crates which it despatched were destroyed by bombing
while in transit; some 300,000 volumes are said to be stored safely at
various places along the Rhine. Some of the staff migrated to towns like
COLOGNE which remained more or less free from bombing attacks; others
went to universities in the interior. Most of the professors still receive
30 to 40% of their salaries from the University.

Foreign Workers Remain in BONN

The extent of the failure of Nazi attempts to evacuate foreign
workers from west of the Rhine is seen in reports of considerable, but
unspecified, numbers left behind in the BONN area. (Reports prior to
occupation also indicated a considerable quantity in this area). Two days
before the occupation of BONN by American troops, over 4,000 foreign
workers guarded by SS and military guards were marched across the Rhine.
A large Russian labor camp near BÜCHEBACH was also evacuated via BONN.
Evacuation was carried out without transportation and with traditional
Nazi ruthlessness. Despite heavy guards of SS, Volksturm and Feldpolizei,
confusion permitted many of the more resourceful to slip away from the
groups of foreign workers and prisoners of war moving toward the center
of Germany. Among the workers who managed to remain in BONN were many
political prisoners charged with distributing propaganda, listening to BBC,
and who, upon serving their term in prisons and concentration camps, had
been released to work in Germany. Some of those who were found in the city
had crossed the Rhine during the last week either by swimming across or by
carrying false papers. These foreign workers are obviously preoccupied
with a quick return to their countries, especially the French and Belgian
workers, who cannot understand why they are not permitted to get on the
road and start walking home. However, initially, RG ordered that all
foreigners must remain in BONN as long as they have means of subsistence
and a place to stay.

Interrogators in BONN report that a certain amount of solidarity
seems to have developed between the foreign workers and the Germans working
classes in this area. Their common hatred of the Nazis and their common
sufferings in concentration camps and forced labor camps is noted as having
bridged national differences which might be expected to exist. Foreign
workers in isolated cases, who had for a number of years suffered in German
concentration camps, expressed sympathy with the German people and spoke
of "the liberation" of the German people. Although it is quite likely that
foreign workers may have developed some sympathies toward individual Germans

SECRET
through their years of close contact, there is no evidence to confirm that any significant sense of internationalism has developed among them. On the contrary, all evidence indicates that the foreign workers continue to display a strong sense of traditional nationalism.

Sabotage by Foreign Workers

As our armies continue to liberate foreign workers, increasing claims of sabotage on behalf of the Allies are encountered. The pattern, at least, is one of small-scale, isolated acts of sabotage, especially attempts at slow-down of work output, and even here the claims are difficult to substantiate. Several Russian workers and Poles who crossed over into Allied territory early in March claim the existence of a sabotage organization known as Podpolnaja Organizatsijja Inostrannj Rabochih (Underground Organization of Foreign Workers). It is alleged to have operated in the following cities: KOBLENZ, DUSSELDORF, BONN, KOBLENZ.

The organization was supposed to have been set up in the standard secret call fashion and headed by a Red Army officer. It reported the following record of sabotage among others:

(1) Destruction of one week’s production of concrete beams at the KOBLENZ Factory in KOBLENZ, April 1944
(2) Treating of two locomotives at the same plant, by causing collision with freight car - May 1944.
(3) Delay in delivery of prefabricated building materials by wilful confusion of component parts and breaking of electric light bulbs
(4) Delay of coal production in ESSEN by cutting of elevator cable - January 1945.

In the Trier area, interrogation of a Polish P/W brought to light claims that foreign workers and prisoners in this area had engaged in the destruction of food and supplies while they were working at various supply depots. Among the techniques reported were: allowing potatoes to freeze by not covering them properly; tempering with flour and sugar containers while loading railroad cars; filling barrels with plain water instead of wine; mixing cow-feed with nail staples, making it necessary to kill the cattle.

A rarely encountered claim of anti-Nazi activity involving the elaborate organization of Germans and foreign workers was put forth by a recently captured P/W. This soldier, 32 years old, claims to have been a member of the Communist party since 1932 and never to have abandoned his fanatical anti-Nazi stand. He was inducted into the German Army in January 1940 and had his first opportunity to contact foreign workers when he was released for essential war work during the period July 1943 to August 1944, in the Waldrich AG plant in SIEGEN, Westphalia. In the factory there were many Russian and French P/Ws, as well as French civilians. The Russians were organized by a young LENINGRAD girl, formerly an engineering student, who was a determined anti-Fascist and who ventured to make contact with this German. It was possible for him to contact this Russian girl because she enjoyed a certain amount of freedom in connection with her duties in assisting the manager’s wife after working hours. He also had secret meetings with the French workers who enjoyed more freedom. The main object of their anti-Nazi activity was to slow down production. They also employed their contacts to exchange news and to encourage the foreign workers that ultimately they would be liberated. At the time of the breakthrough in Normandy, the leaders of the anti-Nazi resistance in the factory held a meeting at which they tried to formulate plans for making contact with British and Americans or the Russians with a view to obtaining weapons. Nothing seems to have come from this meeting except that they agreed to continue to listen to the BBC every night at 2200 hours. Then this German soldier received orders recalling him to active duty in the SchindAkt, he left with letters of introduction to Russian authorities which he planned to use in case he was sent to the Russian front.
EMIL JACOBS

What the Germans are Saying

In the earlier part of the week German home propaganda printed a careful and relatively accurate picture of the Rhine fighting. It was admitted that the Allies were using "strong forces", "quantities of material comparable to the first days of the invasion". Successful penetrations and airborne landings were admitted round WESSEL, "local penetrations" in the RHENEN area and the deployment of strong forces in the plain between the Rhine and the Odenwald. Such news was accompanied by appeals which came closer to desperation than ever before: "If we cannot within the next few weeks halt by military measures the onslaught from the East and the West, all sacrifices made so far will be of no avail to us". The Volkskäfer Nachrichten on 21 March said that "absolute loyalty to our cause is the only help towards facing the change of fortune. Whoever cannot achieve this the might of destiny will overthrow". The SS "Schwarzer Korps" wrote "Winning the war now means: surviving, maintaining liberty of action, preserving Germany's territorial unity and freedom, not coming under the enemy's yoke, not being dragged to Siberia, not ending with a shot in the neck and not perishing in unemployment and misery. Doubters say this would be a negative victory. Are the doubters satisfied only with a victory which lays the British lakes at their feet and makes the Swastika fly over the Kremlin?"

The average German civilian has for some time, of course, accepted defeat as inevitable, but what the average German civilian has thought has been of no significance for the continuance of the war. But extracts such as the above from official party papers suggest that defeat is now believed to be imminent among large sections of the National Socialist movement. (The impression was strikingly confirmed by the anti-desertion order of 1 April to Gauleiters). In face of the news, it must be hard to hold any other belief, and in such an atmosphere of alarm and despondency rumors multiply. After numerous appeals against listening to stories from any source other than the official communiqué had been put out, the Führer's headquarters finally, on 21 March, found it necessary to deny the story that French troops had crossed the Rhine into RHEIN. At the same time orders were given that all telephone reports and instructions were to be checked by ringing back, an indication of the extent to which confusion has spread. With the precarious object of rescuing morale, a slightly more optimistic picture of the Western fighting was given: up to 31 March the High Command communiqué had admitted the capture of WÜRZBURG, HAMBURG, GIESSEN, MÜNCHEN, DAHMENSTADT or WIESEMÜNDE, let alone PADERBORN, LÜNEBERG or HEIDELBERG (omissions hardly compatible with the emphasis on its reliability). Colorful, though fables, stories of Allied atrocities continued, individual acts of heroism by Germans were extolled, and there was at least one reference to "new weapons".

Evacuation East of the Rhine

The only explicit German reaction to General EISENHOWER's evacuation appeal to civilians came from the German Forces Service on 20 March which explained the appeal as intended to confuse the civilian population and complicate the transport situation, "which is already difficult enough". On 21 March, however, the Gauleiters of the 4 Ruhr Gaue, in a broadcast on the wavelength of the COLONIE transmitter (considerably North-east of COLOGNE and still in German hands) informed their people that, although the Allies stood at the border of the area, "paralysis of the transport network" made it impossible to carry through evacuation measures originally arranged. Men liable to military service and boys between 14 and 16 were ordered to join march columns immediately, the remainder were exhorted to face death bravely. On the following night the Gauleiter of HESSEN-NASSAU, in a broadcast on the FRANKFURT wavelength, made a number of appeals (e.g., for small vehicles, for doctors and nurses to provide medical care), which suggested that the population were streaming out of
FRANKFURT, and further messages the following night about stran
gers collecting points in the Westerwald and trains carrying emergency supplies for refugees between MÜNZBURG and MAINZ confirmed the picture. The divergence of policy between the Ruhr and the main areas can be explained by the fact that the 250,000 people left in FRANKFURT in September 1944 are much easier to handle and accommodate than the eight and a quarter million inhabitants of the Ruhr. It might have been expected that when the inhabitants of the Ruhr heard General EISENHOWER'S warning receiving confirmation from their own leaders, they would have caused orders to stay put and taken to their goals. A later report from 9th Army, however, indicates that they have apparently preferred to stay where they are rather than risk moving, and air reconnaissance has not given any conclusive evidence of evacuation. The nervousness of the German authorities about possible movements of population is, however, indicated by the fact that on 26 March all their Home and Forces broadcasts attributed the broadcasts from FRANKFURT and COLOGNE to Allied endeavors to create confusion and unrest. Although it was declared that false broadcasts were "easy to recognize" (without disclosing exactly how to do this), the confidence of the German public in any further instructions broadcast to them by their leaders is likely to be seriously undermined.

Conditions in BERLIN

Latest reports reveal that orders for the defense of the German capital have been issued by the Reichsführer of the SS in conjunc
tion with HIMMLER. These indicate that the main burdens of BERLIN's defense will be borne by the 1st SS Panzer Corps. Although 170,000 men belonging to the SS, Polizei, Fink, etc., are available for the defense of BERLIN, V3 units are not expected to fight on a large scale because of the lack of arms for such units and their questionable dependability. The BERLIN V3, fully armed, numbers only 15,000 men. It was further reported that reasonably large centers for units deployed along the Eastern Front have been established on the Freiwalde, Hirschau Buckow and Schermeckwiese lines. The German High Command has also organized defense of the railway line and roads from BERLIN. Despite these preparations, the report suggests that the German High Command has little confidence in BERLIN's ability to hold out for long. Reports from Sweden suggest that Berliners are still more conscious of the threat from the Oder than of that from the Rhine.

Industrial evacuation from BERLIN began in volume about 7 February. Heavy rain and refugee demands on the railroads, plus the inability to use the canals, however, permitted only small amounts of industrial equipment to be shipped. Up to 16 February only such factories were evacuated as had plants intact to receive them. More rapid evacuation may be expected in proportion to the tapering off of Wehrmacht requisitions for means of transport suited for the removal of machinery. Recently there have been reports of more widespread evacuation, but all that seems to have been happening is that women with children, expectant mothers, girls and women not in important jobs have been partly evacuated.

Citing the "noticeable sugar shortage", the "little milk" available, and claiming further that "conditions deteriorate weekly", journalist JACOB LUMBROSO, fourth article in the Eichmann Stadtbild, 27 March, presented a doleful picture of BERLIN's food situation. Black markets, particularly in tobacco, and better practices, are thriving - a cigarette costs three to five marks on the black market. Insufficient quantities of food, he wrote, have resulted in a "first come first served policy" with Party big-wigs always first, since merchants and wholesalers tip them off.

Insistent Allied air attacks on BERLIN are severely straining hospital accommodation in the capital as evidenced by a recent order of Berlin Police Chief requiring all hospitals "to see that beds are always available for people injured during air raids." This order, reported by the BERLIN correspondent of Deutsche-Bystator, is the first of its kind ever
issued here. Its enforcement will compel many hospitals "to evacuate partially their present inmates."

Few flowers are expected to bloom in BERLIN this Spring. Their cultivation has been prohibited "even for churchyards, lawns and parks" to make ground for the planting of potatoes and vegetables. Would-be gardeners have been urged to surrender spades, shovels and pick-axes to the V3 for the building of fortifications outside the city.

Neutral newspaper descriptions of life in BERLIN continue to paint depressing pictures of chaos, confusion, despair and disintegration. In ordinary working day in BERLIN, according to the Svenska-Svenskbildet (28 March) begins with "tired, depressed workers boarding trains and underground at 0500 and arriving for work at 0800 or 0900. At 0930 comes the alert and work is resumed in time for the noon break". The luncheon period is "a make-believe" and the workers return "to work or shelters hungry". At night this same paper reports "Berliners live in the dark" since candles (50 or 65 Ht on the black market) are allocated only to public institutions. In the same issue the same paper reports "Let's Pretend" as the characteristic attitude in BERLIN. Everybody "pretends" to live normally, eat, believe in victory, in miracles, above all in what the German newspapers print. The Swiss Die Welt (28 March) finds the BERLIN food situation one of the results of "the gravest crises" of the "high Command. BERLIN "is a city of rumors", of wild and fantastic types, typical of which is the report "that Germany would launch a large-scale offensive in the East" started by a "girl in a bakers shop" who got it from a "sentry at the Air Ministry".

Food : Central Controls Locosen

Neutral journalists in BERLIN, with semi-official inspiration, have been hinting for some time that April would see a radical change in the German rationing system. The announcement made on 26 March of future rationing arrangements does not, at first sight, bear out these forecasts.

Basic foodstuffs such as bread, fats, meat, and potatoes will still "be rationed" uniformly throughout the Reich, and the scale of rations until the end of April in those commodities leave the calory intake of the normal consumer at approximately the existing level of 1600 calories per day (a little less bread, a little more fat, some adjustment on jam and sugar). But the supplementary rations for night and long workers have been abolished and those for heavy and very heavy workers substantially reduced. The most sinister part of the announcement, however, was the statement that "The new system will facilitate the local exchange of individual allocations in the event of transport difficulties. The food cards will no longer bear the uniform imprints and denominations of quantities because, in view of the supply and transport system, it will not always be possible to know long enough in advance what quantities of foodstuffs will be allowed to consumers". In other words, the ration scales announced centrally represent no more than an aspiration, and cards will in future be worth just what the local authorities can provide.

Already during March the bread ration in VIENNA has been drastically cut and meat (which happened to be plentiful) substituted. Accordingly, the effect of the new rations on the average German must remain to be seen until there is some evidence of the extent to which local authorities can maintain the rational levels. In this connection, a captured report of a Convention of Food Administration Chiefs in the Rhineland, dated mid-February, is interesting. It stated "We see no way for future provision of sufficient food. The cut in rations is ridiculous and should have been made long ago. We face a complete breakdown". Such a statement from responsible officials helps to explain the widespread public fear of starvation which has been indicated by the tone of several recent broadcasts and press articles. The new announcement will do nothing to relieve this.
Drink is going to be short as well as food. The BURIN Food Office recently forbade the use of barley for malt or coffee-substitute, in order to conserve it for the bread supply. Though local, this may easily forecast a nation-wide measure since bread is obviously more important than beer or coffee.

An unconfirmed report in a Swiss paper of 29 March says that in Southern Germany "fields are being abandoned by their owners". The same thing has been reported by an eye-witness from the Duselkenen area east of the Rhine. This is obviously a serious state of affairs at a time when farm work is essential if there is to be a harvest next autumn, but there is reason to think that the Allied authorities are fully alive to the situation and that in areas longer in Allied hands work on the land has resumed.

As has been mentioned before, the problem of cooking food is becoming almost as great in Germany as that of obtaining it. For example, the domestic use of gas in the CONSTANZE area was forbidden altogether from 7 March onwards, and in the LEIPZIG area from 11 March. A recent secret report says a plan is in hand to feed Germans entirely by communal kitchens. This may be an exaggeration but it was recently estimated that twenty million meals a day are already supplied communally.

Sanitation and Health

For most of the winter the health of the German people seems to have been surprisingly good, and there were no large-scale epidemics. In view of current living conditions, however, this state of affairs is unlikely to last. The typhus which according to German propaganda was brought by the Allies to COLOGNE was, in fact, prevalent before the occupation of the city. A description of the "bunkers" (masses of concrete air raid shelters), in which so many of the population spend a large part of their time, and keep their valuables and clothes, is more reminiscent of the Black Hole of Calcutta than of the twentieth century. These bunkers can of necessity have no windows; owing to the failure of electric current, the air-conditioning plant is frequently out of operation. In these conditions five hundred people are often compressed into a single room; speech has to be forbidden to save oxygen. On 22 February the local ESSEN paper stated that repairs to the water supply and sewage system which had suffered considerable damage in air raids, were being delayed by lack of labor and by the need to divert such labor as there was for work in the operational zone. Consequently some low-lying parts of the town were already boggy; the back-wash flooded several cellars and the bed smell from the swamps was spreading through the houses. People in the districts concerned were asked not to use water closets and not to pour dirty water down sinks but into pits. On 18 February the local OBERKIRCHEN paper, in an article entitled "Something stinks", referred to the smell caused in the town by rotten cabbages and other refuse which had not been cleared away. On the same day the local DUSSBURG paper published a complaint about the delay in repairing the water supply and of the resulting difficulties over washing. On 27 February it was announced that water drawn in GEISENKIRCHEN for public consumption must be boiled until further notice. On 5 March the mayor of LEIPZIG announced that a central water supply had been supplanted as far as possible by emergency wells and that if water was turbid, it must be boiled before drinking.

German Information media

Movie Corrupt Youth: One of the earliest ideological offensives of the Nazis was against the "vile Jewish control" of the arts, especially films, which allegedly resulted in "degenerate Western" productions.
German films are doubtless no longer in Jewish hands, but if an SD report of August 1944 for Gau BIIDEN 15.5.45 is to be believed, it seems that the "reform" of German films, from the Nazi point of view, still leaves much to be desired.

Deplorable "behavior and mannerisms of young people between 14 and 16 in broad daylight and on public streets" are pointed to as evidence of a decline in morality resulting from the tenor of many current films. Frivolousness and a "lust for riches and high life" have resulted from these films, in which "nobody seems to work" but all dress with glamorous elegance, according to these attacks. Children and normal family life are rarely treated. Such films are said to mirror decadent "Western" conceptions of life, out of harmony with Nazi ideals. A more social criticism may be seen in the complaint that the film emphasis upon the "ease of love opportunities of city life" has encouraged a "flight from the country".

The critics recommend a program for improving films which includes central direction by pedagogues and censors "free of mercantile interests" who would encourage the production of films with the themes of love of country, heroism, art and nature. German films recommended as models to be followed are "Einsamer", "Der alte und der junge König" (The Old and the Young King), "Jud Süss" (The Jew Suss), "Uner alles in der Welt" (Over all the World), and "Arseh sur Fuehrer" (March to the Fuehrer). The existence of such puritanical and humorless views in the inner ranks of the Party is a reminder how much misplaced idealism is still involved in the National Socialist movement.

Advertising Restrictions: In an effort to conceal the effects of Allied bombing, the German Propaganda Ministry issued directives, dated 2 February 1945, forbidding newspapers to accept obituary notices revealing the "place and date of death of bomb victims" unless these were specifically mentioned in the Wehrmacht communique or in the local newspaper announcement. In the absence of such specifications, dates and place-names were to be omitted "particularly in cases where the Wehrmacht communique made vague mention of the places attacked". Obituary notices, too, are to make no mention of the victims' "profession" or give addresses of survivors.

In the sphere of commercial advertising, firms, especially public utilities, were ordered to avoid references to themselves as "war essential" and give no hint that normal operations have been hampered by air attacks. Notifications of changes or present location of address, advertising for larger quarters, additional help, are also forbidden. Even the conventional and time-honored boast of most business houses regarding "their size and importance" is no longer permitted. Recommending that "unnecessary advertising" must go, the new directives also placed "professional advertising" (doctors, opticians, bankers) and civilian "Situations Wanted" under ban.

These restrictions seem pointless in the face of the steady shrinking of German newspapers. Latest victims of the paper shortage are the National Zeitung, now only 2 pages (one sheet) and the Oberdonaugeitung which announced that it "will appear 5 times weekly with only one sheet".

1945:
Hamburg Library Closed: A girl wrote to a soldier on 1-January

"Since September 7 1944, I have been working in a factory. The Hamburg Library is no longer operating and my colleagues and I became eligible for service."
That the Russians are Saying

In their propaganda to Germany, the Russians are increasingly displaying concern about Nazi preparations for the post-war period in military, economic and political fields. Reports of Nazi preparations to go underground, of Nazi plans for an economic come-back in establishing relations with American business firms and Swiss banks, parallel general denouncements of HITLER's secret defenders and advocates in neutral and Allied countries. Currently, strong attacks are being made upon the so-called "soft peace campaign" waged by "The Princes of the Catholic Church". On 21 March Red Star, commenting on the recent German peace feelers, quotes the March issue of the London Catholic Herald as calling upon the Allies to pardon the Germans. The Pope's address of 15 March is interpreted as an appeal for pardon for those who "thirsted for hegemony of earthly goods". Soviet papers on 20 March carry a message reporting that a number of important banking and industrial companies controlled by the Vatican are playing a leading part in the transfer of Nazi funds to Latin America. A Pravda article by Ilya Ehrenburg, broadcast by the Soviet European Service in Spanish, accuses the German Catholic clergy of being entrusted with the salvation of German imperialism under the leadership of EURNING, who "prepared the way for HITLER".

U.S. leniency toward Germans is being criticized in the Izvestia. Quoting the Key Chronicle to the effect that "Germans known to have been Hitlerites are taking part in the administration organised under Allied control", it asserts that U.S. troops are showing excessive leniency, partly under the influence of Roman Catholic appeals for pity for the Germans.

Describing the work of Soviet Commandants in German towns, Russian correspondents stress the fact that nobody believes in the inhabitants' pretended dislike of Fascism. There is only one thing for them to do: "To work and obey". The duties and responsibilities of the Commandants are:

1. Discipline in the town
2. Fight against sabotage
3. Swift liquidation of Nazi underground work
4. Registration and preservation of military booty, stores and industrial enterprises
5. Registration of surviving Germans

Reports of an increasing number of incidents illustrating the treacherous character of the civilian population in Russian-occupied Germany, have culminated in a talk by Colonel General of Justice ULAMH, who, in a Red Army Hour Broadcast, warns the Red Army men serving in Germany to be particularly vigilant. Extreme obsequiousness, politeness and servility of German civilians should not cause any slackening of alertness and vigilance.
PART II - WEHRMACHT MORALE

I. General

In the words of General Eisenhower, the German army is a beaten army. The German high command has lost effective control over many units, large and small, of the German forces. In wide areas, no opposition is being encountered, or if there is resistance, it is easily overcome. From an overall military point of view, further resistance seems absurd in the sense that it can only temporarily delay the inevitable. Yet, in many cases where the tactical situation permits, fanatical officers still reform their units, maintain communications and offer such resistance as can be extorted from troops whose dominating preoccupation is now more than ever self-preservation. On both shoulders of the 21 Army Group attack, South of Ederborn, and in the Ascheffenburg sector, effective resistance is still being encountered. North of Frankfurt a pocket has developed which still continues to fight on.

Regardless of his conviction of the purposelessness of continued resistance, and his lack of confidence in himself and his leaders, the German soldier still lacks the initiative and common action required to quit en masse. Surrender for the vast number of German soldiers comes when they are cut off or overrun by the rush of our attack. After capture the feeling that the war is being prolonged by the Nazis merely to save their lives is overwhelming; yet evidence of the existence of Soldatenrat or other forms of organized anti-Nazi activity within the ranks of the Wehrmacht is almost wholly absent. The Nazi terror system although weakened still continues to operate. Even the instinct for self-preservation through capture is counterbalanced by the hope that the war will be over tomorrow and that the surrender will be able to return home directly. The overall picture continues to show that despite fierce resistance in limited sectors, the bulk of the Wehrmacht seems to be waiting to surrender in tactical situations where formerly they would have fought with determination.

II. Enemy Estimates of His Own Morale

The following is an excerpt from a captured order by the CO of the 47 US Division dated 5 March 1945, in which he estimates the morale of his unit in a report to Himmler. It is quoted because of the significance which can be attributed to such a document of self-evaluation and because it confirms interrogation sources.

"The developments in the East have materially lowered the morale of the men from the areas occupied in the East - German Upper Silesians, members of National List No III (Rotes), and also covering Reich Germans. Those people live in great anxiety over their families. Many of them have been influenced by the enemy's skillful use of broadcasts and leaflets. Despite energetic countermeasures taken by the Div (laying of scattered mines, continual education by the National Socialist Orientation Officer; surveillance by all officers, especially by the experienced commanders - also at night; removal of 36 especially unreliable soldiers from the MDR for special indoctrination at the E. Repl. Br.) the prevailing tendency of these people to desert has not quite disappeared. He adds, however, that "The bulk of the troops, however, realizes the necessity for supreme effort, is equally inspired and determined to resist at all cost."

III. Civilians and the Wehrmacht

Allied propaganda has long recognized the role of civilians in spreading their defeatism among German soldiers. Leaflets have been issued designed to encourage the spread of defeatism from this source. With the shift of the main battle line to the East bank of the Rhine, Nazi efforts to isolate the German soldier from the German civilian have all but broken down. The German soldier has thereby become directly exposed to a most powerful source of defeatist propaganda. German 12/4, and frequently officers too, report the entreaties of civilians to which they were subjected. "In the name of God, put down your weapons. Do not defend the city. Since the war is already lost at least leave us a roof over our heads and a bit of property." Isolated
instances have been reported where civilians attempted to dismantle fixed fortifications in order to speed Allied advances. One friendly German officer P/W reported that, after capture, many officers had told him that their troops had been stoned by civilians as they prepared to defend their positions. Those attitudes of civilians, stressed in our combat leaflets, calling on them to question the soldier as to why he continues to resist, have had significant direct effects.

In Bann for example, Pa/W of the 412 Grenadier Inf Bn, report that the attitudes of the civilians induced them to surrender without firing a shot. Soldiers were stopped in the streets and begged to surrender in order to save the lives of women and children. One large group took refuge in an air-raid shelter, and were determined to shoot any German who tried to get them out to fight. Civilians who knew that they were there even brought them food at night.

**Assist Surrender**

Reports on the bold efforts of civilians to assist soldiers who wish to desert or hide continue to increase. Not only have civilians helped them with food and clothes or a place to hide, but they have acted as emissaries between American soldiers and German soldiers who were seeking an opportunity to surrender.

Contact between civilians and soldiers has worked in both directions, moreover. Stragglers and deserters have spread news about Allied advances among foreign workers and German civilians. Deserters together with German youths have been reported as having engaged in organized looting in cities where Nazi control began to break down. In a detailed study of resistance to the Nazis in Cologne, interrogators concluded that deserters as well as foreign workers had attempted to get food or ration points illegally. There is also some evidence that foreign workers have received arms from German deserters.

Complaints about civilian behavior upper in an order of the 6 SS Mountain Div., dated 11 March, which directs that there should be no doubt among the civilians that sabotage will be punished on the spot. A 9 SS Division order complains that responsible reports show that civilians receive incoming American troops in a friendly manner and even to some extent are hospitable towards them. Civilians take a hostile attitude towards German troops, however, and in most cases passively resist justifiable requests, especially in connection with billeting. While it is understandeble that civilians should desire that their property should not be endangered by artillery fire and air attacks, German troops must be supported by every means. Civilians who refuse legitimate requests of German soldiers, passively resist them or commit sabotage are to be arrested and handed over to the secret police.

**IV. Straggler Control**

The increased difficulties of enforcing straggler control indicates that those German soldiers who seek to separate themselves from the battle are convinced that this can best be done by their returning directly home wherever possible. Early in October 1944 with the initial Allied penetrations into the Warsaw area the phenomenon of the personal ending of the war with the occupation of one's own home town was first noted. As Allied advances grew deeper this tendency became more pronounced and contributed to the growth of stragglers. Likewise, the more confusion of battle during a retreat has increased the numbers of stragglers. As a result the previously reported order of Field Marshal Model that there would be no more stragglers on the pain of death was announced.

Several Pa/W have reported the consequence of this order. An iron net has been thrown around the area immediately behind the front and no German soldier caught within it enjoys freedom of movement. Straggler
collection points have been set up in every village or town. As soon as a German soldier is picked up by an M4 patrol he is sent to the collecting point and from there to the division operating the collecting point. Return to the front, with or without weapons, is usually accomplished with great speed. In general the system continues to work although it seems reasonable that the breakthroughs of the last few days have complicated the problem.

It is interesting to note that Party officials, Party members and ordinary civilians have been ordered to cooperate with the Feldjäger Commandos, who have been charged with the duty of maintaining military discipline in the areas rear of the army. The Feldjäger Commandos were established by Himmler on September 15; the use of Party members and civilians to aid them represents a most drastic step in the general tendency to place the army completely under the control of the Party.

V. Officer Morale

(a) Level of Defiance

While the will to resist is now almost wholly absent among enlisted men in the Wehrmacht, the officer corps, although realistically pessimistic about the outcome of the war, still maintains after capture a measure of resolve. Current interrogations reveal clearly the reluctance among many officers to employ their control, because they are unwilling to further resistance at the expense of useless bloodshed.

A write-in poll administered by MI-1/1 to 250 German officers captured between 10 and 19 March indicates the level of defiance which they still maintain after capture. (Nearly half of the sample were 2nd Lieutenants, the remainder divided between 1st Lieutenants, 25%, Captains, 25%, Majors and upwards 5%. Nearly half were under 30 years of age, 20% between 31 and 40 years, 20% between 41 and 50 years, and over 10%, including some U.S. officers, over 50 years.)

The following five questions supplied a preliminary gauge to defactist attitudes (comparative figures are given for a group of 39 officers captured during approximately the same period), as a basis for evaluating other answers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Officers captured 10-19 March</th>
<th>Landmars captured in March</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you trust the Führer?</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe that Germany is winning the war?</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe that Germany still possesses var-decisive secret weapons?</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you prefer a prolongation of the war for years to an Anglo-American-Russian occupation of Germany?</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe that by prolonging the war Germany can obtain better terms from the Allies?</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Attitudes towards Surrender

Conditions of surrender continue to remain an important point of honor among German officers. Twenty percent asserted that surrender is never honorable, while nearly half of the officers refused to answer this question. Only 20% accepted the belief that surrender was honorable when the tactical situation was hopeless.
In contrast to the Landsers, German officers naturally profess more preoccupation with Germany's general strategic situation. It is notable that 50% claim to have been preoccupied with the deterioration of the general situation during the days that preceded their capture, as against only 10% who were preoccupied with the deterioration of their own tactical position, and 32% who were worried about the lives of their men. The extent to which the defeatism of the German soldiers affected the German officer can be inferred from the fact that, of the officers claiming to distrust Hitler, half revealed that their men approached them prior to surrender and voiced their anxiety about the hopelessness of their immediate tactical situation. Only a handful of officers trusting Hitler made a similar admission. The German officers who did not trust Hitler were more prone to admit that their men approached them with worries regarding post-war Germany. Such worries were mainly problems of re-employment and the location of family.

As in the case of the German enlisted men, occupation of his home by either the Anglo-Americans or the Russians resulted in further discouragement rather than development of the desire to fight a last ditch resistance. Thirty-seven percent of the officers stated that their homes had been occupied by either the Anglo-Americans or the Russians. Of these 45% claim that this news discouraged them from further fighting, as against 32% who claim to have been spurred on to further resistance. It was found that distrust in Hitler was correlated to a high degree with occupation of one's home.

(c) Political Attitudes

The 50% trust in Hitler, cited above, was much more marked among the lower e.g. groups and junior ranks than among the higher. Trust in Himmler was limited to about 15% of the officers; even among those who trusted Hitler the percentage was only 50.

The opinion that the G.F.I. lacked the power to surrender the German armies to the Allies, if this seemed necessary and in spite of Party opposition, was expressed by about one-third of the sample. Forty percent took the opposite view, and this group was made up largely of those who did not trust the Fuhrer.

The great majority (70%) of those who trust Hitler consider the conspirators of July 20th to be traitors to Germany and conversely the great majority (76%) of those who distrust Hitler considered they were true patriots and right. The overall result is that 41% of the whole sample considered them to have been traitors; 12% consider them sincere but misguided patriots; 23% considered them to have been true patriots and right.

(d) Attitudes towards Occupation of Post-war Germany

In general these officers displayed optimistic thinking on the subject of Allied occupation. Less than 6% thought that the Anglo-American troops were imbued with a spirit of revenge against the German civilian population; this is lower than the comparative data for Landsers (1%). Over 80% of them thought that in areas of Germany occupied by the Anglo-Americans and Germans, with the exception of fasci leaders, will be allowed to resume their pre-war jobs. But by contrast only 50% of the officers thought that there will be sufficient food for an adequate diet for the civilian population in these areas.

Other interrogations indicate that the belief that Germans will be permitted to resume their post-war jobs does not apply to the professional soldier. There is good evidence to believe that many German officers are constantly preoccupied with their own professional future. Younger officers especially realize that they are military technicians and know, as well as care for, no other profession. At least one source reports that the sentiment is strong among many that "the only solution for us is the Red Army."
(e) Reaction to Allied Bombing

This sample of officers displayed a far stronger resentment against Anglo-American bombings than was expressed by Landsers captured during the same period. Almost 60% considered that Anglo-American bombing of German cities was "a barbarous terror weapon"; 20% considered it a fair reprisal for German bombings of English cities and about 10% thought it a fair method of warfare.

(f) Historical Beliefs

Twenty percent of the officers questioned stated that USA declared war on Germany. This group was largely, but not exclusively, composed of those who trusted Hitler. Another 20% gave no answer.

VI. German Propaganda to the Wehrmacht

Despite the use of sheer police terror as the real basis of control of the Wehrmacht, the Nazis still attempt to keep up their propaganda efforts to the German troops. Due to the confusion within the ranks of the Wehrmacht, and the resulting difficulties of dissemination, the bulk of their efforts apparently devolve on NSU's who spend most of their time reading to the troops the latest orders governing desertion. The "consequences" of defect is the main line; a few continue to talk about new weapons and the devastating effects of V-2s on Allied cities.

New leaflets still appear, although less frequently. Most of them rely largely on the Landsers' military spirit and call on him to remain quiet (zu schweigen) and to carry on. One of the more persuasive attempts is an order of the day by Model on the occasion of Memorial Day. He points out how past German achievements cost the Allies tremendous sacrifices and calls for renewed efforts. Another leaflet issued by NS Pfehrung, on March 12, is an exhortation not to be deceived by enemy leaflets and loudspeakers as well. This treat is no more than a threat to would-be deserters of the consequences that will befall them and their families.

Radio programs to the forces continued to use obscure language in order to minimize the extent of penetration in the West. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the murder of Oppenhoff, Mayor of Aachen. (See Part X, E, What the Germans are Saying.)

VII. Reactions to Allied Loud-Speaker Propaganda

The swiftly moving front and the resulting isolating of pockets of German troops have made possible very effective use of combat loud speakers to induce surrender. The swiftness of the front often makes it impossible to ascertain exactly how many prisoners were taken as a result of a particular PA mission. However, for example, the PA Detachment operating with the 9th Army reports that in the case of Trotland alone over 250 prisoners were taken as result of a PA mission there. Even paratrooper units have responded to PA appeals, as for example, the elimination without any resistance whatsoever of the isolated pockets of paratroopers at Oerdingen. It is interesting to note that the success of many a PA mission is due to the fact that, as a result of the broadcast, enlisted men are strengthened in their representations for surrender to their NCO's, who are still doubtful as to whether they should continue to resist.

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Brigadier General, C.S.C.
Chief, Psychological Warfare Division
Distribution:
General McClure
Colonel Peiley
Mr. Grommen
Lt. Cdr. McLeachlen
Major Herz
Lt. Rosenberg
Intelligence (3)
Plans & Directives (2)
Press
Radio
Entertainment Control

Political Officers, SHAEF (2)
4C of S, 4-2, SHAEF (Air) S/L Ormonde (2)
G-2 Division, US Group Control Council (2)
SHAEF MAIN, G-2 (2)
" " G-2 CIC, Security Section
" " G-3
" " G-5 (8)
" " Public Relations Div.
" " (Gen. Allen) (2)
Historical Section, HQ., ETOUSA
" " (Capt. Greenwald)
G33, Mr. Schlesinger (3)
USCS, Paris (2)
Radio Luxembourg (3)
P & Pl., 6 A.G. (4)
P & Pl., 12 A.G. (6)
P & Pl., 21 A.G. (2)
Major O'Brien, E.J.D., Intelligence (Reer)
for further distribution in London.