SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Psychological Warfare Division

SECRET
April 1945

GERMAN HOME FRONT

A. OCCUPIED AREAS

Civilian Surrender Their Towns

In the desperate defense which it has conducted in BERLIN, the inner core of the Nazi Party is only putting into practice in the capital example the policy which, activated by considerations of personal survival and by long-term political aspirations, it has sought to apply throughout the Reich. On 12 April, K-valu ordered that no German town be declared an open city. At the same time he joined with REUTER and ROHLMANN in announcing that Commandants (Kommandanten) are to be appointed in each town who would be personally responsible for carrying out the order. Should they act contrary to their duty and task, they, like all civilian officials who tried to induce the Commandants to deviate from this duty or even obstruct him in fulfilling his task, would be sentenced to death. These orders, plus first-hand observation and other documentary evidence, clearly indicate the widespread reluctance of the German civilians to support complete defense of the Fatherland. Such reluctance has, in a number of cases, developed into open hostility toward the Wehrmacht and has become a serious force attempting to terminate hostilities, that is at least on a local level. This is the case because, with rare exceptions, German officers display little or no initiative in removing themselves or their units from battle until actually encircled or overrun.

Clear indication of the demoralizing influence of the civilian population on the Wehrmacht could already be seen in a MEDEL order, dated 20 March, which stated:

"Cases are noted in which minority elements of the civilian population have assumed a defeatist and hostile attitude in certain circumstances. It has been announced that in one place German civilians blew up a bridge and others have called upon soldiers to use civilian clothing and cease fighting."

MEDEL ordered, therefore, the use of arms against any disturbance and sabotage on the field of battle, whether the perpetrator was a soldier or a civilian. Under existing conditions permit, perpetrators were to be tried by court martial. One P/M reported that in the BERLIN area alone as many as 30 persons a day were sentenced for failure to carry out orders connected with the defense of the city.

Numerous Divisional captured orders repeat the same story. A captured order from the 306th VG Division enumerates slogans used by the civilian population in their conversations with German soldiers:

"Throw your rifles away. Then the war will be finished sooner."

"Soldiers, do not go this way but through the field, because at the entrance to the town a patrol is located and a new battle group is being formed."

"We hope that the Americans will occupy our town most quickly so that at least the undestroyed parts of the town will remain for us."

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The German Major General FRANZ, in analyzing after capture the
causes of the German defeat between the Moselle and Rhine, said that the
influence of the civilian population greatly reduced the fighting stamina
and morale of officers and men. Women daily told the soldiers that further
fighting would be useless and that civilian suits were at their disposal
(a practical argument likely to have been of potent effect). A woman told
the General himself that it would be worth a bouquet of flowers to the
Americans if the civilians could have quiet and peace after the German
departure. On another occasion the General ordered his troops to fire on
civilians who were trying to clear away a road-block.

In order to protect their remaining private property and their lives,
German civilians are not content merely to urge soldiers to terminate
hostilities, but even engage in such positive action as destroying tank
barriers, transmitting military information or assisting in the execution
of surrender of Wehrmacht units. This sort of activity is reported more
frequently from small towns than from larger communities, where the Nazis
are usually better organized to exercise controls. In BUCHENHEIM, the
Commanding Officer of the 233rd Security Battalion was approached by the
civilians of the town and told to remove his men from the city since they
constituted a danger to civilian life and property. When the Captain
replied that he was only an officer obeying orders, the people went to the
local Ortsgruppenleiter with an ultimatum: Either you get the soldiers
out of town or we will take care of you ... first "The citizens then
proceeded to tear down the heavy logs used in the tank obstacles and pull
them off the road with the aid of horses, in order to facilitate the entry
of U.S. armored spearheads. A German officer who watched the episode
was reported to have said: "You can't blame the people. They have lost so
much already and don't want to lose what is left in the last hour of the
war".

In HÜLSBERG, the lead was taken by the local doctor who, after
hearing a demand for unconditional surrender from a public address system
mounted on one of our advancing tanks, telephoned the officer and convinced
him that capitulation was the best policy. He then appeared on the road,
waving a white flag, and reported to the advancing U.S. troops that the
town was clear of German soldiers. The surrender of the Volkssturm with
their 275 Fernsesamte was arranged after they had told their C.O. that
they would not fight.

In some cases the local Bürgermeister assumed the initiative in
attempting to save his town. The Bürgermeister of HESEN, after surrender-
ing his community, proceeded to accompany our forces to the next town,
NEUBERG, where he promptly arranged with the local Mayor for its
capitulation.

The same desire for capitulation, although not so successfully
executed, was encountered in some of the larger cities. It is reported,
for example, that on the morning of the 16 April, when U.S. troops were
preparing to assault DÜSSELDORF, two citizens appeared at a U.S. Battalion
C.O. and asked that the already damaged city be spared. These men were
not officials of the city but claimed to be founders of the Free Germany
Party in DÜSSELDORF. They offered to lead U.S. troops into the city over
those roads which had not been mined or obstructed by road-blocks. They
also reported that there were few German troops left in the town and those
remaining were not organized for defense. This proved to be the case and
DÜSSELDORF (which, according to a Swedish report in March, was one of the
key towns to be defended by the last men) fell without a shot being fired.
In FRANKFURT, the Nazi Mayor claims that he tried to persuade General KHEIB
to declare an open city when he heard that American troops had crossed the
Rhine. To no avail, however, for the General merely assured him that he
was in a position to put up a strong defense.
But the "sense of duty" is not completely absent among German civilians. In one sector, for example, a group of American officers, freed after 5 days as German PoWs, reported that German women and children crossed our lines and kept the enemy accurately informed about our movements. Civilians manned observation posts and tall buildings and dominant terrain features, and spread the alarm quickly when Allied troops were seen. German troops coming to a town were given food and hot drinks by civilians, who told them the location of the Americans. The same civilians spit and jeered at Allied PoWs being led through the streets.

Notes On Fallen Foes

DESCRIPTION: Although the last Allied air raid which any resident remembers occurred in November 1944, this city has been heavily damaged. In addition to the destroyed and damaged houses, many of which are burned out completely, several of the bridges are blown. In this connection Allied interrogators report that two weeks before our entry the city fathers (Stadtwehr) complained to the city's military commander that in the process of blowing bridges German soldiers were also destroying the municipal water supply. As a result an order was issued to stop the blowing of bridges, followed by other orders not to destroy the gas works, the power plant, railroad installations or the telephone system. According to the informant, who is now responsible to K.G. for organizing the city's police system, the latter orders are supposed to have originated with MI5. Since Allied troops entered the city without any serious opposition, all these utilities are functioning at the present time.

One report mentioned a food depot in the city which contains 150,000 tons of grain. This has not yet been confirmed but, if true, such a supply will be of considerable assistance in feeding the 240,000 people estimated to be still living in the city.

DESCRIPTION: In this city the demise of the former Nazi bosses had somewhat more variety than in other places. The Police President and SS General, formerly head of the D.C.I.U. concentration camp, shot himself in the Kaisergarten. The city's Chief of Air Raid Shelters was killed by several unreasoned citizens. The Ortenaupeikeller of one suburb disappeared on his motor bicycle, leaving his family and belongings behind, and has not been heard from since the occupation. The city is badly damaged only in the central portion and contains about half of its normal population of 550,000. Foreign workers constitute about 10% of its present population.

There is a surprising amount of political activity for a city so recently occupied, though private reports received prior to capture indicated strong anti-Nazi groups. Under the encouragement of British M.I. authorities, representatives of these underground groups are being allowed to establish contact. Some leadership is being furnished by local leaders who escaped to England and who were able to set up underground movements. A loose regional organization on an anti-Nazi basis is being formed. Men are constantly reporting from all parts of the city in response to headquarters instructions directing former members of the Wehrmacht in civilian clothes to turn themselves in.

DESCRIPTION: BOCHUM, which was described as a "dead city" after the catastrophic air raid of 4/5 November, seems to be regarded as a center for a united anti-Nazi organization which has already begun to form at DORTMUND and which anticipates eventually taking on a national character. Its leader was sent into BOCHUM in September 1944 by Allied authorities to assist in the organization of anti-Nazi activities. By the time our forces arrived he had organized a committee of 7 and lists of several hundred reliable men were started for future work. These men have already proved extremely useful to the occupational authorities. They have located various people on the Allied list of war criminals, including some local party functionaries.

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BRUNSWICK: Local officials estimate destruction in the city at 60% according to the usual pattern: the center of the city flattened and several of the outlying districts more or less intact. The city's organization for defense, as reconstructed by Germans who remained behind, presents the chaotic picture which has become representative of German operations in recent weeks. The digging of trenches and barricades is said to have begun only a week before we entered the city. Available to man these defenses were an uncommitted Volkssturm battalion from GÖHUNG, local police, some small unidentified Wehrmacht units, Landeseschutzen and the Gestapo — all these allegedly under the control of the Kreisleitung. The Mayor, Dr. KÖCHLER, after a survey of the situation, decided it would not do. He then made two speeches to the police force in the Rathaus, advising them to organize into patrols which were to inform the first Americans they met that the city was to be surrendered. He reports that this idea met with great enthusiasm and was immediately carried out.

The present population of BRUNSWICK is estimated to include about 160,000 Germans and approximately 40,000 foreign workers and refugees.

BAIREUTH: This town, which was much developed by the Nazis and made the capital of a new Gau named after it, has suffered comparatively little, with the result that its normal population of 45,000 has been increased during the past two years by the influx of some 10,000 refugees. At present there are some 3,000 foreign workers; there are also 1,300 Czech political prisoners in the city. The inhabitants claim that the city was not bombed until one week preceding its fall on 16 April. Confident that the city would never be bombed, the Gauleitung never built any air raid shelters. In consequence it is said that several hundred were killed by direct hits during the pre-occupation raids early in April.

In contrast to the tales of looting by foreigners, told mainly by grumbling and envious German civilians, is a report on the Czech political prisoners in BAIREUTH. Under the direction of a committee of 3, when they selected to take charge of their affairs, these political prisoners have organized groups to prevent large-scale looting. At the railroad station, for example, they have stationed groups over the briquettes and coal piles and are instructed to allow the German civilians to take a small amount which is necessary for their daily use.

The food situation is more than adequate, for the great stores of the Food Office were found intact, and it is estimated that they will provide ample provisioning for at least four weeks. It is also expected that the surrounding countryside will be able to provide potatoes and meat for the city in at least a great quantity as it has done during the past few months. In fact, with the exception of spices and soups from Prussia, the normal diet can probably be continued. The water and electricity supply have suffered minor damage but repairs are already nearly completed. Housing is a somewhat more pressing problem in BAIREUTH, for the city never had an adequate number of dwellings and the population has been increased considerably.

WEIHSEFFEL: After two American ultimatums had been rejected, with the result that considerable destruction was done to houses and stores by artillery fire, the town fell on 16 April. The most interesting feature accompanying this fall was the unusually high number of suicides among local politicians. The Secretary in charge of criminal activity, known as the local Gestapo man who had beaten up many political prisoners, shot himself. The Deputy Kreisleiter shot himself in the W.C. The Chief of the city's Medical Departament poisoned the other four members of his family as well as himself. One of the big local Parteibonzen who stayed to face the music, the Landrat and former Kreisleiter, evidently had been preparing to carry on his work of ordered activity. Lists and receipts for explosives and ammunition which had been transferred from the Wehrmacht barracks to the Landratsamt have been impounded as evidence and he has been arrested.
BISLEBERG: In memory of the local activities of the great reformer, this city is also known as the Lutherstadt. Interrogators report a marked Deutschnational atmosphere about this town, whose inhabitants are mainly small traders and craftsmen and retired civil servants. In large part, the tone of the town seems to be set by its numerous monuments. One specimen is dedicated especially to the police officials who were killed during the Leftist "disturbances" of 1921. Another is dedicated to an SS man who fell on 12th February 1933, "killed by communists". A third monument, dedicated to the dead of the last war bears the inscription:

"INVICTA VICTA VICTURI DEN UNBESEITEN, DIE BESIEGETEN, DAS WIEDER ZU SIEGEN HOFEN."

(To the unbeaten the losers, who hope to win again).

The town has suffered practically no damage, in as much as it has never experienced an air raid. For this reason, again, its normal population of 25,000 has been increased by some 60,000 foreign workers with consequent minor aggravations of the lodging and feeding problem.

Despite the particularly klein burgherlich tone of this town, there seems to be some evidence of an underground organized before the Nazi collapse. One of the leaders of this group lays claim to an anti-Nazi history which goes back to the pre-1933 street-fights of the communists against the Brownshirts. Another is the wife of a former soldier who managed to combine discreet underground activity with a responsible job as collector for a small life insurance company. She was the author of several mimeographed leaflets issued under the name of the "Antifaschistische Arbeitergruppe", which appealed to the population to aid in the surrender of the town. Both of these informants agreed that their movement was a very small one, viz.: at no time exceeded 50 trusted members. There was never any written communication between the members and for security reasons contact was made only among two or at most three people at a time. The membership was confined almost exclusively to members of the working-class.

MESSINGHOFEN: This town, 54 km. south-west of TÄGERBORN, provides an illustration of the inadequacy of the German preparations for scorched earth in the face of the rapid Allied advance across the Rhine. Two large gasoline plants, built last October by the government and managed by Hitlerschale A.G., are intact and in working order. Maintenance crews were left behind and, according to the plant manager, permission from Allied authorities is all that is needed to resume production.

The plant manager's tale about the period preceding occupation varies in one important respect from that told at other plants which remain intact. He states that six weeks prior to the occupation a representative of the German Armament Commission (under Goebbels' Ministry) instructed him not to destroy or sabotage the plant even if ordered to do so by the Wehrmacht or Local Party authorities.

The Flood Gates Open

Reports from the occupied areas of Germany during the past fortnight have been dominated by the prime facie evidence, now finally available at first hand, of German atrocities. The Allied press has given full scope, in front-page headlines and photographs, to the horrors which Allied armies are uncovering everywhere in Germany. While the real need for such publicity has been made clear by General MORGAN's statement to a U.S. Committee of Enquiry, the surfeit of publicity must not be allowed to obscure several important aspects of German concentration camps with particular interest to students of German psychological warfare. These facts emerge not from the collection of individual horror stories but from the careful study of limited situations.
Block 61, Buchenwald: This single street in the huge Buchenwald camp provides an important key for the understanding of the maze of confused details and contrasting viewpoints which Allied interrogators are now receiving from the recently liberated inmates of German concentration camps. It was the main death house for the camp, in which a single room was reserved for the administration of injections. Those who entered this room crossed only in a horizontal position through a small rear door, to a walking truck which carried the corpses to the camp's crematory. In this respect Block 61 resembled dozens of other streets scattered through Central Germany.

The striking thing about Block 61 is that no inmate of Buchenwald yet interviewed, however brief his confinement there, does not know the number of the block and in a general way the arrangements there concluded. Yet there is a great paucity of complete detail about specific cases. This situation is due not to chance but to the characteristic cunning with which the Nazis plan all their attacks upon the human mind.

Block 61 was closed off from the rest of the camp by a wall in which there were only 3 small entries, each designed to serve a particular purpose. The larger part of the building was used mainly to house inmates with contagious diseases. Just behind the large ward was the small room where the medical clerk on duty kept an adequate number of hypodermic needles ready. If an inmate was brought to Block 61, no one in the camp (not even the "patient" himself) could know for certain whether the diagnosis that he had a contagious disease had been pronounced on medical grounds by the doctor, or on political or personal grounds by the camp commandant who gave orders to the doctors. When the same man was carried out through the back door no one could tell for certain whether he had died of tuberculosis or of a very small dose of scurvy.

How Much Do the Inmates Know?: These arrangements carefully precluded any "leak" of exact details. The doctors in the ward never saw the "patients" who were brought into the injection room. The coroner charged with keeping the records of death was presented with a false certificate whenever considered advisable. Inmates of the camp knew nothing except that by far the greatest number of people who went into Block 61 never came out again. However, just as the camp authorities carefully screened all details which could be used against them in a Court of Law, so they permitted a general knowledge of Block 61 to percolate through the camp. For a widespread knowledge of Block 61 meant that the inmates was at least as valuable to the camp authorities as a battalion of SS guards. The knowledge that in Block 61 there was a need for certain death without trace or record was a constant check upon the impatience and restless desires which naturally come to a man in confinement.

A certain long-range effect of Block 61 and its counterparts throughout Germany is evident, too, among those recently liberated from Buchenwald. This Summary has several times commented on the amazing "tolerance" which the human organism can establish in the face of incredible conditions of life. Among the inmates of Buchenwald there has been established a tolerance toward death of which many of the inmates are themselves unaware. One inmate, a politician with a considerable reputation in his own country and an estate student of the human mind, made the following concise analysis:

"Wir haben mit dem Tod geschlafen, mit dem Tod gesessen. Der Tod war unser ständiger Gefährte." (We slept with Death and ate with Death. Death was our constant companion).

Having lost the keen normal sensitivity to death, many of these inmates have lost as well the acute sense of German responsibility. Inevitably as the sense of brutality loses its force, one loses also the keensness of the sense that a man who commits these deeds is guilty of atrocities.

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How Much Do the Germans Know? Most Germans claim, of course, that they know little or nothing about what went on in such camps as Buchenwald or Ohrdruf or Auschwitz. In the AACHEN area six months ago, when Germans living in a small corner of the Reich, far from the scene, claimed that they knew little or nothing about concentration camps and atrocities, there was some ground of credibility for these claims. Even at that time, however, one anti-Nazi in WÜRENSLEN who many times over proved his sincerity by risking his life on behalf of the occupying forces advised interrogators: "You have one sure test of whether a German is lying. If he says he knows little or nothing about atrocities he is lying; if he hangs his head and tells you that he knows all about them, he is telling the truth". In this respect, a large number of the Germans now being interrogated are indeed lying. It is clear that many of them are, and have been, lying even more fervently to themselves than to Allied interrogators. No normal German living in the rear-areas of WESTERLAR or OTTAR could fail to have a fairly clear picture of the general proceedings at Buchenwald and Ohrdruf. The stories of these camps were told and over again among Germans by the guards or by the German civilians who worked in the camp and returned home each night. Prisoners assigned to labor details working outside the camp spoke with civilians in the towns. Other prisoners were released from the camps to various parts of Germany. All their stories were confirmed in a different connection by soldiers returning on furlough from the Eastern front.

The secret of blissful ignorance lies in the mental block which most Germans seem to have set up, to exclude from their daily consciousness knowledge of this sort. But however deeply buried in the minds of individuals, a certain essential knowledge of what has happened remains. Probing by Allied interrogators almost invariably reveals this to be the case. The big question mark that remains is not simply that the Germans must be told, but with what purpose and to what end they are to be told.

Information Facilities and Personnel in COLOGNE

Reports from a special MI investigating team in COLOGNE provide a picture of the position regarding information records and facilities in a captured German city, though it should be borne in mind that destruction and demolition west of the Rhine was on the whole more thorough than was the case east of the river. A careful search of all the targets listed in advance from reference books, P/W interrogations, etc., yielded an almost complete blank, since in those cases where the building had not been destroyed by Allied action, the records had been removed. This was notably the case with the offices of the Gauleitung; not only were these empty but (except for the personal library of the Gauleiter) so was the bunker in the Stadtwald (Municipal Park) to which the Gauleitung had removed for security against bombing. The records of the Hauptstelle Film had been removed in the same way to the Hagre Bunker, but this again had been emptied before evacuation. In the light of this experience it is clear that those in search of records of any kind should pay close attention to bunkers. One bunker contained a projection room at which there appear to have been regular showings of news-reels and other non-entertainment films for Party members.

An investigation of the staff records of the Koelnische Zeitung showed that in the autumn of 1942, 139 out of approximately 1,100 employees had been Party members. Both proprietors of the paper (Uncle and nephew) held posts in the Party branches in the suburbs of the city where they lived. Before taking themselves off on 3 March they gave the usual orders for the immobilization of the presses (see this Summary # 29): these were disregarded and there is some ground for thinking that they were only issued as a formality to avoid more violent action by the Party.
Of the 79 members of the staff who remained after Allied occupation and have been continued in employment, only one truck driver and one typesetter were found to be Party members. On the basis of answers given to a questionnaire, it is reported that only 15 of the 79 revealed any degree of political consciousness, and they were typical "little-man anti's". The overwhelming impression is of a tired, hard-working group of veterans with the firm (68 had been with it before 1933) who had had a hard time during most of their lives and were happy to have survived the severest trial of all: bombing on the top of Party pressure. They are so cowed by their experience that they can probably be written off as a "security threat". There are, however, no German editors on the staff at present and all former members of the editorial staff now in COLOGNE have been Party members. It is reported that in 1937 the Gauleiter brought pressure on the Editor-in-Chief to have his editorial staff under the age of 40 join the Party; all did so without exception. At about the same time all the paper's foreign correspondents were drafted into the Auslandsorganisation and so into the Party. If this measure was applied to newspapers throughout Germany, it is clearly going to complicate the discovery of young men with journalistic experience and without a Party record.
B. ENEMY AREAS

The Defence of BERLIN

It is too early to speculate on the reasons which led HITLER, in contradiction to earlier appearances, to choose BERLIN rather than BERCHTESGADEN as the scene for his final stand at bay. There can be no reasonable doubt, however, that he is in the city and GOEBBELS with him. The fact that the Freikorps Adolf Hitler has been reported in action for the defense of the capital supports the theory that this body was an improvisation on the part of the leaders of the National Socialist Party proper, designed to give them a resistance movement of their own as distinct from the SS Werewolves. If this is so, it would be natural to expect LEY also to be in BERLIN, but HIMMLER to be elsewhere, a hypothesis with which other evidence is in keeping. The public announcement of GOEBBELS's resignation at this moment so conflicts with Nazi interests as to suggest that he is either dead or trying to pursue an independent policy, which might possibly be linked with the unconfirmed report of an attempt by FUNK to form a government during the week. The part attributed to Von EPP by those who engineered the MUNICH revolt is entirely plausible. A curious feature is the complete absence of reports about BOROMANN, who is after all second-in-command of the Party after HITLER. It looks, however, as though the rivalries which have been known so long to exist among the German leaders are at last beginning, in the face of defeat, to lead to definite action.

German propaganda has explained HITLER's presence in BERLIN by emphasizing the importance of the city in the struggle against the Bolshevists. As Otto KLECK in a Political Review on 23 April put it:

"If the Bolsheviks succeed in taking BERLIN, and if they conquer PRAGUE, there is no Europe left. That is why the Fuhrer has remained in BERLIN and... from BERLIN has thrown in everything that Germany has at its disposal in the shape of military forces so that it may be pitted immediately against Bolshevism."

It is stressed that the Fuhrer is in personal command while prominence is given to the part played by the Party in the city's defense. Output is dominated by the contention that "the struggle is now exclusively one with Bolshevism" and operations against the Western Allies have scarcely received mention. The utterer object of this policy received any confirmation it may have needed from a broadcast to Britain on 25 April, in which William JOCE said that:

"In deciding that Soviet Imperialism must be fought with all the strength at the disposal of the German people, the Fuhrer has given Britain the only chance that will ever be offered to her of overcoming the Soviet menace which threatens not only the existence of Germany but the very being of the British Empire."

Such language might easily be intended as the prelude to an offer of unconditional surrender to the Western Powers alone.

The reactions of BERLIN citizens to this propaganda seems likely to be almost as disappointing to the Nazi leaders as those of the British and American governments. On 22 April the Scandinavian Telegraph Bureau (for long Nazi-dominated and now the possessor of the only Scandinavian press representative in BERLIN) said it was already obvious that a large part of the population would not heed the authorities' appeal to participate

*In the version broadcast to S. German listeners, the reference to PRAGUE was omitted.*
in defense. The same implication was conveyed by a German Home Service broadcast on 25 April which said that the population did not in any way hamper the operations by "muttering in flustered and excited" while another mentioned "a pleasant 'don't care a damn' attitude". A further broadcast showed that, faced with a tense crisis and inability to receive radio bulletins owing to the complete cessation of electricity, rumors were more rife than ever, and loudspeaker vans had been called in to cope with the situation. There is no evidence yet of any lack of food.

The "Werewolf" Movement Lapses into Silence

An article in the Volkischer Beobachter of 17 April, after insisting that the misery of life after capitulation would be such as to make any alternative preferable, went on to assert that the illneses would not be able both to wage war in the field and keep in mind the millions of Germans behind their lines. It was therefore of decisive importance for these millions to be ready at the first possible moment to play the part assigned to them in the struggle of which the first beginnings were represented by the Werewolf movement. The article is interesting in that it linked in a new form the mass insurrection advocated by the GERMENS school with the idea of the cadre of versatile individuals on whom HEINLEIN prefers to rely, admitting in doing so that the Werewolves are only a small minority. The Werewolves own propaganda for the first half of the week continued to speak in corresponding terms, but joined with the rest of German propaganda in focusing attention on the BERLIN struggle. The HITLER order which reported that strong reinforcements were being brought up to the city from the west was first announced by this station. On 22 April, a broadcast said that the Bolsheviks were counting on "the gullibility of the working masses of the German capital" and workers were exhorted to look out for "shady characters" and shoot them down. Next day they were told to eliminate cowardly elements and in particular to "jump on the treacherous dogs of the SENTINEL Committee". And whereas the Werewolf tendency hitherto has been to play down all Nazi leaders, another broadcast on the same day pointed to the example of HITLER, "the bravest and most courageous man who has ever led German soldiers". Instead of fleeing to South Germany and leaving Berliners in the lurch, he had remained to conduct the "final and greatest decisive fight for the Reich". All true Germans must stand behind him.

It is perhaps not fanciful to attribute this shift in emphasis to the personal experience of the script-writers, which would suggest a location for the station in the near vicinity of the capital. This is borne out by the fact that the station suddenly went off the air on 24 April and has not been heard since. The suggestion has been made that it was in fact at MAUEN.

A recently captured document shows the Werewolf Movement to have been in preparation since last October. Early in January SS and Party chiefs were nominating special organizers in each district to select suitable members of the Hitler Jugend for Werewolf training and arrangements were being made to prevent such numbers being gathered up in the normal processes of conscription for the Wehrmacht. Interrogations of prisoners have also given fresh confirmation of the extent to which the organization is directed by the SS and composed of the HJ. The statement that "the Hitler Youth stand in the front rank in this struggle" was contained in three Werewolf leaflets handed out by a 16-year-old boy in the Ruhr. The propaganda in these leaflets was stereotyped in form, but concrete suggestions for sabotage of railroads and MT were given, while one paragraph read:

"Most IMPORTANT - don't get caught. Pretend to be dumb, be slick, always find new ways and means and success is assured!"

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Interrogation of several civilians in Allied-occupied territory showed that by now all had heard of the movement through the German radio but confirmed that they resented it for the reprisals which they expected it to bring - and bring on the innocent rather than the guilty. They also asserted (naturally enough) that they would give it no support and that they did not expect many other people to do so either. It would be surprising if the Werewolf leaders expected any other attitude at this juncture.

Twilight of the Ether

The German military collapse has been matched by a similar eclipse of the system which not so long ago flooded Europe and most of the world with vociferous and insidious propaganda. Of the several hundreds of broadcasting transmitters under German control a year ago, perhaps two dozen were left at the beginning of the week and the number is even smaller now. The first step toward dissolution came (as recorded in the last number of this Summary) with the break of the German Home Service into two separate halves, north and south, transmitting for the most part separate programs. By 21 April it had become impossible to maintain any common programs, and next day the two groups became three, a Northern (centering round BERLIN-HAMBURG), a South-Western (centering round MUNICH) and a South-Eastern (PRAGUE, and the stations in Czecho-Slovakia and Austria). The three groups were reduced to two again next day, by which time another serious difficulty was making itself felt. On 21 April all Overseas broadcasts, including those of the Transocean newsagency, ceased (though not on the whole those for Europe). The DNS news service for Europe was cut, and it became evident, especially in the arrangements made for announcing the High Command communiqué, that the whole organization for the central distribution of news was breaking down and that stations were only maintaining their services by improvised monitoring of one another. On 24 April the DNS News Service for the Home press announced that its Hollischoerber transmissions were about to cease but that in substitution news would be given over Deutschlandsender at dictation speed for an hour in the early morning. By the time the first transmission was due, Deutschlandsender had gone off the air and has not been heard since, but on 26 and 27 April the authorities did manage to provide the service from HAMBURG. Despite the British capture of BERLIN, the station on the city's wavelength was still broadcasting at midnight 27/28. Dr GOEBBELS' usual Das Reich article has failed to appear while General DITTMAR is, of course, in Allied hands. A number of detailed announcements which would normally be carried by the press alone have been publicized over the radio suggesting that, as one would expect, newspapers are coming to circulate; the supplies reaching neutral countries seem virtually to have ceased.

So far as is known, none of the German transmitters captured by the Russians in recent weeks have yet recommenced broadcasting.
BROADCASTS OF OUR RUSSIAN ALLIES

Military comment was devoted mainly to the imminent fall of BERLIN and the anticipated junction with the Western Allies. Feature broadcasts illustrated the Red Army’s eagerness to meet the Americans at last in the heart of Germany:

"Hitherto we have known each other as comrades only from afar. Soon we hope to clink glasses and drink to our common victory."

In preparation for this joyous occasion, the Red Army soldiers were said to be busily preparing gifts of tobacco pouches, flasks of wine, and Vodka.

The Allied warning on German treatment of prisoners was published in all Soviet newspapers on 23 April and broadcast in German on the Soviet European Service on 24 April. In this connection, Radio Moscow stated on 24 April that the discovery of Buchenwald and other concentration camps in the West would lead to better understanding of the Russians:

"What is Buchenwald? It is HOLOCAUST on a miniature scale. Our Allies have not before seen what we saw. Now they too have seen for themselves a small share of what we know and will understand us better."

Information received in PARIS reveals no preparation, on the part of Radio Moscow, for the formation of the new government in Austria.

Soviet Rule in Occupied Germany

Until recently a daily bulletin posted in the streets by order of the commandant was the only news available to the German population in Soviet-occupied territory. It is now reported that a Soviet news sheet in German has made its appearance. The paper, under the title of "Nachrichtenblatt", is printed on a single colored sheet and contains an average of 500 words. The format is slightly smaller than that of our news sheets. The headlines of No. 4, dated 21 March 1945, are:

1) German Bridgehead thrown back at STETTIN.
2) Russian Air Attack on DANZIG.
3) 6,000 Po/W taken at KOLBERG.
4) Large-Scale U.S. Offensive.
5) BERLIN raided by 2,000 U.S. Aircraft.

A "Free Germany" report (24 April) on conditions in occupied Germany is of interest not only because of its detailed description of the reconstruction taking place under Red Army guidance, but also for its general tone, which represents the Red Army – citing its contribution and achievements in creating new life in the devastated areas – as a champion of law and order. In the past "Free Germany's" conciliatory line of propaganda was not always identical with the official Soviet attitude. More recently, a gradual alignment of views has become apparent.

Formerly, while "Free Germany" was addressing "good Germans" and denouncing the "bad ones", the Soviet Home Service and Soviet European Service still spoke of "one colossal gang". Gradually, however, the initial cry of "eye for eye" gave way to a line of "work and obey", and "justice not revenge". Finally, with ALEXANDROV’s rebuke to BERCHEM (see Summary # 30), the conception of "good and bad Germans" received an official stamp. Marshal TOLEDBERLIN even went so far as to declare that rank and file Nazis will be spared.

If one regards the voice of "Free Germany" as a herald of coming official views, it is significant to hear "Free Germany" hinting at the
readiness of the Russians to meet the Germans halfway, stressing that the Germans can raise their standard of living by conscientiously following the instructions of the occupation authorities. "Free Germany" points out that the Russians have set up homes in GLEIMPITZ, opened factories in BENZHEN and HINDEBURY, given ample food to homeless children in these and other towns, reopened churches and gradually resumed private trading. It then goes on to explain that these things were possible only as a result of cooperation between the German inhabitants and the occupational authorities.

Two reasons seem to underlie good-will broadcasts to the Germans. First, the belief of Soviet authorities that the reconstruction of Germany cannot take place without full participation of the local population. Second, they are designed to counteract rumors circulating throughout Germany about the brutal behavior of the Russians in occupied areas in the east. In western Germany, wild tales of Russian brutalities against the German population are heard in every town among the German population, and have spread among the foreign workers, reaching even to PARIS. Like the atrocity stories against the Americans which swept over western Germany, they have almost no basis in fact, but are the result of a "sandpropaganda" campaign derived mainly from GORBELOFS' distorted newspaper accounts and spread by aggressively anti-allied, and particularly anti-Soviet, Germans.

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