UNITED STATES GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL
INFORMATION CONTROL SERVICE
APO 742, U.S. ARMY

INFORMATION CONTROL INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (ICIS) # 4

Week ending 3 August 1945

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Ed.: Please wth 4-4-45.
CONTENTS

I. NON-FRATERNIZATION AND THE GERMAN

Interrogation of 24 Germans shortly after the modification of the non-fraternalization law showed that a large number believed that the non-fraternalization law was originally imposed to show the Germans we consider them all guilty; that the present modification in effect removes all restrictions on "normal relations"; that the modification was ordered as an initial step toward understanding between the two nations, or as a measure necessary to implement Allied re-education plans, or as a mere formality recognizing the actual breakdown of an "unnatural" order which violated the desires of the American soldiers themselves.

II. THE RECORD OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM: A SAMPLE OF PRE-NAZI TRADE UNIONISTS

The first part of a study of the present attitudes of German workers. Interrogation of 68 workers engaged in a variety of trades in 4 industrial cities showed that those over 50 years old were almost completely unionized before 1933; that they still approved the record of their unions and leadership. A minority, who believe that the Nazis could have been stopped, blame the pre-1933 union leadership for its factionalism. Most exonerate the leadership on the grounds that Nazism, using unemployment as a weapon and supported by the capitalists, could not have been stopped: they were too strong and well organized; too skilled in propaganda; too prone to use force. In general, these workers tended less to put all responsibility on HITLER and his gang; acknowledged more freely the guilt of the whole German people. The majority felt that Nazism had made no genuine economic contribution to the working class. A group of 10 younger workers, included for purposes of contrast, were rather at a loss - they provided most of the "Don't know's" in response to those questions.

III. HEIDELBERG: POLITICAL THINKING IN A UNIVERSITY TOWN

In this famous university town, undamaged and overpopulated, there is considerable discontent among the mixed and "cosmopolitan" population. Inadequate food supply, unemployment and uncertainty, closed schools, are the chief grievances. Complaints are often heard, too, concerning our de-Nazification policy - which they consider vitiated by our undue respect for clericals and "respectable" elements. By contrast, it is pointed out that Soviet propaganda indicates that all these sources of discontent are being removed in their zone. The Communist Party, by reason of its uncompromising struggle against Nazism, has attained a high prestige. All this is cited as evidence of a leftist trend among the population. In part, this may be a kind of political blackmail. There is no doubt, however, that there is much discontent and, apparently, only the left-of-center groups are capable of giving it direction.
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IV. STUDENT UNION IN HAMBURG

In this lively port city 20 students have formed a "Central Committee of Student Unions." Their statement of principles is believed to be circulating in university towns of Northern and Western Germany. It stands for free speech, thought, and learning and bars no race, nationality, faith, social class, or political view (except National Socialist). Organizationally, it has three main working committees—concerned with educational reform, international relations, and countering the effects of Nazi propaganda.

V. DOCUMENTARY NOTE: "THE WEHRMACHT DID NOT Know!"

When the Allies began to reveal the atrocities discovered in German concentration camps, many Germans in high places rushed forward with protests of their own innocence. An interesting case of systematic alibis occurs in the recently discovered letters of C.G.'s of Army Groups West and South-west to DOENITZ and JODL, designed to establish innocence for themselves and their commands. Careful analysis shows how dubious are these alibis, and how involved in contradictions.

VI. THE MEDIA OF INFORMATION

The first licensed newspaper in the present American zone (although the second licensed by I.C.B.), the Frankfurter Rundschau, appeared on 1 August. Published by a group of diverse political views, the paper represents an innovation which may be of great consequence for a free German press. In MUNICH the theater folk made an agreement to talk less and do more, with apparently beneficial results. Librarians and book-dealers in Bavaria are full of practical plans, which they are implementing with considerable energy.

VII. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF OUR SOVIET ALLIES

Soviet-controlled press and radio are giving much publicity to the film accord among the Allies as revealed in their joint administration of BERLIN. The joint campaign to stamp out black market is going ahead, and new restrictions on movement in and out of the city have been announced. Continued warnings that famine may be the price of German failure to cooperate in the harvest are supplemented by orders designed to prevent this. The anniversary of the 20 July Putsch served as text for sermons concerning opportunities the Germans missed to end the war.
RELAXATION OF THE NON-FRATERNIZATION BAN

The relaxation of the non-fraternization ban, to the extent of allowing conversation between American soldiers and adult Germans in public places during daylight hours, served as occasion for investigating the attitudes current among German civilians on this subject. Using a series of questions designed to learn why Germans believe the ban was imposed and why it was relaxed, I.C.D. investigators interviewed a total of 84 Germans. The group, although not selected by scientific sampling methods, included both sexes, occupation- and age-groups ranging from a 19 year old female music student to a 52 year old charwoman with two daughters, from a 20 year old Silesian farmer to a 60 year old actor who has not played since 1933 (a so-called "Fischling,"—offspring of a marriage between Christian and Jew). Geographically the group was distributed as follows: 47 in Frankfurt, 21 in Stuttgart, 13 in Hamburg. The findings show up most clearly when grouped under the questions used by interrogators.

1. Why was the ban ordered? Of 25 people in Frankfurt answering this question directly, 12 said that the purpose of the ban was to show the German people that they were all guilty. This took various forms. A 40 year old leather worker held that it was designed to show Germans that they have been punished for crimes and atrocities. A 23 year old girl maintained that it was designed to show, rather, that the U.S. soldiers despised the German population. The widespread connection between the original imposition of the ban and the thesis of German guilt, in response to this question, is somewhat surprising—particularly since no such reason was given by Allied officials and, more particularly, since the Germans themselves scarcely make any reference to the question of guilt when explaining why the ban was lifted.

Of the Frankfurt group, 16 people believed that the original purpose of the ban was to safeguard the security of U.S. troops. Since military security is a standard "way out" for Germans who do not know how to answer embarrassing questions, the number of interrogees choosing this reply is probably over-weighted in relation to genuine opinion on this subject. Somewhat more weight should probably be given to the fact that 5 of the interrogees believed that the ban was originally imposed to prevent the influence of German propaganda upon American soldiers. Within this explanation lurks the sense of German intellectual superiority which comes out frequently in unguarded moments during interrogation. Two of the interrogees said simply that they did not know why the ban was originally imposed.

These responses, in themselves, show a certain measure of progress in educating the Germans to awareness, if not yet acceptance, of the conception the German people share in the moral guilt. Five months ago, detailed interrogation of some 150 Germans in various Rhineland towns revealed scarcely any awareness of such an Allied view. A minority perhaps sensed it, and offered such explanations for non-fraternization as "Germans are not worthy to be talked to by Americans." But the greatest number were either ignorant that an
official order existed, or could offer no explanation for it other than the routine reasons of military security. In the present group approximately half of the interrogees offer "collective guilt" as the reason why the ban was imposed and, even more striking, the largest number say that its interference with re-education (by which they mean getting to know the Americans and their ways) was the reason why it was relaxed.

2. What did the relaxation mean? With only a few scattered exceptions, all the interrogees knew that the total non-fraternization ban had been modified. In FRANKFURT the German term used to describe the announcement was "Kühlung," which translates as "softening." Among those interrogated, however, there were very confused conceptions as to what, under the new order, was allowed and what was not.

To a large extent, these misconceptions were due to the manner in which most Germans received the information. Only a few had heard the official announcement transmitted by Allied radio stations. A few, particularly the younger and more attractive girls, had learned of it directly from American soldiers who stopped to chat on the streets. The largest number knew about the order only from hearsay, however, and among these the impression seemed general that the ban had been "lifted" instead of "relaxed." The description of the new order most frequently heard was that "normal relations" between Americans and Germans were now permitted. When pressed further, "normal relations" were seen to be clearly understood as relations without restriction. Several of the younger females interpreted this to mean specifically that it was now all right for both sides to "fall in love." The 52 year old charwoman thought it meant that Americans could now visit her home and a 28 year old secretary of convinced Nazi views said (with some sarcasm) that it seemed to mean only that American soldiers could now "take a look at the Germans." She elaborated by saying that to some of her female colleagues (whom she despises) it means only that they can now make love to American soldiers in order to get chocolate and cookies from them.

3. Why was the ban relaxed? This was the key question, for the way in which it was posed gave interrogees an opportunity to express their frankest feelings by labelling them as the reasoning of the Allied authorities. Although the sampling was not truly random, it is interesting to note the distribution of opinions on why the relaxation order was issued among this group. Among these interrogees, some of whom offered two or more reasons, it was felt that the relaxation order was issued because of inadequacies in the original non-fraternization decree:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>No. of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because it prevented the re-education of Germans</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because it prevented understanding between Germans and Americans</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the Germans are good people and soldiers should get to know them</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See Weekly Intelligence Summary for Psychological Warfare # 23, dated 3 March 1945
3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>No. of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Because it was contrary to the desires of American soldiers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because it was violated anyway and could not be enforced</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because it was &quot;unnatural&quot;</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the Russians were fraternizing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because Americans want to prepare for a joint war with the Germans</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>against the Russians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because there are so many Germans in the U.S.A.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because there are so many Germans in the U.S. Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because military security was no longer threatened</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because the de-nazification program had succeeded</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didn't know</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several striking conclusions emerge from the study of these figures. First of all, it is clear that the official announcement that the de-nazification program had been carried out to an extent which permitted modification of the ban, made little impression. In part, this can be explained by the fact that the interrogations were carried out during the days immediately following upon the new order and before many people had become familiar with the official version broadcast over Allied radios. In part, too, it is clear from earlier studies that many Germans tend to notice, not how far de-nazification has gone, but only how far it has not yet gone (see ICIS #1). To some extent, however, it can be explained by the fact that average Germans would rather be wishful than analytical. Since no official Allied announcement had linked any statements that Germany would eventually be received into the family of nations with the relaxation of the ban, the fact that 15 interrogees "explained" this Allied policy as an initial step toward better understanding between the nations can only mean that they would rather have it so. This too is, in part at least, the explanation for the large number of responses which claimed that the ban was "unnatural"; that it was contrary to the desires of the American soldiers (the sexual aspect also figured strongly in this explanation); that the Germans are good people and the soldiers should get to know them. In most of these responses there was some undercurrent of belief that the Americans were only "playing mad" at the Germans, with the connotation in some cases that the German people are too important in the scheme of things to be fraternized or non-fraternized with according to a whim of military authorities.

The feeling that the non-fraternization ban had to be relaxed as a measure of bringing the two nations together appeared in another, less aggressive, form in the view that it interfered with the Allied re-education program for the Germans. This response was far more marked in FRANKFURT than in the other cities, perhaps a sign that the
residents of this city are more conscious of Allied policies than
residents in other cities. The unexpectedly large number of Germans
who reasoned that the new order was a mere formality - legalizing a
state of affairs which existed anyway, and which the Allied military
authorities were powerless to correct, represents partly the "subtle"
scorn which Germans occasionally inject into interrogations when they
think it will pass unchallenged. In part, however, it represents
the sober judgment of Germans who consider themselves observers -
as in the case of the 40 year-old soldier who explained "I have been
a soldier myself, and know from experience that orders which are
practically unenforceable only undermine discipline and hamper the
Command."

4. Incidental Conversations: Questions designed to find why the
Germans thought the ban was modified produced, as a by-product, the
most startling quantity of anti-American sentiment yet collected.
Of the 23 Germans interrogated in STUTTGART only 8 showed themselves
favorable to the new order, and 7 of these were women (of a total of
13 women); only one of the 10 male interrogees indicated approval.
The other 15, in passing, expressed sentiments definitely unfavorable
to the idea of fraternization.

In FRANKFURT, indications of approval and disapproval were
less clear-cut. Judging from the tone and casual remarks of 22
interrogates here, only 6 seemed favorable while 5 quite definitely
disapproved. A greater proportion of the interrogees tried to
appear indifferent.

The figures in this case, however, do not even tell part
of the story. Disapprovals were on the whole clear and quite
unmistakable - as, for example, the former Party member who was
overheard saying "jetzt müssen eigentlich wir eine Non-Fraternization
machen" (Now it is really up to us to institute non-fraternization.)
Two former Wehrmacht officers condemned German women who fraternize
because Americans are a race mixture, while Germans are pure-blooded.

Approval of the "Minderung", on the other hand, in no way
signified approval of the Americans. The reasons for approval were
mainly concerned with getting food or cigarettes or candy from the
soldiers. One 27 year-old servant girl (she and her husband both
Party members) said that she once got a can of meat and spaghetti from
an American and was very happy about it, and added quite frankly that
she is looking forward to being fed and is not so much interested in
having an American shake hands with her.

II. THE RECORD OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM:
A SAMPLE OF PRE-NAZI TRADE UNIONISTS

Earlier expositions of trade union opinion have dealt mainly
with the plans and expectations of pre-Nazi union leaders, who
already have shown great interest in reconstituting the German labor
movement. To gain some measure of the current attitudes of workers,
I.C.D. investigators have interrogated 86 workers now employed in four
industrial centers of the American zone - to determine, particularly,
the extent to which they hold their pre-Nazi leadership responsible
for the rise of National Socialism, and the extent to which a decade
under National Socialism has changed their own views of trade unionism.
This week's report is the first part of the study.

The picture encountered showed predominant approval of the
record of pre-1933 trade unions, although a significant minority took
their leadership to task for their factionalism. This minority was
among those who believed that the rise of National Socialism could have been prevented. But more widespread was the feeling that National Socialism, resulting immediately from unemployment and the support of the capitalist class, could not have been stopped: the Nazis were too strong, too well organized, too prone to use violence, and their propaganda was too skillful. The larger part of the group maintained that the economic contributions of the Nazis were merely preparations for war and misery rather than any real material advance for the working class; however, the small minority who had benefited personally held the contrary opinion. HITLER and the Nazis received the major portion of blame for war guilt. In some contrast to the population as a whole, on the other hand, many of the workers blamed the whole German nation and people for not having opposed the rise of Nazism.

1. The Sample: The 88 workers were interrogated in KASSEL (mainly employees of locomotive works, public utilities, and building trades); in FRANKFURT (public utilities, precision instruments and railroad workers); in HÖCHST (I.G. Farben machinists, maintenance workers and in OFFENBACH (leather-goods workers). As was to be expected, the group was heavily weighted with older men. In fact, almost three-quarters were over 40 years of age. Ten younger ones, a number of whom were women, from the OFFENBACH and FRANKFURT area were included for the purpose of contrasting their attitudes with the older group. The following table shows how completely these workers were unionized before 1933, with the exception of those under 30 who had no opportunity for union activities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Membership</th>
<th>Non-Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 - 60</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 and over</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examination of the employment records of the group revealed that many had been working in the same factory for long periods of time, up to 20 or 30 years in some cases. There is no reason to believe that this group is not roughly representative of semi-skilled and skilled workers employed in factories now operating. This will not hold true, however, if large numbers of younger returned Pe/N are employed in industrial establishments.

2. How National Socialism came into power: Among the workers over 30, the main reason for the Nazi rise to power was unemployment in the early thirties in Germany, and not the political failure of trade unions and left-wing parties. Their left-of-center political traditions were equally pronounced in the next most frequent reason given: the support accorded to the Nazi Party by the Capitalists. Among these same explanation for unemployment was offered: namely, that the Capitalists caused artificial unemployment which prepared the ground for National Socialism. A few of the group placed the blame on the "foreign powers" who favored HITLER and who failed to support democratic parties in Germany; the world economic crisis; or the role of the German farmer.
Self-criticism of working class politics, although limited in scope, represents a greater willingness to admit mistakes than has yet been encountered in any other German social group. A minority claimed that there were too many Parties who were split among themselves, especially the Leftist Parties who fought each other instead of HITLER. Some few pointed specifically to the weakness of Socialist leaders. Others pointed out that the German people did not appreciate freedom or lacked a long-standing tradition of democracy.

One of the most frequently mentioned reasons for the rise of National Socialism was the Nazi propaganda and lies. Many who offered this answer also pointed to the fact that Nazism used force as the basis of its success. The answers of those under 25 were largely "Don't know" or vaguely, that the people were so desperate that they were willing to believe the Nazi promises.

**Why National Socialism Came Into Power**

- Unemployment; people disillusioned, desperate; misery 40
- Capitalists put NS into power; caused artificial unemployment 23
- Propaganda NS promises 22
- Too many Parties, split among Leftists; weakness of Socialist leaders 13
- Nazi use of force 9
- German people didn't appreciate freedom; politically stupid, militarily inclined 8
- Foreign power favored HITLER; did not support democratic parties 5
- Others (fear of Communism; failure to keep promises; world economic crisis; support from Famos) 8

Further insight into the German workers' conception of the rise of National Socialism were the answers given to the question "Do you believe that the German workers could have prevented the rise of National Socialism?" The answers given were as follows:

"Could the German workers have prevented the rise of National Socialism?"

- Yes
- No
- Too young
- No answer

The majority acceptance of the inevitability of the rise of National Socialism is based, where reasons were given, on the willingness and ability of the Nazis to use force and arms. The Nazis were thorough and well organized, while the workers were confused, inexperienced, and not strong enough. A few pointed out that it could not be done without outside help and blamed England and France in this respect. On the other hand, those who thought that the German workers could have prevented the rise of National...
Socialism were the ones who pointed to the lack of unity in the trade union movement, the mistakes of labor leaders who fought one another instead of HITLER.

3. **Attitude toward pre-1933 Trade Unions**: Although trade union attachments were still powerful among those over 30, they did not prevent a substantial minority from expressing a realistic criticism of union factionalism. Well over half who had trade union experience before 1933 felt that their unions had fought well for their interests, and that their leadership was good and trustworthy. A third, however, directed the bulk of their criticism against the union factionalism which was responsible for the failure to unify before 1933, while National Socialism grew in power. This criticism was offered by those who believed that the German workers would have prevented the rise of HITLER. From this study it seems clear that the professed intention of former union leaders to rebuild German unions on a completely unified basis is certain to meet with wide approval among the workers. In fact, rank-and-file dissatisfaction with factionalism is likely to bring pressure on prospective union leaders to translate their intentions into action in this respect.

The other two reasons for criticism of pre-Nazi trade unions encountered with some frequency concerned their bureaucratic tendencies and their strong political affiliations.

### Pre-1933 Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Favorable to pre-1933 Unions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fought for interests and rights of workers; leadership good, trustworthy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General favorable statements</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical of pre-1933 Unions</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unions failed in critical moment; opposed unification, fought each other, allowed HITLER to come into power</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders had become bureaucratic; lacked courage; merely interested in collecting dues</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blamed unions because they were politically affiliated</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General opposition to unions</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Too young</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET
4. Economic accomplishments of National Socialism: Only a small minority of the group admits any positive economic accomplishments for the Nazi period as a whole. To a degree answers were colored on this question by the fact that the interrogations were carried out by American interrogators. Even more important today, the older German worker cannot view either the economic accomplishments of National Socialism or his personal position under it without being influenced to a large extent by the conditions under which he lived during the closing war years. In any case, negative answers, which for the older group numbered more than 80%, were often well reasoned and convincingly argued. The degree to which these workers now assert that the temporary solution of unemployment was based on a preparation for war and therefore in no respect a real benefit is impressive.

Positive Nazi Accomplishments

Created work, more food, protection of workers, increased salaries, real material advance

Mixed Nazi Accomplishments

Higher wages probably due to war industries

Road building was excellent; rest a swindle

Negative Nazi Accomplishments

No accomplishments

No accomplishments except misery, war "Alles kaputt gemacht"

Solved unemployment by preparing for war and misery; temporary benefits which were no real benefits

Others (destroyed accomplishments of trade unions; no benefit for masses but only for rulers; cost of living rose as wages rose)

Don’t know

Opinions among those under 25 differed sharply in that the group tended to believe that National Socialism had made genuine accomplishments.

The underlying basis for these reserved attitudes toward the accomplishment of National Socialism can be found in the individual worker's estimate of his own economic lot under Hitler. The same small minority who spoke of economic accomplishments of National Socialism admitted that they fared better under Hitler than they did before 1933. Overwhelmingly the group pointed to the ever-rising cost of living under National Socialism, the false promises of consumer goods, the introduction of creatz items, and the higher taxes, endless dues and contributions as evidence of how their economic position deteriorated. Only a few resorted to non-economic arguments – for example, that higher wages were counteracted by their lack of freedom.
5. **Present Economic Lot:** When questioned concerning their present economic lot as compared to their former condition under the Nazis, a majority took the opportunity to present their grievances. Sixty out of the 88 stated that their present economic condition was worse than that under the Nazis. The grievance most frequently mentioned was the shortage of food. One or two went so far as to say that their present rations did not allow for continued productivity at present levels. A number complained about the irregularity of their pay and the lower rates which they were receiving.

A minority (about 10) felt that their conditions had remained unchanged. An equal number, and most of these seemed genuine, said that the advantages of freedom and liberty outweighed whatever difficulties were present at the moment; many of these difficulties, they added, had already started during the closing phases of the war. Only two said that their condition in general was better now than it had been under the Nazis.

6. **Advantages of the German Labor Front:** The advantages of the DAF (German Labor Front), in the opinion of the older workers, was limited to approval by a substantial minority of the summer trips sponsored by the Kdf (Strength through Joy). Better pay, old age pensions, and sick benefits were mentioned by only a very few. In general, the great majority flatly refused to admit any good aspects of the DAF. A number who held this opinion even refused to find anything advantageous in the Kdf. They claimed that the trips were reserved largely for Nazi Party members or that the organized vacations were personally disagreeable to them.

**Advantages of the DAF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advantage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kdf trips</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better pay, old age pension</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sick benefits</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacation guidance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Disadvantages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disadvantage</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No advantages</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took money offered nothing in return</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kdf trips for Nazis only; organized vacations disagreeable</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded to create jobs for Nazis</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **War Guilt:** Claims that the German people were merely innocent dupes of a criminal gang seemed to be less current among the older trade unionists than among the population as a whole. It was most noticeable on the subject of war guilt. As is true for the population as a whole, the Nazi Party is most frequently charged with guilt for causing the war. (Total number of answers given in the table below)

(Continued)
exceed the number interviewed in that some workers attributed guilt to
more than one source.) But strikingly, the next most frequently
mentioned is the German nation and people. Some who admit German
guilt claimed that the German people do not bear the guilt completely,
but that they certainly bear it to the degree that they did not fight
National Socialism and prevent the seizure of power by HITLER. Those
who admit German guilt usually added that German capitalism,
international capitalism, or "foreign powers" (by inference, the
U.S. and Great Britain), because of their refusal to oppose National
Socialism from the beginning, are basically involved.] The thoroughness
with which the group as a whole rejected the Nazi explanations of the
war is further seen by the fact that only one worker over 30 claimed
that Poland started the war and none mentioned the Jews. Because of
the scattered answers given by the group under 25, and the smallness
of their numbers, no clear statement can be made about their opinions
on this subject.

Opinions on War Guilt (among workers over 30)

Nazi Party 33
Germany as a nation; the German people 15
German people in part; because they did
not fight NS; because they tolerated
HITLER 7

HITLER 17

German Capitalists; International
Capitalism; industry (who used
the Nazis as a tool) 12

Foreign powers who did not oppose
NS; who did not support democratic
government 8

All nations; fate 2

Poland 1

No opinion 3

III. HEIDELBERG: POLITICAL THINKING IN A UNIVERSITY TOWN

A recent study of the climate of opinion in the home town of
the Student Prince reveals some reasons for an apparent leftward trend
of current German political thought. M.C. officers on the spot,
University professors, journalists, trade unionists, middle class and
working people are almost unanimous in their assertion that there is a
definite trend to the left in HEIDELBERG. Some, as may be expected,
assert that "the town is going Communist." Accurate measurement of
this leftward swing is not possible because of the stricture upon
political activity. While the fact of a swing to-the-left seems
undeniable, "How far left?" remains a question for the future. There
is as yet no occasion for adherence to specific platforms nor, indeed,
to concrete political action.

There is much about HEIDELBERG that is unique, and it is
problematical to just what degree the results of this study may be
representative of the state of mind in other large communities. Not
only is the picturesque town on the Neckar, the seat of Germany's most famous — if not most distinguished — University, but by virtue of the fact that it escaped bombing, it is one of the few cities which today has a larger population than in peacetime (125,000 as against 84,000). A large number of the migrants who have swarmed to HEIDELBERG in recent years are elderly middle class elements who no longer work for their living and who came chiefly from the large urban centers. This migration, added to the already complex matrix typical of the University town (i.e. students, scholars, settlers from foreign countries, a greater than average proportion of white collar to industrial workers, etc.), gives to the town an urban, intellectual and cosmopolitan character out of all proportion to its size.

The cultural character of HEIDELBERG has been moulded on the one hand by the extra-mural activities of the University (public lectures, concerts, debates, etc.) and the "collegiate" atmosphere; on the other hand by the rich democratic tradition of BADEN and a quite vital religious life. As distinguished from most towns in BADEN, HEIDELBERG has more Protestants than Catholics, the ratio being about 65% to 35%. Churches, it is said, were crowded even during the Nazi period, perhaps because of the traditionally high quality of the clerics.

To sum up: the contemporary HEIDELBERG man, generally speaking, is middle class, articulate, culture conscious, relatively international in his interests, religious, and slightly "spoiled" (since he has suffered no bombing). He and his fellows cannot easily be organized into mass groups possessing common consciousness, common needs, common aspirations.

1. Reasons for Lefting: What then are the forces which have apparently caused a leftist reaction of this amorphous society? Interrogation of persons of all classes and many occupations indicate the following to be the most important:

(a) Food Situation: Considerable bitterness is expressed by nearly all of the populace over the present scarcity of food, and there is fear that the coming winter will bring with it mass starvation. Middle class individuals expressed annoyance over the alleged fact that, contrary to our promise, food is being confiscated and eaten by our troops. Rumor has it that milk is being taken "to make ice-cream for the soldiers and whipped cream for the senior officers! Mess in the Europaischer Hof." The food situation forms by far the most frequently discussed topic of conversation among all classes. One of the most articulate of the city officials, Police Commissioner HERBST, tells us that the key to the political question is the stomach. "At this stage of the occupation, Food is Politics. The Americans, particularly Herbert HOOVER, knew this in 1918-19, but they seem to have forgotten."

(b) Russian Propaganda: Some people think large sections of the HEIDELBERG population are affected by the glowing reports of life under Russian occupation, as told by Radio Berlin. There are no data yet to check this report on a proper sampling basis; but it is clear that other pastures look greener when economic conditions are not favorable.

(c) Unemployment and Uncertainty over the future: In HEIDELBERG as in most other cities there is much unemployment, or — what is nearly as bad — tentative employment in unenlightened work. It should be borne in mind that many former members of the middle class — proletarianized as a result of property destruction, the disappearance
of the middle-man and the shop-keeper in the war-time and post war-time Germany, loss of jobs, etc. have now swollen the ranks of the working class, and are affected by anxiety over employment.

(c) **Disatisfaction with De-Nazification**: Representatives of all classes and occupations criticize the superficiality of our de-Nazification program. They maintain that too many prominent Nazis have been left untouched; that much of the hard and unpleasant work on the community labor projects has been detailed to "innocent" citizens while the Nazis go unpunished; that homes have been requisitioned for the billeting of American soldiers without regard to the political complexion of their owners; that in selecting officials, we have too much confidence in clericals and "respectable" elements, and not enough confidence in working class representatives.

In **Heidelberg**

(e) **Schools**: Particularly interesting are the comments on the effects of our delay in opening schools. Many children, it is said, are taking private lessons with former teachers many of whom were Nazis or Nationalists. The poor complain that the closing of the schools is an act of discrimination favoring those who have the means to pay for private schooling. Fear is expressed that the failure to open these schools is not only putting education into the hands of our enemies, but is also giving too great an influence over the minds of the youth to the clergy, since many children are now receiving an education in clerical institutions.

(f) **Communist Party**: Leftist interrogees suggest as further influences toward a leftward orientation of thought: the high prestige of the Communist Party, resulting from its uncompromising struggle against Fascism, and a belief that only the Left has the political schooling and experience necessary for building a free Democratic Germany.

2. **Potential Political Leadership**: Obviously HEIDELBERG is a city of discontent. While the reasons summarized above clearly indicate the basis of discontent, they do not constitute evidence of a leftward trend. In point of fact, no political group has yet attempted to organize and relieve this discontent. But signs of developing organization are beginning to appear, even if in a form allegedly non-political. The following background must first be considered before dealing with these organizations:

(a) **Nazis**: In 1932 the Nazis polled 21,000 votes in HEIDELBERG. At a recent registration only 5,000 persons confessed to Nazi Party membership - as contrasted with the figure of 12,000 which was suggested as more nearly correct by individuals who were questioned. Whatever the number, the Nazis appear still too frightened to engage in open agitation. Overt action, in terms of spreading rumors, conversational rubbing in of the hardships of occupation, and so forth, is evident.

(b) **Nationalists**: Having polled a meager 2,000 votes in 1932, the largely rantier-class of Nationalists may be considered politically bankrupt and without a substantial following.

(c) **Church**: Both the Protestant and Catholic Churches enjoy high prestige among all classes. This is due more to the integrity, intelligence and courage of individual clergies - a Dr HAS, Protestant and outspoken anti-Nazi; Dr HÄUSER, Catholic priest - than to the Church as an institution. Even extreme left-wingers express respect for the Church because, as a Communist said: "There were 3,000 priests and ministers at DACHAU the time I was there." Unquestionably the Church can play an important part in the reconstruction of German life.
the degree to which it will directly affect the political scene depends upon how much the Church will concern itself with social and economic in addition to purely spiritual problems. The Catholic Centrist Party, it is recalled, polled 9,000 votes.

(d) Left Groups: In 1932 the Social Democrats polled 10,000 votes, the Communists 6,500. Today these Parties would probably do better -- with the Communists possibly taking the lead. The Social Democracy retains a potent influence among the University men, and on the working class and lower middle class. Pro-HITLER leaders of the "Meist" groups, denied the opportunity to take up political action, are devoting their efforts to establishing a trade union program supported on a broad front by all anti-Fascists, which they hope will be acceptable to M.G. and to all men and women of "good will" and democratic convictions.

3. Civic and Discussion Groups: Theodor HEUSS --journalist, author, lecturer, member of the pre-HITLER Reichstag, former leading member of the German Democratic Party -- provides the following information on these groups.

The Heidelberg Citizens Group consists of prominent citizens including several University professors, and was started on the initiative of Herr VEITNER, an old Democratic publisher. Non-political in nature, the group offers members an opportunity to participate in public affairs and speed the solution of some of the more pressing local problems by working closely with representatives of the local government. Its aim is the care of people released from concentration camps and their families, and the mobilization and allocation of available labor to essential tasks, such as farming, housing and education.

The Political Discussion Group has as its aim the establishment of The New Christian Party. (An interesting point was raised in connection with including the term Social in the name, to indicate the social emphasis of its policy: HEUSS opposed this, arguing that the word has lost its meaning as a result of National Socialism.)

This new Party is to be based on a general Christian ethical, rather than on a confessionaistic basis -- which should not be too difficult in BADEN and WÜRTTEMBERG where no strong confessional conflicts exist. While the policies are still in a nebulous state, its expressed aims are the contemplation of the broader political problems of the future, especially as these problems relate to the coming German generation, the future administrative structure of the Reich, and future political alignments on a Party basis. A united trade union idea may well be incorporated in the Party's platform as part of the attempt to win working class support.

IV. STUDENT UNION IN HAMBURG

An interesting corollary to the civic and discussion groups forming in HEIDELBERG comes from a set of documents concerning student activity in Northern Germany. Twenty students from HAMBURG have formed what they call the Central Committee of the Student Unions. The underlying principles of the organization, outlined below, are believed to be circulating among all student organizations in the University towns of Northern and Western Germany. The Zentralausschuss (Central Committee) purports to be unpolitical, anti-fasci and anti-militarist. Its positive aims include the institution in Germany of free thought, speech and learning, and the restoration of the old human and ethical values among the German people. The ZA recognizes no differences of race, nationality, faith or social position, and bars its doors to no
political creed except National Socialism. Divided into three working committees, the Za concerns itself with educational reform, international relations and the countering of Nazi propaganda.

One committee deals with all matters pertaining to education. Its function, as stated, is to nurture by education those Germans capable of individuality together with self-control, who are fully aware of the laws and values of living in community with other peoples. In short, it is intended to revive what the committee terms "the German academician" - an individual capable of expressing his own opinions, of recognizing the virtues of humanity, possessed of a sense of responsibility toward himself and toward science, and aware of his obligation toward the German people in leading them to a better future.

The second committee is concerned with the present isolation of German cultural and political life from that of the rest of Europe. It hopes to revive interest in the intellectual, political and social currents of the democratic world. This will entail the importation from the outside world of the new developments during the past twelve years in as many fields as possible.

The third committee has as its aim the restoration within Germany of a sense of judgment, as a counter-balance to the years when they were led around by the Nazi Propaganda Ministry. It is the firm conviction of the committee that this aim supersedes all others in importance and must be realized as soon as possible. They conceive the task as a systematic and long-range counter-propaganda campaign. Specific jobs will be assigned to sections dealing with annihilating the militaristic spirit wherever found; with destroying all ideas sponsored by National Socialism; and with broadcasting all ideas favored by the Za. Most important in the committee's scheme, is its projected campaign to reveal to the German people the position of the individual in a dictatorship and in a democracy.

V. DOCUMENTARY NOTE: "THE WEHRMACHT DID NOT KNOW"

A few days after Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies two of her military leaders, Commanding Generals of Army Groups South-west and West, sent statements to DHEITZ and SDBL designed to establish their own and their army Groups' collective alibis regarding allied charges of collective German guilt for atrocities committed in Concentration Camps. The two documents provide interesting evidence of German reaction to the guilt theme and are remarkable for their logical inconsistencies.

Both Generals, VILLINGHOFF (South-west) and DESLOCH (West), claim to speak for every man under their command and are at pains to disassociate themselves from the revelations of Allied press and radio. It is difficult to reconcile their rather naive manifestations of ignorance with their solemn declarations condemning atrocities and the emphatic expression of their feelings of horror and disgust. It is significant, too, that in neither statement is there any hint that the facts exposed by the Allies (which they both claim to have heard for the first time during the past few days) may be doubtful or even questionable.

VILLINGHOFF, after a sweeping statement - which he does not substantiate in any way - that every soldier in his Army Group from the Commanding General down had been completely ignorant of the existence of such horror camps, rather invalidates his argument.
at once by mentioning the transfer of groups of concentration camp inmates to rear areas under his command. He thus admits his men's physical contact with persons detained in concentration camps and has no case for denying the accessibility of direct sources of information, had he wished to avail himself of them. But he evades the issues. Instead he gives prominence to the good treatment of transferred camp inmates by his soldiers and his Army Group's strict adherence to the articles of the Geneva Convention in P/W and other camp matters.

DESLOCH's statement is a slight variation on the same theme. The C-in-C West, while admitting that the penitentiary character of concentration camps was common knowledge in Germany, flatly denies knowing anything about horror conditions in these camps. He does not, of course, suggest that he or his men ever made any effort to find out what was going on behind barbed wires in Germany, but naively remarks that concentration camps were off limits to any outsider. The unfortunate inmates, upon their release, would not divulge any of their experiences, and the General takes care to strengthen this defence by pointing out that differences of opinion between Wehrmacht and Party had apparently caused Nazi authorities to keep the German Armed Forces deliberately in the dark about atrocities. Moreover, during the last five years the German soldier had been too busy fighting the war to have anything to do with concentration camps, and pre-war atrocities had probably been insignificant. Lastly, like his fellow general, C-in-C West states on behalf of his Army Group that he is horrified and disgusted with such un-German acts of unparalleled cruelty.

The Wehrmacht was not the only agency, however, which disclaimed all knowledge and responsibility at that time. On 15 May the "leading minister of the acting Reich Government", SCHERRM-KROSIGK also took pains to protest his ignorance and innocence in a letter to Admiral DOENITZ. Using Allied "revelations" about inhuman treatment of concentration camp inmates working on boats stationed at FLENSBURG as a starting point, KROSIGK declares that "if things contrary to the legal and moral code have happened in concentration camps, I state that only a few people in Germany have had knowledge about them." KROSIGK then adds that it is not enough to make the facts public but that "the German people, to the extent that the occupying powers will permit, want to clean their own house. This can only be done by prosecution in a criminal court ... I beg you to issue a ruling transferring exclusive competence for this matter to the Reich Supreme Court." At the same time KROSIGK adds a few words about another "discovery". In the last paragraph of his letter to DOENITZ, he says:

"The German public life must also be purified in other ways. In the last few years, a handful of men have enriched themselves in a fashion contrary to legal and moral standards, and in a manner offensive to the feelings of decent human beings. I recommend that a board be set up to ascertain the facts and submit recommendations for their correction ..."

VI. THE MEDIA OF INFORMATION

1. Press: The first edition for sale of the Frankfurter Rundschau, published under License No.2 of the News Control directive, is a large four-page newspaper carrying five columns to the page. A brief statement by the FRANKFURT M.G.O. explains that this edition represents
a major step in the instituting of a democratic, peace-loving Germany, as well as the first indication of the rehabilitation of FRANKFURT. The major article on the first page is devoted to the British elections and points out the "absolute majority of the Labor Party," together with a one-column cut of Attlee. A follow-up story describes the impressions of the English people following the announcement of the election results, stressing the fact that the newspapers of the opposition parties displayed a genuine spirit of good sportsmanship in their defeat. Directly underneath is a WASHINGTON detailed report (written around a cut of President Truman) announcing the overwhelming majority with which the Senate ratified the Charter of the United Nations. The upper right-hand corner is taken up with a half-page box entitled "Loyal Victims," listing the people of FRANKFURT killed by the Nazis, Briefly items give the latest information on the war against Japan, and news of the Allied Control Commission.

Page 2 carries an editorial statement entitled "The Symbol of Democracy," pointing out that this newspaper has achieved something new in German journalism: the coalition of various political parties, united for a common purpose, and with a common aim - cooperation. Other items on this page include THORNS' visit to FRANKFURT; BLUM's testimony against HURRI: a brief account of GODDELS; last attempt to negotiate a separate peace with Russia; a report on the showing of the app. film to 52 prominent Nazi leaders; and a warning by mayor SCHAFER, to JUINOK residents to ignore rumors which are obviously inspired by Nazi whisper-propaganda.

The third page should be of considerable interest to regular readers. A column called Greater Frankfurt, apparently intended to become a regular feature, summarized local happenings of special interest to residents of the city. In addition, news of the whole Rhine-Main area is briefly reported: reconstruction in GIESSEN; counter black market activity in CROSS-GERMANY; sanitation in Eisenhut; administrative progress in WESEL; an article on M.G. Law #197 explains the relation between this law and the beginnings of cultural revival in FRANKFURT. It points out that the Americans will deal harshly with all artists who actively supported, or were affiliated with, National Socialism.

The last page tells the story of RADJ GERAIK, the "internationally known football star" who became an SS man. An extremely interesting article addresses itself specifically to German women, who at the present time perform constitute a large part of the reading public for any newspapers published in Germany. This page contains the daily broadcast schedule of Radio Frankfurt and a section devoted to notices and advertisements.

2. Theater: Several leading figures in MAINZ's theater have expressed considerable enthusiasm for the reopening of the Nationaltheater, long a representative of the liberal trend in German theater. Meetings have been held at which table-talk was held down to a minimum, contrary to the basic instincts of theater folk, and a future plan of action decided upon. Arrangements were made for three musical performances: a light operatic concert on 5 August; HAYDN's "The Creation" on 12 August; and a chamber music evening at a later date. As yet, no conductor has been designated for the MAINZ orchestra, but guest conductors have been obtained tentatively. The orchestra, after a purge of undesirable elements, now consists of 32 members.

To date, only these three musical events have been scheduled. But the Nationaltheater personnel plans to present a series of plays which will tour the area and thereby increase its income. A budget
has already been submitted, outlining the major expenses and the chief sources of income. The one does not jibe with the other and the officials have concluded that, road tours included, the annual deficit will be approximately $15,000 PA. At first, this failure of the theater revival caused opposition from the mayor's office and the city councillors. But the population's hunger for entertainment soon won them over to the project, and today their full cooperation has been obtained. The city officials feel that in reviving the Nationaltheater, much can be contributed to Germany's desire for a new life. The guiding spirits, in planning plays ranging from Shakespeare, Moliere, and Lessing to Ibsen, Gogol, and O'Neill, hope to stimulate European thinking, rebuild intellectual Germany, and revive the poetic theater reflecting the rhythms of modern life as well as the myths of classical tradition.

3. Libraries: Dr. Held, director of MUNICH libraries, has set into operation plans for re-opening the city's libraries with the assistance of approximately 50 local experts. This staff convenes weekly to sift available books in order that each library may adequately provide for public taste. The many gaps that now exist they attribute to the fact that the Nazis suppressed large numbers of books shortly after their publication, while foreign literature was permitted only on a small scale. Dr. Held points out that although many books were printed between 1923-45, the majority of them were limited to Nazi Weltanschauung. He underlines the dearth of serious political books by declaring that in the last twelve years not a single one of value has appeared.

The librarians are devoting special attention to banned German literature, along with better known foreign titles. They are extremely anxious for a supply of books by such writers as UNN and HEINE, and for translations from the English, French and Italian. One of the top titles on their list is "Gone with the Wind", which achieved great success with the German reading public. Dr. Held is of the firm conviction that the public's interest in books should be stimulated not only in terms of entertainment but in the direction of education: he plans to encourage the reading of scientific and technical books along with novels. The Germans, he maintains, have neglected this sphere too long and they must endeavor to acquaint themselves once again with the world of ideas, with the thinking and feeling of other peoples. Dr. Held and his staff hope to be instrumental in such a renaissance.

4. Book Dealers and Publishers: In the large Bavarian area supervised by 6870 DISCO, the registration of book distributors and the segregation of undesirable publications is in progress. Simultaneously, German distribution of books and magazines is being organized for the circulation of publications produced both by Allied and licensed German publishers. A Publishers' Committee, composed of members of Bavarian book trades, has extended its scope to assist in the enforcement of publications control. The most recent addition to the services of this association is a manuscript registration committee which will file submitted manuscripts until they can be delivered to licensed publishers. With respect to literary remnants of the Nazi regime, the Z and RA Section of the Regional M.G. will superintend the removal of objectionable literature from public libraries. Publications officers will aid in locating reliable directors for the re-opening of libraries.
VII. ANNOUNCEMENTS OF OUR SOVIET ALLIES

1. The BERLIN Experiment goes well: Even while plans were being perfected by the "Big Three" in POTSDAM for the future administration of Germany, successful demonstrations of unity in action evolved from the joint control of BERLIN. Soviet announcements concerning the strength and purpose of allied unity offered no encouragement to the hopes of Allied discord which are still current among Germans. BERLIN is the testing ground for the greater experiment and so far the Soviets view results favorably, judging from pronouncements on the meetings of the Inter-Allied Kommandantur. The third such meeting was held on 25 July, when the Russian, American, British and French commanders met to discuss the supply of food, coal, fuel and trucks. Radio Berlin was able to announce later that decisions had been reached on all of these questions and joint orders issued to the Lord Mayor, Dr. Arthur WERNER, for execution. It was announced, furthermore, that labor problems had been discussed and that a uniform weekly wage scale would be fixed by a commission appointed by the Allied generals. Another commission is being organized to fix prices and supervise trade.

The campaign to stamp out the BERLIN black market was reinforced by a decree prohibiting the free sale of foodstuffs and the acquisition by Germans of armament, ammunition, military equipment, uniforms or private property from military personnel of any of the Allied armies. A few days earlier German police, aided by the military police of the various zones, began a concerted attack on the flourishing black market, which had attained bazaar proportions and fabulous prices. (Sample quotations: "cheap" watches, $200 to $400; old-fashioned typewriters, $400; cameras of poor quality, $1,400; soap, 5 cents a cake; corned beef, 44 cents a tin; chocolate, 5 cents a bar). In the roundup approximately 2,000 German civilians were arrested and some soldiers. General GURANTOV, the Russian military governor, was reported as having personally arrested 15 Russian officers and having ordered them dismissed from the service.

Previously, Allied correspondents had reported that Russian authorities had found no particular objection to black market activities and had taken no repressive action. The threat to BERLIN's food supply, in which the Soviets have recently shown a lively interest, was undoubtedly one factor in the decision to eliminate the black market. To meet actual and prospective food shortgages the Kommandantur has ordered the Lord Mayor to take immediate steps for the harvesting of all ripe grain in the Greater Berlin area. Furthermore, a registration was ordered of all inhabitants within the area between 25 July and 25 August, in order to afford a measure of prospective food and fuel requirements of the bomb-battered city.

Other restrictions were announced by Soviet authorities to tighten up control. Marshal ZHUKOV ordered that no one may enter BERLIN to take up permanent residence without a special permit. (It was estimated that 4,000 to 5,000 persons attempt every day to enter the city in search of living quarters.) In the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany holders of valuables - such as gold and silver coins and ware, platinum articles, foreign banknotes, coins and documents relating to property and precious objects, and all banknotes issued in territories formerly occupied by Germany or elsewhere - were ordered on 25 July to turn over such items within five days to the field offices of the state bank of the Soviet occupation army. Simultaneously, members of the former German armed forces were forbidden to wear their military uniform or any other uniform of a military nature after 26 July. Marshal ZHUKOV further ordered all firms producing vital commodities to reopen by 15 August, with the price of goods sold held at 1944 prices.
As evidence of the benefits of occupation, the Soviet-controlled newspapers and Radio Berlin publicized the restoration of social insurance and the creation of German law courts in BERLIN. Under the new social insurance regulations all employees are automatically insured, with 20 per cent of wages going into the social insurance fund, the contribution being divided equally between the employee and the employer.

2. The Food Situation: All propaganda facilities continued to support the campaign to bring in the harvest. Grave warnings were again sounded on the prospects of widespread famine this winter unless immediate preparations are made to avert this danger. The recently-constituted "United Front" of anti-Fascist Parties (Communist, Social Democratic, Christian Democratic Union, and Liberal Democratic) issued a joint appeal to all segments of the population to join in the harvest effort. The various governmental administrations were directed particularly to organize all available labor and agricultural machinery for the task. Radio Berlin reported that the Metal Workers, Technical Employees and Farm Workers Unions are assisting in the harvest work.

"The anti-Fascists have taken the initiative in reviving the land which has been sucked dry after 12 years of ruthless exploitation", declared Radio Berlin. "Many harvest helpers have already left Berlin... Everybody who is physically fit should do agricultural work. Whoever is not fully employed at present must report for harvest work in the country. Evacuees should stay to help the farmers. Everybody must do his bit."

Soviet radio also warned local authorities and heads of rural districts that they are undergoing a test as to how far they have established real working contact with the people and mobilized all resources for the harvesting. The Landrat, it pointed out, is not a purely administrative office, but involves also responsibility for total elimination of the Nazis and for seeing that the administrative machinery of the district is democratic.

Recounting the difficulties in feeding the BERLIN population in view of damaged transport facilities, Radio Berlin recounted measures taken by the Soviet authorities to feed the population in the Allied zones. In the first 24 days of July, it pointed out, the Russians sent to BERLIN 43,128 tons of food – including 2,496 tons of meat; 812 tons of fats; 1,282 tons of sugar; and 16,471 tons of flour. Because transport is lacking, BERLIN municipal authorities have been able to obtain only 70 per cent of the potatoes necessary for BERLIN's population, according to the same broadcast.

3. Anniversary of 20 July Putsch: The first anniversary of the unsuccessful bomb plot on HITLER's life furnished Radio Berlin with additional material for pointing out to their listeners the passive role they had played under HITLER, for asking why they had not taken action sooner to end the war. The station quoted Dr Andreas HERRS, former Reich Minister and now head of the BERLIN Food Department, as saying:

"The 20 July will be commemorated by all decent Germans who kept their escutcheons clean in the many years of Nazi rule, thus showing that HITLER, although he held the nation in an iron grip, could not make them the tools of his disastrous policy. On this day the truly responsible Army leaders and many honest politicians attempted to eliminate the nation's grave-diggers."

SECRET
Another commentary on the anniversary over the same station, developed the view that a great opportunity to end the war had been missed. "The past year", it said, "has shown the whole world history's justification of the action undertaken on 20 July."

"Had Germany been liberated from Hitler's yoke on that day, the war would have ended in July 1944 ... A more consistent policy of anti-Fascist unity, based on the sound forces of the working class, might have produced a more telling success in the fight against Hitler and for peace. That is the main lesson of 20 July, 1944, and no sincere anti-Fascist and Democrat should ever forget it."

William S. Paley
Colonel, S.J.S.
Deputy Director, Information Control Service.

Distribution:
General McClure
Colonel Paley
Lt Col Gurfein
Mr Kale
Mr Schneider
Lt Col Linary
Intelligence (3)
Plans & Directives (2)
Press (2)
Publications
Radio
Film, Theater &
Music Control
Commanding General, USFET
Commanding General, U.S. Group C.C.
Chief of Staff, U.S. Group C.C.
US Group C.C. (Lt Col Fried) (21)
Liaison Officer, ISG Branch, Control
Commission for Germany (British)
(Major Huijzer) (25)
Information Services, H.Q., Berlin Dist.
(Lt Col Leonard) (5)
Information Control Branch, Austria (4)
6970 DISC (10)
6971 DISC (10)
AC of S, G-1, USFET (2)
" G-2, " (10)
" G-3, " (2)
" G-4, " (2)
" G-5, " (20)
" Public Relations Div., USFET (2)
Historical Section, H.Q., USFET (Captain
Greenwald)
AC of S, G-2, H.Q., TSF, European Theater
I. & E. Div., H.Q., TSF, European Theater
Allied Press Service
CSS Mission for Germany (Lt Ed Carroll) (3)
O.W.I. (R & A) London (3)
O.W.I., New York (3)
O.W.I., Washington (3)
Propaganda Branch, G-2, War Dept.,
Washington D.C. (4)
M.I.S., G-2, War Dept., Washington (4)
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe
Radio Luxembourg (3)