days and were combined with the filling out of Fragebogen. Teachers selected from among those found politically acceptable heard morning lectures by heads of German church and educational groups on such subjects as history, the racial composition of Germany, religion, etc. The afternoons were given over to open discussion of the problems teachers would face under current conditions, and the methods that might be adopted to cope with these problems.

It will be possible to continue this re-indoctrination process for other politically acceptable teachers interested in continuing their profession, and in view of this fact, plus the difficulty of repairing additional school buildings, it seems likely that the supply of teachers will keep something like an even pace with the school facilities that will become available during the next few months. However, once Darmstadt's educational system approaches normal, the supply of teachers is likely to become acute, and for this reason plans are already afoot to open a normal school for persons with sound political records and the necessary educational background.

The quality as well as the quantity of education in Darmstadt today is sharply limited, and probably will continue to be so for some time to come. At present, teaching in the lower grades is confined to reading, writing and arithmetic, while the curricula in the higher grades will depend entirely on the teaching personnel available. Courses for pupils who
have been out of school most of the past year will be stepped up in an effort to bring them back to a normal footing by the end of the present academic year. In order to accommodate the largest possible number of children in the limited space available, classes are conducted in morning and afternoon shifts in the same building. Classes will not be co-educational, but as an additional method of conserving space the same school buildings will be used for both boys and girls. Those aspects of the educational system which were not changed during the Nazi period, such as grades, tests, punishments, etc., are being maintained. A bare minimum of physical teaching aids, such as chalk, small blackboards, pencils, ink, etc., has been obtained by the German authorities with the assistance of MG. MG also undertook to print textbooks from the authorized list published by G-5, USFET, and these were sold to pupils through local retail bookstores. The actual job of remolding young minds trained under the Nazis will be left largely to the teachers, using the authorized texts, subject to supervision, and scheduled for periodic indoctrination courses themselves.

E. THE ROLE OF RELIGION

Statistics on religious affiliation are almost identical with those of 1939. Replies to a query on religious faith yielded these results:
1945 (Sample)*  1939 (Official Figures)*

Catholic       16       16
Protestant     79       77
Other          5        7
100            100

(*In percentages)

There is no way of checking the conviction of the majority of priests and ministers in Darmstadt that the population is more interested in religion "than ever before". What is known is that 18 per cent of the city's population now attends church weekly, 58 per cent occasionally, and 24 per cent never. Church-going habits among the two main faiths appeared as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Church Attendance</th>
<th>Catholic (percentages)</th>
<th>Protestant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At least weekly</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occasionally</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On most political and economic questions the questionnaire showed the Catholic minority to be uniformly more anti-Nazi than the Protestants. However, there were only 32 Catholics in the sample, which is too small to permit reliable statistical manipulation. The consistency of the Catholic-Protestant differences, on the other hand, justifies their mention here, even though nothing can be ventured about the actual amount of difference.

Catholics, for example, were more opposed to the admission of Nazis to trade unions than Protestants; more Catholics want
all Nazis removed from office, and fewer thought enough Nazis had been removed from government and business in Darmstadt. More Catholics than Protestants described Hitler's ideas as unequivocably "bad", and more considered Allied occupation policies just.

Military Government has distributed Fragebogen among the clergy of Darmstadt, but by mid-September these had not been returned, and no priest or minister in the city had been removed from his post. Meantime, both Catholics and Protestants claimed to be carrying out some denazification measures of their own. The Catholics reported that the only priest in Land Hessen who had been a Party member had been removed and presumably transferred to another post. A special investigating committee of the Protestant Church had distributed its own Fragebogen, and had removed 20 ministers in the Land pending investigation of their Party connections. Only two or three men among the 18 Protestant ministers in Darmstadt before occupation, according to those who remain, were Party members.

While expressing strong personal antipathy for Nazism, most priests and ministers were critical of "wholesale" American denazification policies, on the ground that a more careful distinction should be made between real and "nuss" Nazis, and all were concerned about the effect of denazification on individual members of their congregations.

Interviews with the four Roman Catholic priests and the
seven Protestant ministers (including the President of the Evangelical Church of Land Hessen and two Confessional ministers) of Darmstadt showed that nearly all were well informed and keenly interested in political conditions and developments. Only one 33 year old minister, the youngest cleric in the city, expressed no interest in politics, insisting that he was concerned solely with the spiritual welfare of his flock. All the others discussed politics in practical, non-mystical terms of economic factors, party prospects and the power of propaganda.

The Catholic priests were unanimously, though in different degrees, afraid of the Socialists and particularly of the Communists. Two of the Protestant ministers were also suspicious of the Left parties, but this anxiety was not shared by the other five. There seemed to be general agreement among clergymen of both faiths that the old Center Party should not be revived, but there was sharp disagreement over the advisability of establishing a new, inter-confessional Christian Party. The leader of the Catholic clergy, Dr. Valentin Degen, asserted that all four of Darmstadt's priests had agreed to oppose formation of such a party, but two of the priests expressed themselves during the interviews in favor of the project. The Protestant leader, Dr. Thomas Müller, reported that he had turned down, at least temporarily, a proposal from the Catholic Bishop of Mainz that the two churches cooperate
in building a new party. Nevertheless, Dr. Mueller's principal objection was that the party should be formed by politicians, without direct church intervention, and both he and the other Protestant minister who expressed suspicion of the Left favored the idea of a Christian Party in principle. The remaining five Protestant ministers opposed the idea, seeing no obstacle to Christian cooperation with the Left, objecting to church participation in party politics, and fearing division of the population into religious and anti-religious factions.

The amount of direct or indirect aid a new Christian Party might receive from the two churches in Darmstadt probably will depend partly on the extent to which the new Party adopts a purely negative, anti-leftist program, and partly on the influence of the individual clergymen with their respective congregations. Meanwhile, the leaders of both faiths are acutely interested in material problems and seem certain to play a large part in political, social and economic developments within the community.
IV. POLITICAL LIFE IN DARMSTADT

Except for a small and inarticulate anti-Fascist Committee which sprang up soon after occupation, political activity worthy of the name began in Darmstadt only during the last six or eight weeks and consists almost exclusively of the plans and discussions held by a few old pre-1933 political functionaries. The population at large has had no opportunity to participate, and although the actual level of political interest among the masses is probably no lower than it was in pre-Hitler days, this interest is significantly lacking in local content and bears almost no relation to the activities being carried on by the small circle of political leaders. The latter are aware that they are operating in a rarified atmosphere, out of contact with the citizens for whose votes they will eventually be competing, and they regard the " politicization" of the masses as one of their major problems.

In general, the programs and initial tactics of the Darmstadt politicians are strongly influenced by the ideas already circulating from headquarters in Berlin and Frankfurt. Two parties have been authorised by MG, the Socialists and Communists, while a third, the Christian Democrat, called "the Movement for German Reconstruction," has applied for recognition. Of these the Communists are most dependent on regional headquarters, in Frankfurt, for their line; the Social Democrats are somewhat less dependent on the party line, primarily because of the presence in the city of several administratively highly placed socialist leaders who until quite recently were active in the non-orthodox socialist "Union", a group which gives a local flavor to and presses for alterations in the accepted Social Democratic line. The Christian Democratic group is a purely local development which hopes to integrate itself with political Christianity in other areas of Germany.
Thus far, conservative and business interests have shown no intentions of organizing politically.

A. POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND INTERESTS OF THE DAMSTADT POPULATION

Although the interrogations demonstrated that the majority of Darmstadt's adult population takes no active interest in the political life of the community, there are other indications that the level of political interest is not far different from what it must have been before 1933.

Twenty-five per cent of those questioned said they "plan to join a political party" when parties are permitted, while 62 per cent said they did not plan to join and the remainder were uncertain. These data compare closely with those on party membership before 1933, when about 25 per cent of the sample were members of some party and about 70 per cent were not, with the remainder not answering. The bulk of the apolitical sentiment is found among women; only 10 per cent of the adult females, as against half (49 per cent) of the adult males, plan to join a party. This relatively high proportion of active interest in party politics among men will not, however, be a permanent feature of Darmstadt's political life. Eighty-seven per cent of these men are over 40 years of age, representing a carry-over from Weimar days, while the majority of young people questioned in the companion survey clearly have no background for participation in democratic political life and frankly show no interest in it.

These indications that active interest in party politics is at present not far from the pre-Nazi level are bolstered by several other pieces of evidence. Of another group of Damstadt—
ters, answering a written questionnaire, 30 per cent said they intended "to take a personal interest in political affairs."

An IOD sampling in Kassel, Hanau and Bremen, unconnected with the Darmstadt study, showed 50 per cent of the population interested in joining a political party and 70 per cent planning to vote in local elections.

In general, these data fail to substantiate—or at least suggest the need for a reexamination of—the widely held view that German adults are afflicted with "political apathy." To judge by pre-1933 experience, when less than 10 per cent of the voters in National elections were members of any political party, Darmstadt with its projected 25 per cent party membership will be politically over-active, at least until its Nazified and politically naive younger generation supplants the present Weimar-permeated adult generation. But a more sober and probably more useful inference from the data would be that political apathy has hitherto been discussed without attention to the fact that standards by which to judge such a phenomenon are lacking for a nation which has been physically smashed to the extent that Germany has. It may be that an objective appraisal would conclude that the Germans are in general showing an unusual amount of political interest and activity, when allowance is made for the demands made on energy and interest by the struggle to secure food and housing.

Ignorance about political affairs corresponded fairly well with lack of interest in politics. Fifty-six per cent "didn't know" or had no answer to the question, "Who are the outstanding men of Darmstadt?". Sixty per cent "didn't know" or had no answer to the question, "Who are the most politically active groups and people in Darmstadt?". Both figures were rather close to the 62 per cent who did not want to join a party. That this ignorance was due more to lack of interest than to rudimentary information services was indicated by the fact that 72 per
cent of those interrogated said they received all the information they wanted from newspapers and the radio.

To those who had any ideas at all on the subject, the most prominent men in the city are officials of the civil administrations. Thirty-six percent named Matzger, the mayor of Darmstadt; 27 percent named Bergstraesser, president of Land Hessen; nine percent named Reiber, deputy mayor of the city. All three of these men are Socialists; but the actual leader of the city SPD, Zinnkann, was mentioned only twice. Apparently administrative activity, rather than political leadership, is the current criterion of prominence in Darmstadt.

Among the 41 percent with opinions about politically active groups and people, the largest number — 25 percent — picked the Social Democrats as the most outstanding, while 13 percent named the Communists. This does not jibe with the opinion of most of the political leaders interviewed in the course of the survey that the Communists are the most active group in the city. The answers do show, however, that the two Left parties have an overwhelming monopoly of such political consciousness as exists in the city; only three percent mentioned the Catholic Church or the Centrists in this connection, and only one person out of 208 named the Christian Democrats.

Of the pre-1933 party members, 11 percent had been Social Democrats, and another 10 per cent had been scattered about equally among the Communist, Center, Democratic, Nationalist and Nazi parties. One and one-half per cent admitted NSDAP membership before 1933, and 13 per cent (27 per cent of the men and five per cent of the women) said they had belonged to the NSDAP at some time. Despite this rather low proportion of avowed Nazis, fully half of those questioned though Hitler's ideas were either partly good and partly bad, or good but badly carried out. A rather interesting correlation appeared between opinions of Hitler's policies and interest in joining political
parties. Those who considered Hitler's ideas "bad" tended to favor party membership, while most of those with a more lenient view of Hitlerism were undecided about joining a party. This tendency was confirmed in a separate interrogation of dismissed Nazis, one of whose most characteristic responses was the energetic rejection of all active political life in the future.

B. DENAZIFICATION

Denazification in Darmstadt has gone farthest in the case of employees of the civil administration. A start has been made on denazification in business and industry, and work in this field has been resumed following a pause during August, when effort was concentrated on the screening of school teachers in preparation for the re-opening of the schools on 1 October. Denazification of the medical profession is also now in progress. The figures indicate both that denazification work is mounting in volume, and that the methods and processes employed are being gradually refined. From 26 March to 1 September 1945, 9,183 fragebogen were collected in the city, and of these 3,997, or 43.5 percent, were received during the month of August alone. Until August, persons screened were divided into three categories: non-employment mandatory, employment discretionary, no evidence of Nazi activity — and no apparent effort was made to turn up special information on the basis of which an individual in the employment-discretionary category might have been ousted. During this period, all persons, except falling into the employment-discretionary category were retained. In August, however, this category was subdivided so as to allow for adverse recommendations in particular cases, and 69 persons were removed on this ground. This refinement
of technique was due chiefly to the use of several German investigators in the Special Branch who were able to dig into doubtful cases and produce information singling out unreliable individuals within the employment-discretionary category.

The overall denazification figures for Darmstadt between 26 March and 1 September 1945 read as follows:

- Fragebogen received ........................................... 9,183
- Persons retained or employed .................................. 1,765
- Persons removed or not employed ............................... 626
- Government personnel retained or employed ............... 1,384
- Government personnel removed or not employed .......... 444
- Business and industry personnel retained or employed .. 369
- Business and industry personnel removed or not employed 156
- Other personnel retained or employed ........................ 12
- Other personnel removed or not employed ................. 26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Business &amp; Industry</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In</td>
<td>Out</td>
<td>In</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Employment Mandatory</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Discretionary (adverse recommendation)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Discretionary (no adverse recommendation)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Evidence of Nazi Activity</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence of Anti-Nazi Activity</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

As in other German cities, denazification has inevitably caused considerable maladjustment in civil administration and in certain fields of essential activity. There is reported to be especial concern over the fact that a Blockwarte in the NSV falls in the mandatory removal category.

Two special problems have been the denazification of
school teachers and denazification of the medical profession. Of 217 teachers vetted in the Stadtkreis, 74 turned out to be mandatory removals, 15 others were recommended for removal, 26 were on the borderline with no adverse recommendation; against these 115 cases, only 99 offered no evidence of Nazi activity, and only three could produce records of anti-Nazi activity. In view of the serious shortage of teachers forecast by these figures, and in the hope that many in the doubtful categories were "nominal" Nazis whose services might be salvaged, MG has set up a special committee to hear individual complaints about removals and to sift out meritorious cases.

A somewhat different procedure is being followed in the case of doctors, another sphere of limited personnel. All physicians coming under the mandatory removal category are to be dismissed from any positions they may hold, to have their accounts and property-blocked, and their licenses to practice revoked. Temporary revocable licenses will then be issued, and each doctor will receive a serially numbered book of vouchers made out in triplicate. Each time he treats a patient, he will turn over one voucher, retain one, and present one to the office of the Bürgemeister. The patient will pay his bill at the Bürgemeister's office, and the money will be deposited in the doctor's blocked account, from which the physician will be allowed to withdraw only the usual living allowance, plus a supervised expense account for essential supplies and items of medical equipment.

The denazification of the police has been thorough, and there is a shortage of trained personnel, but Police Chief Reibold regards this as preferable to retaining half-Nazis because of their technical competence. Reibold reports that ex-Schmacht officers regularly apply for admission to the force, offering to accept the rank of simple patrolman, but he has to date rejected all such applications, not only because he dis-
trusts them politically (R. is a left-wing Socialist, former Reichsbräuner) but also because he anticipates that in a short time they would tire of their lowly status and begin agitating for a position of command.

Reactions to Denazification

Reactions to denazification in Darmstadt were tested both through the opinion sample and in interviews with a number of dismissed persons. Half a dozen questions covering the subject were included in the poll, with the following results:

1. Should Party Members be Dismissed from Leading Jobs?

A wide split of opinion was expressed on the question whether all Nazi Party members should be dismissed from important jobs in government and industry. Forty-three per cent replied "yes," 44 per cent replied "no," and the remainder offered no opinion. Interesting sex, age and class differences on this question emerged.

a. Women favored mandatory dismissal from important jobs much less than men: 36 per cent as against 53 per cent.

b. Opposition to dismissal was far greater among those under 40 years of age than among those over 40: 60 per cent of the lower age group answered "no" on this question as against 33 per cent of the older age group. This seems to indicate that rejection of Nazism has been more widespread among older people, while the survival of Nazi ideas is greater among the younger. This finding was well substantiated by other
questions in the Darmstadt study.

c. It was found that members of the lower socio-economic classes (i.e. unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers) favored dismissal of Nazis more than white collar workers, professional and self-employed people. Fifty-one per cent of the first group favored mandatory dismissal, as against only 37 per cent of the white collar class and only 13 out of 34 self-employed and professional people. It was also found that pre-1933 trade union members tended to favor dismissal of Nazis more than non-unionists.

d. Protestants were less in favor of dismissal than Catholics; to some extent this reflects the fact that Darmstadt is predominantly Protestant, and that it is well known that Nazism made greater inroads among Protestants.

2. Political Sympathies of those Opposed to Strong Denazification

The extent to which those opposing strong denazification took a favorable view of Hitler's ideas was most striking. Sixty-six per cent of this group either thought that Hitler's ideas were good though badly carried out, or thought that some of his ideas were good and some bad. In contrast, only 30 per cent of the group favoring strong denazification subscribed to similar views. The same difference between the two groups is shown by the fact that Hitler's views were unambiguously rejected as "bad" by 62 per cent of the group.
favoring strong denazification as against only 30 per cent of the group which opposed strong denazification. On the basis of this, it is clear that, whatever the specific justifications offered by those who oppose strong denazification, those who oppose strong denazification are basically the people who still retain a favorable attitude towards Hitler's ideas and Nazism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Those favoring dismissal of all Nazis from leading positions</th>
<th>Those opposing dismissal of all Nazis from leading positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hitler's ideas, bad</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hitler's ideas good, but badly carried out</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of Hitler's ideas good, others bad</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opposition to strong denazification was also related to the feeling that Allied measures in general were too hard. Seventy-two per cent of those who thought that Allied measures were generally too hard also opposed strong denazification, as against only 38 per cent of those who thought Allied measures were just.

3. Criticisms of Denazification

The 92 people who, on the above question, specifically opposed dismissal of all party members from high offices gave the following justifications for their view:
Those forced to join Party, and "little people" should be given another chance
Cases should be individually judged
Industry will suffer as a result
Only active or pre-1933 Nazis should be dismissed
Some Nazis have honestly changed their minds
All Nazis aren't so bad after all

4. Views on Adequacy of Denazification

On the question whether enough Nazis had been removed from the local government, business and the church, approximately 50 per cent in each case professed to have no opinion. However, it was clear that there was greater satisfaction with denazification in government than in business, and this reflects the order in which these two fields have been denazified by Special Branch MG in Darmstadt, as elsewhere. Thirty-seven per cent thought that there had been adequate denazification in government, 23 per cent did not. As for business, only 20 per cent thought there had been adequate denazification against 25 per cent who did not. As expected, only a small per centage (4 per cent) thought that denazification of the church had been inadequate. It seems safe to assume that a considerable number of those who had no opinion on all these questions did not in any event favor a strong denazification policy. Dissatisfaction with adequate denazification in business was particularly strong among the group which favored a strong denazification policy.
5. Do Nazis "Constitute A Danger?"

Interviewees were asked whether they thought the Nazis in Darmstadt "constitute a danger". Sixty-nine per cent thought that they did not as against only 11 per cent who thought they did. The specific danger cited most often was that the Nazis were still active, and that danger of an underground existed. As was to be expected, the people who thought that the Nazis constituted a danger tended to be the same persons who thought that too few had been dismissed from government and business.

6. Rumors Spread by Nazis

Interviewees were asked whether they knew of any rumors spread by Nazis in Darmstadt recently. One hundred and thirty replied in the negative, while 72 respondents listed rumors. This figure indicates a widespread disposition to believe that Nazis are engaging in such activities. The rumors cited were similar, for the most part, to those circulating at the time in the rest of the American Zone. The most frequently quoted rumors concerned future changes in occupation areas. A smaller batch of rumors had to do with growing Soviet-American tension. Other rumors alleged that conditions were better in the British Zone. Finally, a number of rumors referred to discreditable American occupation policies and practices.

Economic Adjustment and Attitudes of Denazified Persons

ICD investigators spoke with some 30 individuals removed
from office in Darmstadt. The conversations were focused on
what the person had been doing and thinking since being thrown
out of office. Care was taken not to give the interrogee the
impression that a special study was being made of those who had
been denazified; the explanation given was that a general opinion
survey was being made of Darmstadt as a whole. Although
disposed to admit the justification of denazification in general,
all those dismissed insisted that it should apply only to "real"
or "active" Nazis, from which group they excluded themselves.
From a psychological point of view, most of the individuals
objected to the impersonal manner in which denazification is
carried out. Everyone found some particular reason why he
should not be included in the general house-cleaning and each
would have liked a chance to voice this reason before being
dismissed.

Among those dismissed, two types were easily distinguished:
the opportunists and the idealists. The attitude of the oppor-
tunists can be paraphrased as follows: "I was never a Nazi.
I only joined the Party in order to keep or improve my job."
These men tend to complain more violently and passionately about
the harshness of denazification than the other group. They
reject the idea that opportunism should be severely punished,
saying: "All right! I made a mistake in believing in the
success of National Socialism -- everybody can make a mistake.
I do not consider this a crime."
The attitude expressed by the idealist, on the other hand, takes this form: "I was a Nazi -- I believed in Hitler -- I have been deceived and have learned my lesson. However, I am not a criminal and I don't see why my wife and children are now compelled to suffer for my former belief in Hitler." The idealist also tends to object strenuously to the pre-1937 provision; he states, typically: "Those who joined the Party before 1933 were mostly idealists and decent. Those who joined the Party in 1937 were opportunists because at this time it was obvious what criminals the Nazis were. And now they fire us who were the dumb idealists but do not punish the opportunists who joined the Party in 1937 and later."

The tendency to fatalistic acceptance of the situation is particularly noticeable among the poorer, less intelligent, small-fry dismisses. None of these appeared to know of the USFET review procedure. Thus, it would appear that many of the "ordinary" men of humble attitude and of low or moderate socioeconomic status will tend to bow to their fate in the same way that they bowed to the Nazi power. On the other hand, those who formerly held the more important jobs under the Nazi regime appear to be more aggressive and resourceful in exhausting all channels in order to obtain reinstatement. These people know how to write letters of protest and how to enlist the aid of neighbors and colleagues.

Practically all dismisses agreed that the American occu-
pation had been far more lenient than they had expected, except with regard to denazification.

**Socio-Economic Adjustment**

A rather surprising degree of physical mobility on the part of dismisseees was evident. At least 60 out of 450 dismisseees in Darmstadt had left town, probably because they thought that opportunities would be better elsewhere. Within the city itself, the dismisseees tended to move a great deal as a result of requisitioning and the necessity to make economies. The greatest difficulty in economic adjustment was experienced by the older, petty civil servants of the white collar group. There was a general tendency to shun manual labor until savings were exhausted. These older petty officials complained bitterly about having to forfeit their pensions, for which they had worked their whole lives. Some of them appeared to have saved very little money, expecting to live on their pensions after retirement. A number of the dismisseees from minor jobs had availed themselves of the public welfare (58 RM per month).

Pessimism with regard to their economic future was generally expressed. In the more severe hardship cases some of the dismisseees exhibited acute depression and expressed a desire for self-destruction. Accompanying the pessimistic outlook, however, there was a widespread disposition to clutch at the belief that MG would sooner or later revise its "harsh" policy, at least as far as non-activists were concerned. "After all," said one
dismissed, "there were so many Parteigänger that it would prove impossible to eliminate all of them from the economic life of Germany permanently."

In contrast to the difficulties being experienced by the older petty civil servant type, dismisses who had held more important and higher salaried jobs under the Nazis appeared to be getting along better. Many of them had found jobs of a not too uncongenial character, though admittedly less so than their previous employment. A building inspector, who had made 6500 RM per annum since 1939, had now been hired as an architect. Another of the better paid dismisses, who formerly worked in the stockyards, was planning to open a private veterinary practice as soon as he could procure the necessary surgical instruments.

Political Ideas

The most striking characteristic of dismisses' political attitudes appeared to be a general disposition to steer clear of all party affiliations in the future. Many of the dismisses, having had their fingers burned once through membership in a political party, appeared to draw the lesson "no more politics." A number of other dismisses, on the other hand, indicated that they would be interested in joining a party depending on its program, and that they intended to vote. In general, the impression gained from these 30 dismisses did
not support the view advanced by some critics of denazification that dismissee are ripe for Communism.

The single experience of having been thrown out of office in itself seemed to have had no effect on basic political attitudes. Despite the familiar willingness to dissociate themselves from the worst features of the Nazi regime, those who had been "good" Nazis showed little evidence of having re-evaluated their basic political philosophy since dismissal.
C. THE SOCIALISTS

The Socialist movement in Darmstadt has crystallized into two groups, representing the old and the new elements in German Socialism. The Social Democratic Party has resumed operation with the same over-all political views, the same leadership, and some of the same internal tensions that marked it before 1933. The "Union of Socialist Organizations of Germany" is a new movement composed of progressive, intellectual middle-class representatives and advocating local application of socialism in the economic field on a non-Marxian principle of solidarity among all classes. Though they certainly represent differing directions and ideologies within the Socialist movement, the two groups do not constitute opposing political forces, since they do not operate on the same plane of political activity. The Union does not function as a party, and the bulk of its members are choosing to join the SPD. Hence the differences between the two will not appear as a public conflict, but will be worked out within a united Socialist Part for the determination of a party line to present to the population. This phenomenon stems from the nature and development of both groups.

SPD Leadership and Organization

The Social Democratic Party in Darmstadt consists of three sections. One is the old-line party functionaries, constituting the revived Party organization, obedient to Party discipline,
adhering automatically to the watered-down Marxian ideology which is the traditionally dominant strain within the SPD. Another section consists of men who have risen to prominence since the occupation, primarily through appointment to public office; they consider themselves, and are regarded by others, as members of the SPD because they belonged to the Party before 1933, but they apply the general Social Democratic approach to administrative problems without being active in the Party as such, and they are not bound to any Party line either in action or in ideology. A third section is made up of the older Social Democratic workers and voters in the city, whose political role has been limited to serving as objects for the activities of Party organizers seeking to re-establish contact with their supporters in anticipation of future elections. Because of this passive role, the focal points of Social Democracy in Darmstadt so far have been party organization and public administration. Party members in these two fields reflect, in the diversity of their Party affiliation, in their functions, and in their ideologies, the elastic nature of the entire movement.

The Darmstadt SPD received permission in October to operate publicly as an active political organization. The Party consists, as in the rest of Germany, of a relatively small group of older leaders and functionaries with no more than regional or local significance. During the Nazi regime they
NOTE

The Oberbuergermeister of Darmstadt, Ludwig Metzger (see pages 133-160) was dismissed by MG in mid-October because of his past in the German occupation of Luxemburg. While his appeal is being considered by USFET, his place has been taken by Buergermeister Reiber.
maintained some sort of social contact, and after occupation they naturally gravitated together to resume their old profession of party organization. During the ban on political activity, the SPD maintained a loose organization. Leaders met for discussions of the future Party line and set up an informal local system in which the old guard (chiefly former SPD city assemblymen) were responsible for establishing contact with the workers, especially in factories.

The unquestioned leader in this activity was Oberregierungsrat Zinnkann, chief of the sections for Labor Law and Protection and Price Formation and Control in the Economics and Reconstruction Department of the Land Hessen government. Zinnkann's natural assumption of authority indicates the backward orientation of the Party in Darmstadt; it was based on the fact that from 1931 until the Nazi dissolution of all German parliament Zinnkann was leader of the SPD fraction in the Hessian Diet. By the same token, no Party members who have risen to prominence since occupation played leading roles in the first phase of Party activity. Both Bergstraesser, President of the Land Hessen administration, and Metzger, Lord Mayor of Darmstadt, are SPD members; but their Party activity has been slight, partly because of their responsibilities to the American authorities, partly because their place in the Party hierarchy before 1933 was not high, and partly because they do not adhere to the traditional ideological line of the dominant faction in German
Social Democracy. This lack of contact was strikingly illustrated when Bergstrasser addressed local government leaders in Landkreis Darmstadt last summer. His favorable statements about the head of the Marlenburg Chamber of Commerce or used excited protests from his audience, many of whom were old-line Social Democrats led by Landrat Wink. The fact that the 120 to 150 persons he estimates to be active in the movement in Darmstadt are overwhelmingly old-time Party functionaries has been raised by Zinnkann into a principle. After the confusion, the weakness and the betrayals which characterized the past 12 years, he reasons, only the old leaders whose reliability is guaranteed by their constant contacts under the Nazis can be entrusted with reconstitution of the Party.

This process of traditionalist selection, initiated during the first phase of the occupation, has undergone no substantial change during the second phase inaugurated by the Potsdam Declaration. The lines of Party organization have simply been hardened in preparation for overt political activity. The former unofficial leadership of the Party has been converted into a regular executive, consisting of the three men who played leading roles during the first phase by reason of their pre-1933 prominence in the Party hierarchy. These are Zinnkann, who acts as chairman; Riesel, a white-collar worker (Angestellte) who was formerly secretary of the Darmstadt SPD; and Reibold, a worker who was formerly a city assemblyman.
This organizational tightening has, however, brought a somewhat clearer and closer relationship between Social Democrats in the public administrations and the Party organization. Open political activity and anticipation of elections are narrowing the gap between politics and administration. The Party needs more than nominal membership from its prominent people; the administrators will soon need Party support. Thus Bergstræsser, as well as Zinnkann, spoke at a public SPD rally on 14 October, and Metzger attended the national conference of Social Democrats at Hanover on 5 and 6 October. Though this development has not yet affected the dominant place of the Party organizers in the Party leadership, it does represent the beginning of Party democratization, and foreshadows a struggle to wrest leadership of the Party from the old organizers.

Ultimately the Party executive is to consist of seven members, who will be nominated by a general meeting of SPD leaders in the city. This formal process of filling out the executive is considered necessary to give representation to other socialist elements besides the older leaders who already occupy key positions; such elements are not in a position to attain "naturally" to authoritative posts. The new elements to be represented are non-Marxian religious socialists, who are expected to be represented by a school teacher named Mahr; the Union, connoting non-Marxian bourgeois socialism; and the younger generation of Socialists. There is, however,
no question of setting up a parity with the older leaders on the executive: Zinnkann explicitly explained that the younger Socialists would be included so that they could be trained to take over when the old leaders are gone. For the rest, the local Party organization is to take the traditional form of Party stewards (Vertrauensmänner) to watch over Party interests in each district of the city.

The real change in Party organization has been its integration into a more general framework above the local level. The Darmstadt Social Democrats acknowledge unreservedly the authority of the Frankfurt SPD, which, under the leadership of Willi Knothe, has established in Frankfurt a regional executive for all of Hessen Nassau and Land Hessen. Zinnkann is Knothe's deputy as chairman of this regional executive, which is dominated by the Frankfurt Social Democrats. This is a deviation from the pre-1933 organizational pattern and means the disappearance of the Land Hessen SPD as an intermediate unit directly under the national leadership. The Darmstadt Social Democrats, once the core of the Land Party leadership, have become instead simply a city organization under the regional leadership in Frankfurt, in which they share only through Zinnkann's position as one member of the 11-man regional executive.

For national leadership, the Darmstadt SPD looks at present to Kurt Schumacher in Hanover, a nationally known Party leader before 1933. They reject claims to leadership by the Berlin
Central Committee of the SPD, not only because of the lack of communications, but also -- characteristically -- because that body is made up of men who are unknown to the Darmstadt people. Only Helmut Lehmann, a member but not an authoritative leader of the Berlin Committee, is familiar to them. These facts prove for the Darmstadt Socialists not the untrustworthiness of the Berlin SPD, but Lehmann's participation satisfies them on that point -- but the impossibility of political integration with Social Democrats in the Russian zone. Hence they envisage two Social Democratic organizations in Germany -- one led by Schumacher and comprising the American, British and French zones, the other under the leadership of the Berlin group in the Russian zone. The Darmstadt Socialists expect these two organizations to work together in close contact and harmony for uniform development of German Social Democracy until a national organization becomes possible.

Activities of the SPD

The Darmstadt Social Democrats address their efforts to two main fields: building up of the Party organization, and activity in administrative bodies centering on the civil administration under MG. Extension of the Party organization down into the population is handled by trusted Party stewards working in the various sections and plants of the city, an activity which has been facilitated by the fact that the trade union organizers and old Betriebsräte who have been active are at the same time
in overwhelming proportion Social Democratic. Extending the Party organization outwards beyond Darmstadt has tended to merge into the other main field of Social Democratic endeavor, participation in public administration. Positions in the administration has given organizers like Zinnkann an opportunity to establish contact with Social Democratic local administrators (who are legion in Land Hessen), as well as to get to Frankfurt, which is the seat both of Regional Economic Office and of the Regional Labor Office for Land Hessen. The field of public administration is also a highly important sphere of activity in its own right for the Darmstadt SPD. In the absence of elections, the administration has become the chief vehicle for Party propaganda, since it puts the names of SPD people before the population. Surveys show that the average Darmstädter thinks of Metzer, the Lord Mayor, as the most prominent political figure in the city. Also, Social Democrats working on immediate problems are able to establish conditions for future political activity as they want them established. For these reasons, members of the SPD have not shrunken from taking over leadership in the city administration. Metzer is Lord Mayor of Darmstadt; Wolf is district administrator and in charge of the district marriage office and district court for the city district of Arheilgen; Daechert holds the same offices for the district of Eberstadt; Weibold is the Police President of Darmstadt; Ruchlein is head of the department for trade and
industry (Gewerbewesen) and for missing persons, and is deputy head of the Insurance Office. Dörner is in charge of market administration; Deichert heads the important office for construction and ground property administration; Specht is deputy chief of the local court of Darmstadt. In the Land government, Bergstrasser, the President and chief of the department of education; Ahl, the vice-president and head of the interior department; Friedrich, head of the section for primary schools in the department of education; and Zimmann are Social Democrats. Walk, head of the departments of economics and reconstruction, is about to join the Party.

However, presence of the Social Democrats in the administration does not mean a party government, since many of the leading figures in both regional and city administrations -- especially Bergstrasser and Metzger, who have nominated the other office-holders -- are not part of the group of Social Democratic party organizers and have not been as yet integrated into the party organization or subordinated to its directives. Because of the elementary state of political organization and program-building at this time and because of the inclusive nature of German Social Democracy, the party organizers do not take this independent position of their office-holding colleagues amiss, but rather point with pride to them as the representatives of the party in the top rungs of the administration. Even the political opponents of Social Democracy look upon these office-
holding Social Democrats as integral elements of the Party to be reckoned with in present negotiations and future struggles.

The Darmstadt Social Democrats justify their domination of the city administration both by their claim to be the best possible collaborators with American MG because of their determination and technical competence to build a genuine democracy, and by their contention that they represent the great majority of the population. On this basis, they have attained prominent participation not only in the administration, but also in the various special committees which have been created or which have set themselves up as representative of the population, either in a general advisory capacity or as welfare agencies. In the nine-member City Committee (Stadt-ausschuss) appointed by Metzger as an intermediate advisory body between the public administration and the people of Darmstadt, the SPD is represented by three men (it will become four when Walk joins the party), which gives it a plurality over every other group. Of the three SPD representatives, at least two, Averarie and Wiesenecker, are middle-class members of the Union and therefore outside the orthodox line of Social Democracy. In the Auxiliary for Political Prisoners, a welfare organization for returnees from concentration camps with a parity representation for each group, Zinnkann is the SPD representative, probably because this agency deals with persons who were formerly prominent politically and hence is closer to

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the organizing than to the administrative activities of the Darmstadt Social Democrats. Towards the Anti-fascist Committee, a group reportedly Communist inspired and claiming to represent the population against the appointed civil administration, the Social Democrats naturally have taken a more negative line. However, the Social Democratic leadership directed Mahr to join the Antifa for the purpose of keeping an eye on it, and presumably to have representation in the group should it develop some support.

Beyond the needs imposed by the present situation, the organized leadership of the Social Democratic Party in Darmstadt has not materially moved, in its attitude towards the other parties, from its pre-1933 position. The parties are viewed in static terms from a static position; all are distrusted for the same reasons as in 1933. The bourgeois Catholics, whatever their new form, are looked upon as Centrists and are rejected because they are the tools of a church with reactionary interests and tend to compromise with the extreme right, i.e. Nazism. Other bourgeois political groups are rejected because they have no popular or ideological foundation for existence.

On the crucial question of cooperation with the Communists, the Social Democratic leadership takes the usual position that such cooperation is possible only if current Communist professions of conversion to democracy are genuine and not simply a mask for the prosecution of their old aims of revolutionary
dictatorship. However, the Social Democrats make it abundantly clear that to their mind the conversion is not genuine, and that the Communists are merely practicing a deception in order to insinuate themselves into the other political groups — especially the SPD — and into the confidence of the American authorities. Many of the Darmstadt Social Democrats have in their possession copies of a speech purporting to have originated in the "Seventh World Congress" of the Comintern, explicitly stating the relationship between the present "tactics" of democracy and anti-fascist united fronts and the "strategy" of proletarian world revolution. Although the document is at least questionable and probably fraudulent (it has found its way throughout western Germany, especially to right-wing Socialists), Darmstadt Social Democrats are so ready to believe what the document is intended to make them believe that they have accepted it as the authentic Communist line.

The result such distrust on the one hand and the practical necessity for cooperation on the other appears in the conflicting policies followed by the Mayor, Metzger, who in this respect reflects the old-line Party point of view. Metzger has appointed Communists to two important posts in the city administration, and has intimated his intention of increasing the Communist representation; his motive is a desire to draw the KPD into an administration which must enact unpopular measures. On the other hand, Metzger opposed the present pace of denazification on the
ground that discharged Nazis will become hostile to the administration which has discharged them and in future elections will turn to the Communists.

Hence Social Democratic cooperation with the Communists is dictated wholly by the necessities of the situation and is of an administrative rather than a political nature. The character of the so-called Inter-Fraction Committee (Interfraktionelle Ausschuss), the primary vehicle through which cooperation between the two labor parties has been expressed, bears this out. The Committee is in no sense a regular organization for common political action, but rather a loose group in which different representatives of each party appear at irregular meetings in order to hear some Socialist or Communist administrator explain the bases of certain regulations he has fathered. In other words, the Inter-Fraction Committee, like the City Committee and the antifa, is simply an ad hoc administrative instrument designed by the parties to act as a buffer between an appointed administration and the population on which it acts by justifying necessary but unpopular measures, thereby safeguarding the electoral future of the parties concerned. It is inspired not so much by a positive desire for cooperation between the parties of the Left as by the need of each to take the other into account and to share responsibility before the voters of the future.

Cooperation with political groups to the Right of the SPD
has not yet become a problem except for juxtaposition with individual representatives of those groups in the MG administrations. With the modern version of the Center Party, even juxtaposition is no problem, since, with the exception of Hoffmann, who acts as associate head of the education department under Bergsträsser, it has no representation in high positions in either city or regional administration (including the City Committee). Since Bergsträsser and Metzger have been the nominating agents in these administrations, this absence of old Centrists indicates the distrust in which the Social Democrats hold them and the small opinion the SPD has of Centrist popular support. In the absence of a need for cooperation, there has been no contact between the Social Democratic organization and the nascent Bewegung des Deutschen Aufbaus. The attempt of the latter to make contact with the SPD through Bergsträsser has brought no reaction whatsoever. With the former Democrats, who are amply represented in the administrations, the problem of political cooperation has not appeared, since this group has formed itself into an independent political party. Cooperation on an individual basis has gone well and finds its counterpart in the political field in the Social Democrats' readiness to accept former Democrats for membership. While the SPD has made no overtures to the Union, an expression of the left-wing of the old Democratic Party, it is accepting Union members in the SPD and is reserving a seat on the Party executive for them.
The Social Democratic Party functionaries have, in general, concentrated their interest on party organization to the virtual exclusion of programmatic considerations. They have worked out no new party program and insist that this is not possible until an authoritative re-formulation of the old program is decided upon by a national assembly of the Party when it has been re-formed on a Reich basis. This inclination to seek programmatic guidance from above is confirmed by the fact that the short statement of principles which was submitted in Darmstadt as part of the application to MG for permission to organize was written in Frankfurt by the regional party executive. (The Frankfurt group actually had this statement printed up as a form, with the designation of the local MG detachment and the local signatories as blanks to be filled in by the respective party organizations.) This statement of principles consists simply of a set of banalities on denazification and de-militarization, re-education, and reconstruction, combined with such vague phrases as "in the sense of socialism" and "just distribution of essential goods", and including an indefinite blank on "the socialization of the branches of industry ripe for socialization". The introduction reveals the real preconceptions of the group of party organizers who run SPD Party affairs in Darmstadt: "The program of the SPD corresponds to the program of the Second International including the Labor Party in
England..." In other words, they feel that essentially the traditional SPD program, as it existed before 1933, remain valid. The only changes they admit to be necessary are those additions which will concentrate the forces of the party on the immediate tasks of the present; further, they declare that a stronger emphasis on socialization is essential, since only an economy in which the primary means of production are government-owned and operated can deal with the gigantic problems of reconstruction.

The emphasis on party organization and preparation for elections, together with the comparative lack of interest in substantive policy in any specific sense, has enabled the Party to gather in the representatives of the several ideologies which profess democracy and socialism as general and formal aims. In addition to the revisionist Marxism which constitutes, as it always has, the abstract faith of the older party functionaries, at least two other philosophical bases are represented in those who claim to be and are accepted by the party functionaries as Social Democrats. One is that of those SPD members who think of themselves as Christian socialists, who deny Marxian historical materialism as the philosophical basis of socialism and who come to socialism through that interpretation of Christian social principles. Outstanding representatives of this line among Social Democrats are Metzger and Mahr.
Such typical conceptions operate as no bar to the full acceptance of their advocates in the Party. For example, Metzger maintains that the traditional dogmatism of Social Democracy on the subject of the churches and religion has lost its power to such an extent that it is no longer necessary to re-form the religious socialists as a faction within the party. Mahr constitutes an even more striking case in point. Although ideologically divided from the run of party organizers through his espousal of Christian socialism, Mahr remains a trusted henchman of Zinnkann, who has charged him with watching over the interests of the party in the Antifa and who hopes to put him on the party executive of Darmstadt.

The other unorthodox line is that of the SPD members who are also members of the Union, whose socialism rejects both Marxian and Christian bases and rests rather on the response of a bourgeois humanitarian liberalism to the conditions of German economic development. A relationship of trust exists also between this section of the SPD and the party organizers, as is witnessed by the fact that Zinnkann insists that men like Bergstrasser and Wuhl are not members of the Union (although they are), but are entirely SPD. Even during the period when the Union maintained itself as an independent political group with party aspirations, Zinnkann could find no difference in principles between it and the SPD and attributed its desire for independence only to the personal ambitions of the Union leaders.
Thus the Social Democratic Party in Darmstadt is attaining a form in which its identifying principles are so general that it welcomes all people who believe in the validity of the democratic process and who profess the necessity of socialism in the economic sphere. Organized thus far on the principle of a division of labor which leaves the Social Democrats in public administration freedom from Party organizational tasks, which are handled by a group of experienced functionaries, the Darmstadt SPD is now preparing, on the same basis, to appeal to all groups of the Darmstadt population for support in the coming elections.

**The Union of Socialist Organizations of Germany**

The membership of the Union has remained static since the earliest days of its inception. According to its leaders, it amounts to some 35 people, and the fact that even the leaders can give only an approximate membership figure is a clue to the organizational nature of the group. For there is no organization or membership in the strict sense of those terms. The Union is simply a discussion group of bourgeois intellectuals with similar political points of view. The group represents that tradition of German middle-class progressive liberalism which suffered its great defeat in 1848 and carried on its fight with ever waning strength as the Progressive Party under the Empire and as the Democratic-Party under Weimar until 1931. The course of German economic and political development was
towards an ever increasing polarity, and after the economic crisis of 1929, this last political expression of genuine bourgeois liberalism in Germany was finally crushed.

By 1931 the representatives of this line in German politics found themselves without a political vehicle. The German State Party, which succeeded the Democratic Party, was considered too conservative by the former Democratic leaders in Darmstadt. These leaders chose one of two courses, typified by the cases of Reiber, leader of the Democratic Party in Hessen from 1919 until 1931 and now deputy mayor of Darmstadt, and Ahl, leader of the Democratic Party in Darmstadt until 1931 and now vice-president of the regional administration. Reiber tried in 1931 to found a new Radical Democratic Party for the continued expression of progressive liberalism in the old form, and, failing, retired from political life. Ahl, on the other hand, went immediately over to the Social Democrats (Bergsträsser, another left-wing Democrat, also took this course in 1931). Despite this split, the left-wing Democrats in Darmstadt maintained constant touch with each other, and even those who belonged nominally to the Social Democratic Party tended to gravitate to this group of bourgeois intellectuals.

Their experiences and discussions during the Nazi regime completed the conversion of this group to socialism. However, having arrived at this position from the principles of political democracy through recognition that liberal political forms were
impossible of achievement given Germany's economic structure, this group was not ready to go over to the Social Democratic Party, with its emphasis on the protection of labor's material interests and its Marxist ideology. Instead, the group sought a new organization. This it found in 1933 when, through contacts in the Ruhr, it learned of the founding of the Union of German Socialists in Great Britain and obtained a pamphlet on "The New German Republic" put out by this emigre organization for distribution in Germany. Though knowing practically nothing of the founders of the organization, the Darmstadt group did know that it included representatives from the old socialist splinter groups as well as the SPD and assumed from this that it was an entirely new political development in the socialist movement. Hence the Darmstadt group took over the name and the principles of the Union, as enunciated in the pamphlet, and set itself up as a separate illegal group under the Nazis, independent even of the SPD. Evidently it felt that the presence of former members of the SPD, like Bergstraesser and Ahl, within the Union group in Darmstadt was enough to comply with the pattern established by the Union in England. During the last months of the Nazi regime, many members of the Union evacuated to the country outside of Darmstadt. There they strengthened their contacts with one another and made definite plans for collaboration with the Allies when Darmstadt should fall. When the city was occupied, the group
made contact with the Americans and succeeded in placing many of its people in authoritative posts in the administration of both the region and the city: Bergstraesser as president of the regional administration, Ahl as vice-president, Reiber as deputy mayor of Darmstadt, Valk as head of the department of economics and reconstruction in the regional administration and member of the City Committee of Darmstadt, Averarie and Wiesenecker as members of the City Committee, Koch as Director of the City Prison.

During the first phase of American occupation, the Union maintained its existence as an independent political discussion group with the definite intention of enrolling itself as a separate political party when the time for legal political activity came. They did not once approach the Social Democratic organization, which emerged under Zinnkann's direction, to speak of merger. This concept of the Union among the Darmstadt members did not correspond to the facts of the organization in England. The Darmstadt people envisaged a new, organized socialist movement in which older party affiliations were completely dissolved and which therefore could be the vehicle of a united labor party including former Communists as well as former Socialists of all shades. The Union in England was simply a cover organization for the establishment of a common socialist platform for the four main German Socialist groups there (SPD, SAP, Neu Beginnen, and ISK), all of which were represented on
a parity basis and all of which maintained their individual identities and organizations. Moreover, in England the Union represented socialist principles vis-a-vis the Communists, rather than attempting to effect cooperation or merger with them.

The Darmstadt group's erroneous belief that in setting itself up as an original, independent political party it was acting in conformity with a larger development amongst the German Socialists in England, upon whom they could eventually depend, led to a misjudgment of the actual currents in German political life. For in Darmstadt the SPD and KPD did not tend to merge in the Union, but built up their organizations on their old bases, leaving the Union with its original membership and no recruits. Moreover, the Union found that it could not count upon the undivided loyalty even of its own members. Those Unionists who were at the same time members of the SPD -- notably Bergstraesser and Ahl -- continued to profess this membership, since they did not dare surrender the support which a revived SPD could provide. This left the leadership of the Union in the hands of the former Democrat Reiber, with the Democrat Koch and the non-party Walk playing prominent roles. Even the Union's modest secondary aim of becoming the agency through which the independently organized Social Democrats and Communists could achieve a working political cooperation failed when these parties created their own instru-
ment, the Inter-Fraction Committee, to achieve the degree of cooperation they desired.

There was no possibility of the Union's recruiting mass support outside the organizational framework of the older parties, since it was composed of representatives of that very small section of society which is at the same time bourgeois and socialist, and hence had no real contact with any sizeable social group. The result was that when the time for open political activity and organization arrived, the Darmstadt Union had made no gains either in acquiring adherents or in developing any kind of organizational structure in preparation for future expansion. The Unionists now claim that permission to form legal political parties came long before they expected, and that it caught them before they had had time to make touch with and gain a following among the population. Despite the opposition of such enthusiasts as Koch, who believes that the Union could have 4,000 members in Darmstadt, the Unionists have decided not to enter the lists as a political party.

The Union is to continue in existence, but as a political society seeking through common discussion and pressure on all parties of the Left to achieve general aims which cannot be realized by an individual political party. Unionists explain their recession from the party field not only by their unpreparedness, but also by the argument that becoming a third party would not further their aim of achieving a united labor
party. The form of the Union as a political society is to be modeled after the Fabian Society in England and the German Peace Society of pre-Hitler days. The Unionists have approached Danz, the former leader of the Darmstadt pacifists, and obtained from him an assurance that he would not revive the peace society in Darmstadt, but would work through the Union. The Union is thus to provide a forum for common discussion and the working out of common policy by Socialists, Communists and other representatives of the Left on supra-party lines, with the aim of contributing to their ultimate merger into a united labor party. Adherents of the Union are to join the parties of the Left, according to individual preference. The few who are already members of those parties (all, characteristically, members of the SPD) are to remain such. Wall, one of the Union leaders, estimates that of the Union membership some 30 will opt for the SPD, 5 for the KPD.

Thus the Darmstadt Union has now been pushed by the essential conditions of German politics into a position which is much closer than before to that of the parent Union in England (although it still differs on the question of Communist participation). In Darmstadt it has now become clear, as was always clear in England, that the Union does not represent a new and original force in Socialist politics which will replace the older formations, but that it is a coalition instrument of increasingly diminishing importance through which the SPD can garner Socialist splinter groups into its fold.
Political Principles of the Union

The Union rejects both Marxist and Christian bases of socialism as part of its general rejection of all philosophical foundations for politics. The Unionists are what may be called pragmatic socialists, i.e., their socialism rests simply on what they conceive to be the elementary facts of the economic structure and situation in Germany. This basis for socialism is an adaptation of the traditional approach to politics characteristic of bourgeois liberalism, which conceives of the political process as a competition of groups advocating different means within the framework of a single set of ends endorsed equally by all the groups. The Union assumes that the political procedures of a liberal democracy and the humanistic values guaranteed by them constitute the unquestionable ends of the political process. The Unionists consider socialism purely pragmatically, necessary for the maintenance of the political process of democracy and for the solution of the problem of German reconstruction. From this it follows that the Union has and wants no ideology of its own, and rejects all parties that do have ideologies. It aims at a two-party system in which both parties would equally espouse the essential values of political democracy, and contend only concerning capitalistic or socialist measures for the solution of real problems.

The Union considers itself the fittest possible instrument
for achieving a unified party of the Left because it professes to be left of the Social Democrats and therefore the proper mediator between the SPD and the KPD. The claim of this bourgeois group to be more radical than a labor party like the SPD is based on the argument that the leaders of the SPD are old functionaries whose conceptions remain those of the pre-1933 era, whereas the Unionists represent socialist ideas which have derived from the German situation as it has developed to the present. The Union attitude toward the Communists has been best expounded by Bergstraesser in numerous speeches as well as in private interviews: whatever one thinks of Communism, it is a fact in the German situation, and as such it cannot be ignored but must be met by negotiations and compromise. Thus, while the formal line of the Union is to maintain an equal reserve toward both the older parties of the Left as superannuated formations, their liberal approach to politics leads them as individuals to a much closer sympathy with the Social Democrats than with the Communists. Toward the latter they actually maintain, despite the unifying aim of the Union, the usual mistrustful attitude characteristic of Right-wing Socialists.

Thus the Union is not a definite political group advocating a set of substantive political principles. Its representatives even admit that no statement of its principles exists, and that fundamentally its pragmatic approach is such that no
theoretical statement can be made. They point to the program for "The New German Republic" circulated by the London Union as expressive of their own line of thought, but actually this pamphlet has little applicability, since, beyond demanding the nationalization of "key positions" of the German economy, it simply directs attention to the necessity of democratizing all aspects of public life through the agency of self-administrative corporations composed of representatives of all anti-Nazi organizations and possessing supreme local and regional powers. This program has actually been nullified by the fact of total occupation and Military Government, and is being transgressed every day by the Unionists in the administrations.

The Union movement in Darmstadt is part of the same pattern as the circle of intellectual bourgeois socialists which has developed around Alfred Weber in Heidelberg, and it is characteristic that Walk, of the Union, knows Weber well but that there is no question of organized political contact. The Union is a local group, and despite the fiction of belonging to a national movement with its center in London, has no connections outside of Darmstadt, since it represents no national social class and has no political principles on which to found such connections. A group of this kind reached the high point of its influence and had its great opportunity in the chaotic days immediately after the occupation, when even its loose organization was superior to that of the other political groups. With the re-
establishment of institutional forms of society, however, the older political forces, whose strength lies in their tradition and capacity for organization, have gained a definite advantage. Given the broad and flexible nature of German Social Democracy today, the present entrance of the bulk of the Unionists into the Social Democratic fold represents a necessary step and presages the end of the Union as an independent political organization. The general approach which the Union has represented will in all probability appear from now on within the framework of Social Democratic politics.
As in most German cities, the Communists in Darmstadt have become the focus of much apprehension and suspicion. The Right (represented by the Bewegung des Deutschen Aufbaus) hates and vilifies them and has built its Party on an "anti-Bolshevik" basis. The Socialists talk about SPD-KPD collaboration, but invariably insert the qualification that "one can't really trust those Communists until they've proved that they mean what they say." Protestant and Catholic clergymen are preparing to conduct a campaign against the Communists with the latter playing the combined role of Satan and Anti-Christ.

The actual composition and activities of the Darmstadt KPD appear as something of an anti-climax to the great fear the Party inspires among all sections of the Darmstadt population. This is not surprising, for while a well-organized party with an elite of active members can justifiably inspire fear in a revolutionary situation, such a situation does not exist in Darmstadt today, and fear of the Communists within the present relatively stable political pattern of the city has become largely unwarranted. The character of the party is perhaps best typified by its leader, Fritz Woertge, a man in his fifties who headed it before 1933 and who led a small group of illegal party members during the Nazi period. He is hard-working and sincere, but a slow talker and thinker. He was described by a former associate as a man who pores for hours over the Party.
line as it comes to him from Frankfurt, the Bezirk headquarters, and who can talk about nothing else once he has grasped its meaning. He gave the following account of the Darmstadt Communists' present position and aims: During the Nazi period a group of about 40 KPD members carried on illegal operations. Since the time of the American entry into the city membership has increased to approximately 200. The ultimate aim of the Darmstadt KPD is a membership of 400. Thus, even though Woertge believes that popular support for the KPD in Darmstadt has increased considerably (from approximately ten per cent in the 1933 Reichstag elections to approximately 25 per cent at the present time) he is still thinking in terms of a small, select nucleus of active members.

Program and Organization

The Darmstadt KPD program submitted to Military Government as part of the Party's application for legal recognition is almost identical with the program published by the Central Committee of the Party in Berlin. It calls for the erection of a democratic, anti-fascist government, i.e., a parliamentary-democratic republic with all democratic rights, duties, and liberties for the people, and contains a condensation of the ten-point Berlin program.

The Statute of the Darmstadt Communist Party contains a detailed account of membership regulations and organizational structure. It excludes former members of the NSDAP, SS, SA
"as well as functionaries of organizations affiliated to the NSDAP" and all "imperialists and militarists." A prospective member must name three Party members as guarantors for his trustworthiness. The Party Directorate, which must consist of at least nine members and must meet at least once a week, is elected by an assembly of city delegates which in turn is elected by members in the various districts of the city of Darmstadt. One delegate represents every ten members. The Party Directorate elects the Secretariat, which consists of at least three members of the Directorate. It is responsible to the Party Directorate for the execution of current Party resolutions.

In the various city districts, district directorates are elected by "groups of members". These directorates are responsible to district member meetings which are held once a month. The assembly of city delegates formulates programs, passes resolutions, and decides on the amount and method of collection of membership dues. It elects the President of the party and his deputy as well as a so-called "Commission of Examination." This Commission consists of at least three members, none of whom must be a member of the Party Directorate. The Commission accepts complaints against the resolutions of the Party Directorate and decides on disagreements between party members which are brought before it. Its decisions can be vetoed only by the assembly of city delegates. These
members who are excluded from the Party by the Party Directorate may contest their exclusion through the Commission of Examination and the Assembly of City Delegates. They must be given the opportunity of an oral defense.

The Communist Party for Stadtbezirk and Landkreis Darmstadt is responsible to the KPD Bezirksleitung in Frankfurt and is clearly dependent on Frankfurt in matters of program, propaganda, and policy. This dependence is demonstrated by the following two incidents:

1) Recent negotiations for closer collaboration with the Socialists were conducted, not by Woertge, but by Oskar Mueller, the leader of the KPD in the Bezirk Frankfurt.

2) When the Local Government and Administration Officer of the Darmstadt MG Detachment requested a meeting with leading Darmstadt Communists for the purpose of discussing the impending application for the formation of the Communist Party, the meeting was attended by Walter Fisch, KPD Secretary for the Bezirk Frankfurt.

The Communists in Darmstadt Public Affairs

A list of Department Heads and Deputy Department Heads in the Darmstadt city administration (as of September 1945) contains the names of 18 pre-1933 Democrats, 14 Socialists, and two Communists. Even if Communist strength had not increased at all since 1933 (and representatives of all parties are
unanimous in saying that it has) this figure would not be a true representation of Communist voting strength at that time, which was approximately ten per cent of the total popular vote.

It is therefore not surprising that Communist leaders in Darmstadt are greatly dissatisfied with their present representation in the city administration. They are making strong efforts to increase that representation and are having some success. Oberbürgermeister Metzger says that he is going to increase KPD representation in the city administration. At present the Strassenverkehrsamt (Transportation Office) is in charge of a Communist named Hoffmann, and the Wohnungsamt has Feuerfell as its deputy chief. Metzger says that he will appoint a Communist Party member as head of the special winter public welfare campaign and thus increase Communist strength to three top positions. While the Rightist groups are willing to admit that the number of KPD members in the city administration is small, they repeatedly point out that housing and transportation are the most vital public functions at present and allege that having charge of these departments gives the KPD a "stranglehold" on the city. There are stories about the assignment of housing space on the basis of former party affiliation, etc. Whether these stories are true or not (and the present investigation found no basis for them), it must also be pointed out that the very fact that Communists are in charge of two vital public
services which under the prevailing circumstances, cannot be expected to run smoothly, makes them and the Darmstadt KPD vulnerable to much criticism from all sections of the population.

Probably because of Bergstraesser's strong emphasis on SPD cooperation with the Communists, the KPD has been able to obtain a greater representation in the Land administration than in the city administration. However, Woertge is not satisfied with present Communist strength in either. He claims that although the KPD in Darmstadt has less than its share of Fachmaenner (experts) because of the predominantly SPD-Center complexion of the pre-1933 administration and because of its loss of manpower through the Nazi regime, there are still enough able men available to fill a fairly large number of positions satisfactorily. Woertge says that he is willing to wait until prejudice on the side of MG and the other parties has decreased through a realization of the sincere nature of the present KPD democratic program and until the local elections have shown the amount of popular Communist support. He feels sure that this support will prove fairly high, and his opinion is endorsed by both Socialists and Centrists. Estimates of Communist strength from all sides range from 15 to 30 per cent of the total vote. In the meantime, the Socialists are strongly entrenched in the city administration and will continue to remain in control. Representatives of the Center and the Right (as well as some Socialists) continue to claim that the Communists are responsible for rumor campaigns.