A. PRISONERS-OF-WAR.

1. Sources. The most solid evidence comes from a random sample of 321 prisoners captured during the St. Lo breakthrough on 26 and 27 July, interrogated and also opinion polled at Bourton (No. 1. P.W.E), by a S.H.A.E.F. team. Consolidated reports from F.U.S.A., Kempton Park and Brevises, and a large mass of raw material from F.U.S.A. form the rest of the data of this report.

2. Outcome of the War. Quantitative analysis of 321 POW taken at the beginning of the St. Lo attack, less than 20 per cent had any confidence in German victory. This represents a further drop in this category, as compared even to the Cherbourg batch of prisoners. The sample from St. Lo was composed to a large part of men from three badly mauled Inf. Divs., either youngsters or men well over 30 years old, with a sprinkling of wounded veterans put in to stiffen them. The sample is however, representative of a narrow sector of the front at that time. Paratroop elements, for example, when taken separately, showed much more confidence.

Kempton Park, on a sample of unknown size and composition, reports a sharp division between a fanatical group of Hitler devotees who also believe in victory, and a group of defeatists. The correlation between Nazi faith and belief in victory, secret weapons etc. remains high. It is noteworthy, that the Nazis in interrogation are accusing the Allies of "unfairness", i.e. of reliance on material superiority rather than on "soldierly qualities", in which latter they at least can still fancy themselves top dogs.

3. Faith in Hitler. As mentioned last week, this figure stays very constant. It is again about 50 per cent, of which 18 per cent are fanatical devotees - the same group who in the main constitute the "tough core" of the Wehrmacht.

4. Attitude to the Putsch. Officers are non-committal, though in a few instances of more senior men of upper class origin their sympathy with the rebel generals has been clear. In the main our evidence shows that the German soldier, including junior officers, has been quick to identify himself with the Nazi propaganda version of the story and to regard the attempt at killing Hitler and seizing power as traitorous - the work of some retired old malcontents. In the same way, the introduction of the Party salute has been taken as a matter of routine - just a new regulation introduced, like a change in orders about carrying gas-masks.
Nearly all prisoners had heard of the attempt. Those to whom it was announced for the first time reacted according to political convictions. The non-political type appeared to be as uninterested in this as in most other events.

5. "Fight to the last man" orders. The reactions to these were the subject of further study. Few prisoners took up an attitude of "An order is an order." The majority, including a colonel commanding a regiment who was interrogated at length, regarded such orders as a directive for prolonging resistance, on which common-sense interpretation was justified. A small number (in accordance with general attitude to war and regime) were frankly ribald or contemptuous of such a "mad" order, e.g., a saxon peasant: "It was all very well and good, but holding on was senseless."

6. General Morale topics. A group of junior officers POW were confident of German victory, on the grounds that "it would be a crime on the part of the Führer to demand such sacrifices if there were no prospects." They believed Germany had good reserves, shorter lines to hold than previously, that their men's morale was good and unaffected by the Putsch or by Allied propaganda at which they sneered. They also thought Germans would fight even better on German territory.

There is no new information on shortage of officers. Interrogation discloses a slight rise in the number of POW who have doubts or frank mistrust, sometimes contempt, of their officers, which is proportionate to the closeness of the officer to the man. The more remote senior leaders (regimental and higher commanders) are less suspect. It must be added, however, that well over 60 per cent of all POW show confidence and respect for their leaders and describe them in complimentary terms.

7. SS v. Army. There is a considerable rise among all age-groups of POW in expressed dislike of being a soldier, and longing for peace. It must again be stressed that evidence of rivalry or antagonism on the part of the Wehrmacht soldier towards the Waffen SS is not impressive. Soldiers state repeatedly that the Waffen SS is no longer a volunteer body, and that "the boys are conscripted just the same as ourselves and get the toughest jobs." They are indeed regarded as fine troops. The quality of envy, if any, is one based on the Waffen SS getting more publicity.

The police and security troops of the SS are distinguished, come in for a good deal of hostility, and are called by such names as "thugs" and "murderers."
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It would appear that a more genuine cleavage is that between the "sensible fellow" who has had enough and is not going to risk his life unnecessarily, and the "40 per cent Nazi" fanatic, whether he be an officer, an SS man or a paratrooper.

About 80 prisoners, taken at random, were given a written poll which included the following questions:

a) If the Fuehrer should order it, would you fire on German troops who wanted to lay down their arms?

   \[\text{Answers:} \begin{array}{ll}
   \text{Yes} & 4 \text{ per cent.} \\
   \text{No} & 89 \text{ } \\
   \text{No answer} & 7 \text{ } \\
   \end{array}\]

b) Do you think the Waffen SS would shoot on German troops if the Fuehrer ordered it?

   \[\text{Answers:} \begin{array}{ll}
   \text{Yes} & 56 \text{ per cent} \\
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S. News and Allied Propaganda. All observers are impressed by the ignorance of German POW about events on other fronts and Germany. The German in or near the front line in fact relies to a marked degree on Allied leaflets, and to a much lesser extent on radio such as the Atlantik Sender, for obvious reasons. "Nachrichten fur die Truppe" remains the favourite. Nazis attempt to play down the influence of our services, but admit "weak characters" are impressed and that troops widely discuss Allied leaflets. The Commander of the 50th British Div. pays tribute to the influence of Allied propaganda in causing over 200 desertions and more extensive unresisting surrender in his sector since D-day. Copies of our leaflets are brought as "safe conduct" by POW, when an actual "safe conduct pass" was not available to them. There seems to be a latent period between the reception of amplifier broadcasts or a leaflet raid and the appearance of deserters. The Div. has evidence of the popularity and wide discussion of our publicity among enemy troops. Other sources confirm the increased discussion of the outcome of the war among small groups of German soldiers. More POW than last week have reported that their officers had warned them of bad treatment in Anglo-U.S. captivity, but as few as ever in fact feared it.
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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1940</td>
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If you have already registered for the 1939-1940 school year, you are no longer required to register for the current school year. If you have not registered, you must do so by the end of the registration period. If you have any questions, please contact the school office.
9. **Attitude to Surrender**: It is hoped to present a fairly large analysis of POW stories on this important theme. The impression to date is that while the number of active, voluntary deserters is small, there are many men who either wait the Allies passively in their foxholes, surrendering at first opportunity, or offering "token resistance". The latter is usually decided on by an officer or senior NCO who thus satisfies 

![image]

numb and yet saves most of the men under him. In the sample under review, there were few last-ditchers, even retrospectively, despite a tendency of soldiers to dramatize and embellish their own experiences.

10. **Post-War Expectations and Authority**: An important feature of great consistency is the utter lack of political interest or responsibility among large masses of prisoners. They take it for granted that someone "above", their present Führer, some other leader or the Allied authorities will settle the future, and that the "little man" can do nothing about it. This apathy and passivity, coupled with the inability to visualize any movement, group or person other than Goering who would take over after Hitler's fall is very impressive. It is shared even by highly educated and otherwise intelligent POW.

11. **Home Front**: Recently there has been some increase in the number of anxious references to the potential danger of foreign workers as an inner enemy.
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Here is an excerpt from the text:

"...the nature of the office and the work to be done..."

"...part of the office..."

"...for the work..."

"...in the office..."

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12. **Personnel Selection.** An opportunity occurred to interview a former Wehrmacht psychologist, now a paratroop officer. His statements, which can be considered reliable, show that all prewar or psychological selection for the Army and Air Force was abolished some two years ago, and the whole elaborate organization of experts dispersed. The source gave jealousy and reactionary obscurantism as the motive.