WARNING

***

SECURITY

MUST NOT BE USED AT ALL
FOR INFORMATION ONLY

1. The attached is for the PERSONAL information only of yourself and your Head of Section. It is circulated on condition that its contents be neither divulged nor used in any way without express permission.

2. Use may be allowed in exceptional circumstances if application is made to Intelligence Room, PWD, Ext. 105.

3. Under no circumstances may mention be made of locations.
PRISONERS OF WAR

I. Morale: General trends

(a) Two series of interrogations by P.W.D., S.H.A.E.F. interrogators, analyzed by Services Section, comprise a group of 126 German Ps/7 taken early in July near St. Lo - Gercet near the break-through with 195 German Ps/7 taken on 26 and 27 July in the same area during the early phase of the break-through. The results indicate a downward trend in German Army morale in this sector. The basis of this conclusion rests on answers to eight questions in Standard Questionnaire No.2. These eight questions can be taken as crucial indicators of German soldier morale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of capture</th>
<th>Early July</th>
<th>Late July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proportion thinking war will end with German victory or a stalemate</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion having faith in German propaganda</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion with complete faith (or belief with reservations) in National Socialism</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion denying decisive Allied material superiority</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion who are zealous or at least acquiescent soldiers</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion devoted to Hitler or at least generally approving of him</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion trusting senior leaders</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion trusting or respecting immediate officers</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total prisoners interrogated</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decline has been statistically reliable in every instance except in trust and respect for immediate officers.

The significance of these figures is enhanced if it is pointed out that both samples were approximately similar in composition and came from the same area (Gercet - St. Lo). The difference in battle conditions at the time of the respective surrenders should however, be noted.

Analysis of the above results by types of units showed, as might be expected, that the paratroopers suffered less deterioration of morale.
The Panzer Lehr Division (once the crack Armoured formation) showed considerable lowering of morale in the later sample, after heavy mauling in the field.

(b) A very recent sample of paratroopers captured at St Malo belonging to 2 and 5 Para Divs. showed (on a write-in poll) a 65 per cent faith in German victory among 118 N.C.O.'s and men. The N.C.O.'s taken alone had 78 per cent of believers in victory. The contribution to prolonged resistance made by such high-morale units or individuals is out of proportion to their number. By contrast, 34 members of a Signals unit (38 Nachrichten Abt.) taken from the same area showed a 14 per cent belief in victory. A small group of Flak men was intermediate between these two extremes.

It is clear that in Psychological Warfare operations there is constant need for proper tactical intelligence as to the type of unit we are attacking.

2. Officer/Man Relationship

The P.W.O.'s, S.M.I.S.R. Interrogation (referred to in 1 (a)) further shows that while there is a phenomenal drop in some of the morale indices of Pa/W, nevertheless trust by the soldier in his leaders - Hitler himself, and in both senior and junior officers, remains relatively steady. This indicates that a psychological appeal to the officer, who holds his men together through their allegiance to him, is necessary. A recently captured booklet issued by the O.K.W. shows how aware the Germans are of this problem. It is devoted to intensive indoctrination of officers to be just, fair and exemplary in the handling of their men, especially of new entries.

3. Officer Morale

A batch of some 30 recently captured junior combat infantry and artillery officers are of very solid Nazi faith and show few signs of surrender mentality. An equal number of medical, supply and administration officers present an almost defeatist picture, and their faith in National Socialism is lower. For both groups it can be stated that the more senior in years or rank the officer is, the more defeatist he is.

The group's attitude towards the outcome of the war was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Administrative</th>
<th>Combat</th>
<th>Supply, Medical</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany wins</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stalemate or Compromise</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubt</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German defeat</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The full impression of the combat officer's lack of surrender mentality is established by the fact that almost all of those who expressed doubt about the outcome of the war continued resistance of their units until actually overrun.

The difference in degree of acceptance of National Socialism between the combat and non-combat officers, as set forth below is largely a function of age.
The administrative and supply officers were captured mainly in the St Malo area, while the combat officers came from a wide variety of Divisions including the 266, 326, 353, 363, 709 Inf. Div. and the 2 Panzer Div.

4. Esprit de Corps

Consciousness of being well-equipped and proud in one's unit are shown to be closely connected. Here the S.S. and Para troopers score heavily. Some nicknames among crack troops may be of interest. 21 Panzer Div. was called by its members "Harakiri Div." before D-Day, and "Teufel Div." (The Devil's Own Div.) after it, indicating its own valuation of its role in Normandy.

9 S.S. Pz. Div. "Hohenstaufen" bears the nickname of "Feuerwehr" (Fire Brigade) Div., to show its function in being thrown in to save desperate situations.

By contrast, foot-slogging infantry regiments, and especially "Marsch" Battalions, are ashamed of their units because insufficiently equipped with heavy support weapons and transport. They comment on lack of air and tank support. One Pz/W from the 206 Tank Bn. remarked: "Now are we to win a war with the same weapons with which the French in 1940 lost theirs?"

Reports about the widespread split between the Waffen S.S. and the Wehrmacht should be treated cautiously. Friction and envy occur, but bear a limited relation to behaviour in battle, where the infantry often admire the superior qualities of their S.S. comrades.

5. Desertion

It remains difficult to make quantitative assessments of desertion, self-inflicted injury etc., but these are talked about a good deal. So far as desertion to the Allied side is concerned, Pz/W frequently state that they are deterred by the dangers and physical difficulties. "By day our people shoot us, and by night your people", as it is put by them. In addition, they are held back by fear of retaliation on their people at home, and the typically German scruple of "Ehrenverlust" (loss of honour) involved in desertion.

6. Penetration and Credibility of Allied Leaflets

On 3 August at the F.W.B., S.H.A.E.F. Cage, a write-in poll by 200 Pz/W showed that 168 (84%) had seen leaflets and of these, 127 (75%) believed their contents. The high figure should be somewhat discounted as the 200 Pz/W were a "low morale group."

This represents a considerable increase over earlier figures. While there was no relationship between the type of prisoner and his picking up and reading of leaflets (i.e. both "good" and "bad" soldiers did so), there was a large difference of credence in what they read, as between good and bad soldiers. The latter, having lost faith in their own group, were more ready to accept what the Allies had to say. Clearly, as the military situation induces greater fatigue and disillusionment, so our leaflets will
become cumulatively more effective. Full details of this particular study will be found in a special report to be circulated by P.M.D. Intelligence (Surveys Section).

Expectation of good treatment in captivity continues to be the attitude of the average Pz/N, but all manner of torment is feared by the S.S. and paratroopers in a fair number of cases.

7. Interest in U.S. participation in War

This is a topic which has recurred frequently in the minds of some older Pz/N. They wonder why this far-off Transatlantic power should mix herself in the quarrels of Europe. Frank replies that the U.S. have done so because of the need to defend human liberties and democracy produce a sense of satisfaction if not admiration. "That's what it is" - "Ah - so it is the Nazis they don't want". The impression is that they wish to clear their minds of some misapprehension, probably the result of Nazi indoctrination which they have not quite accepted.

8. A Last Ditch

An Oberstumfuehrer (Captain) of S.S. Pz. Gren., asked during interrogation about the chances of desperate resistance on German soil, replied he thought reckless, self-destructive death-or-glory fighting was a likely alternative which his soldiers would choose in preference to the certain prospect of slavery, deportation or wholesale sterilisation. He was a nervous, whimpering ex-Police officer, and stated he would rather commit suicide than be sent to Russia.

This case, while isolated, may be indicative of S.S. attitudes (see also end of para 6 above).

9. Morale in the "Pocket"

A 24 A.G. report, dated 13 August, rates the morale of 35 men captured near Conde as extremely low. Their story is always of being cut off by Allied armour and surrendering in small groups.

British safe conduct passes are very effective and snatched up as "talismane".

"Nachrichten fur die Truppe" are eagerly read as almost the only news available.

30 Corps reports specifically that no "hold on to the last man and cartridge" orders have been issued in the present situation.

Distribution:

General McClure
Col Roche
Col Keay
Mr J. Jackson
Mr Crossman
Mr Oechner
Mr Raath
Mr Adams
Lt Col Whitaker
Captain Herz

Plans & Directives (5)
Intelligence (2)
Leaflets
Radio
Training
Consolidation
Communications
Films
Publications & Displays
News

Press
Surveys
A.I.S. (2)
F.W. forward SHAPE
P & PW 12 A.G. (6)
P & PW 21 A.G. (6)
P.I.D (Col Chambers) (3)
O.S.S. - R & A (4)
O.S.S. - MO (3)
O.S.S. (Maj. Coollidge)
O.N.I (Mr Backer)