Some Neglected Points
—in the—
Theory of Socialism.

BY

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AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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(See 3d cover page.)
SOME NEGLECTED POINTS IN THE THEORY OF SOCIALISM.

The immediate occasion for the writing of this paper was given by the publication of Mr. Spencer's essay, "From Freedom to Bondage"; although it is not altogether a criticism of that essay. It is not my purpose to controvert the position taken by Mr. Spencer as regards the present feasibility of any socialist scheme. The paper is mainly a suggestion, offered in the spirit of the disciple, with respect to a point not adequately covered by Mr. Spencer's discussion, and which has received but very scanty attention at the hands of any other writer on either side of the socialist controversy. This main point is as to an economic ground, as a matter of fact, for the existing unrest that finds expression in the demands of socialist agitators.

I quote from Mr. Spencer's essay a sentence which does fair justice, so far as it goes, to the position taken by agitators: "In presence of obvious improvements, joined with that increase of longevity, which even alone yields conclusive proof of general amelioration, it is proclaimed, with increasing vehemence, that things are so bad that society must be pulled to pieces and reorganized on another plan." The most obtrusive feature of the change demanded by the advocates of socialism is governmental control of the industrial activities of society—the nationalization of industry. There is also, just at present, a distinct movement in practice, towards a more extended control of industry by the government, as Mr. Spencer has pointed out. This movement strengthens the position of the advocates of a complete nationalization of industry, by making it appear that the logic of events is on their side.

In America at least, this movement in the direction of a broader assertion of the paramount claims of the community,

*Introductory paper of "A Plea for Liberty"; edited by Thomas Mackay.

[345]
and an extension of corporate action on part of the community in industrial matters, has not generally been connected with or based on an adherence to socialistic dogmas. This is perhaps truer of the recent past than of the immediate present. The motive of the movement has been, in large part, the expediency of each particular step taken. Municipal supervision, and, possibly, complete municipal control, has come to be a necessity in the case of such industries—mostly of recent growth—as elementary education, street-lighting, water-supply, etc. Opinions differ widely as to how far the community should take into its own hands such industries as concern the common welfare, but the growth of sentiment may fairly be said to favor a wider scope of governmental control.

But the necessity of some supervision in the interest of the public extends to industries which are not simply of municipal importance. The modern development of industry and of the industrial organization of society makes it increasingly necessary that certain industries—often spoken of as "natural monopolies"—should be treated as being of a semi-public character. And through the action of the same forces a constantly increasing number of occupations are developing into the form of "natural monopolies."

The motive of the movement towards corporate action on the part of the community—State control of industry—has been largely that of industrial expediency. But another motive has gone with this one, and has grown more prominent as the popular demands in this direction have gathered wider support and taken more definite form. The injustice, the inequality, of the existing system, so far as concerns these natural monopolies especially, are made much of. There is a distinct unrest abroad, a discontent with things as they are, and the cry of injustice is the expression of this more or less widely prevalent discontent. This discontent is the truly socialistic element in the situation.

It is easy to make too much of this popular unrest. The clamor of the agitators might be taken to indicate a wider prevalence and a greater acuteness of popular discontent than actually exists; but after all due allowance is made for exag-
Neglected Points of Socialism.

Neglected Points of Socialism. 59

geration on the part of those interested in the agitation, there can still be no doubt of the presence of a chronic feeling of dissatisfaction with the working of the existing industrial system, and a growth of popular sentiment in favor of a leveling policy. The economic ground of this popular feeling must be found, if we wish to understand the significance, for our industrial system, of the movement to which it supplies the motive. If its causes shall appear to be of a transient character, there is little reason to apprehend a permanent or radical change of our industrial system as the outcome of the agitation; while if this popular sentiment is found to be the outgrowth of any of the essential features of the existing social system, the chances of its ultimately working a radical change in the system will be much greater.

The explanation offered by Mr. Spencer, that the popular unrest is due essentially to a feeling of ennui—to a desire for a change of posture on part of the social body, is assuredly not to be summarily rejected; but the analogy will hardly serve to explain the sentiment away. This may be a cause, but it can hardly be accepted as a sufficient cause.

Socialist agitators urge that the existing system is necessarily wasteful and industrially inefficient. That may be granted, but it does not serve to explain the popular discontent, because the popular opinion, in which the discontent resides, does notoriously not favor that view. They further urge that the existing system is unjust, in that it gives an advantage to one man over another. That contention may also be true, but it is in itself no explanation, for it is true only if it be granted that the institutions which make this advantage of one man over another possible are unjust, and that is begging the question. This last contention is, however, not so far out of line with popular sentiment. The advantage complained of lies, under modern conditions, in the possession of property, and there is a feeling abroad that the existing order of things affords an undue advantage to property, especially to owners of property whose possessions rise much above a certain rather indefinite average. This feeling of injured justice is not al-
ways distinguishable from envy; but it is, at any rate, a factor that works towards a leveling policy. With it goes a feeling of slighted manhood, which works in the same direction. Both these elements are to a great extent of a subjective origin. They express themselves in the general, objective form, but it is safe to say that on the average they spring from a consciousness of disadvantage and slight suffered by the person expressing them, and by persons whom he classes with himself. No flippancy is intended in saying that the rich are not so generally alive to the necessity of any leveling policy as are people of slender means. Any question as to the legitimacy of the dissatisfaction, on moral grounds, or even on grounds of expediency, is not very much to the point; the question is as to its scope and its chances of persistence.

The modern industrial system is based on the institution of private property under free competition, and it cannot be claimed that these institutions have heretofore worked to the detriment of the material interests of the average member of society. The ground of discontent cannot lie in a disadvantageous comparison of the present with the past, so far as material interests are concerned. It is notorious, and, practically, none of the agitators deny, that the system of industrial competition, based on private property, has brought about, or has at least co-existed with, the most rapid advance in average wealth and industrial efficiency that the world has seen. Especially can it fairly be claimed that the result of the last few decades of our industrial development has been to increase greatly the creature comforts within the reach of the average human being. And, decidedly, the result has been an amelioration of the lot of the less favored in a relatively greater degree than that of those economically more fortunate. The claim that the system of competition has proved itself an engine for making the rich richer and the poor poorer has the fascination of epigram; but if its meaning is that the lot of the average, of the masses of humanity in civilized life, is worse to-day, as measured in the means of livelihood, than it was twenty, or fifty, or a hundred years
NEGLECTED POINTS OF SOCIALISM.

ago, then it is farcical. The cause of discontent must be sought elsewhere than in any increased difficulty in obtaining the means of subsistence or of comfort. But there is a sense in which the aphorism is true, and in it lies at least a partial explanation of the unrest which our conservative people so greatly deprecate. The existing system has not made, and does not tend to make, the industrious poor poorer as measured absolutely in means of livelihood; but it does tend to make them relatively poorer, in their own eyes, as measured in terms of comparative economic importance, and, curious as it may seem at first sight, that is what seems to count. It is not the abjectly poor that are oftenest heard protesting; and when a protest is heard in their behalf it is through spokesmen who are from outside their own class, and who are not delegated to speak for them. They are not a negligible element in the situation, but the unrest which is ground for solicitude does not owe its importance to them. The protest comes from those who do not habitually, or of necessity, suffer physical privation. The qualification "of necessity," is to be noticed. There is a not inconsiderable amount of physical privation suffered by many people in this country, which is not physically necessary. The cause is very often that what might be the means of comfort is diverted to the purpose of maintaining a decent appearance, or even a show of luxury.

Man as we find him to-day has much regard to his good fame—to his standing in the esteem of his fellow-men. This characteristic he always has had, and no doubt always will have. This regard for reputation may take the noble form of a striving after a good name; but the existing organization of society does not in any way pre-eminently foster that line of development. Regard for one's reputation means, in the average of cases, emulation. It is a striving to be, and more immediately to be thought to be, better than one's neighbor. Now, modern society, the society in which competition without prescription is predominant, is pre-eminently an industrial, economic society, and it is industrial—economic—excellence that most readily attracts the approving regard of that society.

[349]
Integrity and personal worth will, of course, count for something, now as always; but in the case of a person of moderate pretensions and opportunities, such as the average of us are, one's reputation for excellence in this direction does not penetrate far enough into the very wide environment to which a person is exposed in modern society to satisfy even a very modest craving for respectability. To sustain one's dignity—and to sustain one's self-respect—under the eyes of people who are not socially one's immediate neighbors, it is necessary to display the token of economic worth, which practically coincides pretty closely with economic success. A person may be well-born and virtuous, but those attributes will not bring respect to the bearer from people who are not aware of his possessing them, and these are ninety-nine out of every one hundred that one meets. Conversely, by the way, knavery and vulgarity in any person are not reprobated by people who know nothing of the person's shortcomings in those respects.

In our fundamentally industrial society a person should be economically successful, if he would enjoy the esteem of his fellowmen. When we say that a man is "worth" so many dollars, the expression does not convey the idea that moral or other personal excellence is to be measured in terms of money, but it does very distinctly convey the idea that the fact of his possessing many dollars is very much to his credit. And, except in cases of extraordinary excellence, efficiency in any direction which is not immediately of industrial importance, and does not redound to a person's economic benefit, is not of great value as a means of respectability. Economic success is in our day the most widely accepted as well as the most readily ascertainable measure of esteem. All this will hold with still greater force of a generation which is born into a world already encrusted with this habit of a mind.

But there is a further, secondary stage in the development of this economic emulation. It is not enough to possess the talisman of industrial success. In order that it may mend one's good fame efficiently, it is necessary to display it. One does not "make much of a showing" in the eyes of the large
majority of the people whom one meets with, except by unremitting demonstration of ability to pay. That is practically the only means which the average of us have of impressing our respectability on the many to whom we are personally unknown, but whose transient good opinion we would so gladly enjoy. So it comes about that the appearance of success is very much to be desired, and is even in many cases preferred to the substance. We all know how nearly indispensable it is to afford whatever expenditure other people with whom we class ourselves can afford, and also that it is desirable to afford a little something more than others.

This element of human nature has much to do with the "standard of living." And it is of a very elastic nature, capable of an indefinite extension. After making proper allowance for individual exceptions and for the action of prudential restraints, it may be said, in a general way, that this emulation in expenditure stands ever ready to absorb any margin of income that remains after ordinary physical wants and comforts have been provided for, and, further, that it presently becomes as hard to give up that part of one's habitual "standard of living" which is due to the struggle for respectability, as it is to give up many physical comforts. In a general way, the need of expenditure in this direction grows as fast as the means of satisfying it, and, in the long run, a large expenditure comes no nearer satisfying the desire than a smaller one.

It comes about through the working of this principle that even the creature comforts, which are in themselves desirable, and, it may even be, requisite to a life on a passably satisfactory plane, acquire a value as a means of respectability quite independent of, and out of proportion to, their simple utility as a means of livelihood. As we are all aware, the chief element of value in many articles of apparel is not their efficiency for protecting the body, but for protecting the wearer's respectability; and that not only in the eyes of one's neighbors but even in one's own eyes. Indeed, it happens not very rarely that a person chooses to go ill-clad in order to be well dressed.

[351]
Much more than half the value of what is worn by the American people may confidently be put down to the element of "dress," rather than to that of "clothing." And the chief motive of dress is emulation—what I have ventured to designate as "economic emulation." The like is true, though perhaps in a less degree, of what goes to food and shelter.

This misdirection of effort through the cravings of human vanity is of course not anything new, nor is "economic emulation" a modern fact. The modern system of industry has not invented emulation, nor has even this particular form of emulation originated under that system. But the system of free competition has accentuated this form of emulation, both by exalting the industrial activity of man above the rank which it held under more primitive forms of social organization, and by in great measure cutting off other forms of emulation from the chance of efficiently ministering to the craving for a good fame. Speaking generally and from the standpoint of the average man, the modern industrial organization of society has practically narrowed the scope of emulation to this one line; and at the same time it has made the means of sustenance and comfort so much easier to obtain as very materially to widen the margin of human exertion that can be devoted to purposes of emulation. Further, by increasing the freedom of movement of the individual and widening the environment to which the individual is exposed—increasing the number of persons before whose eyes each one carries on his life, and, pari passu, decreasing the chances which such persons have of awarding their esteem on any other basis than that of immediate appearances, it has increased the relative efficiency of the economic means of winning respect through a show of expenditure for personal comforts.

It is not probable that further advance in the same direction will lead to a different result in the immediate future; and it is the immediate future we have to deal with. A further advance in the efficiency of our industry, and a further widening of the human environment to which the individual is exposed, should logically render emulation in this direction more intense. There
are, indeed, certain considerations to be set off against this
tendency, but they are mostly factors of slow action, and are
hardly of sufficient consequence to reverse the general rule.
On the whole, other things remaining the same, it must be ad-
mitted that, within wide limits, the easier the conditions of
physical life for modern civilized man become, and the wider
the horizon of each and the extent of the personal contact of
each with his fellowmen, and the greater the opportunity of each
to compare notes with his fellows, the greater will be the pre-
ponderance of economic success as a means of emulation, and
the greater the straining after economic respectability. Inas-
much as the aim of emulation is not any absolute degree of
comfort or of excellence, no advance in the average well-being
of the community can end the struggle or lessen the strain.
A general amelioration cannot quiet the unrest whose source
is the craving of everybody to compare favorably with his
neighbor.
Human nature being what it is, the struggle of each to possess
more than his neighbor is inseparable from the institution of
private property. And also, human nature being what it is, one
who possesses less will, on the average, be jealous of the one
who possesses more; and "more" means not more than the
average share, but more than the share of the person who makes
the comparison. The criterion of complacency is, largely, the
de facto possession or enjoyment; and the present growth of
sentiment among the body of the people—who possess less—
favors, in a vague way, a readjustment adverse to the interests
of those who possess more, and adverse to the possibility of
legitimately possessing or enjoying "more;" that is to say,
the growth of sentiment favors a socialistic movement. The
outcome of modern industrial development has been, so far as
concerns the present purpose, to intensify emulation and the
jealousy that goes with emulation, and to focus the emulation
and the jealousy on the possession and enjoyment of material
goods. The ground of the unrest with which we are concerned
is, very largely, jealousy,—envy, if you choose; and the
ground of this particular form of jealousy, that makes for
socialism, is to be found in the institution of private property. With private property, under modern conditions, this jealousy and unrest are unavoidable.

The corner-stone of the modern industrial system is the institution of private property. That institution is also the objective point of all attacks upon the existing system of competitive industry, whether open or covert, whether directed against the system as a whole or against any special feature of it. It is, moreover, the ultimate ground—and, under modern conditions, necessarily so—of the unrest and discontent whose proximate cause is the struggle for economic respectability. The inference seems to be that, human nature being what it is, there can be no peace from this—it must be admitted—ignoble form of emulation, or from the discontent that goes with it, this side of the abolition of private property. Whether a larger measure of peace is in store for us after that event shall have come to pass, is of course not a matter to be counted on, nor is the question immediately to the point.

This economic emulation is of course not the sole motive, nor the most important feature, of modern industrial life; although it is in the foreground, and it pervades the structure of modern society more thoroughly perhaps than any other equally powerful moral factor. It would be rash to predict that socialism will be the inevitable outcome of a continued development of this emulation and the discontent which it fosters, and it is by no means the purpose of this paper to insist on such an inference. The most that can be claimed is that this emulation is one of the causes, if not the chief cause, of the existing unrest and dissatisfaction with things as they are; that this unrest is inseparable from the existing system of industrial organization; and that the growth of popular sentiment under the influence of these conditions is necessarily adverse to the institution of private property, and therefore adverse to the existing industrial system of free competition.

The emulation to which attention has been called in the preceding section of this paper is not only a fact of importance to an understanding of the unrest that is urging us towards an
NEGLECTED POINTS OF SOCIALISM. 67

untried path in social development, but it has also a bearing on the question of the practicability of any scheme for the complete nationalization of industry. Modern industry has developed to such a degree of efficiency as to make the struggle for subsistence alone, under average conditions, relatively easy, as compared with the state of the case a few generations ago. As I have labored to show, the modern competitive system has at the same time given the spirit of emulation such a direction that the attainment of subsistence and comfort no longer fixes, even approximately, the limit of the required aggregate labor on the part of the community. Under modern conditions the struggle for existence has, in a very appreciable degree, been transformed into a struggle to keep up appearances. The ultimate ground of this struggle to keep up appearances by otherwise unnecessary expenditure, is the institution of private property. Under a régime which should allow no inequality of acquisition or of income, this form of emulation, which is due to the possibility of such inequality, would also tend to become obsolete. With the abolition of private property, the characteristic of human nature which now finds its exercise in this form of emulation, should logically find exercise in other, perhaps nobler and socially more serviceable, activities; it is at any rate not easy to imagine it running into any line of action more futile or less worthy of human effort.

Supposing the standard of comfort of the community to remain approximately at its present average, the abolition of the struggle to keep up economic appearances would very considerably lessen the aggregate amount of labor required for the support of the community. How great a saving of labor might be effected is not easy to say. I believe it is within the mark to suppose that the struggle to keep up appearances is chargeable, directly and indirectly, with one-half the aggregate labor, and abstinence from labor—for the standard of respectability requires us to shun labor as well as to enjoy the fruits of it—on part of the American people. This does not mean that the same community, under a system not allowing private property, could make its way with half the labor
we now put forth; but it means something more or less nearly approaching that. Anyone who has not seen our modern social life from this point of view will find the claim absurdly extravagant, but the startling character of the proposition will wear off with longer and closer attention to this aspect of the facts of everyday life. But the question of the exact amount of waste due to this factor is immaterial. It will not be denied that it is a fact of considerable magnitude, and that is all that the argument requires.

It is accordingly competent for the advocates of the nationalization of industry and property to claim that even if their scheme of organization should prove less effective for production of goods than the present, as measured absolutely in terms of the aggregate output of our industry, yet the community might readily be maintained at the present average standard of comfort. The required aggregate output of the nation's industry would be considerably less than at present, and there would therefore be less necessity for that close and strenuous industrial organization and discipline of the members of society under the new régime, whose evils unfriendly critics are apt to magnify. The chances of practicability for the scheme should logically be considerably increased by this lessening of the necessity for severe application. The less irksome and exacting the new régime, the less chance of a reversion to the earlier system.

Under such a social order, where common labor would no longer be a mark of peculiar economic necessity and consequent low economic rank on part of the laborer, it is even conceivable that labor might practically come to assume that character of nobility in the eyes of society at large, which it now sometimes assumes in the speculations of the well-to-do, in their complacent moods. Much has sometimes been made of this possibility by socialist speculators, but the inference has something of a utopian look, and no one, certainly, is entitled to build institutions for the coming social order on this dubious ground.

What there seems to be ground for claiming is that a society
which has reached our present degree of industrial efficiency would not go into the Socialist or Nationalist state with as many chances of failure as a community whose industrial development is still at the stage at which strenuous labor on the part of nearly all members is barely sufficient to make both ends meet.

In Mr. Spencer's essay, in conformity with the line of argument of his "Principles of Sociology," it is pointed out that, as the result of constantly operative social forces, all social systems, as regards the form of organization, fall into the one or the other of Sir Henry Maine's two classes—the system of status or the system of contract. In accordance with this generalization it is concluded that whenever the modern system of contract or free competition shall be displaced, it will necessarily be replaced by the only other known system—that of status; the type of which is the military organization, or, also, a hierarchy, or a bureaucracy. It is something after the fashion of the industrial organization of ancient Peru that Mr. Spencer pictures as the inevitable sequel of the demise of the existing competitive system. Voluntary cooperation can be replaced only by compulsory cooperation, which is identified with the system of status and defined as the subjection of man to his fellow-man.

Now, at least as a matter of speculation, this is not the only alternative. These two systems, of status, or prescription, and of contract, or competition, have divided the field of social organization between them in some proportion or other in the past. Mr. Spencer has shown that, very generally, where human progress in its advanced stages has worked towards the amelioration of the lot of the average member of society, the movement has been away from the system of status and towards the system of contract. But there is at least one, if not more than one exception to the rule, as concerns the recent past. The latest development of the industrial organization among civilized nations—perhaps in an especial degree in the case of the American people—has not been entirely a continuation of the approach to a régime of free contract. It is also,
to say the least, very doubtful if the movement has been towards a régime of status, in the sense in which Sir Henry Maine uses the term. This is especially evident in the case of the great industries which we call "natural monopolies;" and it is to be added that the present tendency is for a continually increasing proportion of the industrial activities of the community to fall into the category of "natural monopolies." No revolution has been achieved; the system of competition has not been discarded, but the course of industrial development is not in the direction of an extension of that system at all points; nor does the principle of status always replace that of competition wherever the latter fails.

The classification of methods of social organization under the two heads of status or of contract, is not logically exhaustive. There is nothing in the meaning of the terms employed which will compel us to say that whenever man escapes from the control of his fellow man, under a system of status, he thereby falls into a system of free contract. There is a conceivable escape from the dilemma, and it is this conceivable, though perhaps impracticable, escape from both these systems that the socialist agitator wishes to effect. An acquaintance with the aims and position of the more advanced and consistent advocates of a new departure leaves no doubt but that the principles of contract and of status, both, are in substance familiar to their thoughts—though often in a vague and inadequate form—and that they distinctly repudiate both. This is perhaps less true of those who take the socialist position mainly on ethical grounds.

As bearing on this point it may be remarked that while the industrial system, in the case of all communities with whose history we are acquainted, has always in the past been organized according to a scheme of status or of contract, or of the two combined in some proportion, yet the social organization has not in all cases developed along the same lines, so far as concerns such social functions as are not primarily industrial. Especially is this true of the later stages in the development of those communities whose institutions we are
accustomed to contemplate with the most complacency, e.g.,
the case of the English-speaking peoples. The whole system
of modern constitutional government in its latest developed forms,
in theory at least, and, in a measure, in practice, does not fall
under the head of either contract or status. It is the analogy
of modern constitutional government through an impersonal
law and impersonal institutions, that comes nearest doing
justice to the vague notions of our socialist propagandists.
It is true, some of the most noted among them are fond of
the analogy of the military organization, as a striking illustra-
tion of one feature of the system they advocate, but that must
after all be taken as an obiter dictum.

Further, as to the manner of the evolution of existing insti-
tutions and their relation to the two systems spoken of. So
far as concerns the communities which have figured largely in
the civilized world, the political organization has had its
origin in a military system of government. So, also, has the
industrial organization. But while the development of indus-
try, during its gradual escape from the military system of
status, has been, at least until lately, in the direction of a
system of free contract, the development of the political
organization, so far as it has escaped from the régime of
status, has not been in that direction. The system of status
is a system of subjection to personal authority,—of prescrip-
tion and class distinctions, and privileges and immunities;
the system of constitutional government, especially as seen
at its best among a people of democratic traditions and habits
of mind, is a system of subjection to the will of the social
organism, as expressed in an impersonal law. This difference
between the system of status and the "constitutional system"
expresses a large part of the meaning of the boasted free
institutions of the English-speaking people. Here, subjection
is not to the person of the public functionary, but to the
powers vested in him. This has, of course, something of the
ring of latter-day popular rhetoric, but it is after all felt to be
ture, not only speculatively, but in some measure also in
practice.
The right of eminent domain and the power to tax, as interpreted under modern constitutional forms, indicate something of the direction of development of the political functions of society at a point where they touch the province of the industrial system. It is along the line indicated by these and kindred facts that the socialists are advancing; and it is along this line that the later developments made necessary by the exigencies of industry under modern conditions are also moving. The aim of the propagandists is to sink the industrial community in the political community; or perhaps better, to identify the two organizations; but always with insistence on the necessity of making the political organization, in some further developed form, the ruling and only one in the outcome. Distinctly, the system of contract is to be done away with; and equally distinctly, no system of status is to take its place. All this is pretty vague, and of a negative character, but it would quickly pass the limits of legitimate inference from the accepted doctrines of the socialists if it should attempt to be anything more. It does not have much to say as to the practicability of any socialist scheme. As a matter of speculation, there seems to be an escape from the dilemma insisted on by Mr. Spencer. We may conceivably have nationalism without status and without contract. In theory, both principles are entirely obnoxious to that system. The practical question, as to whether modern society affords the materials out of which an industrial structure can be erected on a system different from either of these, is a problem of constructive social engineering which calls for a consideration of details far too comprehensive to be entered on here. Still, in view of the past course of development of character and institutions on the part of the people to which we belong, it is perhaps not extravagant to claim that no form of organization which should necessarily eventuate in a thorough-going system of status could endure among us. The inference from this proposition may be, either that a near approach to nationalization of industry would involve a régime of status, a bureaucracy, which would be unendurable, and which would there-
fore drive us back to the present system before it had been entirely abandoned; or that the nationalization would be achieved with such a measure of success, in conformity with the requirements of our type of character, as would make it preferable to what we had left behind. In either case the ground for alarm does not seem so serious as is sometimes imagined.

A reversion to the system of free competition, after it had been in large part discarded, would no doubt be a matter of great practical difficulty, and the experiment which should demonstrate the necessity of such a step might involve great waste and suffering, and might seriously retard the advance of the race toward something better than our present condition; but neither a permanent deterioration of human society, nor a huge catastrophe, is to be confidently counted on as the outcome of the movement toward nationalization, even if it should prove necessary for society to retrace its steps.

It is conceivable that the application of what may be called the "constitutional method" to the organization of industry—for that is essentially what the advocates of Nationalization demand—would result in a course of development analogous to what has taken place in the case of the political organization under modern constitutional forms. Modern constitutional government—the system of modern free institutions—is by no means an unqualified success, in the sense of securing to each the rights and immunities which in theory are guaranteed to him.

Our modern republics have hardly given us a foretaste of that political millennium whereof they proclaim the fruition. The average human nature is as yet by no means entirely fit for self-government according to the "constitutional method." Shortcomings are visible at every turn. These shortcomings are grave enough to furnish serious arguments against the practicability of our free institutions. On the continent of Europe the belief seems to be at present in the ascendant that man must yet, for a long time, remain under the tutelage of absolutism before he shall be fit to organize himself into an
autonomous political body. The belief is not altogether irrational. Just how great must be the advance of society and just what must be the character of the advance, preliminary to its advantageously assuming the autonomous—republican—form of political organization, must be admitted to be an open question. Whether we, or any people, have yet reached the required stage of the advance is also questioned by many. But the partial success which has attended the movement in this direction, among the English-speaking people for example, goes very far towards proving that the point in the development of human character at which the constitutional method may be advantageously adopted in the political field, lies far this side the point at which human nature shall have become completely adapted for that method. That is to say, it does not seem necessary, as regards the functions of society which we are accustomed to call political, to be entirely ready for nationalization before entering upon it. How far the analogy of this will hold when applied to the industrial organization of society is difficult to say, but some significance the analogy must be admitted to possess.

Certainly, the fact that constitutional government—the nationalization of political functions—seems to have been a move in the right direction is not to be taken as proof of the advisability of forthwith nationalizing the industrial functions. At the same time this fact does afford ground for the claim that a movement in this direction may prove itself in some degree advantageous, even if it takes place at a stage in the development of human nature at which mankind is still far from being entirely fit for the duties which the new system shall impose. The question, therefore, is not whether we have reached the perfection of character which would be necessary in order to a perfect working of the scheme of nationalization of industry, but whether we have reached such a degree of development as would make an imperfect working of the scheme possible.

T. B. Veblen.

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Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*. The work is divided into three volumes. The total number of pages is 2,265. There are eight parts devoted to the discussion entitled respectively (1) the state of sociology, (2) the inductions of sociology, (3) domestic institutions, (4) ceremonial institutions, (5) political institutions, (6) ecclesiastical institutions, (7) professional institutions, (8) industrial institutions.

It is not possible to present an adequate and lucid discussion of a work of this size and scope in an hour or two. Instead of attempting such a presentation I have under the circumstances thought that my task can best be performed by introducing the taking up of one of the eight parts as an example of the whole. Then I will state my brief general conclusions in the other seven parts. These will constitute a brief mind set in the other seven parts.

+ a description of Spencer's method of treating sociology. This method involves the kind of criticisms to which both this method statement of the kind of conclusions that have been subjected will conclude the paper.
II - Part I. The Data of Sociology

Of the eight parts into which the work is divided, the
first entitled "The Data of Sociology," will be the best to take
in special presentation, because it shows the place of social
in the Synthetic Philosophy, because it contains the dis-
cussion of those institutions with which the members
of society are acquainted.

1. Religions institutions.

Part I opens then, with the reminder that in First Principles
the two main kinds of evolution are outlined — (1) organic ev., (2) or
social ev., and (3) super-organic ev. Spencer and his
followers, who have occupied two volumes on Ethics and Soci-
ology, devoted four volumes to Psychology. Spencer
regarded historical or true organic ev. as the one by
which the co-ordinated actions of many individuals,
"all these processes a product of sociology" by
which he means "all these processes a product of sociology." (1, 4)

Social phenomena are due to two types of factors: the
original, or "natural," factors or conditions
and the derived, or "social," factors. The original factors are:

1. Climatic, surface, flora, fauna — it
influences which men live.
2. The character of men as they are,
physical, emotional, intellectual.
3. The derived, or "social," factors are those which, through institutionalization
of the actions of men, such as:
4. The increasing size of its social agencies,
5. The accumulation of super-organic products — such as
tools, language, knowledge, customs, laws, aesthetic products.

Having listed these factors whose interactions produce social
phenomena, Spencer proceeds to discuss them in detail. The
original personal factors are dismissed in a
single chapter which exhibits in a broad way the influence
of climate, surface, flora & fauna on social development. More space is devoted to the original animal factors - the physical, emotional & intellectual characters of man - partly because the most primitive man known to anthropology. The general drift of this discussion is to show that primitive man was engaged in the earliest stages of his development. Man's progress is hindered not only by obstacles imposed by optimal nature, but also by his own deficiencies. In relation, structure & strength he was on the whole inferior to civilized man. It is called he was on the whole inferior to civilized man. It is called...
tectonics, metamorphoses. "Such are the changes in the clouds; the appearance & disappearance of the stars, the sun & moon; the less regular phenomena, of comets, meteors, lightning, rain-bow, fog, mirages, dust-which winds: the changes in the visible air, & now dying away & at other times expanding force.

How, asks Spencer, does the savage account for these changes? He has no scientific hypotheses to advance for the problem that they are all present, the problem of a perceptible & an imperceptible mode of existence. On him the simplest support, is that all these things really have two forms, one perceptible, the other imperceptible.

Again, Spencer says, the finding of fossil plants & animals inevitably leads the savage to the conclusion that certain things can be transferred from one form into another, from their visible & their imperceptible as the stars can change from their visible into their invisible, & as seeds can change from their invisible into a vegetative form. We can see that seeds turn into plants, eggs into animals, certain butterflies into dry leaves. It is no more difficult, at least, to believe that any kind of creature may be transformed into any other.

Observation of both classes of phenomena, irresistibly brings in the mind of the savage, first a general impression of arbitrariness in all things, & a more definite notion of duality. These notions are confirmed by thinking about shadows which cling to all things on some days & disappear on others; reflecting that in some places we can see mimicking all active & in other places we are present; echoes that come back from a vantage somewhere that can never be found. If all these things bring the savage who thinks to this idea, then external objects have a double existence, still more must the experience of dreams force a similar conclusion regarding himself. "Having no exception of mind, the primitive man regards a dream as a series of actual occurrences: he
did the things, went to the places, saw the persons, dreamt of them untroubled by incongruities, to accept the facts as they stand, to in proportion as he thinks about them, is to lead to conceive a double which goes away during sleep & comes back. This conception of his own duality seems confirmed by the thousand whims occasionally witnessed.

"More decisively does it seem confirmed by other abnormal insensibilities. In arrow, catalepsy, the unconsciousness following violence, it appears that the other-self, instead of returning at all, will not return for periods varying for some minutes to two days. Occasionally after one of these states, the other-self tells what has happened in the interval; occasionally no account of its adventures can be got; it occasionally prolonged at some time it doubts whether it has not gone away for an indefinite period.

"The distinction below, then, consists of two kinds of insensibility & the condition of personality insensibility, is one which, sometimes inextensible to instructed persons, cannot be perceived by the savage. The normal unconsciousness p. w. 1 man's double is readily knotted back, is limited by these abnormal kinds of unconsciousness p. w. The double is knotted back with difficulty, & that lasting kind of unconsciousness p. w. The double cannot be knotted back at all. Still, analogy leads the savage to infer that it will eventually come back. That is, the theory of the resurrection of the dead is a theory which primitive men inevitably arrive at as they apply the idea of the wandering other-self so clearly suggested by dreams.

So far we have traced the ev. of the ideas of duality in natural objects of the dual nature of man. We must now see how man's 2d-self is conceived & trace some of the actions that belief in it provokes.

"The 2d-self ascended to each man, at least differs in nothing from its original. It is perceived as = by visible = by mental; it has less hunger, thirst, fatigue, pain, sensation, quickness to. The person himself, capable of being alone, desired..."
The double of the dead man, originally conceived as like him in all other respects, is conceived as having like occupations. If of predatory race, it fights and hunts as before; if of pastoral, it continues to tend cattle, and drink milk; if of agricultural, it resumes the business of sowing, reaping, etc. And from this belief in a second life thus like the first, and also like in the social arrangements it is subject to, there result the practices of leaving with the corpse food, drink, clothes, weapons, and of sacrificing at the grave domestic animals, wives, slaves.

"The place in which this life after death is believed to be passed, varies with the antecedents of the race. Often ghosts are thought of as mingling with their descendants, and portions of meals are daily set aside for them; sometimes the adjacent forests are their imagined haunts, and they are supposed to consume the offerings of food left there; while in other cases the idea is that they have gone back to the region whence the race came. This other-world is reached by a journey over land, or down a river, or across the sea, towards this or that point of the compass, according as the traditions determine. Hence at the grave are left fit appliances for the journey - canoes for the voyage, or horses to ride, dogs to guide, weapons for defence, money and passports for security. And where burial on a mountain range entails belief in this as a residence of ancestral ghosts, or where such range has been held by a conquering race, the heavens, supposed to be accessible from the mountain-tops, come to be regarded as the other world, or rather as one of the other-worlds.

"The doubles of dead men, at first assumed to have but temporary second lives, do not, in that case, tend to form in popular belief an accumulating host; but they necessarily tend to form such a host when permanent second lives are ascribed to them. Swarming everywhere, capable of appearing and disappearing at will,
and working in ways that cannot be foreseen, they are thought of as the causes of things which are strange, unexpected, inexplicable. Every deviation from the ordinary is attributed to their agency; and their agency is alleged even where what we call natural causation seems obvious. "Regarded as workers of remarkable occurrences in the surrounding world, they are regarded as workers also of unusual actions in living persons. The body, deserted by its other-self during insensibility, normal or abnormal, can then be entered by the other-self of someone else, living or dead; and hence to the malicious doubles of dead men are ascribed epilepsy and convulsions, delirium and insanity. Moreover, this theory of possession, accounting for all those bodily actions which the individual does not will, makes comprehensible such acts as sneezing, yawning, etc., and is extended to diseases at large and to death; which is habitually ascribed to an invisible enemy. "While the entrance of friendly spirits into men, giving supernatural strength or knowledge, is desired and prayed for, this entrance of spirits which inflict evils, physical and mental, is of course dreaded; and when it is believed to have occurred, expulsion is the only remedy. The exorcist, by loud noises, frightful grimaces, abominable stenches, etc., professes to drive out the malicious intruder. And this simple form of exorcism is followed by the developed form in which a more powerful spirit is called in to help. Whence, also, there eventually grow up the practices of the sorcerer; who, using means to coerce the souls of the dead, commissions them to work his evil ends." (i, 424-7).

These paragraphs show that the belief in a second self - to which we have seen that the primitive man necessarily comes - is a most potent factor in directing action. Burial customs, the treatment of diseases, attempts to inflict injury on enemies by sorcery, result logically from this idea, and, in their varying forms, prove the universality and the sociological importance of primitive man's ghost theory. But the most important sociological consequence of the ghost theory remains to be discussed. From it are derived, directly or indirectly, all forms of religious practices. The manner of their derivation and development Spencer outlines as follows.
"--while primitive men, regarding themselves as at the mercy of surrounding ghosts, try to defend themselves by the aid of the exorcist and the sorcerer, who deal with ghosts antagonistically; there is simultaneously adopted a contrary behaviour towards ghosts - a propitiation of them. Two opposite ways of treating the corpse show us the divergence of these two opposite policies. In some cases the avowed aim is to prevent a revival of the deceased, so that he may not trouble the living: a kind of motive which, where he is supposed to have revived, prompts antagonistic dealings. But in most cases the avowed aim is to secure the welfare of the deceased on resuscitation: a kind of motive which prompts propitiatory observances. "Out of this motive and these observances come all forms of worship. Awe of the ghost makes sacred the sheltering structure of the tomb, and this grows into the temple; while the tomb itself becomes the altar. From the provisions placed for the dead, now habitually and now at fixed intervals, arise religious oblations, ordinary and extraordinary - daily and at festivals. Immolations and mutilations at the grave, pass into sacrifices and offerings of blood at the altar of a deity. Abstinence from food for the benefit of the ghost, develops into fasting as a pious practice; and journeys to the grave with gifts, become pilgrimages to the shrine. Praises of the dead and prayers to them, grow into religious praises and prayers. And so every holy rite is derived from a funeral rite." (1,427,428).

Primitive man's ghost theory supplies, of course, not only the purpose, place, and manner of all forms of worship; but also the object worshipped. The ghost of the dead is the original type of supernatural being whose favor is sought by the practice of religious rites, and out of the ghost all other forms of gods are evolved.

That ancestor worship arises from worship of the ghosts of the recent dead Spencer thinks is abundantly shown by evidence relating to many different peoples living in widely separated parts of the world. But he also contends that such religions as fetishism, idolatry, totemism, plant worship, nature worship, the worship of such deities as those of ancient Greece, and even Christianity, are ultimately derived from this same source - primitive man's ghost theory. We will follow his treatment of these several forms of religion to see what connection he establishes between them.
and the primitive religion — the worship of ghosts. First he takes up the worship of idols. From the corpse receiving offerings before burial, he argues, to the embalmed body similarly cared for, and then to figures formed partly of the dead man's remains and partly of other things, we pass to figures wholly artificial: and find that the effigy of a dead man supplied with food, etc., is then propitiated in place of him. Proof can be found that this effigy of the dead man occasionally becomes an idol of a god; while the continued propitiation becomes an established worship of it. And since the doubles of the dead, believed to be present in these images of them, are the real objects to which offerings are made; it follows that all idolatry hence arising, is a divergent development of ancestor-worship.

Spencer gets his derivation of fetichism by following this same line of development a little farther. Objects rudely resembling human beings, and supposed parts of human beings as well as those which by contact with human bodies have absorbed their odor or spirit, come to be included with idols as things in which ghosts reside. The propitiation of the ghosts in such things is fetichism — which is thus a collateral result of the ghost-theory.

Totemism, the worship of animals, is derived from the ghost-theory in two different ways. First, the primitive man readily believes in the transformation of men into animals. Hence he supposes house-haunting creatures to be the dead returned in new shapes; and creatures which frequent burial places to be disguised souls. In either case he may make them objects of worship. The second derivation of totemism depends upon the frequent naming of men after animals in savage tribes, and the imperfectness of savage languages. "Primitive speech is unable to transmit to posterity the distinction between an animal and a person named after that animal." (i, 353). Hence by misinterpretation of traditions about ancestors named after animals, many savage tribes have come to believe that they really are descended from animals. "—thus the sacred animal, now treated with exceptional respect, now propitiated, now worshipped, acquires its divine character by identication with an ancestor; real or remote:" (i, 430).
"Similarly, plant-worship is the worship of a spirit originally human, supposed to be contained in the plant - supposed either because of the exciting effects of its products; or because misapprehended tradition raises the belief that the race descended from it; or because a misinterpreted name identifies it with an ancestor. Everywhere the plant spirit is shown by its conceived human form, and ascribed human desires, to have originated from a human personality.

"Even deification of the greater objects and powers in Nature has the same root. When it marks the place whence the race came, a mountain is described in tradition as the source or parent of the race, as is probably the sea in some cases; and both also give family names: worship of them as ancestors thus arising in two ways. Facts imply that the conception of the dawn as a person, results from giving of Dawn as a birth-name. The personalisation of stars and of constellations, --(is) --associated among inferior races with the belief that they are beings who once lived on the Earth. So, too, is it with the Moon. Traditions of peoples in low stages tell of the Moon as having been originally a man or woman; and the Moon is still a source of birth-names among the uncivilized; the implication being that reverence for it is reverence for a departed person. Lastly, worship of the Sun is derived in three ways from ancestor-worship. Here conquerors coming from the region of sunrise, and therefore called 'children of the Sun', come to regard the Sun as an ancestor; and there Sun is either a birth-name or a metaphorical name given because of personal appearance, or because of personal achievements, or because of exalted position; whence identification with the Sun in tradition, and consequent Sun-worship.

"Besides these aberrant developments of ancestor-worship which result from identification of ancestors with idols, animals, plants, and natural powers, there are direct developments of it. Out of the assemblage of ghosts, some evolve into deities who retain their anthropomorphic characters. As the divine and the superior are, in the primitive mind, equivalent ideas - as the living man and re-appearing ghost are at first confounded in early beliefs - as ghost and god are originally convertible terms; we may understand
how a deity develops out of a powerful man, and out of the
ghost of a powerful man, by small steps. Within the tribe
the chief, the magician, or someone otherwise skilled, held
in awe during his life as showing powers of unknown origin
and extent, is feared in a higher degree when, after death,
he gains the further powers possessed by all ghosts; and
still more the stranger bringing new arts, as well as the
conqueror of superior race, is treated as a superhuman
being during life and afterwards worshipped as a yet greater
superhuman being. Remembering that the most marvellous
version of any story commonly obtains the greatest currency,
and that so, from generation to generation, the deeds of
such traditional persons grow by unchecked exaggerations
eagerly listened to; we may see that in time any amount
of expansion and idealization can be reached.

"Thus setting out with the wandering double which the dream
suggests; passing to the double that goes away at death;
advancing from this ghost, at first supposed to have but
a transitory second life, to ghosts which exist permanently
and therefore accumulate; the primitive man is led gradually
to people surrounding space with supernatural beings, small
and great, which become in his mind causal agents for every­
thing unfamiliar. And in carrying out the mode of inter­
pretation initiated in this way, he is committed to the
ever-multiplying superstitions we have traced out." (1,430
-432).

Spencer concludes this exposition of the primitive man's
theory of things by the characteristic remark that undeniably
"a system of superstitions evolves after the same manner
as all other things. By continuous integration and dif­
ferentiation, it is formed into an aggregate which, while
increasing, passes from an indefinite incoherent
homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity." (1,434).
Chapter III

Conclusions of the Remaining Seven Parts.

Having now given a literally full resume of the first part of the Principles of Sociology, I pass on to a concise statement of the chief conclusions arrived at in the remaining seven parts.

Part ii. The Inductions of Sociology.

The question begins by asking whether societies are organisms. This question is answered in the affirmative; for it is found that like organisms, societies grow, that there are great variations in the growths reached, that types, successively larger sizes result from the aggregation of elements, smaller sizes; and that along with increase in size goes increase in structure, etc.

But the true development of these analogies, as considered above, is that between the body politic and living bodies. Spencer attaches no great importance to them. For him they are "but a scaffolding or a building of a coherent body of sociological inductions."

It is these inductions concern the changes in social structures, the changes that accompany social growth. Primitive hordes are very small and without distinct time of parts. Growth brings organization; and the 1st division to appear is that between the persons who carry on relations, habitually hostile, or environing societies, and those who produce the necessaries of life. As growth proceeds both of these groups differentiate — the governing group into political, religious, and military divisions; its sustaining group into food producing classes and landholding men. Thus also develops an intermediate group whose function is to transport and distribute goods.
The evolution of the sustaining system is due to changes in the organic or inorganic environment; that is, the regulating system to counter offensive or defensive social situations. The rise of development is primitive headless groups, temporary chieftainship resulting from temporary war, permanent chieftainship resulting from chronic social hostilities, that is, the gradual change to military control. As industrial activities increase, there slowly develops a decentralized regulating system in the industrial structure, or, at least, there becomes substantial independence of military control. Somewhat advanced societies may be roughly grouped as military or industrial. The first type in its developed form is organized on the principle of compulsory co-operation, while the other in its developed form is organized on the principle of voluntary co-operation. The one is characterized not only by a despotic central power, but also by unlimited political control of personal conduct, while the other is characterized not only by a democratic or representative central power, but also by limitation of political control over personal conduct. (1, 395, 396).

And all this, Spencer concludes, shows that the general formula of evolution applies to social phenomena. There is progress towards greater size, coherence, multifacility, and definitiveness.

Part iii - Domestic Institutions.

contains Spencer's account of the development of marriage and the family. He is inclined to deny the suggestion that this was ever a stable, entire promiscuity in sexual relations, but he says
that in many such groups there is nothing that can be
called marriage. Men take such women as they can
and keep them as long as they list. Among such
people many of whom are dissolved the family
groups consist of mothers and children—the latter
have different fathers, their paternity being often
by common, different fathers, this small, incon-
cetent. As such primitive families, this small, less
important, less definite, arise, so a community in the low?
evolution, clusters of such primitive types of families—some
characterized by a mixed polyandry and polygamy; some
by polyandry, differentiated into the paternal propa-
gynic, others by polygyny, differentiated into those
not; some that are polygynous, differentiated into those
not; some that are polyandrous, differentiated into those
not; some that are monogamous, among whom; whereas,
combinations; some that are monogamous, among whom, headed
by a wife married only for a part of each week (1, 758).

Besides this discussion of marriage forms Spencer places a dis-

As in the status of women and children, Spencer is chiefly con-
censed to show that it alters w. the change fr. a mili-
tant to an industrial form of society. "The marital rela-
tion becomes altered to one of master & subject int. one of
approximately equal partnership, while the bond becomes
less that of legal authority or more that of affection. The
parental - filial relation ceases to be a tyranny wh. sacri-
fies child 2 parents, to become an in wh. neither, the will,
its parent subordinate itself 2 its welfare 2 its child."
(i, 762).

Finally, Spencer asks what may be inferred respecting the fu-
ture domestic relations. He anticipates this marriage
will be strengthened by the suppression of bigamy & adul-
tery. The romantic element in marriage will increase at
the expense of the commercial element — i.e. there will be
less of marriage for money a position. It may be, too,
thus when the natural bond be-2ren husband & wife ceases
to exist, the legal bond will be dissolved. This will, how-
ever, be a strengthening of the bond constituted by 2nd in
every in its children.

We may also anticipate "a diminution of the political &
domestic disabilities, women, until then remain only
such as differences in constitution entail." But "no con-
siderable alteration in the careers, women in general, can be
produced — any extension change in the
or child be, … produced … Any extension change in the
education, women, made w. a new & fitting them fr. their
emotions & professions, will be mischievous. If women approx-
imated all that is contained in the domestic sphere they
would excel in no other." (i, 769).

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suffrage cannot safely be granted until a higher


Ceremonial rules, Spencer asserts, precede both civil and religious control of conduct. In fact, at first civil and religious regulations are little more than sanctions, ceremonies, directed towards particular purposes, living and dead.

These earliest of social regulations arose initially for disciplining and enforcing agreements, but for modifying acts performed for purely social ends, i.e., they grew out of individual conduct before social arrangements existed to control it.

The most important components of ceremonial rules are: trophies; mutilations; presents; visits; sacrifices; forms of address; titles; badges; costumes; class distinctions; fashion.

Thus classes, customs, make this a small aggregate in which heads hold 7 primitive men. All this on the finds one's few methods of salutation, certain bodily mutilations, or frequently introducing or foods monopolized by adult men.

But as societies increase in size by coalescence, by conquest, by conquest, or by marked growth, ceremonial regulations, which in some cases govern minutely all the actions of life. These come in addition to the primitive ceremonial observances, sacrifices, nicely graduated according to rank; from aboriginal salutations grow complimentary forms of address; weapons taken in war give origin to symbols of authority; certain trophies differentiate our badges; certain insignia in Oriental societies in fixed forms, prescribed in all details, are enforced under penalties.

Ceremonial forms are naturally initiated by the relation between the conqueror and the conquered. They therefore develop...
w. the militant type of society. Their fullest development is, however, not by the advanced nations only, but by such semi-savage peoples as those of Fiji. In such societies they represent the effect of fearful subjection. Those who may harm them if so disposed. By thus winning "respect" or affection, which in no sense feels, the subject strives to earn unmerited favours.

It seems to be a general observance to decline w. advancing influence. "In proportion as the system of ranks under contract spreads, so the rendering of services under compulsion diminishes; men dread one another less; and, consequently, become less scrupulous in fulfilling preparatory terms." (ii, 223)

But while due primarily to other motives, ceremonial observances have an important social consequence in training people to live peaceably one with another. Observances that were once prompted by fear finally turn into observances expressive of a proper regard for the individualities of other persons, and a true sympathy in their welfare. "So that as law differentiates from ranks personal commands, so inequality differentiates from religious injunctions. So politeness differentiates from ceremonial observances; so also, Spencer adds, "does rational usage differentiate by fashion." (ii, 229)

As to the future, Spencer thinks that this is no doubt that it will diminish. As the title, complimentary forms of address, etc., will diminish. Indeed he thinks there is danger that they will altogether be replaced by the development of feelings which prompt him to abolish. When this occurs, this immediately follows without more or less involvement in habits or consequences habitual to discourse.
Part V. Political Institutions.

Political institutions, according to Spencer, point out whether formal or informal, whether primitive is highly developed, presents a triune structure. This is the relative large body of the undistinguished many — represented by the warriors; a tribe, the steady holders; a company, the superior few — represented by the leading councillors, a tribe, its direction, a company, the executive head — represented by the chief; a tribe, its president, a company.

A large part of the discussion of political institutions is devoted to the division of these three divisions.

The most primitive societies have no settled headship, though certain men distinguished for strength, courage, sagacity, presence or age exercise greater influence than their fellows.

War, however, requires a more definite organization — commonly leads to the growth of a chiefship. Two kinds of enmity, especially to this development — that of the warriors and that of the medicine men. Often both are united in a single individual.

At first such chiefships are temporary — ceasing with the military needs that produced them. Later they come to endure for the lifetime of its incumbent; still later, they become hereditary. The latter development is aided by the reverence in which ghosts, departed chiefs are held.

Consultative bodies — the 2d element in the triune political structure — like chiefs are developed by militancy. The men, for whom they arise is the council of war, formed by the leading warriors who deliberate in its presence their followers. With the increase in the size of the social unit, this council grows, consolidates, separates itself with ever increasing influence from the community. Frequently it becomes a privileged body, a landowners and local rulers — an aristocracy; sometimes an oligarchy.
Part V. Political Institutions.
As for the masses, the people — the 3rd element in the trinity of political structure — they gradually lose what influence they lost with government. For as the size, its activity increases it becomes more and more difficult for them to attend meetings. Summoning them falls into disuse, and after a time their right to participate is forgotten and denied. Then the king remains absolute except so far land owning aristocracy supply what can legislation may exist.

Thus political evolution until the latest phases; its development depends primarily upon military purposes is represented by building up centralized despotic governments. But we must consider absolutely the king may appear like it is undeniable that taken in its radical acceptance, the policy if its duration is its sole source of political power: in times communities, at least, who are not under foreign domination. (ii, 327) Despotism is really supported by popular approval, approval from a people whose political duty is formed primarily by habit, war.

Consequently the cause, political development is changed when industry begins to play a large role in the lives of people. The life of contracts begins a political feeling different from that begotten by a life of warfare. Popular sentiment is no longer behind the harem institutions; despoticism + a gradual modification of political institutions takes place — the most conspicuous feature, the change is the readmission of the masses; the people into the national councils — a readmission which seems, not because of the great increase in the size, but because societies must be re-admitted by representatives.

At the present time the most advanced nations, it would have made a certain degree of progress away from the
militant type society, toward the industrial type. This progress is more marked in Eng. than in Fr. or in other societies, because the class dominance of industrial interests in Eng. has not been as strong as in Eng. The members of militancy. Sooner or later, however, man will cease fighting, and the industrial type will be supreme.

This industrial life will be reflected politically by a much greater freedom for individuals. Governments will restrict itself by "preserving the component members of society from destruction by injuring one another": injury, as the interrelated, including not only immediate, but also remote, breaches of equity. (ii. 656-7). It may well be also that govt. will undertake the equitable division of all natural advantages such as land (ii. 657, 6567). But governmental interference on the whole will be much less than at present. The present inclination toward an optimization of governmental functions, Spencer regards as a temporary reaction caused by the rising tide of militancy at the end of the 19th century. It will pass, and the world will require progress in the direction of gradually decentralizing the exercise of political power. How decentralizing is shown by the following quotation: "even in all citizens a quick sense, equity, in must happen, ... that while those who have no children will protest against the taking away of their property, others will see the children of others, the others will unity to educate the children of others, the others will unite in protecting the education of their own children, partly paid for by forced exactions from the childless, from the unmarried, from those whose means are in many cases less than their own" (ii, 658).
Part VI—Ecclesiastical Institutions.

Take for granted the validity, the theory of the origin, worship developed in Part I. The priestly office is at first the prominent one among the personal acts of the tribe, the newly deceased family head. When the family multiplies into a tribe, presents itself, chief, accompanied by compliments and petitions, are continued, as in the death in the shape of offerings, prayers, a pages. This fact.

Occasionally, some question arises between the private cult proper to each family, to the public cult proper to the chief's family, to the chief as protector of the dead ancestors on behalf of the tribe, as well as on his own behalf, unite the functions? civil, social, and religious, Ordination? the tribe, bringing instead of spiritual heads. Development of the tribe bringing in chieftainship, political and military functions, obligations to chief more and more definite, usually to a relative, his priestly function. Thus, in course of time, this acquires a separate agency. [(iii, 150)]

The priesthood thus established is increased in size, becomes more definite, more highly organized, devoted more and more exclusively to the performance, the priestly office as societies increase in size.

The origin of the deity, the priest is the carrying on of worship, worship being the beginning and the end. As a primitive one aims to obtain the good will of the gods to obtain the good will of the gods of the gods, often by atrocious observances. There is no moral element at all other than the recognition of the duty of obedience. But slowly, experience establishes ethical conceptions of obedience. These gods, these spirits, are not merely spirits, public spirits, giving them some public authority. This process is accelerated when warfare goes away and civil war rises, in industrialism, factories in general overthrows a clear notion; these rules, conduct that must be observed to make industrial co-op. successful.

For these, there is eventually obtained a supernatural authority, than some alleged communication than is an inspired man; for long periods, community than is meditated on in the void, than it is God's commands. The emphasizing moral precepts, acts that are said to be desired, comes, however, to occupy a larger space in religious services.
human nature produced by prolonged social discipline, evolves as length the conception of an independent ethics— an ethics so far independent that it seems to have a foundation, its own, apart from the previously alleged theological foundation.

In this connection, authority, the ethical way, more than this teaching. The authority, its influence, its power, becomes so strong, that theological dogmas are encrusted into it, in many cases rejected, because it has been so long so long established. Thus, we see that modern preaching tends to disappear. This is the modern preaching tendency.

What now of the future, ecclesiastical institutions? First, we may expect a complete separation between church and state. Second, social differentiation will continue to produce increasing numbers of religious bodies having their respective differences. The minister will more and more of practical belief. Further, the minister will lose his secularized character, authority.

The original element of authority—dispensation, may be affected by new ideas, but it does not follow that this will lead to a complete disappearance of all observances. The sense of the Universal Cause, of the incalculable and that consciousness, will remain. There will remain a need for qualifying that to preserve and maintain its true deeper meaning. The universal are abandoned? (iii, 157)

Again, a new meaning, the universal are abandoned. The ministers teaching will be more and more discussion in content, religious teaching will be more and more discussion in relation to those more difficult questions, conduct arising from the increasing complexity of social life?
Part VII - Professional Institutions

Epps's theory that all the professions have grown out of the activities performed by the primitive medicine-man.

The physician & surgeon are anticipated by the medicine-man's methods of curing diseases by the expulsion of evil spirits. As the latter's apprentices, the physician had to act supernaturally, come the understood as acting naturally, his office gradually lost its supernatural characteristics; the physician appeared as a lay practitioner.

Somewhat later, vocal & instrumental musicians, & eventually, became distinct classes performing functions derived from the medicine-men who as ministers of joy, now in the presence of the living ruler & now in the supposed presence of the deceased ruler, wine at 1st simultaneously singers & dancers.

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Thus time was joined in the medicine-man the potenti uiity
out, who gradually arose the specialized groups we know
as professions. And the whole process development of
the, the evolution, progress, the general evolutionary process
- an advance through successive differentiations and integrations
- an indefinite homogeneity to an indefinite heterogeneity.

Part viii - Industrial Institutions.

Begins by calling attention the obstacles - natural & mental -
which industrial advance has to face at the outset. Then
in successive chapters we are shown how men have gradu-
ally overcome them. First comes division of labor between
the sexes, between different localities, between men of differ-
cent kinds. This division paved the way for more efficient
acquisition & production of wealth - processes that reach
labor development only as tools, & later machinery, as em-
ployed. The increase of production has necessarily been accom-
plished. The increase of production has necessarily been accom-
plished, accompanied by a corresponding increase of trade, which beginning
with the exchange, proceeds progressively through the forming of markets, the adoption of commerce, the rise of banking. This
also, of course, an analogous development of transportation,
into communication, etc. The immensely complex development
results in producing on the one side industrial
min-depence on the other side industrial integration.

Spencer now turns back to treat the regulation of labor. This
regulation, as the woman. Through the successive stages of patriarchal,
patriarchal, communal, guild, regulation, to free contract,
patriarchal, communal, guild, regulation, to free contract,
patriarchal, communal, guild, regulation, to free contract,
contract wages.

Meanwhile there has taken place a change in the organization of production on the business side. The single employer has in large measure given place to the joint stock company, whose direct hand work has given place to machine production. The small and the large factory.

The rise of the factory system has brought benefits to men as consumers, but detriments to labourers as producers. Their earnings, in fact, are in large part more uncertain, and their work in factories is in large part more monotonous and precise to produce less wholesome than the work of the small mechanic. But this unhappy result is only the modern analogue of ancient ills. Partly, every step in modern civilization involves the sacrifice of some frailties in the interest of the collective community. 

Concerning its bad features, that wages miners have found to meet these difficulties, Mr. Spencer thinks that taken all around it is a gain. When union does not succeed in advancing wages, but when other unions have followed suit, the effect is only to bring the same results than an advance in the prices of products, and therefore an increase in living expenses in the face of this rise in money wages. But unions are a natural result of economic situation, if they have benefitted results as societies in rendering mutual aid. They also check the capacity of employing securing prompter advances, wages in good times and delaying reductions in bad times. Further their power requires more considerate treatment of their members, the discipline
of union life induces habits, feelings, and thoughts that tend to make men more available to such higher forms; social organization as will probably thereafter arise. (iii, 552).

Cooperation, which has been so vigorously pressed by some men as the solution to industrial ills, Spencer thinks would achieve the descriptiveness that the manual labor "shall have for its product all that remains after due remuneration to the brain worker." But he admits that its practical utility depends on the character of the participants. The requisite "sweat meanness" is not yet sufficiently prevalent to secure general success. Still he thinks that such cooperative ventures as survive may in the future, a spreading organization. (iii, 574).

On socialism, Spencer has sympathy only as a criticism of existing evils. After contemplating the useless being who now brunches in club rooms and sunrooms through the game of pleasure, he says, "the many artisans may well curse a state of things in which pleasure varies inversely as income; it may be relevant in the demand for another form of society." (iii, 578). But the socialist ideal is an impossible one, "just as the socialists would suspend the natural relation between effort and benefit, so would they suspend the natural relation between the instinctive actions of parents and the welfare of progeny. The two great laws in their absence are of which organic evolution could have been impossible, are both to be repled!" (iii, 583).

Concluding with a tentative forecast, Spencer exhibits the usual pessimism as to the near future of his optimism as to the ultimate situation. He thinks has the men reaching midpoint of the social militiam since the middle of the 19th century -- a revival that has temporarily checked progress -- is leading nations and substitutes in the rule of privileged class, ...
broken by industrial advance, the rule, as bureaucracy. But this reaction may prove but temporary. Perhaps in time to come a federation, the leading nations, may in turn to save or pedestrify, any of its constituent nations, by forbidding wars between any of its constituent nations, put an end to the re-barbarization wh. is continually unceasingly on the way. If this happens, then "On the way doing civilization." If this happens, then "On the way doing civilization." 6. (1), 6. (1),

Having concluded my survey of Spencer's conclusions I ought to add a brief account of the method by which they are established.

Spencer himself would say, I think, that this method is a judicious combination of deduction and induction.

The deduction consists in a continual application of his general formula of evolution to the special cases presented by social phenomena. At the close of each part, frequently in the concluding chapters, he calls attention to the fact that the process of development as shown in the formula he has presented it, satisfies the terms of the formula, and this fact is in his mind a reason for greater confidence in the conclusions to which he comes.

The great bulk, the discussion, however, is inductive. In dealing with each successive subject Spencer cites facts, saying from ethnological and historical sources to show the form that the establishment in question assumes among a variety of different peoples ranging from the black peoples of Australia, the Eskimos of his own day. The amount of evidence thus made use of is enormous. The systematic method with which Spencer conducted it in advance is highly characteristic.

In 1868, when planning the Principles of Sociology, Spencer found that the work required a much larger and more permanent body of material than was provided in the treatment as ethnology. His other occupations,—his public health, preaching, and undertakings, the efforts of collection for himself, the cooperation of others,—sufficed to collect all the facts. He instructed the agents he selected to search out all the material they could giving information about the men...
men of life of certain races, to arrange this information according to a scheme of classification which he provided.

This plan was begun solely to facilitate the new work, this being impressed by the remonstrance of the material thus thrown together; in other students, Spencer decided to have the work presented as a view to publication. The result was the issue of five volumes of the Descriptive Sociology. As the work now stands it includes eight folio volumes:

Vol. i - The English, by J. Collie

ii - Ancient Mexicans, Central Americans, Indians,

Ancient Peruvians, by R. Schaffing.

iii - Types of the Lower Races, Negro Races and Polynesian Races, by A. Duncan.

iv - African Races, by A. Duncan

v - Asiatic

vi - American

vii - It Shows & Polynesians, by R. Schaffing.

viii - The French, by J. Collie.

This publication provides the bulk of the evidence cited in the Principles of Sociology; but Spencer was always a great reader and must a little, the material used in the latter parts of his own writing.
V - Critical estimate.

I must admit that this paper ought not to close without some attempt to appraise the value of the work it discusses. But I must confess that little of Sociology can be computed to express opinions. Doubtless some of its members and guests at the Keirnan Club can remedy the omission. All I know is that Spencer's works in Sociology as in other fields have found numerous critics. Spencer himself was attacked by critics from the other side. The work on the origin of religion, e.g., found the ghost theory of its adherents highly untenable. W.D. Thomas declared it was his desire to deduce all professions from this. The modern sociologist seems to find his account of the development of marriage inadequate. The Welshe would declare that he does not understand the trade-union situation, & Martian Socialists would declare the socialist which he criticizes is of the trade-union brand. The fact seems to me to be discarded utopian. Spencer attempted to cover a field to cultivate any part of it thoroughly. Regarding his method also this is much deficient. Some would question the legitimacy of using material from such diverse races as the Bushmen of Africa, the Chinese, the ancient Egyptians, or the modern Greek, as representing different stages in a single evolution. Others would assert that much more can be learned concerning social institutions by studying the various social phenomena presented by a single race, than by studying any single phenomenon as presented by different races. Everyone would admit, some
Some sociologists go so far as to say that Spencier's selection & manipulation of the materials he had was warped by his preconceived ideas. Everyone would admit that no discussion can now be confined to the materials that Spencier possessed. Indeed, if I remember rightly, Spencier himself made provision in his will for a revision & expansion of the Brunst's So-
ciety.

But the fair-minded among the critics of Spencier's Sociological work are ready to say that they owe him much. And when all detractors have been allowed in the reader, the Principles, Sociology, however vague, cannot fail to impress the palate. He may be prompted by ingenuity, in the logical force that it employs.

logical force — its display.
Spencer were the King, thus a large part of much valuable ethnological data now available, has appeared since the Principles of Sociology was published.
Spencer's preface dated July 73.

"In preparation for the Princes' Social Roman, requiring as bases, in..."