Selected Bibliography for Roger B. Myerson

Glen A. Lloyd Distinguished Service Professor in Economics and the College

Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2007

Published Works

"Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica, 2015, 83(6), pp. 2083-126.

http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA9737

"Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria." Roger Myerson and Jörgen Weibull; Econometrica, 2015, 83(3), pp. 943-76.

http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA11048

"Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's the Bankers' New Clothes." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2014, 52(1), pp. 197-210.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.52.1.197

"Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan." Roger Myerson; World Development, 2014, 53(0), pp. 46-54.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.01.005

"Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles with Risk-Averse Agents." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2014, 153(0), pp. 74-102.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.05.009

"Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory." Roger B. Myerson; Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2013, 8(3), pp. 305-37.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00013006

"A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Political Economy, 2012, 120(5), pp. 847-78.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/668839

"Decisiveness of Contributors’ Perceptions in Elections." Rebecca Morton and Roger Myerson; Economic Theory, 2012, 49(3), pp. 571-90.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0605-y

"Toward a Theory of Leadership and State Building." Roger B. Myerson; Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 2011, 108(Supplement 4), pp. 21297-301.
http://www.pnas.org/content/108/Supplement_4/21297.abstract

"Capitalist Investment and Political Liberalization." Roger B. Myerson; Theoretical Economics, 2010, 5(1), pp. 73-91.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE570

"Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2009, 47(4), pp. 1109-25.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.4.1109

"A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization: Theory of Leadership and Lessons of Iraq." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2009, 53(3), pp. 470-82.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002709333356

"Fundamental Theory of Institutions: A Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz." Roger Myerson; Review of Economic Design, 2009, 13(1-2), pp. 59-75.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0071-6

"Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 2008, 98(3), pp. 586-603.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.586

"The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State." Roger B. Myerson; American Political Science Review, 2008, 102(01), pp. 125-39.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055408080076

"Do Adjusting-Amount and Adjusting-Delay Procedures Produce Equivalent Estimates of Subjective Value in Pigeons?" Leonard Green, Joel Myerson, Anuj K. Shah, Sara J. Estle and Daniel D. Holt; Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 2007, 87(3), pp. 337-47.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1901/jeab.2007.37-06

"Capital and Growth with Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger B. Myerson; Review of Economic Dynamics, 2007, 10(4), pp. 676-704.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.red.2007.02.006

"Virtual Utility and the Core for Games with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136(1), pp. 260-85.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.002

"Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication." Dino Gerardi and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60(1), pp. 104-34.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.006

"A Macroeconomic Model of Russian Transition. The Role of Oligarchic Property Rights." Serguey Braguinsky and Roger Myerson; The Economics of Transition, 2007, 15(1), pp. 77-107.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0351.2007.00280.x

"Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption." Roger B. Myerson; Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2006, 108(4), pp. 727-42.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x

"Population Uncertainty in Contests." Roger B. Myerson and Karl Wärneryd; Economic Theory, 2006, 27(2), pp. 469.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2

"Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in D. Glycopantis and N. C. Yannelis: Differential Information Economics. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2005, pp. 481-505

"Review of 'Economic Effects of Constitutions'." Roger B. Myerson; Economica, 2005, 72(3), pp. 555.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0013-0427.2005.430_5.x

Probability Models for Economic Decisions; Roger B. Myerson; Belmont, CA: Thomson/Brooke/Cole, 2005

"Justice, Institutions, and Multiple Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson; Chicago Journal of International Law, 2004, 5(1), pp. 91.
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/cjil5&id=99

"Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster." Roger B Myerson; Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 2004, 160(2), pp. 187.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40752453

"Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I III"." Roger B Myerson; Management Science, 2004, 50(12), pp. 1818-24.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0297

"Graphs and Cooperation in Games," Roger B. Myerson, in B. Dutta and M. O. Jackson: Networks and Groups: Models of Strategic Formation. Heidelberg and New York Springer, 2003, pp. 17-22

"Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 103(1), pp. 219-51.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2830

"Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," R. Myerson, in Y. Varoufakis: Game Theory: Critical Concepts in the Social Sciences. London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp. 159-66

"Review of 'Incentives and Political Economy'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 2001, 39(4), pp. 1277.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2698560

"Economic Analysis of Constitutions." Roger B. Myerson; University of Chicago Law Review, 2000, 67( 3), pp. 925.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1600345

"Large Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 94(1), pp. 7-45.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2453

"Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; European Economic Review, 1999, 43(4-6), pp. 671-97.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(98)00089-0

"Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1999, 37(3), pp. 1067-82.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2564872

"Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures." Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1999, 89(5), pp. 1182-96.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/117053

"Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games." Roger B. Myerson; International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27(Issue 3), pp. 375.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050079

"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1998, 25(1), pp. 111-31.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0610

"Working on Game Theory: A Personal Perspective," Roger B. Myerson, in M. Szenberg: Passion and Craft: Economists at Work. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998, pp. 227-33

Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict; Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997

"Dual Reduction and Elementary Games." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 21(1-2), pp. 183-202.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0573

"Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons," Roger B. Myerson, in P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler and A. Vercelli: The Economics of Transnational Commons. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 17-34

"Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games," Roger B. Myerson, in W. Albers and et al.: Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten. Edited with the help of Martin Strobel. Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1997, pp. 111-21

"Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in D. M. Kreps and K. F. Wallis: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications: Seventh World Congress.Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 46-65

"An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections." Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz, Roger Myerson and Robert Weber; International Journal of Game Theory, 1996, 25(3), pp. 355-83.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02425262

"Analisis Economico de Las Instituciones Politicas: Una Introduccion (Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction with English Summary )." Roger B. Myerson; Cuadernos Economicos de I.C.E., 1996, (62), pp. 7-28.

"John Nash's Contribution to Economics." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1996, 14(2), pp. 287-95.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0053

"Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 9(1), pp. 35-65.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1004

"Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption." Roger B. Myerson; Social Choice and Welfare, 1995, 12(1), pp. 59-74.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182193

"Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(1), pp. 77-89.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138356

"Communication, Correlated Equilibria and Incentive Compatibility," Roger B. Myerson, in R. J. Aumann and S. Hart: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Amsterdam; London and New York: Elsevier North-Holland, 1994, pp. 827-47

"An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories." Robert Forsythe, Roger B. Myerson, Thomas A. Rietz and Robert J. Weber; Social Choice and Welfare, 1993, 10(3), pp. 223-47.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00182507

"Game-Theoretic Models of Politics." Jeffrey S. Banks and Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 1-2.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1001

"Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems." Roger B. Myerson; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(4), pp. 856-69.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938819

"Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis." Roger B. Myerson; Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5(1), pp. 118-32.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006

"A Theory of Voting Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; American Political Science Review, 1993, 87(1), pp. 102-14.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938959

"Reviews of 'Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting' and 'Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition'." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Literature, 1993, 31(1), pp. 237.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2728163

"Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections," Roger B. Myerson, in W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich and N. J. Schofield: Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 107-33

"Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory," Roger B. Myerson, in R. Selten: Rational Interaction : Essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Berlin: Springer, 1992, pp. 13–33

"Viscous Population Equilibria." Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen M. Swinkels; Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, 3(1), pp. 101-09.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(91)90007-2

"Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation," Roger B. Myerson, in P. H. Young: Negotiation Analysis. Ann Arbor: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991, pp. 67-85

Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict; Roger B. Myerson; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991

"Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Theory, 1989, 48(1), pp. 264-303.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90127-0

"Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions: An Application of the Shapley Value," Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. e. Roth: The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley. Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 175-91

"Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," Roger B. Myerson, in W. P. Heller, R. M. Starr and D. A. Starrett: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 3-24

"An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria." Roy Radner, Roger B. Myerson and Eric Maskin; Review of Economic Studies, 1986, 53(1), pp. 59-69.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297591

"Multistage Games with Communication." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1986, 54(2), pp. 323-58.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913154

"Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Roger B. Myerson, in A. E. Roth: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 115-47

"Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction," Roger B. Myerson, in L. e. Hurwicz, D. e. Schmeidler and H. e. Sonnenschein: Social Goals and Social Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner. Cambridge; New York and Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 229-59

"Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1984, 52(2), pp. 461-88.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911499

"A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1983, 4(4), pp. 309-51.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(83)90013-6

"Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading." Roger B. Myerson and Mark A. Satterthwaite; Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29(2), pp. 265-81.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0

"Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1767-98.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912116

"Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information." Bengt Holmstrom and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1983, 51(6), pp. 1799-820.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912117

"Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1982, 10(1), pp. 67-81.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90006-4

"Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs." David P. Baron and Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982, 50(4), pp. 911-30.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912769

"An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematical Programming, 1981, 21(1), pp. 182-89.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01584239

"Optimal Auction Design." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981, 6(1), pp. 58-73.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689266

"Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1981, 49(4), pp. 883-97.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912508

"An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions." Roger B. Myerson; Theory and Decision, 1979, 11(4), pp. 339-52.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00139446

"Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1979, 47(1), pp. 61-74.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1912346

"Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816694

"Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games." Roger B. Myerson; Mathematics of Operations Research, 1978, 3(4), pp. 265-74.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3689625

"Discussion of 'Altruism, Meanness, and Other Potentially Strategic Behaviors'." Roger B. Myerson; American Economic Review, 1978, 68(2), pp. 231.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1816694

"Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility." Roger B. Myerson; Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1977, 45(7), pp. 1631-37.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913955

A Theory of Cooperative Games; Roger Bruce Myerson; Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1976.

Discussion Papers

Many of these are available for download through Econpapers

Economic Analysis of Constitutions; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1291; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 2000.

Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1261; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.

Informational Orgins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1242; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1999.

Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1216; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.

Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1214; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1998.

Large Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1189; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1997.

Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1162; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1155; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

John Nash's Contribution to Economics; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1154; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1996.

Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro, 1996.

Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1134; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Dual Reduction and Elementary Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1133; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1995.

Extended Poisson Games and the Condercet Jury Theorem; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1103; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1102R; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1997.

Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Performance; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1095; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Bargaining, Veto Power, and Legislative Committees; Daniel Diermeier and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1089; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1994.

Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1063; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1993.

Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters; Rebecca B. Morton and Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1023; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.

Incentives to Cultivate Special Interest Groups under Alternative Electoral Systems; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 1000; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1992.

Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 956; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.

Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 928; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1991.

Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 907; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.

Viscous Population Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson, Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen Swinkels; Discussion paper no. 906.; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1990.

Endogenous Formation of Links between Players and of Coalitions : An Application of the Shapley Value; Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson; Technical report no. 524; Stanford: Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences Stanford University, 1988.

Mechanism Design; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 796; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

A Theory of Voting Equilibria; Roger B. Myerson and Robert J. Weber; Discussion paper no. 782; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 767; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1988.

Dynamic Matching Problems with Incentive Constraints; Roger B. Myerson; Discussion paper no. 721; Evanston, Ill.: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 1987.

Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans; Roger B. Myerson; Working Paper ;; no. 691; Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, 1986.